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“The whales do not sing because they have an answer, they sing because they have a song”  
~ Gregory Colbert 
 
ii 
 
CONTENTS 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ....................................................................................................... v 
ABBRIVIATIONS .................................................................................................................. vi 
PART I  RESEARCH QUESTIONS, CONTEXT, AND METHODOLOGY 
1.1  Theoretical and methodological starting points .................................................................. 1 
1.2  Research questions .............................................................................................................. 4 
1.3  Literature on the ‘added value’ of human rights-based approaches to development ......... 7 
1.4  Purpose and assumptions .................................................................................................. 12 
1.5  The food security situation in Malawi .............................................................................. 14 
1.6  Data and method ............................................................................................................... 19 
1.6.1  Research strategy: Analysis of three approaches ................................................ 19 
1.6.2  Data collection: Semi-structured individual interviews and group interviews ... 22 
1.6.3  Ethical issues ....................................................................................................... 27 
1.6.4  Analysis of interview data ................................................................................... 28 
1.6.5  The question of validity in analysis of qualitative data ....................................... 30 
1.6.6  Summary .............................................................................................................. 32 
1.7  Thesis outline .................................................................................................................... 32 
PART II   CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 
2.1  Review of the meanings attached to ‘development’ ......................................................... 34 
2.1.1  Why ‘development’? ........................................................................................... 34 
2.1.2  The economic growth and human development schools ..................................... 35 
2.1.3  Defining development and poverty in human rights approaches ........................ 37 
2.1.4  Alternative development models and empowerment .......................................... 42 
2.1.6  Concluding remarks ............................................................................................. 46 
2.2  Giving meaning to ‘human rights’, agency, and change in human rights discourse ........ 47 
2.2.1  Introduction ......................................................................................................... 47 
2.2.2  Historic overview of the human rights movement .............................................. 48 
2.2.3  A review of the meanings attached to the human rights concept: Moving  
beyond human rights as defined by the ‘powerful for the powerless’ ................ 51 
2.2.4  Human rights and agency .................................................................................... 60 
2.2.5  The political element of human rights ................................................................. 62 
2.2.6  Human rights and legalization ............................................................................. 64 
2.2.7  Human rights law and change (contesting the status quo) .................................. 65 
2.2.8  The question of universality, relativism, particularity and context ..................... 69 
2.2.9  Individual rights and collective rights ................................................................. 74 
2.2.10  Indivisible and hierarchical human rights ........................................................... 76 
2.2.11  Concluding remarks ............................................................................................. 79 
2.3  Food rights, food security, and livelihoods ...................................................................... 81 
2.3.1  Who are the poor and hungry? ............................................................................ 81 
2.3.2  The poor as experts on their own development ................................................... 83 
2.3.3  Integration of food security and the right to food ................................................ 84 
iii 
2.3.4  The right to food defined internationally, regionally and nationally ................... 92 
2.3.5  Concluding remarks ........................................................................................... 102 
2.4  The role and meaning of ‘human rights principles’ in development practice ................ 103 
2.4.1  Defining human rights-based approaches to development ................................ 103 
2.4.2  Five principles as key elements of human rights approaches to development 
cooperation ........................................................................................................ 107 
2.4.3  Express linkage to human rights norms and standards: Using human rights  
law as a framework for analysis ........................................................................ 109 
2.4.4  Equality and non-discrimination ....................................................................... 112 
2.4.5  Accountability ................................................................................................... 117 
2.4.6  Participation ....................................................................................................... 127 
2.4.7  Empowerment .................................................................................................... 135 
2.4.8  Concluding remarks on human rights principles ............................................... 146 
PART III   THE ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN FOOD SECURITY EFFORTS IN 
MALAWI: CHARITY-BASED, RIGHTS-BASED AND LEGAL 
APPROACHES 
3.1  Human rights discourses in Malawi: Giving meaning to ‘human rights’ ....................... 148 
3.1.1  Second liberation: Commitment to a multiparty democracy, human rights,  
and a market economy ....................................................................................... 148 
3.1.2  ‘Freedom’ discourse .......................................................................................... 150 
3.1.3  Local reactions to official human rights discourses .......................................... 153 
3.1.4  Civic education .................................................................................................. 154 
3.1.5  The right to food in the legal framework of Malawi ......................................... 156 
3.1.6  Concluding remarks ........................................................................................... 158 
3.2  Food assistance: A charity-based service ....................................................................... 158 
3.2.1  Introduction ....................................................................................................... 159 
3.2.2  Food aid as part of the right to food .................................................................. 160 
3.2.3  The new food aid agenda: No free food ............................................................ 162 
3.2.4  Good development practice ............................................................................... 164 
3.2.5  Concluding remarks ........................................................................................... 170 
3.3  A rights-based approach to food security: Demanding accountable services as  
a matter of rights and obligations ................................................................................... 171 
3.3.1  Oxfam’s rights-based approach ......................................................................... 171 
3.3.2  Background to the Shire Highland Sustainable Livelihoods Programme ......... 172 
3.3.3  Programme activities in 2005/2006 ................................................................... 174 
3.3.4  Focus on rights and obligations ......................................................................... 175 
3.3.5  Sustainability and the role of the government ................................................... 177 
3.3.6  Giving meaning to human rights: An actor-oriented approach ......................... 179 
3.3.7  Are rights confrontational? ................................................................................ 182 
3.3.8  Rights-based development principles ................................................................ 184 
3.3.9  Concluding remarks ........................................................................................... 191 
3.4  A legal approach to food security: Legislation as a tool for transformation .................. 193 
3.4.1  Introduction to the Right to Food Project .......................................................... 193 
3.4.2  Background: The famine of 2001/2002 ............................................................. 195 
3.4.3  Giving meaning to the right to food in Malawi: A word on process ................. 198 
3.4.4  From freedoms to entitlements? ........................................................................ 200 
3.4.5  Policies as politics ............................................................................................. 204 
iv 
3.4.6  What is the role of human rights principles in the draft bill and the Right  
to Food Project? ................................................................................................. 206 
3.4.7  Concluding remarks ........................................................................................... 209 
3.5  Conclusions and review of assumptions ......................................................................... 211 
PART IV  CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
SVENSK SAMMANFATTNING ....................................................................................... 224 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................ 226 
Books and articles .................................................................................................................. 226 
Research reports and papers ................................................................................................... 237 
The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights .................................................... 238 
UN documents and reports ..................................................................................................... 238 
NGO reports and documents .................................................................................................. 242 
Donor documents and reports ................................................................................................ 243 
Evaluations ............................................................................................................................. 244 
Press ....................................................................................................................................... 244 
Treaties ................................................................................................................................... 245 
Declarations ............................................................................................................................ 245 
National legal and policy material, and surveys .................................................................... 245 
Interviews (archived at Finnish Social Science data Archive under FSD2727) .................... 246 
 
v 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS  
First of all I would like to thank the people I encountered in Malawi at the end of 2006. Doing 
field research was a challenging process that brought me in touch with my own vulnerability. 
This vulnerable state forced me into new insights – it opened up new possibilities and ways of 
seeing. A special thanks goes to David Nungu, who helped me identify my lost suitcase at the 
airport in Lilongwe; Fiona Mwale and Mary Kachale who assisted me with numerous 
practical tasks; Joe Chunga who acted as my driver and research assistant; Christine Dun who 
asked the right questions at the right time. Moreover, without the support of my hosts at 
Church and Society, Oxfam Malawi, and staff at the Centre for Social Research at the 
University of Malawi I would not have been able to conduct this work. Almost seven weeks 
of field research was made possible thanks to funding from the Nordic Africa Institute.   
Over the years, many colleagues have given me valuable comments on my research. I am 
especially grateful for comments by Dr. Hans-Otto Sano, Dr. Celestine Nyamu-Musembi, 
Professor Jemery Gould, Dr. Harri Englund, Siobhán McInerney-Lankford, Zairah Kahn as 
well as my colleagues within the research project “Implementing a Human Rights-Based 
Approach to Development” that was funded by the Academy of Finland (2006-2011). It has 
been enriching to work within a research project in a team of researchers exploring similar 
questions related to human rights and development. The majority of the funding for my thesis 
has come from the Academy of Finland project but in addition the Finnish Graduate School in 
Human Rights Research has also provided funding.   
I want to thank my first supervisor Professor Martin Scheinin for encouraging me to write a 
thesis and for being open to my multidisciplinary methods. I thank the Director of the Institute 
for Human Rights, Professor Elina Pirjatanniemi, for commenting on a preliminary version of 
this thesis and for her practical and emotional support. I am also grateful for valuable and 
constructive comments by the pre-reviewers Professor Paul Gready and Dr. Thoko Kaime.   
Last but not least I want to thank my family and friends. The past six years of writing (and 
mothering) has involved transformation – the theme of my thesis – on all levels in my life. I 
thank you for inspiring discussions, for pushing me, for supporting me, for being part of the 
circle that means everything to me.    
 
 
Alessandra Sarelin, October 2012  
vi 
 
ABBRIVIATIONS  
ADMARC  Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation 
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms Discrimination 
against Women  
CSO Civil society organisation 
DBU   Development Broadcasting Unit 
DCHR   Danish Centre for Human Rights 
DEC  District Executive Committee  
DFID  United Kingdom’s Department for International Development 
DPP   Democratic Progressive Party 
ESCR  Economic, social and cultural rights  
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations  
FFA  Food for asset 
FFW  Food for work  
FISP  Farm Input Subsidy Programme  
GA  General Assembly of the United Nations  
HRBA  Human rights-based approach   
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights  
ICCPR  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
HIS  Integrated Household Survey  
JEFAP  Joint Emergency Food Aid Programme 
Malawi CARER Centre for Advice, Research, and Education on Rights 
MBC   Malawi Broadcasting Corporation 
MCP   Malawi Congress Party 
MDGs  Millennium Development Goals  
MHRRC   Malawi Human Rights Resource Centre 
MoAFS  Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security 
MPI  Multidimensional poverty index 
MVAC  Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee  
NGO  Non-governmental organization 
NORAD  Norwegian Agency for Development 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PRA  Participatory rural appraisal  
PWESCR  Programme for Women’s Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
RLC  Radio listening club  
RBA  Rights-based approach 
SGR  Strategic Grain Reserve  
SIDA  Swedish International Development Agency 
SHSLP  Shire Highland Sustainable Livelihoods Programme 
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme  
UDF  United Democratic Front 
VDC  Village development committee 
WFP  World Food Programme  
WLAS  Women and Law in Southern Africa (NGO) 
WMS  Welfare Monitoring Survey  
1 
PART I RESEARCH QUESTIONS, CONTEXT, AND 
METHODOLOGY 
1.1 Theoretical and methodological starting points 
This research is interested in processes of change. Change is brought about by people and 
groups who have agency and a vision for the kind of society they want to live in. The 
theoretical starting point is the ‘constructivist’ view that “individuals and groups are not only 
shaped by their world but can also change it,” as expressed by Audie Klotz and Cecilia 
Lynch. New normative, cultural, economic, social, and political practices that change 
conventional wisdoms are set into motion by people,1 who believe they can affect change in 
their lives, as a perquisite for agency. Constructivism is increasingly the lead paradigm in 
social science, with positivism no longer dominating except in economics and ‘number-
crunching’ sociology.2  
Another theoretical starting point is that human rights are social constructions created by 
people. This study relies on a discursive understanding of human rights, moving away from a 
positivist view according to which human rights are ‘things’ that can be measured.3 Instead, 
human rights are seen as social constructions that are discursively constructed,4 and therefore 
by definition change over time. 
John Searle makes a distinction between ‘brute facts’ and ‘institutional facts’. The former are 
physical or natural facts while the latter are created by human agreement, through a shared 
language. Institutional facts cannot exist as isolated units but only through being part of a 
larger system of relationships to other facts. Social reality is created by social acts – and in 
some sense this reality is only the continuous possibility to act.5 Human rights are institutional 
facts that have come into existence through social agreement.  
Constructivists claim that particular meanings become ‘stable’ over time, creating social 
orders called structures or institutions. In this context, rules and norms set expectations about 
how the world works, and what types of behaviour is legitimate.6 As long as international 
human rights agreements are breached on such a massive scale as is the case today, one can 
probably not say that human rights constitute very ‘stable’ institutional facts, however, there 
is the continuous possibility for people and institutions (mainly states) to act according to the 
human rights ideal that has been manifested in legal agreements. At the same time there is 
also the possibility for individuals and groups to claim and demand respect for the human 
rights ideal. The position taken in this study is that human rights are constantly being 
negotiated and renegotiated, i.e., human rights are not static social constructions. 
                                                 
1 Audie Klotz and Cecelia M. Lynch, Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations (New 
York: M.E. Sharpe, 2007) at 1. 
2 Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Development Theory: Deconstructions/Reconstructions (London: Sage Publications, 
2001) at 142.  
3 See Jim Ife, Human Rights and Social Work: Towards Rights-Based Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University press, 2001) at 145. 
4 See Neil Stammers, Human Rights and Social Movements (London: Pluto Press, 2009) at 10. 
5 Johan R. Searle, Konstruktionen av den sociala verkligheten (Uddevalla: Daidalos, 1997; Original title: The 
Construction of Social Reality, 1995) at 46, 49, 50. 
6 Klotz and Lynch, Strategies for Research, supra note 1, at 8.  
2 
Institutional facts are of course not independent from brute facts of materiality or physicality. 
Intuitional facts require some sort of physical realization, but the form they assume are not 
decisive. Human rights, “in all their many forms, have to assume some materiality or 
physicality for functioning as operative norms and standards.” This can be called the ‘material 
infrastructure’.7 The material infrastructure of human rights includes international legal 
agreements, monitoring mechanisms, institutions, reports, etc.  
When it is accepted that ‘social reality’ is being constructed and reconstructed, it is clear that 
a single text, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is open to multiple readings. 
It is the reader rather than the author who ‘makes sense’ of it. In this world view, these 
multiple wisdoms by the readers will be valued, “rather than single, unifying world views 
imposed from above.”8 As articulated by Baxi, no text may “claim the status of unique 
authorship and therefore claim axiomatic authority; the birth of the reader (as Roland Barthes 
said memorably) entails the death of the author.”9  
Yet, in human rights discourse ‘from above’ expert knowledge is given high value and 
emphasis. However, there can be no independent and quasi-objective concept without falling 
into a top-down practice in which “generalized truths are used to determine how to act in 
specific contexts.”10 Jim Ife notes that such top-down perspectives are characteristic of 
modernity and its search for certainty, order and predictability.11 Merry notes that human 
rights conventions embody many of the ideals of modernity, offering a universal vision of just 
societies. A particular cultural system that is rooted in a “secular transnational modernity” is 
articulated in the human rights regime. Claims to ‘culture’ do not “justify deviation the culture 
of transnational modernity,” 12 an issue I will come back to later. It follows from the 
increasing relevance given to the international human rights system that ‘human rights 
culture’ is a core aspect of “a new global, transnational culture, a sui generis phenomenon of 
modernity.” At the core of its structuring ideas lies, according to Cowan et al, its 
individualistic conception; addressing suffering through a legal/technical framework (instead 
of e.g. an ethical); and emphasizing certain aspects of human relationships over others 
(individual’s rights over an individual’s duties or needs). These are foundational ideas, even 
though they are contested, as the authors point out, for example through processes related to 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.13    
However, the world in which any human rights-based development programme operates is 
characterized by unpredictability and chaos.14 Imposing order on chaos and predictability on 
uncertainty requires a lot of control, and often coercion,15 that goes against the idea of agency 
and stifles initiative and ‘from below’ action. The actor-oriented and human rights 
perspectives from below, which are raised in this study as an alternative to the more 
                                                 
7 Upendra Baxi, “Politics of Reading Human Rights: Inclusion and Exclusion of Human Rights”, in Meckled-
García & Cali (eds), The Legalization of Human Rights: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Human Rights and 
Human rights Law (London: Routledge, 2006) 182-200, at 189. 
8 Ife, Human Rights from Below (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 47. 
9 Baxi, “Politics of Reading”, supra note 7, at 187. 
10 Ife, Human Rights from Below, supra note 8, at 134. 
11 Ibid., at 30. 
12 Sally Engle Merry, “Constructing a Global Law-Violence against Women and the Human Rights System”,  28 
Law & Social Inquiry (2003) 941-977, at 945-946. 
13 Jane K. Cowan, Marie-Bénédicte Dembour and Richard A. Wilson, “Introduction”, in Cowan, Dembour & 
Wilson (eds), Culture and Rights: Anthropological Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 
1-26, at 12. 
14 Chaos does, however, not mean randomness or the absence of order; “it refers to the unpredictability of the 
outcome of processes”. Pieterse, Development Theory, supra note 2, at 143.  
15 Ife, Human Rights from Below, supra note 8, at 30.  
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conventional approaches, are postmodern perspectives that put emphasis on wisdom and 
change from below.16  
The theoretical basis for an actor perspective is from development sociology, here represented 
by the work of Norman Long.17 The theoretical basis of the actor-oriented perspective on 
human rights is in part from legal literature that does not position itself within the human 
rights tradition, but which calls for evaluation of legal principles in terms of their concrete 
effects in a social setting. Emphasis is on estimating consequences for less powerful groups 
and/or individuals in society. Celestine Nyamu-Musembi quotes Joseph Singer who says we 
must ask ourselves not only whether a social or legal practice works, but ‘works for whom’? 
Due to power differences and hierarchical relationships in society there is need to look 
beyond abstract formal equality principles. Through asking the question ‘works for whom?’ 
and translating the question into action, people change the terms of institutionalized 
understandings of rights and make “the meaning of rights” real in their own context.18 This is 
in accordance with the constructivist view that people have agency and are thereby capable of 
altering meanings, structures, and institutional facts.  
Human rights is not a discipline in its own right and research on human rights is found within 
many disciplines. Human rights scholarship has historically been dominated by philosophy 
and law, while international relations and political science have more recently devoted 
growing attention to human rights.19 The perspective of this thesis is from the field of 
international law, but due to the nature of the research subject it takes a multidisciplinary 
approach. Study and interpretation of legal texts, such as international conventions, and the 
activity of judicial or quasi-judicial institutions is only a small part of the research strategy 
chosen. The usual perspective on human rights in international relations and political science, 
that is to approach human rights as a state-centric practice,20 is also not sufficient to answer 
the research questions on the role of human rights in development.  
I have been especially inspired by research from the fields of anthropology,21 and community 
development and social work,22 and wish to mention these disciplines as I believe they can 
make considerable contribution to human rights studies. I have also been inspired by lawyers 
who apply anthropological methods.23 Ethnography of human rights24 is an area of 
scholarship that is essential for improving our understanding of the practice of human rights 
in transnational as well as local contexts. The book The Practice of Human Rights: Tracking 
Law Between the Global and the Local reveals that this practice is more complicated than 
previously assumed. What is even more crucial is that when such studies are undertaken, 
despite methodological challenges, they often suggest that the ‘practice’ being documented 
and analysed potentially “transforms the framework through which the idea of human rights 
                                                 
16 ‘Postmodern’ is a highly complex concept and examining its meaning is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
Moreover, postmodernists tend to avoid definitions that are seen as engaging with the qualities of rationality and 
objectivity that postmodernists deny. The Post-Modern Age is characterized by incessant choosing; pluralism is 
the ‘ism’ of our time, which is seen as both the great problem and the great opportunity. See Krishan Kumar, 
From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995) 104-105.    
17 See e.g. Norman Long, Development Sociology: Actor Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2001).  
18 Celestine Nyamu-Musembi, “An Actor-oriented Approach to Rights in Development”, 36 IDS Bulletin (2005) 
41-51, at 41.  
19 Stammers, Human Rights and Social Movements, supra note 4, at 12. 
20 Ibid., at 12. 
21 Sally Engle Merry’s work is important and also that of Marie-Bénédicte Dembour.  
22 See Ife, Human Rights and Social Work, supra note 3; Ife, Human Rights from Below, supra note 8. 
23 Celesetine Nyamu-Musembi’s work is important here.  
24 See Mark Goodale and Sally Engle Merry (eds), The Practice of Human Rights: Tracking Law Between the 
Global and the Local (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
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itself is understood.”25 This is also a central thread in this study about human rights-based 
development practice.  
‘Discourse’ is widely used in social theory and analysis, inspired, for example, by Michel 
Foucault, as a means of referring to different ways of structuring areas of knowledge and 
social practice.26 The human rights community has its specific way of “talking about and 
understanding the world”,27 and thereby we can refer to ‘human rights discourse’. While I do 
analyse and refer to ‘discourse’, this study does not apply methods of discourse analysis. Key 
approaches in discourse analysis are built on linguistics28 and this way of studying social 
reality and change is not useful for the purpose of answering my research questions.  
This study is ‘critical’ in the way that it tries to unmask dominant, taken-for-granted 
understandings of reality. It wants to destabilise prevailing systems of meaning, especially 
that of the human rights concept. It is when we see that our understandings of the world are 
merely that – understandings – not the world itself that we can transform them into objects of 
discussion and criticism and open to change.29  
1.2 Research questions 
An increasing number of people go hungry. Between 2007 and 2008 the number of 
undernourished increased by 8 percent in Africa.30 At the same time as the number of the 
hungry has risen, the levels of cereal production have been breaking records on a worldwide 
basis.31 This shows that Amartya Sen has been right in pointing out that increasing production 
will not solve global hunger.32  
As the majority of the hungry live in rural areas and usually depend on small-scale farming or 
are employed on large plantations, it is through supporting them that changes can take place.33 
Hunger is a problem related to the lack of access to productive resources, the concentrated 
input of the providers sector and insufficient support to the poor, i.e., of social, economic and 
political structures. I agree with De Schutter et al that in the debates on hunger too little 
attention has been paid to the imbalances of power in the food systems and to the failure of 
the international economic environment. There are structural problems in the political 
economy of food production and distribution chains.34 The question is whether human rights 
practice and discourse, through the right to adequate food and human rights-based strategies 
to food security, can contribute to challenging and transforming the structures that prevent 
small-scale farmers in the global South feeding themselves and their communities.  
                                                 
25 Mark Goodale, “Locating Rights, Envisioning Law Between the Global and the Local”, in Mark Goodale and 
Sally Engle Merry (eds), The Practice of Human Rights: Tracking Law Between the Global and the Local 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 1-38, at 4.  
26 Norman Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change (Oxford: Polity Press, 1992) at 3. 
27 Definition of ‘discourse’ in Marianne W. Jørgensen and Louise Phillips, Discourse Analysis as Theory and 
Method (London: Sage Publications, 2002) at 1.  
28 Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change, supra note 26, at 1.  
29 See Jørgensen and Phillips, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, supra note 27, at 176 and 178. 
30 Food and Agriculture Organization, The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2011 (Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations: Rome, 2011) at 8.  
31 Olivier De Schutter and Kaitlin Y Cordes, “Accounting for Hunger: An Introduction to the Issues”, in De 
Schutter & Y Cordes (eds), Accounting for Hunger: The Right to Food in the Era of Globalisation (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2011) 1-24, at 6. 
32 See for example Amartya Sen & Jean Drèze “Hunger and Public Action”, in The Amartya Sen & Jean Drèze 
Omnibus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
33 De Schutter and Cordes, “Accounting for Hunger”, supra note 31, at 6. 
34 De Schutter and Cordes, “Accounting for Hunger”, supra note 31, at 7. 
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This thesis believes that human rights law is not a tool that is going to re-shape the economic 
domain. Although human rights law makes clear that the state has some responsibilities in the 
economic sphere (at a minimum supervision), which places it in evident  contrast with the 
neo-liberal paradigm of the non-interventionist state, and even to the managerial, good 
governance state; it remains, however, a fact that human rights operates on the margins of real 
economic power.35 Paul Gready rightly points out that in the ongoing financial crisis there has 
been an almost complete absence of human rights references in political or popular 
discussions. Moreover, not even the successes of human rights discourse – Gready refers to 
the Treatment Action Campaign in South Africa and the Right to Food Campaign in India – 
have challenged the prevailing market-led economic model in these countries.36 Due to the 
limited impact and potential I see for human rights in challenging and transforming the 
dominant economic structures, nationally and internationally, this thesis will explore what 
other, if any, transformative potential human rights have in development processes and 
contexts. It explores the role of human rights in general and the right to food in particular in 
development cooperation policy and practice. It does not investigate the question of whether 
human rights-based development approaches lead to better development outcomes. 
The starting point is that a rights discourse can have liberating effects at one moment and can 
facilitate domination at another.37 Therefore, there is need for research into specific contexts 
where human rights are used to further a development agenda. In part III, I will give an 
analysis of three specific projects in Malawi in order to demonstrate the diverse roles that 
human rights play in development processes.  
A second starting point is that in the name of human rights advancement, a huge number of 
schemes for transformation, regulation, and ‘governance’ have been established all over the 
world.38 Some kind of transformation is indeed taking place and there are authors who call 
this an expansion of modernity.39 It is less clear whether the expansion of the human rights 
idea contributes to change that contest the status quo in favour of oppressed and marginalized 
people and groups. This thesis investigates whether human rights, as they are further 
integrated into development, contribute to transforming development practice and structures 
that prevent agency for the poor and marginalised. Is it possible for human rights to be a 
counter-hegemonic force in the face of hegemonic development? (I agree with Rajagopal that 
as ‘development’ has been expanded to include everything from poverty alleviation, 
democratization, rule of law, human rights, environmental sustainability to anti-corruption, 
‘development’ has come to assume a hegemonic function.40) Are human rights creating space 
                                                 
35 Paul Gready, “Reasons to Be Cautious about Evidence and Evaluations: Rights-based Approaches to 
Development and the Emerging Culture of Evaluation”, 1 Journal of Human Rights Practice (2009) 380-401, at 
385, 388, 399. 
36 Ibid., at 382, 386. I partly disagree that the Right to Food Campaign has not challenged the prevailing 
economic model: it has challenged it but the structural changes sought have not been successful. See chapter 
2.3.4.  
37 Mahmood Mamdani, “Introduction” in M. Mamdani (ed.) Beyond Rights Talk and Culture Talk: Comparative 
Essays on the politics of Rights and Culture (New York: St. Martin’s press, 2000) 1-13, at 6. One of the major 
conclusions in the book Contested States is that “the power of law is at once hegemonic and oppositional.” See 
Mindie Lazarus-Black & Susan f. Hirsch (eds) Contested States. Law, Hegemony and Resistance (New York: 
Routledge, 1994) at 20. 
38 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010) at 
227. 
39 Merry, “Constructing a Global Law”, supra note 12, at 945-946; Cowan, Dembour and Wilson, 
“Introduction”, supra note 13, at 12. 
40 Balakrishnan Rajagopal, “Counter-hegemonic International Law: Rethinking Human Rights and Development 
as a Third World Strategy”, in R. Falk, B. Rajagopal & J. Stevens (eds), International Law and the Third World: 
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for agency and empowerment? In order to answer these questions it is necessary to examine 
more closely how the human rights concept has been defined, and by whom it has been 
defined.  
It is also necessary to be to be aware of the various forms that the so called human rights-
based approaches to development assume. There is no single definition of the concept ‘human 
rights-based approach to development’ and, therefore, I agree with Patrick Twomey that it 
makes sense to talk of human rights-based approaches instead of one approach.41 In this 
thesis most variations of human rights-based and rights-based approaches appear in one form 
or the other, and the ambition is to make the distinctions clear whenever necessary.   
Moreover, there are clear tensions between human rights-based approaches to development 
cooperation and to national development policy. For instance, the Indian MP Jaipal Reddy 
makes clear that “a rights-based approach in public policy is a moral imperative” for India but 
that a human rights-based approach to development cooperation is patronizing in its 
assumption that donors know what it in the best interest of the South. Such an assumption 
aims at introducing a rights-based approach to public policy from the outside, and “bring 
about empowerment through the planning, programming and implementation activities of a 
donor agency.” This approach seeks to bring about empowerment through external pressure 
and is based on the conviction that to achieve poverty eradication there needs to be ‘good 
leadership’, ‘good governance’ and the empowerment of ordinary people. Reddy highlights 
that a rights-based approach to public policy, that comes from within the country is more 
desirable as movement away from political, economic, and social oppression can only be 
sustainable when it springs from within a society.42  
This dilemma – human rights as a form of imperialism – cannot be avoided when 
investigating the possible transformational role of human rights in development. It is further 
perpetuated by the problem of the lack of accountability on the part of donors.43 According to 
the human rights-based language now widely used in international cooperation and aid circles, 
the people in the recipient countries are seen as rights-holders, and the national state is seen as 
the primary duty-bearer, but it is not clear where the funder countries position themselves in 
the ‘right-duties’ equation.44  
While being sympathetic to human rights-approaches to public policy, it is the more 
interventionist human rights strategies that are the main focus in this thesis. Therefore, a 
second set of questions arise concerning development planning and programming. What 
difference do human rights make as they enter into development programmes and projects, 
what new elements are brought in, and what value is added? What are the characteristics of 
the so called human rights-based approaches to development cooperation, compared to ‘good 
development practice’? How are ‘legal approaches’ to be regarded? (A legal approach to 
human rights is internally diverse but a central feature is that the idea of human rights must be 
legislated, legally recognised, and codified.45) I will approach these questions on a general 
                                                                                                                                                        
Reshaping Justice (London: Routledge-Cavendish, 2008) 63-79, at 65. “Hegemony” is the social, cultural, 
ideological, or economic influence exerted by a dominant group. 
41 Patrick Twomey, “Human Rights-Based Approaches to Development: Towards Accountability”, in Mashood 
Baderin (ed.), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007) 45-69, at 49. 
42 Statement by Mr.S. Jaipal Reddy, Member of Parliament on the agenda item 88, Operation activities for 
development at the Second Committee of 57th UNGA on October 28, 2002. Available at http://secint04. 
un.org/india/ind661.pdf, visited 4 December 2011.  
43 Ibid.  
44 Andrea Cornwall and Celestine Nyamu-Musembi, “Putting the ‘Rights-Based Approach’ to development into 
perspective”, 25 Third World Quarterly (2004) 1415-1427, at 1424-25. 
45 Goodale, “Locating Rights”, supra note 25, at 6. 
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level as well as on a more particular level, looking at proposed human rights-based 
approaches to food security. 
It should be noted that this study is not restricted to exploring the role of human rights law, 
but rather that ‘human rights’ is seen as a phenomenon much broader than a formalistic and 
legalistic understanding of the human rights concept would entail. We can distinguish 
between internationally recognized human rights in legal documents and human rights in 
social relationships and as cultural practice. Naturally there is no strict division between the 
two, but having this picture in mind can help when reading my work. As the human rights 
idea enters into development work, it is not only or even primarily in the shape of legal texts. 
In human rights-based strategies for development, human rights ideas inform and inspire the 
whole working process, and this process takes place in social relationships within 
communities, families, households, workplaces and public spaces. This study is concerned 
with the processes of ‘development’ that set out to claim and achieve human rights through 
different channels. In this context, ‘the law’ and ‘legal’ has a social theory definition. Social 
theory focuses on law as a ‘social process’ – not solely a text or formal legal structures.46  
1.3 Literature on the ‘added value’ of human rights-based approaches to 
development 
This thesis is not limited to exploring the so called human rights-based approaches to 
development cooperation but since the immediate need  to answer questions on the ‘value 
added’ by human rights has partly sprung from the growing popularity of such approaches 
attention is devoted to whether human rights-based approaches make a difference. In this 
overview, I will review what other authors have suggested in terms of the new and added 
value of various human rights-based approaches to development.  
The fact that the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 199347 stressed the link 
between human rights and development was a window of opportunity for further integration 
of the two discourses. With the trend within human rights of embracing much broader 
concerns for human dignity, such as access to resources (i.e., economic and social rights), 
came the need among human rights groups to engage with development actors and with civil 
societies and social movements.48  
In the report Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform, which was launched in 
1997, the Secretary General made the following statement: “A major task for the future will 
be to enhance the human rights programme and integrate it into the broad range of the 
Organization’s activities, including in the development and humanitarian areas.”49 This 
ambition gradually led to the so called Stamford consensus document of 2003 in which 
                                                 
46 Caroline Moser and Andy Norton, To Claim Our Rights: Livelihood Security, Human Rights and Sustainable 
Development (Overseas Development Institute, 2001) at 21. This view has a bases in the anthropological concern 
with ‘law as process’ aimed to get away from a concern with rules as such in order to focus on how those rules 
were implemented or not. Olivia Harris, “Introduction”, in O. Harris (ed.), Inside and Outside the Law (London: 
Routledge, 1996) 1-15, at 4. Critical social theory of law (with thinkers such as Bourdieu, Foucault and Gramsci) 
tries to show the contribution of law to resilience and pervasiveness of domination in hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic processes. See Boaventura de Sousa Santos and César A. Rodríguez-Garavito, “Law, Politics, and the 
Subaltern in Counter-Hegemonic Globalization”, in de Sousa Santos & Rodríguez-Garavito (eds), Law and 
Globalization from Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 1-
26, at 6. 
47 Adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights, 25 June 1993. 
48 Jethro Pettit and Joanna Wheeler, “Developing Rights? Relating Discourse to Context and Practice”, 36 IDS 
Bulletin (2005) 1-8, at 2.  
49 UN doc. A/51/950, 14 July 1997, para. 196.  
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participating agencies agree on a Common Understanding on a Human Rights-based 
Approach to Development within the UN system.50 
In early 2000, there was a debate between Peter Uvin and Hugo Slim about the potential of 
further integration between human rights and development. Uvin stated that much of the 
policy declarations and exhortations for the need for integration “risks being little more than 
rhetorical, feel-good change, further legitimizing historically created inequalities and 
injustices in this world.”51 While Uvin was very critical of this agenda, he did see a potential 
in the so called human rights approach to development, in which “the mandate of 
development itself may be redefined in human rights terms, potentially bringing about a 
fundamental rethinking of the development paradigm itself”.52 In this ‘new paradigm’ the 
boundaries between human rights and development would disappear, and both become 
conceptually and operationally inseparable parts of the same process of social change.53 As he 
saw very little evidence that this was taking place, Uvin’s conclusion was that there is less to 
the emerging human rights approach in the development regime than meets the eye. He was 
concerned that the status quo is not being challenged sufficiently.54  The question is whether 
today there is more evidence to support the claim that hegemonic development is challenged 
by human rights arguments.  
We should keep in mind that the question of new dimensions and value added can be 
approached from many different angles and perspectives. It can be looked at from the 
perspective of either the development actors (donors, states, NGOs, etc) or the target groups 
(‘beneficiaries’) of development aid.55 Clearly more studies have been devoted to the first 
perspective rather than the second. I argue that the questions should be looked at holistically, 
since whatever is changed in the practices of development actors also will have an impact on 
target groups. However, it is more challenging to measure concrete benefits and impacts in 
the lives of target groups compared to studying policy and practice of agencies and 
organisations.   
Uvin raised doubts whether further integration of human rights and development can have any 
impact on donor practices and he claimed that it is merely rhetorical repackaging of ‘old wine 
into new bottles’.56 Slim, on the other hand, identified potential in NGOs that have strong 
links to marginalised groups and start basing their efforts on human rights-based approaches, 
thereby supporting genuine struggles for rights.57 Hans-Otto Sano made a similar argument a 
few years later. He claimed that human rights have become increasingly important as a source 
of inspiration for local development efforts and for local advocacy.58 Examples of this are 
presented in the Malawi case-study in part III.  
                                                 
50 The Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation: Towards a Common Understanding Among 
UN Agencies, developed at the Inter-Agency Workshop on a human based approach in the context of UN 
reform, 3-5 May 2003, Stamford. Available at http://hrbaportal.org/?page_id=2127, visited 10 May 2012.  
51 Peter Uvin, “On High Moral Ground: The Incorporation of Human Rights by the Development Enterprise”, 
XVII  PRAXIS The Fletcher Journal of Development Studies (2002) 1-11, at 1.  
52 Ibid., at 2. See also Peter Uvin, Human Rights and Development (Bloomfield: Kumarian Press, 2004).  
53 Uvin, “On High Moral Ground”, supra note 51, at 6.  
54 Ibid., at 10.  
55 Hans-Otto Sano, “Does Human Rights-Based Development Make a Difference?” in Salomon, Tostensen & 
Vandenhole (eds), Casting the Net Wider: Human Rights, Development and New Duty-Bearers (Antwerp: 
Intersentia, 2007) 79-63, at 63.  
56 Uvin, “On High Moral Ground”, supra note 51, at 2 and 4.  
57 Hugo Slim, “A Response to Peter Uvin, Making Moral Low Ground: Rights as the Struggle for Justice and the 
Abolition of Development”, XVI PRAXIS The Fletcher Journal of Development Studies (2002) 1-5, at 4.  
58 Sano, “Does Human Rights-Based Development Make a Difference?”, supra note 55, at 68.  
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In the struggle for rights, Sano believes that human rights-based approaches potentially can 
“strengthen national strategies and social and political movements on account of a shared 
foundation of norms and rights”.59 As will be seen in the chapter on rights-based approaches 
in Malawi, it is, however, not very clear that the human rights concept always offers a shared 
foundation.  
There is, moreover, a risk of romanticising local NGO work in the area of human rights and 
development. Paul Nelson and Ellen Dorsey remind us that NGOs invoke human rights as a 
source of power; and in NGOs’ search for sources of power it is difficult to disentangle 
organisational and principled political objectives.60 Srirak Plipat also finds evidence that the 
potential of rights-based approaches is diminished because NGOs interpret and use these 
approaches in ways that correspond with their organizational backgrounds and expertise.61  
Nelson and Dorsey find more evidence of human rights playing a role in mobilization for 
resistance against policy changes such as privatisation than of human rights arguments 
succeeding in pressing governments to provide services more equitably, adequately and 
effectively.62 Sano finds similar question marks and areas where it is difficult to show what 
impact and value added human rights and human rights-based approaches to development 
have. He finds it challenging to prove that poor and marginalised target groups achieve 
improvements in their economic, social and political conditions through a human rights-based 
strategy.63  
It seems easier to show that human rights-based strategies bring in new dimensions to 
advocacy on poor people’s claims in the form of right’s defence and promotion than to show 
concrete improvements in the protection of rights of poor and marginalised individuals. The 
interaction between legal standing and social mobilization around economic and social rights 
has, according to Nelson and Dorsey, powerfully contributed to new rights (the right to 
water), to new understandings of the implications of these rights, and to new strategies and 
language for their promotion  by NGOs outside of the historic human rights field.64 What is 
less clear is the impact of these new strategies on achieving social change in favour of 
disadvantaged people, either through the work of social movements or in development 
programming.  
Darrow and Tomas raise five interrelated points on what comparative advantage a human 
rights-based approach brings to development programming: (1) a normative basis for values 
and policy choices that otherwise are more or less negotiable; (2) a predictable framework for 
action that is objective, determinate and defines the appropriate legal limits; (3) an 
empowering strategy for the achievement of human development; (4) legal means to secure 
redress for violations; and (5) a basis for accountability.65 The other authors referred to above 
have raised similar points, but with less focus on accountability and redress. This argument on 
                                                 
59 Sano, “Does Human Rights-Based Development Make a Difference?”, supra note 55, at 68.  
60 Paul J. Nelson and Ellen Dorsey, New Rights Advocacy: Changing Strategies of Development and Human 
Rights NGOs (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008) at 170. 
61 Srirak Plipat, “Developmentazing Human Rights: How Development NGOs Interpret and Implement a Human 
Rights-Based Development Policy” (Dissertation, University of Pittsburg, 2005) at 6. Available at 
http://etd.library.pitt.edu/ETD/available/etd-02222006145152/unrestricted/Srirak_Plipat_2006_dissertation_ all_ 
chapters.pdf, last visited 26 January 2012.  
62 Nelson and Dorsey, New Rights Advocacy, supra note 60, at 182. 
63 Sano, “Does Human Rights-Based Development Make a Difference?”, supra note 55, at 68.  
64 Nelson and Dorsey, New Rights Advocacy, supra note 60, at 172. 
65 Mac Darrow & Amparo Tomas, “Power, Capture, and Conflict: A Call for Human Rights Accountability in 
Development Cooperation”, 27 Human Rights Quarterly (2005) 471-538, at 485-486.  
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the value added by the human rights framework was nevertheless raised early in the debates 
on the human rights-approach to development assistance.66  
I agree that the two first points are, in theory, what human rights-based approaches, as defined 
e.g. in the so called Common Understanding among UN agencies,67 set out to do, but I am 
hesitant to whether this is an advantage that can be generalised. While human rights violations 
in the name of development should never be accepted, I question the value in having a 
framework that is ‘objective’ and ‘determinate’ because this inevitably leads to top-down 
approaches, an issue I will return to.   
The forth point is quite straightforward, at least in theory. In practice there are many obstacles 
for socially weak groups to seek redress for human rights violations. On the fifth point, it is 
again, in theory, quite clear that human rights potentially function as a basis for demanding 
accountability but from whom and in what forum is not at all straightforward, as will be 
shown in the section on accountability. Similarly, the question as to whether human rights are 
‘an empowering strategy of human development’ will be debated in chapter 2.4.7 and it 
should be explored more deeply in further research. These questions should always be 
answered in a specific context where political, legal, historical, and financial factors all play a 
role.   
In addition, Siobhán McInerney-Lankford sees that the answer to the question of ‘added 
value’ of human rights discourse lies in the realm of accountability and obligations.68 She 
notes that human rights should be integrated more systematically into development policy and 
practice, inter alia, because human rights treaty obligations are legally binding States parties, 
as a matter of public international law, and as such they should be respected in all contexts, 
including development. The assumption, as expressed by McInerney-Lankford, is that 
“greater reliance on human rights law might provide one effective way to promote a more 
systematic, explicit and coherent approach to the integration of human rights in 
development”.69 While valuing an emphasis on obligations, this thesis is concerned that a 
legalistic approach is unrealistic and elitist in most Southern contexts and has little value on 
the local level. I share Gready and Ensor’s concern about what they call the ‘legal reflex’ 
within human rights discourse, i.e., the assumption that the “resort to law is the most effective 
and perhaps only form of protection and remedy”. This is not to deny the importance of the 
law, but equal importance should be given to political and social processes in securing human 
rights.70 In Nelson’s and Dorsey’s study, NGOs find that the political power of human rights 
stems from their role in social movements while their legal power depends on their status as 
internationally recognised legal standards. NGOs use human rights as a way of reframing 
debates and as a tool for resisting neo-liberal economic norms and intellectual property rights. 
                                                 
66 See The Human Rights Council of Australia, The Rights Way to Development: A Human Rights Approach to 
Development Assistance (The Human Rights Council of Australia, 1995); Birgitte I. Hamm, “A Human Rights 
Approach to Development”, 23 Human Rights Quarterly (2001) 1005-1031.  
67 Common Understanding, supra note 50. 
68 Siobhán McInerney-Lankford, “Human Rights and Development: a Comment on Challenges and 
Opportunities from a Legal Perspective”, 1 Journal of Human Rights Practice (March 2009) 51-82, at 53. 
69 Ibid., at 52.  
70 Paul Gready and Jonathan Ensor, “Introduction”, in Gready & Ensor (eds), Reinventing Development? 
Translating Rights-Based Approaches from Theory into Practice (London: Zed Books, 2005) 1-44, at 9. This is 
also discussed in Sano, “Does Human Rights-Based Development Make a Difference?”, supra note 55, at 66; 
and Jeremy Holland, Mary Ann Brocklesby and Charles Abugre, “Beyond the Technical Fix? Participation in 
Donor Approaches to Rights-Based Development”, in Samuel Hickey & Giles Mohan (eds), Participation: From 
Tyranny to Transformation (London: Zed Books, 2004) 252-268, at 255. 
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At the individual level they use human rights as a source of empowering language and 
concepts.71  
Some argue that the main value added by so called human rights-based approaches to 
development is that they can potentially re-politicize areas of development work.72 It is 
argued that redefining development work as based on human rights claims rather than charity 
or benevolence is not a neutral act. Poverty is not natural or inevitable but created by deep-
rooted or structural inequalities and unequal power relations. Moreover, it is the work of 
politics to focus on underlying causes of poverty and to challenge asymmetries of power.73  
As the political character of human rights in development is recognised, this creates the fear 
that these approaches can be too interventionists. While the tension between the rights of 
states and the rights of citizens, who may be oppressed within these states, is not new in 
human rights debates, the expansion of human rights-based approaches in various shapes and 
forms brings in new dimensions to these tensions. Uvin applauds “the move away from the 
dominant reductionist and technical [development] approaches of the past”, but he recoils 
from the “thought of the limitless intervention seemingly condoned if not morally justified by 
the emerging agenda.”74 He fears that the legitimacy of the human rights standards may be put 
into question as the West intervenes “ever more frequently but ever more inconsistently in the 
affairs of other societies”.75 In order to deal with this fear, Uvin suggests a radical capacity 
building approach, which entails a transfer of the power of initiative and conceptualization to 
local actors.76 (See section on ‘alternative development’.) I suggest that an actor-oriented 
perspective on human rights should be part of such a radical approach so that the local actors 
also have the power to contribute to giving meaning to the human rights concept. When 
human rights enter into development as ready-made concepts with predetermined goals this 
stifles initiatives from local actors.   
Uvin, McInerney-Lankford, Sano, and Gready and Ensor seem to agree that strengthening the 
human rights perspective in development is not an answer to all the shortcomings of the 
development enterprise. We should be clear about the limits of the overlaps between the two 
fields. The relevance of human rights to development processes may not be generalized, nor 
involve all human rights.77 Sano summarizes some critical perspectives on human rights-
based approaches to development with the statement that there is, inter alia, a risk of 
exaggerating the strategy’s potential. This may occur especially in the area of transforming 
power relations and when addressing the so called root causes of poverty.78 This thesis 
supports the fact that there is reason to be careful in drawing conclusions on the role of human 
rights in transforming power relationships, especially if more conventional definitions of 
‘human rights’ are accepted. However, I find that these difficult questions cannot be avoided 
when studying the potential transformative power of human rights in development. Human 
rights have little value if they have no impact on the relationship between rights-holders and 
duty-bearers. Similarly, if structural reasons for poverty and human rights failure are not 
addressed human rights-based approaches will be used to maintain the status quo rather than 
                                                 
71 Nelson and Dorsey, New Rights Advocacy, supra note 60, at 169-172. 
72 Slim, “A Response to Peter Uvin”, supra note 57, at 3; Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi, “Putting the ‘Rights-
Based Approach’”, supra note 44; See also Gready and Ensor, “Introduction”, supra note 70, at 23.  
73 Gready, “Reasons to Be Cautious”, supra note 35, at 389-390.  
74 Uvin, Human Rights and Development, supra note 52, at 195. 
75 Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), at 19.  
76 Uvin, Human Rights and Development, supra note 52, at 198.  
77 McInerney-Lankford, “Human Rights and Development”, supra note 68, at 58.  
78 Sano, “Does Human Rights-Based Development Make a Difference?”, supra note 55, at 67 and 79. 
12 
challenging it. I agree with Gready and Ensor that an engagement with rights should stimulate 
a political transformation rather than seeking only technical and quantifiable outcomes.79  
The above summary of some of the attempts to answer the question regarding the possible 
added value of human rights in development cooperation indicates the importance and need 
for further research in this area. As will be shown in this thesis, and as has been shown by 
other studies, it is clear that different actors use human rights in general, and human rights-
based approaches to development in particular, in various ways. Therefore human rights play 
diverse roles in development, depending on the context and the actors involved. It is difficult 
to make generalisations about, for instance, the so called added value of human rights-based 
approaches as the question can only be answered in a specific context.  
1.4 Purpose and assumptions 
This thesis provides empirical data on the role, meaning, and value of human rights in the 
effort to confer food security in Malawi. The purpose is to: (1) identify the role of human 
rights, particularly the right to food, in three development efforts with the aim to strengthen 
food security in Malawi; (2) identify what is characteristic of the three case studies 
representing charity-based, rights-based and legal approaches to food security; (3) identify the 
possible value added of human rights and principles that are said to come with them in these 
efforts in terms of the transformative potential.  
The assumption I had before going to Malawi to gather data for the analysis was that human 
rights offer a new way of  working, thus also adding value to ‘good development practices’, in 
three interrelated ways: (1) human rights language changes the mindset of the actors in 
development, underlining the legally binding nature of addressing food insecurity, and 
contributing to empowerment of rights-holders; (2) human rights-based situation analysis 
implies that a complete range of new and different questions, which have a basis in the 
normative human rights framework, are raised in a development context; (3) human rights 
offer a platform to demand accountability of duty-bearers. These assumptions were the 
starting point when going into the field to collect data. The assumptions are presented here in 
the way they were formulated in the early phase of the research process. When drawing 
conclusions the assumptions are evaluated. 
It is clear that many development organisations have realised the power of using human rights 
language, and that by using this language they can increase the legitimacy of development. 
Some would even argue that development agencies implement human rights-based 
approaches only on a rhetorical level, changing the language of their programme description 
documents but not the logic behind their work.80 This is perhaps true in some cases. The 
assumption I had in the beginning of this research was, however, that human rights-based 
approaches have potential to change the business of development on more than the surface 
level. The shift to rights-based language, according to which poor people are ‘rights-holders’ 
instead of ‘beneficiaries’, may contribute to a sense of empowerment: efforts are made to 
create an environment in which people can mobilise, express and raise concerns and 
ultimately claim and realise their human rights.  
The second assumption builds on the importance of careful situation analysis. When problem 
analysis raises questions such as who is responsible for taking steps towards progressively 
                                                 
79 Gready and Ensor, “Introduction”, supra note 70, at 23. 
80 See e.g. Emma Harris-Curtis, Oscar Marleyn and Oliver Bakewell, The Implications for Northern NGOs 
Adopting Rights-Based Approaches (England: INTRAC, Occasional Papers Series No: 41, 2005) at 18.  
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realising the right to food and what obstacles are hindering these steps from being taken, 
focus is directed to structural issues such as legislation and policy, power and politics, action 
and non-action by institutions, exclusion and marginalisation as well as rights-holders’ lack of 
possibilities to participate.81 One can say that the normative human rights framework gives a 
road map for development, directing situation analysis (and therefore also the so called 
interventions) onto a new path. Focus is shifted from short-term technical solutions (e.g. 
service delivery) to promoting long-term structural change. It is especially useful to identify 
the structural causes of food insecurity, i.e., to look beyond for instance drought, at issues 
such as lack of access to livelihood resources, government social security, and other 
entitlements, which could enable people to cope with natural disasters.82 This is related to the 
entitlement dimension of human rights, meaning that human rights imply entitlements to 
action by government.83 This second assumption is connected to one important element of a 
human rights-based approach highlighted in the so called Common Understanding, i.e., 
identifying rights-holders (and their entitlements) and corresponding duty-bearers (and their 
obligations) and working towards strengthening the capacities of rights-holders to make their 
claims, and of duty-bearers to meet their obligations.84  
The third assumption is that focus on holding duty-bearers accountable is what really makes 
the human rights-based approach to development a new way of working.85 The implications 
for addressing accountability, however, need to be investigated.86 Which actors are seen as 
accountable to whom and on what grounds? What kinds of strategies are used to achieve 
accountability? 
The first assumption deals more with possible benefits for the rights-holders than for 
development actors, although no strict division is made. The assumption is that when and if 
rights-holders start demanding various services that are relevant to food security as a human 
rights issue, duty-bearers are forced to deal with issue of food security as a matter of fulfilling 
a human rights duty.87 This contributes to a sense of empowerment among rights-holders. The 
analysis is not trying to measure possible tangible benefits for the poorest as this would 
demand the use of quantitative methods in the form of socio-economic indicators.88  
The question of demanding services and action from duty-bearers is related to the third 
assumption about accountability. It is a question of relevance for both development actors and 
beneficiaries. In most cases, beneficiaries are not in the position to demand accountability 
from power holders on their own but need the support by local, national, and sometimes even 
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supra note 55, at 72.  
87 ‘Services’ that are based on human rights entitlements can be interpreted broadly to mean material goods, 
protection and respect. See Kent, Freedom from Want, supra note 83, at 93. 
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international groups. The second assumption about the potential added value of human rights 
in situation analysis has more to do with changing strategies in programming, and it could be 
assumed that it is therefore more relevant for the development actor than for beneficiaries. 
However, the analysis has shown that it is in fact rights-holders themselves that, with some 
assistance, do this kind of analysis that then leads to mobilizing efforts to demand for changed 
and improved practices. When fulfilled, these demands do bring tangible benefits for the 
rights-holders, e.g. in the form of agriculture extension services, improved water outlets or 
teachers.  
All three assumptions try to pinpoint the transformative potential of human rights and a 
human rights-based approach to development. Can human rights contribute to societal, legal, 
and political change that strengthens the position/voice of the rights-holders? 
1.5 The food security situation in Malawi 
Malawi is commonly known among tourists as the Warm Heart of Africa. It is a landlocked 
country south of the equator in Sub-Saharan Africa. Malawi is among the poorest countries in 
the world, ranking 171 in the UNDP’s Human Development Index 2011,89 despite recent 
annual growth rates of 6.8 percent (2004-2010).90   
It is beyond doubt that food insecurity in Malawi is a chronic problem that is caused by a 
complex web of factors, including diminishing farm size, weak access to markets, high 
prevalence of HIV/AIDS, weak governance,91 and chronic poverty. Around 2005 about 52 
percent of the population was living below the national poverty line and 22 percent were 
classified as ultra poor who could not afford to meet the minimum standard for recommended 
daily food requirement.92 According to UN sources this figure has not improved: the Human 
Development Report 2011 reports that more than 52 percent of the population are affected by 
multidimensional poverty,93 a concept that is reviewed in chapter 2.3.1 of this study. Forty-
four percent of children under five are chronically malnourished and around 20 percent are 
unable to meet their minimum food requirements.94  
The Welfare Monitoring Surveys (WMS) conducted by the National Statistical Office in 
Malawi does, however, show a reduction in poverty from 50 percent in 2005 to 39 percent in 
2009. This reduction took place over the implementation period of the Farm Input Subsidy 
Programme (FISP) and may be due to the increase in maize production under FISP, but 
analysts also speculate that the WMS is not reliable since it is based on imputed consumption 
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expenditures rather than actual values.95 The most recent Integrated Household Survey (IHS) 
shows an improvement in welfare in terms of basic needs. While the second IHS (2005) 
reported that almost 57 percent of households felt they had inadequate food consumption, the 
report published covering the period of 2010-2011 indicates that this figure has fallen to 38 
percent.96 The same report shows that poverty and food insecurity in Malawi takes on a 
distinct gender dimension: 46.3 percent of female headed households reported inadequate 
food while the same figure for male-headed households was 35.8 percent.97 Paradoxically, 
women are the main food producers: about 70 percent of agriculture labour is carried out by 
women.98  
There is persistent lack of economic opportunity either to produce one’s own food through 
subsistence farming or to exchange labour for an income that is needed to purchase adequate, 
safe and nutritious food.99 There is a cycle of poverty where farmers lack input because they 
do not have cash, so they work in other people’s fields (ganyu), and this leads to a situation 
where the household suffers from a lack of labour.100 As an end result the household does not 
have enough food  
Numerous reports analysing the problem and possible solutions have been produced. In a 
report from 1994, the problems discussed were low maize productivity, poor weather, and 
population growth. Policy issues raised were land policy, marketing and pricing policy, 
research and technology, agricultural input policies, and employment and wages policy.101 In 
the Food Security Policy of 2006 many of these issues reoccurred: promoting irrigation was a 
priority together with ensuring access to fertilizers. Land policy and the new Land Bill were 
briefly referred to.102 On the operational level, the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security 
was working with no less than 45 policies.103 The Technical Secretariat within the Ministry 
was coordinating 150 food security projects.104   
During my interviews with representatives of relevant ministries, donors, and NGOs working 
to improve food security, a long list of causes for the persistent hunger problem was given. 
Lack of rain105 was mentioned by almost everyone as being one factor leading to the recurrent 
food crisis situations facing Malawi in the past ten years. A typical statement was: “The cause 
                                                 
95 Mussa and Pauw, “Poverty in Malawi”, supra note 90, at 2. 
96 Republic of Malawi, National Statistical Office, “Integrated Household Survey 2010-2011”, September 2012, 
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103 Malawi Agriculture Policy Framework: Logical Framework for Agriculture Sector Policy Documents, May 
2006.  
104 Field diary, notes from discussion with Adviser in Technical Secretariat, 12 December 2006.  
105 During the past ten years at least five severe droughts have damaged the harvests. 
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of the food shortage was quite natural: the rains were not just there.”106 Only rarely did the 
informant link past policy decisions to the food security situation in the country today (“this 
problem is a result of accumulated effects of wrong actions, wrong decisions, wrong 
policies”),107 thereby linking food shortages to the responsibility of those involved in deciding 
on policies. This sort of shift in the awareness and analysis of the food insecurity problem, 
away from seeing it as ‘natural’, would be critical when moving from a charity-based to a 
rights-based approach to development, i.e. putting legislation, policy and practice in place that 
supports the realisation of the right to adequate food. According to Amartya Sen famine is 
always a social phenomenon and classifying famines into ‘man-made’ and ‘nature-made’ is 
often misleading. Even when the prime mover in a famine is a flood or drought, what the 
impact will be on the population would depend on how society is organised.108 
Land policy (or the lack thereof) is one example of how food insecurity has been made worse 
by past policy decisions. From independence in 1964 until 2002 there was no comprehensive 
land policy in the country. During the 1970s and 80s, when tobacco growing was profitable, 
land was continuously transferred from customary ownership to private tenure for the estate 
sector, the result being a declining size in land holdings.109 Bias in favour of the estate 
production has led to shortage of arable land in some regions. Failure to deal with land policy 
has no doubt contributed to current problems of poverty, food insecurity, and inequalities in 
access to arable land.110 Increased land fragmentation has contributed to a situation where 
farmers with less than one hectare, which is more than half of all farmers,111 have been 
identified as a category of food insecure households in need of special support.112  
The problems created by unclear and non-existing policies were being addressed at the time 
of the interviews as there was a land policy reform underway in 2006. A Special Law 
Commission had reviewed all land related laws and drafted one comprehensive Land Act 
based on the policy from 2002. The Land Bill was in the process of being reviewed in 
Parliament at the time of my field research. One proposal was that all land, including 
customary land, is privatized and titled.113 Sixty-five percent of the land in Malawi is 
customary land that the ‘owner’ has the right to use but has not a formal title to,114 and 
allocation of rights to such land is the responsibility of traditional leaders.115 The policy seeks 
to encourage customary landowners to register land holdings as private customary holdings 
with land tenure rights.116 It remains to be seen if these quite radical proposals will be adopted 
as law, and what impact it will have on food security. This sensitive issue has taken many 
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years to process and the Customary Land Bill, existing since 2010,117 had not yet been 
adopted in 2012.  
The human rights civil society in Malawi was not actively working on land-related policy 
issues in 2006, despite the fact that land policy potentially has a considerable effect on food 
rights. Olivier De Schutter, Special Rapporteur on the right to food, has pointed out that in the 
context of increasing commercial pressure on land, it is essential from a human rights 
perspective to improve the protection of livelihoods in rural areas by strengthening security of 
tenure. However, he believes that an exclusive emphasis on individual titling, which is what 
the Land Bill was proposing in Malawi, risks leading to the creation of land markets and 
privatisation of common resources that are particularly vital for the most vulnerable members 
of the communities.118 Case law concerning the right to property in Malawi has in fact 
established that ownership of the beneficial interest in customary land is also protected – 
contrary to the misconception that tenure in customary land is insecure.119  
In Malawi maize is the staple food in most districts. People use maize meal to make porridge 
(nsima) that is eaten every day in most households. For many people in the rural areas nsima 
is food. Relish from vegetables, fish or meat is a supplement to nsima.120 Among educated 
Malawians and expatriates you often hear diminishing expressions such as “Malawians are 
spoiled, they want nsima three times a day and when the maize harvest is bad they complain 
that they don’t have food even when rice would do the same job”.121 This and other similar 
statements hint at the fact that rural Malawians can blame themselves for their food insecurity 
problem because they simply do not value other staple foods such as rice, cassava, and sweet 
potatoes. This is naturally not the case. However, decades of skewed policies aimed at 
promoting white maize production have distorted production and consumption patterns, and 
this has made Malawians vulnerable to chronic food deficits.122  
Increased maize production has, since the 1960s been the main strategy for achieving the 
objective of self-sufficiency in food production. As a consequence of this policy, maize 
cropping has been introduced throughout the country and has become the dominant food crop 
even in those areas that used to produce other crops. Agriculture extension workers have 
largely focussed on promoting hybrid maize production and the use of fertilizers to the 
neglect of other food crops and extension strategies. Small-holder land allocated to growing 
maize increased from 58 percent in 1980/81 to 70 percent in 1990/91.123 Out of all 
agricultural households 97 percent cultivated maize in Malawi in 2005.124 Over-reliance on 
maize is a problem that is today recognised both by the government as well as by donors and 
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NGOs trying to improve food and nutrition security. Promoting alternative crops together 
with diversification is, however, challenging due to decades of public information on the 
importance of producing maize.125  
Agricultural liberalisation measures have hit rural Malawi hard. Until the mid-1990s, 
smallholder farmers enjoyed subsidies on fertilizers and hybrid maize seeds, but farmers in 
the early 2000s worked in a very different policy environment. Before liberalisation farmers 
could also access cheap credit and sell their produce at supported prices to the Agricultural 
Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC). By 1996, fertilizer and hybrid maize 
seed had been removed and agricultural markets had been liberalised. Smallholders faced 
deteriorating terms of trade, volatile markets, and scarce credit.126 In the liberalised, non-
interventionist context, ‘bad’ maize production years became normal. Since the mid-1990s, 
the only good years have been those when there have been large-scale interventions to boost 
food production. Various such interventions have been implemented over the years by the 
government and with the support of donors, known as the Starter Pack and the Targeted Input 
Programme.127  
The presidents that followed the one-party regime of President Kamuzu Banda (1966-
1993),128 Bakili Muluzi and Bingu wa Mutarika, implemented policies to remedy the previous 
biases against smallholder agriculture.129 Following the election of Mutharika as President in 
2004, the government decided to implement a radically different input programme, moving 
towards a general (not targeted) subsidy.130 The President had publicly placed great 
importance on the FISP as a key strategy of the country’s agricultural policy and is considered 
the most influential actor in this context.131 In 2004/05 the government provided two million 
smallholder farmers with packs of 25 kg of fertilizers, 5 kg of maize seed and 1 kg of 
legumes, in addition to distributing vouchers for buying fertilizers to 500,000 smallholders.132 
The voucher programme targeted economically active farmers who could afford to buy 
subsidised fertilizers at 950 kwacha. During my stay in Malawi the FISP was a very topical 
issue, and almost every day news papers raised issues of alleged corruption and 
mismanagement. Due to these and other reasons donors have been reluctant to support 
subsidies. They have, however, accepted targeted subsidies for the poorest farmers and in 
2006 the EU, DFID and NORAD supported a seed component of the subsidy programme.133 
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Needless to say, the subsidy programme is hugely popular in Malawi.134 The country has 
experienced an increase in national maize production in the period of 2006-2010, moving 
from chronic food deficits to the point of exporting maize to neighbouring countries.135 
In 2012, following the sudden death of President Mutharika, one of the key questions being 
asked is whether the change in government will also bring changes to the major policies such 
as the FISP. The new head of state, Joyce Banda, who was Mutharika’s vice president, has 
already expressed commitment to the continuation of the programme. Analysts do not see this 
as surprising, considering that Malawi’s agricultural production depends on some form of 
subsidy to smallholder farmers. Blessings Chinsinga writes that “subsidies have become more 
or less an integral part of the social contract between the government and citizens.” Maize 
subsidies are at the core of Malawi’s politics.136  
The year 2012 is a challenging year in terms of food security in Malawi. The Malawi 
Vulnerability Assessment Committee (MVAC) reports that more than 1.6 million people will 
need food assistance. As many as 15 out of 28 districts are affected by dry spells and 
deteriorating food security. The recent devaluation of the national currency by 49 percent, 
together with a high inflation, has produced sharp increases in food prices and living costs.137  
This is the context in which the three projects to be analysed operate: a country that suffers 
from chronic food insecurity and deep structural problems that create hunger.  
1.6 Data and method  
1.6.1 Research strategy: Analysis of three approaches  
This study applies qualitative social science methodology. The goal is the same as in 
empirical social science in general: to explain and understand observed social phenomena. 
The aim is to understand the meanings, processes, and context138 in which human rights and 
development are integrated; to explain the role of human rights and human rights principles 
within these contexts; and to identify what is characteristic of ‘good development practice’, 
human rights-based approaches as well as legal approaches to development. 
In part III, the objects of enquiry are three food security projects in Malawi and the aim is to 
understand and explain the role of human rights and human rights principles within these 
projects, and to identify what are the characteristics of charity-based, rights-based and legal 
approaches. It is also important to understand the processes and contexts in which they 
operate. The analysis of the three food-related projects in Malawi takes place in a specific 
locality, context, and timeframe, and this cannot be disregarded. For instance it is of relevance 
to be familiar with the history of the human rights movement in Malawi, especially during the 
transition from an authoritarian regime to a multiparty form of government, in order to 
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understand the role human rights play in society today. Naturally, it is also important to know 
the food security challenges that Malawi is facing. The thesis tries to capture the rationale for 
choosing a specific approach to intervene in food insecurity and the role human rights play in 
this picture.139 The study does not, however, attempt to give an over-arching analysis of the 
cause-and-effect processes of food insecurity in Malawi in general or to evaluate the 
effectiveness and effects of the programmes.140  
The strategy for providing an answer to the main research questions about the role and added 
value of human rights in food security efforts is an analysis of three food-related projects. 
This strategy is empirical in the sense that evidence about what is taking place in these three 
projects is collected.141 The analysis provides in-depth knowledge of the three cases studies 
and therefore I have no ambition to draw generalized conclusions based on the data acquired 
in the field. However, the data may provide theoretical insights, in this case related to the 
assumptions made before embarking on the field research, which help in understanding the 
role of human rights in development on a general level.142 Data for the analysis has been 
collected through semi-structured individual interviews and group interviews conducted at the 
end of 2006. In addition to analysis of the interviews carried out during the field research, 
policy documents as well as other written material concerning the programmes are critically 
reviewed. Due to the difficulty of obtaining written material from Malawi after the end of the 
field research the study only gives a superficial follow-up of the projects.       
The three food-related interventions in Malawi represent different approaches to development 
and food security: (1) supporting food security through food-for-asset (representing charity-
based approaches); (2) supporting food security through demanding accountable services 
from duty-bearers as a matter of rights (representing rights-based approaches); (3) supporting 
legislation on the human right to food (representing legal human rights approaches). The 
assumption is that human rights play a role in all of these approaches, but what that role is 
differs and so do the interpretations of the so called human rights principles. The point in 
making such a comparison is not to play these approaches against each other (‘charity/needs 
vs. rights’) but instead highlighting that if and when needs are seen as a matter of fulfilling 
human rights (‘needs as rights’) this has certain implications. The process should look 
different if needs are dealt with as an human rights issue compared to cases where fulfilling 
needs is seen as ‘charity’ or a ‘favour’.   
The first object of inquiry is the food-for-asset component of the food assistance programme 
called the Joint Emergency Food Aid Programme (JEFAP) by the World Food Programme 
(WFP) and its NGO partners. What is characteristic of this approach is that service delivery 
(food commodities distributed in exchange of asset creation) is based on targeting needs, and 
the delivery of the assistance is based on charity rather than entitlements. The aim is to 
identify the rationale behind distributing food assistance, and the principles according to 
which programmes are managed, not to evaluate the effectiveness in reaching the intended 
beneficiaries.  
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The second programme that is analysed is Shire Highlands Sustainable Livelihoods 
Programme (SHSLP) implemented by Oxfam and local government institutions. It is seen as 
representing ‘rights-based approaches’ because it makes more inspirational use of human 
rights than a normatively-based human rights approach.  Integrating a rights-based approach, 
which started in 1999, has according to Oxfam, meant working at the institutional level to 
“stimulate the supply of rights and services” and at the community level to “generate 
awareness of and demand for these rights and services”,143 but without linking this language 
to international human rights instruments. My aim is to identify challenges in applying 
‘rights-talk’, i.e. demanding accountable and transparent services as a matter of rights and 
obligations, not as a favour, in a very resource-constrained environment.  
The third project chosen for the analysis is the Right to Food Project implemented by Church 
and Society together with a loose network of other civil society organisations. The project is 
seen to represent a ‘legal human rights approach’ since its main focus is on putting legislation 
in place that will guarantee duty-bearer responsibility and avenues for accountability. 
Through analysing the project, it is possible to study the possible added value, and the 
challenges facing this kind of a normative approach; an approach that is strongly rooted in the 
international human rights framework.  
Malawi was chosen because of its prevalent food security problems and because I was 
familiar with the policy framework in the country from previous research on the human 
rights-based approach to development in the context of food security and HIV/AIDS.144 There 
are many benefits in having all three case studies in the same country. In addition to logistical 
and practical benefits in carrying out field research, it also meant that all three projects 
functioned in the same political, social, economic, and legislative environment. However, the 
three projects chosen for the analysis are very different in terms of number of beneficiaries 
and staff members, budget, and not the least in terms of the assumed importance given to 
human rights. They also operate on different levels of society: while the Right to Food Project 
lobbies on behalf of national legislation, operating on the national level in a political 
environment, the two other projects operate on the district and local levels. There are different 
external factors inhibiting the projects and this is taken into account in the analysis.  
It is clear that the projects cannot be compared with each other – and I analyse the three 
projects for different reasons. I deliberately choose projects that have a varied approach to 
food security, and it was a conscious choice that only one of the projects claims to apply a so 
called rights-based approach to development. I assumed that through analysing one food 
assistance project that represents a ‘conventional’ approach to hunger it would be possible to 
determine if there is any difference in how certain principles, common to ‘good development 
practice’ and human rights, are applied in this approach compared with the other two projects 
that both claim to apply these same principles. The purpose of the analysis of the food 
assistance project is to have a starting point, or baseline, of what is the role of human rights in 
a conventional charity-based approach. It is argued that it is impossible to know whether new 
ways of doing ‘development’ has any transformative effects before one is familiar with the 
situation that proceeded the rights-based and human rights-based approaches. Moreover, food 
assistance has traditionally played an important role in Malawi and it is still distributed every 
year. Since WFP is an important actor in Malawi the JEFAP programme was chosen. 
Naturally, it also played an important role that it was possible to reach WFP staff before the 
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field research and that they agreed to meet me in Lilongwe during the first days of my stay in 
Malawi.  
At first I thought that analysing a ‘conventional’ food aid project and a livelihoods project that 
identifies itself as rights-based would already provide me with some answers about the role of 
human rights and so called human rights principles in these two different approaches. 
However, when I saw a small article about the Right to Food Project in Malawi in a document 
published by FIAN145 the idea to have a third project that is implemented by human rights 
NGOs instead of developmental organisations was conceived. In this way the analysis would 
also be able to see possible differences in the two discourses of development and human 
rights, which traditionally have been operating side by side with hardly any cooperation, at 
least in Malawi. Although I had little information about the Right to Food Project before 
going to Malawi I decided to take a risk and try to set up a sufficient number of interviews 
with project stakeholders. Church and Society, that heads the Right to Food Project, agreed to 
be part of the analysis. 
1.6.2 Data collection: Semi-structured individual interviews and group interviews 
A field research trip to Malawi was conducted in November-December 2006 to gather data 
for the analysis. During the field visit I was affiliated with the Centre for Social Research at 
the University of Malawi. The method for data collection was semi-structured interviews, 
combined with group interviews. Semi-structured interviews means that I used an interview 
guide146 with some predetermined questions and areas to cover, but during the interview I also 
raised new questions while omitting others because of lack of time or because they seemed 
inappropriate with a particular informant.147 In semi-structured interviews it is common to 
incorporate more highly structured sequences (e.g. to obtain factual biographical material) but 
since such personal data plays no role in my research there was no need for this.148 Moreover, 
I wanted to underline the importance of dialogue and encourage the informants to elaborate 
on their views. In preparing for the interviews I benefited from Steinar Kvales extensive work 
on both the theoretical as well as practical aspects of qualitative interviews.149 My interview 
guide included firstly some introductory comments, covering the purpose of my research in 
general and the interview in particular and secondly a list of topics and key questions to ask 
under each project.150 Questions directed to people involved in all three projects focused on 
the rationale for the approach chosen in the particular project, and how human rights fit or do 
not fit into this rationale. The meaning of the concepts non-discrimination and focus on 
vulnerable groups, participation, accountability and empowerment was raised in the majority 
of the interviews. In addition to the common set of questions, project-specific questions were 
also raised. At the end of the interview I indicated that I had no further questions and gave the 
informant the opportunity to raise any issues he or she had been thinking about. 
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I conducted 34 interviews with project personnel, government representatives, NGO staff, 
donors, and other relevant project stakeholders. Altogether 47 informants were interviewed. 
The majority of semi-structured interviews were on an individual basis but on a few occasions 
two or three people participated.151 Individual interviews lasted about 45 minutes, while group 
interviews with two or three people took over one hour. The group interviews with rights-
holders lasted one to two hours, depending on the number of people participating. The 
language spoken in the group interviews was Chichewa, and I used an interpreter. All other 
interviews were in English. Notes were taken during and after every interview and 
observations were written down in a field diary. This was also useful as sometimes informants 
shared useful information after the tape recorder had been turned off.  
The majority of the informants were men – only 15 informants were women. This gender 
imbalance is due to the fact that most government officers and NGO staff members are men. 
The greatest gender imbalance was in interviews for the analysis of the Right to Food Project. 
All individual interviews were with men and it was only in one group interview that I had the 
chance to talk to (three) women.  
Four group interviews with beneficiaries or rights-holders were organised. The discussion in 
these settings was not focused on only one particular topic and therefore it was not a focus 
group. Focus groups are group discussions with the purpose of addressing and exploring a 
specific topic in detail, e.g. people’s views and experiences of contraception.152 Moreover, 
focus groups are distinguished from the broader category of group interviews through 
explicitly using group interaction as research data.153 It is also typical for focus groups that 
people participating are more or less homogenous, e.g. a group of widows, although opinions 
on this vary and heterogeneous groups are also used.154 In my group interviews, the 
discussion covered a broad area and it was directed partly by my questions and partly by the 
interests of the participants. In the analysis of the data obtained from the participants. I do 
take group interaction and internal power relations into account but the study of these factors 
was not the main purpose of the interview.  
In group interviews participants may be invited, i.e., sampled, or random in the way that 
participants are those who happen to be around at the time of the interview.155 In my case I 
did not have any influence over the selection of participants in the group interviews. This can 
be seen as a challenge from the point of view of wanting to ensure an equal representation by 
all groupings in the village, including so called vulnerable groups such as widows, people 
living with HIV/AIDS and people with disabilities. On the other hand, random selection can 
have benefits in terms of excluding possible researcher bias. Two groups interviews were 
organised when visiting the SHSLP and the other two (separate for men and women) were 
held as part of the analysis of the Right to Food Project. The first two groups were mixed in 
the sense that people participating came from diverse backgrounds. The group interviews in 
which men and women were interviewed separately were more in the style of focus groups, as 
all participants were members of Church and Society in the Mulanje District. However, in this 
case the participants also came from diverse social backgrounds. Due to practical challenges it 
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was not possible to organise an interview with beneficiaries of the food-for-asset component 
of JEFAP. Instead, questions concerning food assistance were raised with participants in the 
other groups.  
The first group interview with rights-holders was held in a village in the Mulanje District. 
People in the villages usually work in their fields in the morning so I was advised by Oxfam 
to visit the village in the afternoon. Oxfam had informed the village about my visit. I arrived 
together with one officer from the Community Development office and one staff member of 
the human rights NGO Malawi CARER (Centre for Advice, Research, and Education on 
Rights), who also acted as my interpreter. As we arrived we were greeted by the village 
headman. He showed us into a brick house that is used for adult literacy classes and other 
common activities for the villagers. Inside the house I met a group of about ten men and 
women.156 I shook hands with everyone. Then the village headman said a word of welcome in 
Chichewa, to thank everyone for attending. After this there was a short prayer. Then it was 
my turn to explain why I had arrived and what I wanted to talk about, i.e., express my interest 
in learning about the structures in the village, the outside support from government 
institutions and NGOs, the on-going development activities and the challenges villagers are 
facing. I also raised some questions about rights as I knew that the Malawi CARER had been 
educating villagers on rights issues. The village headman was the first to talk and answer my 
questions. While he was talking the others did not participate in the discussion. When I raised 
a question about the Village Development Committee a male member of the committee 
replied. From this point the others in the room also participated in the discussion. A young 
woman from the Village Rights Committee was active in giving replies and she also 
explained about the activities of this committee.  
The set-up for this discussion with the rights-holders had a number of weaknesses. First of all 
it is clear that it was mostly the village headman and people with a position within an elected 
body who were talking. This is a typical problem in group interviews and focus groups. The 
benefit, on the other hand, is that participants tend to provide checks and balances on each 
other, i.e. there is a kind of natural quality control.157 However, I cannot claim to have the 
view of, for instance, vulnerable groups. Secondly, the presence of the officer from 
Community Development and Malawi Carer, both of which are partners in the Shire 
Highlands programme, might have made people prone to speak only favourably of the 
programme activities. It is naturally impossible to make sure people were being honest and 
not only saying what they thought I wanted to hear. This is a general human tendency and 
anyone, no matter how powerful or powerless, has been in a situation where he or she is 
trying to assess what the person asking questions really wants to hear. Statements such as 
“gender balance is important”, and the use of development buzz words such as “capacity 
building” made me careful when drawing conclusions based on this group interview. Thirdly, 
it is difficult to assess the accuracy of the translation from Chichewa to English and from 
English to Chichewa. These concepts might be the choice of the interpreter rather than the 
informant. The ideal situation is to have a professional outside interpreter but due to practical 
challenges such as time constraints, long distances and a limited local network (as this was in 
the beginning of my field trip) this was not possible.   
The second group interview was the following afternoon in a village in the Thyolo District. 
When I arrived together with two staff members from Development Broadcasting Unit (DBU) 
that coordinates the Radio Listening Club in the village, a crowd of 10-15 villagers greeted us 
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with singing and dancing. They wanted to share the song that they use in the radio 
programmes they make. The atmosphere was full of pride for the village and the common 
activities, especially the Radio Listening Club that currently was making a programme about 
the misuse of fertilizer coupons. The villagers were very well prepared for my visit and my 
impression was that this was not the first time they received visitors from foreign countries. 
The man from the DBU interpreted. Again a strict protocol was followed during the opening 
of the discussion. The difference here was that while the headman of the previous village 
played an active role in the opening ceremony, this time all three village heads (two men and 
one woman) were sitting at the other side of the room and not taking active part in the 
discussion until later. After the praying and all the opening statements and introductions there 
was a short play about farming and the challenges faced by farmers performed by a small 
group of women and men. Then elected members from the Village Development Committee, 
the Village Rights Committee and the Radio Listening Club explained about the work these 
committees carry out in the village. After these general introductions I had the opportunity to 
direct specific questions to individuals from the committees and the village headmen. At one 
point I also indicated I would like to have an answer from everyone in the room. Towards the 
end of the session I encouraged the villagers to ask question of me and we concluded by 
comparing farming in Finland and Malawi.   
The weaknesses in this second group interview are the same as in the first: not having an 
outside interpreter, not being sure that the presence of village headmen is not intimidating 
others and the difficulty to get all the people to participate in the discussion. My impression 
was, however, that the statements made were honest and frank and people were not trying to 
give a too rosy picture of the Shire Highlands Programme or the Radio Listening Club. Many 
women were also active in the discussion but the problems raised were not as gender specific 
as was the case in the forth group interview that was for women only. A common challenge in 
all four group interviews was to clearly communicate to the participants that I was not 
representing a donor or any development agency and that I was not in a position to decide 
about funds or the future of the programme. Being a white, European, academic woman 
visiting a village for a short while naturally effects the information shared with me. It would 
be naïve not to see that people were hoping to obtain some benefits from my visit and 
therefore also trying to please me as much as possible. The research interview was in this case 
not a conversation between two equal partners.158 
The third and forth group interviews took place at Mulanje Mission with members of a local 
branch of Church and Society. It transpired to be a good decision to have separate interviews 
with men and women. Although this was a much smaller group interview than the previous 
two and the people interviewed were not direct ‘beneficiaries’ of the Right to Food Project it 
can still be argued that they, as local members of Church and Society, represent ‘rights-
holders’. It should also be noted that the Right to Food Project does not have any direct 
beneficiaries and this was as close as I could come to talking to people who were not staff 
members from NGOs involved in the project. The discussion was useful as it revealed the 
limited role of local activists in the Right to Food Project. At the same time, I had the chance 
to take up food security issues such as fertilizer coupons, land policy, food assistance, the role 
of local duty-bearers and power structures in villages with people who were in a considerably 
less privileged position than NGO staff. The fact that these people all lived in Mulanje, where 
Oxfam’s Shire Highlands programme was implemented made the discussions even more 
relevant as this gave me additional information about the specific challenges in the 
programme area.              
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When the interview started it was only me with two men from the Church and Society Board. 
Ten minutes later a third person, who happened to be part of the local elite, joined us. It was 
noticeable how the other two men became silent as the third man started talking in English 
instead of Chichewa. My driver was interpreting when the discussion switched back to 
Chichewa again. It soon became clear that none of the men had much information about the 
Right to Food Project and the atmosphere was a bit tense as it seemed it was embarrassing for 
them to admit they had no idea what I was asking about. The atmosphere improved again as I 
started asking about other Church and Society activities in Mulanje and general food security 
problems. For example, they showed me civic education material about human rights that 
Church and Society had used when conducting rights training with members of the Church. 
This was useful as I could see rights issues were taken up also outside Church and Society’s 
main office in Blantyre.  
During the discussion with three female members of Church and Society I was given an 
insight into these women’s lives. The atmosphere was intimate and open. The presence of my 
male driver, who interpreted, did not seem to prevent these women from sharing stories with 
me. I heard about everything from violence against women in the families to how young 
orphan girls working on the tea plantations sell sex to male employees. The women told me 
how they work in the fields, how they get advice from extension workers and struggle to get 
coupons to buy subsidized fertilizer, knowing that most of the coupons go into ‘deeper 
pockets’. The loud laughter following my question if there is anything they can do about 
corruption revealed what they thought of this a naïve question. Some of the women had also 
received goats and seed from NGOs and their opinion was that assistance coming from NGOs 
works better than from village chiefs. At the same time the women tried their best to help 
orphans in the area, taking care of them with food, soap, and blankets, even taking them to 
school. The trusting and intimate atmosphere in which all three women felt comfortable to 
express their views made it the most useful group interview in providing information about 
the overall context and challenges concerning food security and human rights in Mulanje.      
When studying multiple cases it is crucial to set the boundaries of the study, i.e., to define 
aspects of the cases that are feasible to study within the time and means at hand. The question 
of who to interview (sampling) can have a considerable impact on later analysis. Qualitative 
researchers usually focus on a small sample of people compared to quantitative researchers 
who aim for larger numbers and seek statistical significance. Qualitative samples also often 
have more purpose than being merely random.159 I set the boundaries of the case studies early 
on as I decided not to study every aspect of the programme but instead focus on the particular 
area that related to human rights issues. The boundaries for each project were a little different 
because the assumed role of human rights was different. For example, in the SHSLP I was not 
interested in learning about the seed component of the programme but instead I focussed on 
how rights issues have been integrated into the programme through rights training, radio 
listening clubs, and cooperation with the Labour Office and the trade union. This also helped 
to narrow down the people to interview.  
In JEFAP my focus was broader and more general as I was not sure what the role of human 
rights would be but after my initial interviews I made the choice to narrow my focus down to 
the food-for-asset aspect of the overall programme. This choice was based on the perception 
that principles non-discrimination, participation, empowerment and accountability play a 
larger role in this context compared to schemes in which food given as direct assistance.  
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With regard to the Right to Food Project, which is much smaller in scope, and focuses purely 
on the right to food, the question of setting boundaries was not a significant issue. The 
ambition was to interview as many relevant stakeholders of the project as possible, but being 
aware that it is not possible to cover everyone and some kind of selection had to be made. 
This selection was more or less random in that it was the circumstances (e.g. who picked up 
the phone that moment I called to set up the interview) that dictated the final selection rather 
than a detailed list of people to be interviewed that had been prepared well in advance. (This 
also holds true for the other projects as well.) Time constraint and conditions in Malawi did 
not permit the following of any detailed plan but instead the situation was lived each day. 
After each interview I considered who else should be interviewed in order to cover different 
aspects of the programme and to avoid bias.  
The Right to Food Project had a rather ‘elite approach’, with limited input from ‘the 
grassroots’, and this is reflected in those individuals I interviewed (mostly male leaders of 
NGOs). The aim was to obtain an overview of the characteristics of settings and processes 
within the programme. This means the people themselves were secondary.160 In fact, I did not 
know anything about the people to be interviewed in advance of the interview and he or she 
was selected based on his/her role in the programme, not their personal capacity. In addition 
to interviewing representatives of stakeholders to the projects, I also decided to speak to 
people who were familiar with either the projects or had insight into the substantial issues that 
I was trying to learn about, i.e. food security challenges, land policy, the human rights 
movement in Malawi, NGOs trying to work with a rights-based approach, etc. This proved to 
be a good opportunity not only to learn about the context in which the projects operate in 
Malawi but also to get contrasting and comparative information about the phenomenon of 
rights-based approaches in Malawi. For example, I have learned to be much more critical of 
NGO, donor and government reports. Moreover, talking “with people who are not central to 
the phenomenon but who are neighbors to it” can help in ‘de-centring’ oneself from a 
particular way of viewing the cases.161  
1.6.3 Ethical issues  
During any research process ethical issues will arise. In field research, the issue of how to 
approach the informants and what kind of information about the overall research project to 
supply is constantly on the researcher’s mind. In order to be certain about having the informed 
consent and voluntary participation of the informants it is first of all necessary to inform the 
research subjects about the overall purpose of the research. Secondly, any possible risks and 
benefits from participating in the interview should be raised.162 Depending somewhat on the 
interview setting I devoted more or less time to explaining the purpose of my research in 
general and why I had chosen to study the three programmes in Malawi in particular. I did 
this already when approaching the informant for the first time by phone and then in more 
detail before the start of the actual interview. When approaching the three implementing 
organisations WFP, Oxfam and Church and Society through e-mail before going to Malawi I 
also sent my research plan so that the overall aim of the research would be clear from the 
beginning. In the case of the present research, I failed to see any risks with participation from 
the perspective of the individual informant and therefore the issue was not raised when 
approaching them. For the three implementing organisations WFP, Oxfam, and Church and 
Society there is naturally the risk of being criticised. A potential benefit is, on the other hand, 
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to obtain an outsider’s analysis of the programme that can be used in internal policy 
development.  
A second ethical issue is that of confidentiality, which implies that private data identifying the 
informants will not be reported.163 With permission, interviews were recorded on tape after 
handing over a statement guaranteeing the anonymity of the informant. I explained that I 
would use interview numbers instead of names when referring to interview data. On two 
occasions consent to use a tape recorder was not given and then I relied on writing notes. 
When reporting on the results I have chosen to indicate if the informant represents civil 
society, the government or a donor. With regard to interviews with the three implementing 
organisations I use their names in my reporting. I also indicate which government department 
has been interviewed. In some cases I only refer to the anonymous ‘NGO’ or ‘donor’. The 
nature of the information given in the interviews is not as such sensitive or personal but as the 
number of NGOs and donors is so limited in Malawi it would in theory be possible to identify 
the name behind a specific statement, therefore, this was the only way to guarantee 
confidentiality. When interviewing donors some information concerning the relationship 
between the donor and Malawi Government arose that can be regarded as sensitive and in this 
case the informant specifically asked that I would not report this piece of information. During 
group interviews with rights-holders sensitive issues such as power relationships and 
corruption often occurred , and I have also reported on that, but in this case there is no way to 
find out the identity of the informants.  
1.6.4 Analysis of interview data 
All tape recorded interviews have been transcribed. The quality of the recording varies; 
sometimes there is heavy rain on a tin roof, sometimes the informant’s speech is unclear and 
this has made the full transcription difficult. Altogether I have more than 200 pages of 
interview data, which is still a manageable quantity for the purpose of analysis. Analysis of 
the interview data started already in the field as I had the habit of listening to every interview 
the same evening as the interview took place, and writing a short summary in my field 
research diary. Below is an example of what a summary could look like.  
1993-94: Malawi went through a transition but not transformation  
Dualist legal system, but duties not taken all the way: legal challenges for 
implementing the right to food 
Other challenges on the community level, still fear to talk of rights and demand 
accountability  
Duty-bearers blank in terms of seeing their work in a rights context  
Influx of human rights NGOs around 1994, but a lot of missed opportunities. 
Preaching the language of rights but no integration them into people’s livelihoods.  
Rights need to be integrated into the official documents of the service providers 
Reason for RBA: development agencies see that development projects are not 
sustainable 
Accountability not taken all the way up (CARE), work with health centres but do 
not go to the district or central level  
NICE project has changed its approach this year from education on rights to 
“walking all the way” with communities seeking for remedies, taking different 
issues all the way, to central government if necessary.164  
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Through using this diary I was able to write down observations that were useful for the 
analysis and when developing questions to be raised in up-coming interviews.   
I use the empirical data to understand how the actors in Malawi give meaning to concepts 
such as human rights, participation, discrimination, accountability, and other key concepts and 
principles used in development and human rights work. This is a constructivist view.165 I also 
make some generalisations to show trends within the broad phenomenon of interaction 
between human rights and development in the field of food security. In this context, I use my 
own interpretations. As interpretation requires at least some key concepts to guide the 
selection of relevant information,166 I have chosen to focus on concepts that are characteristic 
of human rights-based approaches (HRBAs). 
When analyzing qualitative data, the researcher has to move, in the interpretative analysis, 
between theory and empirical social facts in a way that often reshapes the theoretical ideas as 
well as her view of the empirical data.167 In my case I started with an assumption about the 
role and added value of human rights in food security, then I collected my data, and as I 
started to analyse and interpret the data I also started to formulate some theoretical ideas. 
There has been a constant interplay between theoretical ideas (explanations) and empirical 
data.     
When I started the transcribing process I had the habit of highlighting interesting passages and 
sentences. I did the writing of the first draft analysis parallel with transcribing. Before writing 
the conclusions I read through all relevant interviews again and highlighted relevant words 
and sentences. In the interviews, I have been looking for statements that support and/or 
question my assumptions about the role and added value of human rights in food security 
efforts. I have also focussed on how the informants give substance and meaning to the five so 
called key principles of a human rights-based approach to development. When writing the 
analysis I let the data speak for itself through using quotations. The contact persons from the 
three organisations have been given the opportunity to comment on the draft analysis before it 
was presented at any academic seminar.  
In social research method text books, a long list of different approaches to analysis of 
qualitative data are usually identified and described. What analytical approach is chosen by 
the researcher depends on the purpose of the analysis. A key issue is to be explicit about the 
chosen method of analysis when reporting on the results. It is also important that the 
researcher is conscious of how qualitative data can be interpreted differently and that 
interviews will always contain an element of interpretation.168 As noted, the possible 
approaches to analysis are diverse but there are, however, recurring features such as coding 
the data; adding comments and reflections; going through the materials trying to identify 
similar phrases, patterns, themes, relationships, etc; gradually elaborating a small set of 
generalizations that cover the consistencies in the data; and linking these generalizations to a 
formalized body of knowledge in the form of theories.169 The overall aim is to look for 
meanings and understanding. There are no strict formulas for analysing qualitative data as is 
the case with analysing quantitative data – but this does not mean that there are no guidelines 
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to assist in qualitative analysis.170 Constructive advice can be found in e.g. Miles and 
Huberman, who advocate a systematic approach to qualitative analysis,171 and in Kvale’s 
writings on what methods can be used to organise the interview texts.172  
For the purpose of the analysis of the interview data from Malawi I have found that coding is 
the most useful approach. Coding of qualitative data means organising the raw data into 
conceptual categories and creating themes or concepts, which are later used to analyse data.173 
The themes and concepts I use are based on my assumptions and research questions.174 I 
categorised data under the following headings: express linkage to rights, non-discrimination 
and focus on vulnerable groups, participation, empowerment, accountability, self-reliance, 
charity/favour, politics, policy issues, service providers, duty-bearers, rights-holders, and 
power structures. These labels are then attached to phrases, sentences, or whole paragraphs in 
my interview data. Codes are used to retrieve and organise data so that I can quickly find, 
retrieve, and cluster the segments relating to a particular research question, assumption, or 
theme.175   
In order to display the interview data in an organised fashion I placed sentences that have 
been coded into charts before drawing final conclusions.176 This functioned as a verification 
process, testing the validity and reliability of my conclusions. When displaying data in a chart 
it was easier to confirm if an explanation is plausible and if I have sufficient evidence to 
support it.177  
1.6.5 The question of validity in analysis of qualitative data 
A common challenge in qualitative social research is how to assess whether the conclusions in 
a study that are based on qualitative evidence are valid, i.e., are the findings meaningful, 
relevant, ‘true’?178 This is an epistemological question: what can we know, and how do we 
know what we know? There are, of course, different epistemological positions.179 Qualitative 
methods are sometimes dismissed as unscientific, subjective, unreliable, and invalid. This is 
especially the case when qualitative methods in general and qualitative data analysis in 
particular are judged against common criteria of validity, as developed for psychometric tests. 
In positivist social science, validity is based on whether a method measures what it is 
intended to measure.180 According to Kvale, it is clear that “[i]f the concept of validity is 
confined to quantitative measurements, then research, aiming at qualitative descriptions and 
interpretations of meaning, is by definition not a valid scientific method.”181 However, 
qualitative methods may achieve a valid scientific practice when validity is seen as a broader 
concept, implying to what extent a method investigates what it is intended to investigate, i.e., 
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to what extent our observations reflect the phenomena of interest to the researcher. Qualitative 
research has then the power to reflect and conceptualise the nature of the phenomena 
investigated and can capture the complexity of the social reality.182  
When discussing what is valid, true knowledge in social science one inevitably runs into the 
philosophical question of what truth is.183  Social science is concerned with social reality that 
is constructed through people’s opinions, experiences and judgments. The interview data I 
analyse represent the subjective opinions, reflections, and views of the informants in question, 
and therefore it is not possible to find one objective truth behind the data. Instead of one 
‘absolute truth’ there are multiple subjective narratives of what is taking place in the three 
food security projects in Malawi. The interview conversation is able to capture the multitude 
of views on a theme.184  
Hermeneutics deal with interpretation of social meaning – as opposed to naturalistic research 
methods searching for casual laws through the gathering of data by observation and 
experiment.185 An interpretative process of knowledge production has always existed in the 
social sciences and humanities, so this is not a new phenomenon.186 However, hermeneutics 
does not always apply the same notion of ‘truth’ as the naturalistic position, that views truth 
as corresponding to reality. Moreover, hermeneutics claims that scientific inquiry is always 
interpretative.187 This is the position in this research. In this interpretative mission, when 
reading a text or listening to someone, the researcher should forget all her preconceptions 
concerning the content. She should, in the words of Gadamer, “remain open to the meaning of 
the other person or text”. This kind of openness and sensitivity involves neither “neutrality” 
nor the “extinction of one’s self”, but rather being aware of one’s own bias, so that what is 
being interpreted can present itself in all “its otherness” and thereby present its own truth 
against the researcher’s own preconceptions.188  
It is clear that the interview as a research method directly violates a positivist conception of 
science as interview data consist of meaningful statements, which are based on interpretations 
so that data and their interpretations are not strictly separated. Here we must keep in mind that 
quantified knowledge is not a goal of interview research, instead the main research findings 
are expressed in language. Language is neither objective or universal, nor subjective or 
individual, but intersubjective. Additionally, the interview is intersubjective instead of a 
purely objective or subjective method.189  
With regard to the language used in part of my interview data, especially where the informant 
had a similar educational and professional background as I have, it is clear that we share the 
same language of the ‘human rights expert’. The informant uses the same jargon and semi-
technical language of rights and duties, the same concepts of accountability and 
empowerment. These are concepts I wanted to understand in the particular context of a project 
in Malawi. This means that the ‘analysis’ is already taking place during the interview, as the 
informant is helping me to analyse what is happening in the project and what role human 
rights play in it as well as in Malawian society and politics overall.190 I am interested in 
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understanding how these concepts are used and interpreted within the different projects, by 
the different actors, and through listening to my informants giving meaning to these concepts 
I am learning precisely that. I acquire information about how they want me to think they apply 
the concepts; how they try to instil empowerment in the people they work with. They offer me 
their story about what empowerment should be – and that reveals to me how different actors 
in the human rights community, the development/relief community, and the organisations 
where these two communities have come together as a rights-based approach (RBA) have 
different interpretations of these concepts. I can relate this to theories, and help in 
understanding the ideological differences these stories display.  
What can be done to validate the findings that are based on interview data is to check the 
credibility of knowledge claims. We do not need to ‘check’ or validate the story given to us in 
the interview against ‘one truth’ but instead ask why this story is relevant now, what does it 
reveal? As put by Kvale: “Validation becomes investigation, continually checking, 
questioning, and theoretically interpreting the findings.”191 Theory helps in understanding the 
reality that is reflected in the interviews.  
1.6.6 Summary 
In this chapter I have made an effort to describe and problematise the various steps I have 
taken in the research process of the empirical section. Secondly, I have described the research 
strategy I have chosen in order to find an answer to my main research questions. In this 
context I have also explained why and how I have chosen the three food security programmes 
that are the object of enquiry. Thirdly, I have described the steps in data collection and the 
main challenges in using interviews as a research method. Ethical issues are part of these 
challenges. Finally, I have described my approach to the analysis of the qualitative data. I 
conclude by problematising the issue of validity in the analysis of qualitative data.   
1.7 Thesis outline  
Before presenting the analysis of the empirical data it is necessary to outline what is meant by 
key concepts such as development, human rights, human rights-based approaches to 
development and food security as well as human rights principles in general. This helps us to 
understand the three case studies from Malawi. Therefore, the second part of this study is a 
critical conceptual analysis that reviews how these concepts relate to agency and change. It 
starts with a review of the meanings given to ‘development’, introducing the major 
development schools and exploring what kind of ‘development’ is striven for in human rights 
approaches. It moves on to critically reviewing the human rights concept itself. Thirdly, it 
explores the relationship between food rights, food security and livelihoods. It reviews what 
meaning has been given to the right to food by international legal experts, by activists and, as 
an example, by national legal actors in India. Finally, the role and meaning of five selected 
‘human rights principles’ in development is critically analysed. This is necessary in order to 
understand what difference human rights make as they enter into development programmes 
and projects, what new elements are brought in, and what value is added. The overall purpose 
of part II is to give theoretical explanations as to how these concepts have been defined by 
various actors in various contexts as well as answers to the general questions concerning the 
transformative potential of human rights in development practice and food security posed in 
part I. In this way we can understand the role of these concepts in food security in Malawi.  
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Part III is a case study, based on empirical data, from Malawi. It starts with an overview of 
human rights discourse in Malawi. It then moves on to analysing the three projects, starting 
with a food assistance programme, that represents a classical charity-based response to food 
insecurity, then analyses a rights-based sustainable livelihoods programme and lastly a 
conventional human rights project that is working with a legal approach. Finally, the 
assumptions are reformulated as conclusions.  
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PART II  CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS  
2.1 Review of the meanings attached to ‘development’ 
Gro Harlem Brundtland noted in her forward to the influential report Our Common Future of 
1987 that “the word ‘development’ has been narrowed down by some into a very limited 
focus, along the lines of ‘what poor nations should do to become richer’, and thus again is 
automatically dismissed by many in the international arena as being a concern of specialist, of 
those involved in questions of ‘development assistance’”. Brundtland challenges this 
assumption and suggests a common sense definition of development as something we all do 
in attempting to improve our lot.192 As much as I like this definition, for the purpose of this 
thesis, I need to first of all explain and elaborate on the usage of the term ‘development’ 
during the last half century in development discourse. Second, I need to make clear what kind 
of ‘development’ is in focus in human rights-based approaches to development. Development 
for whom? Development of what? What is the objective of development?  
2.1.1 Why ‘development’? 
Looking back at the early days of the ‘development era’ that emerged after the Second World 
War, Gilbert Rist points out that there might well have been hesitation about the right term for 
the many different practices designed to increase human well-being. ‘Civilisation’ was a term 
widely used until the end of the First World War and it could have been taken up again.193 
(Rist also argues that colonisation was seen as philanthropic in that it held a worldwide 
promise of civilisation for all, and it was seen as an expression of solidarity, something which 
resembles the rhetoric of the modern development discourse.)194 ‘Westernisation’ could have 
been chosen to highlight the origins of the implicit model; and ‘modernisation’ also had its 
supporters. In the end, however, it was ‘development’ that gained most support.195  
The way in which the term development has been used in the era after World War II is related 
also to the term ‘underdevelopment’, which was introduced by President Truman in 1949. 
‘Underdevelopment/development’ suggested that there is a final stage and the possibility of 
bringing about a change in order to achieve it. It was then perceived to be possible to 
‘develop’ a region; as opposed to things just ‘developing’. Rist writes: “This ‘development’ 
took on a transitive meaning (an action performed by one agent upon another) which 
corresponded to a principle of social organisation, while ‘underdevelopment’ became a 
‘naturally’ occurring (that is, seemingly causeless) state of things.”196 
According to Gasper, we see the following four major types of usage of ‘development’ in 
development studies literature: (1) development as fundamental or structural change; (2) 
development as intervention, action; (3) development as improvements, ‘good change’; (4) 
development as the platform for improvement, that which enables or allows improvement. 
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The two last categories are more ‘evaluative’ in the usage of the word.197 A commonality 
among the many usages of ‘development’ is denoting enhancement, i.e., increasing value or 
desirability – which naturally is subjective. What is ‘good change’ for an agribusiness might 
not be good for a landless peasant, etc. Development as a concept is used by those who 
promote the interest of the affluent and by those who would serve those  less affluent.198  
When we speak of different ways of defining development, and what differentiates them and 
what they have in common, a word of caution is needed, according to Rist. These definitions 
are all based upon the way in which one or many individuals picture the ideal conditions of 
social existence. These pictures are often inviting and desirable, and nobody can say it is 
illegitimate to dream of a more just world where people are happy, live healthier and longer,  
are free of poverty, exploitation and violence. It is fairly easy to assemble a broad consensus 
around such unchallengeable values. However, says Rist, “if ‘development’ is only a useful 
word for the sum of virtuous human aspirations, we can conclude at once that it exists 
nowhere and probably never will!”199 Nevertheless, ‘development’ does exist, through the 
actions that it legitimates, through institutions that are dealing with development efforts. It is 
very real that there are development projects, development cooperation, development 
ministers, UN agencies for development, development banks, NGOs furthering development, 
and many other institutions and activities with similar aims. In the name of development all 
sorts of activities are undertaken: schools and clinics are built, wells dug, roads laid, children 
vaccinated, oversight institutions established, reports drafted, experts hired, trade liberalized, 
and much more. Every modern human activity can be undertaken in the name of 
development.200  
This thesis is concerned with the activities that are undertaken in the name of development 
cooperation, specifically those that are claimed to support human rights and food security. 
Therefore, it is essential to be aware of the ways in which the thinking of different institutions 
and schools of development defines the desirable outcome of the activities carried out for 
further ‘development’.  
2.1.2 The economic growth and human development schools 
In the crudest usage, development is seen as the same as economic growth, or GDP per 
capita.201 Over time economists have been largely preoccupied with GDP as a measurement 
of economic growth, along with other abstract concepts such as saving and investment and 
exports and imports. A lack of recognition has been given to people as an end result of 
development, and there has been a general confusion about ends and means.202  
Under the leadership of Pakistani economist Mahbub ul Haq (1934-98), the annual Human 
Development Reports (published since 1990) made a breakthrough in the campaign to see 
development as more than economic growth. The evolution towards ‘human development’ 
had, of course, been gradual, and in addition to ul Haq, the Indian economist and philosopher 
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Amartya Sen (1933-) also played a considerable role in the development of the concept. Sen 
integrates many of his insights under the label ‘development as freedom’.203  
Since the introduction of the concept of ‘human development’, it is generally accepted that the 
real purpose of development is to enlarge people’s choices in all fields. Economic growth or 
income increase is one of many choices people make, but it is not the only one.204 
Paradoxically, human development thinking came to the fore around the same time as there 
was a switch from state to market in the name of neoliberalism, according to which the central 
objective – economic growth – is to be achieved through structural reform, deregulation, 
liberalisation, and privatisation.205 These two dominant development schools with different 
objectives and also with different agendas concerning how to reach them have existed side by 
side ever since. By the end of the 1990s, the World Bank, known for promoting development 
as being understood and measured in economic and monetary terms, now underlined the 
human development aspect.206  
However, economic development thinking remained, and still is, influential, and people are 
not at the centre of development policy and planning in many countries. As an example of the 
strong role that economic development still plays, it can be mentioned that official 
development assistance (ODA) is defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development as “those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients 
and to multilateral development institutions which are […] administered with the promotion 
of economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective”.207 This 
means that in development cooperation, the main objective is economic development of 
nations.   
It is important to understand the difference between the economic growth and human 
development schools. The defining difference is that the first focuses on the expansion of one 
choice only – income – while the second takes on board all human choices, be they economic, 
social, cultural or political. It can be argued that economic growth can enlarge all other 
choices as well. However, it is important to understand that this is not necessarily true. There 
is simply no automatic link between income and human lives. There are many reasons why 
income expansion may fail to enlarge human options. National priorities may lead to uneven 
income distribution; the use of income is just as important as the generation of income. 
Moreover, knowledge, health, a clean physical environment, political freedom and enjoyment 
of life are not exclusively, or largely, dependent on income. National wealth can increase 
people’s choices in these areas – but they might not.208 Wealth is a means, not an end. Ul Haq 
writes “unless societies recognize that their real wealth is their people, an excessive obsession 
with creating material wealth can obscure the goal of enriching human lives.”209  
However, this does not mean that growth is not important in the human development school. 
Rejecting an automatic link between growth and flourishing human lives is not rejecting 
growth itself. Economic growth is held important in poor societies for reducing or eliminating 
poverty. What is essential to keep in mind is that the quality of growth is just as important as 
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its quantity. This means conscious public policy is needed to translate economic growth into 
human growth. This may require restructuring of economic and political power, far-reaching 
land reform, progressive tax systems, new credit systems, a major expansion of basic social 
services to reach all the deprived population, etc. The human development paradigm claims to 
question the existing structure of power. In the human development model, the policy 
interventions naturally vary from country to country depending on the circumstances but what 
is common to all of them is that people are moved to the centre stage. Each development 
activity is analysed to see how much people participate in it and benefit from it.210 
There must be a search for models of development that enhance human life, not 
marginalize it; treat GNP growth as a means, not as an end; distribute income 
equitably, not concentrate it; replenish natural resources for future generations, 
not destroy them; and encourage the grass-roots participation of people in the 
events and processes that shape their lives.211 
The human development ‘definition’ of development is normative in the sense that it 
represents the UNDP’s vision of what it hopes development to be. The formula of ‘enlarging 
people’s choices’ does not mean very much: the process is open (it leads to the ‘expansion of 
possibilities) and is in principle unlimited. It also assumes the existence of ‘stages of 
development’, just like any economic theory.212  
2.1.3 Defining development and poverty in human rights approaches 
The meaning of development in human rights thinking  
What kind of understanding of development is the basis for human rights-based approaches to 
development? It is clear that human rights-based development is concerned with people as 
rights-holders and claim-makers. Moreover, as Nowak points out, full realisation of human 
rights is replacing economic growth as the ultimate goal of the development process.213 The 
human rights-based approaches to development and the right to development are two distinct 
but yet intertwined phenomena and it is useful to look at the right to development discourse in 
order to understand what a human rights perspective on development means. The right to 
development discourse has given this much more thought than what is standard in various 
human rights approaches to development, where development as a concept is often taken to be 
a given. 
It might be interesting to note that already by 1977 the Commission on Human Rights 
requested that the Secretary General would undertake a study into the international aspects of 
the right to development, which was being debated in the UN at the time. In this report, 
published in 1979, the Secretary General set forward an analysis, based on major UN 
instruments and debates, on which elements needed to be part of the concept of 
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development.214 This meaning of development has striking resemblance with human 
development and is also outlines what we today know as human rights-based principles:  
(i) The realisation of the potentialities of the human person in harmony 
with the community should be the central purpose of development;  
(ii) The human person should be the subject not the object of development;  
(iii) Development requires the satisfaction of both material and non-
material basic needs;  
(iv) Respect for human rights is fundamental to the development process;  
(v) The human person must be able to participate fully in shaping his own 
reality; 
(vi) Respect for the principles of equality and non-discrimination is 
essential; and 
(vii) The achievement of a degree of individual and collective self-reliance 
must be an integral part of the process.215 
Once development is seen to contain these elements, it is obvious that it is not a concern only 
for ‘developing countries’ but for every nation. The relationship between economic growth 
and the well-being of the individual, problems of non-participation in decision making, and 
environmentally unsustainable policies216 are only a few issues that were mentioned as 
examples of problems being relevant to all societies in 1979 and remain so still today. In the 
above list, there is no talk of the realisation of human rights being the objective of 
development and also in other ways the definition of development has more in common with 
the human development philosophy, underlining the importance of the realisation of the 
potentialities of the human person, than modern discourse on the right to development.  
The Declaration on the Right to Development was finally adopted in 1986, and here human 
rights are seen as instruments of change,217 implying that everybody has the right to a process 
of change which is compatible with the human rights norms listed in human rights treaties.218 
One can say that development is defined as ‘good change’, and ‘good change’ is defined as 
being compatible with human rights norms.  
 
Many countries of the South hoped to link the development discourse with the human rights 
agenda through the adoption of the UN Declaration on the Right to Development in 1986. The 
Declaration was, however, adopted with a certain degree of hesitation among the so called 
developed countries.219 Its legal and political status (a non-legally binding instrument as it is) 
has remained controversial.220 However, the Declaration opened up for debate on issues of 
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individual human rights in development work, and this is still an ongoing topic in the UN.221 
As a basis for human rights-based development work, the right to development has, however, 
not been very popular. Bilateral donors in fact very seldom refer to the right to 
development.222 The Declaration places emphasis on global inequity among states and donor 
obligations, referring also to a new international economic order based on sovereign 
equality,223 and this is probably too political for many international development actors.224 
Among (Western) development actors various human rights-based approaches to development 
have gained wider support – and maybe this is a deliberate effort to stay away from the 
controversies raised due to the reference to global inequalities in the Declaration on the Right 
to Development.225    
Another reason for the hesitation among some Western states towards the Declaration has 
been the general reluctance to accept economic, social, and cultural rights as enforceable 
human rights. Although this has changed significantly over the past ten year or so, historically 
there has always been certain tension between the North, that has traditionally emphasised 
civil and political rights, and the South that has given primary importance to economic and 
social rights.226 One of the reasons for the long separation of development and human rights 
could be found in this tension. Around the time of the adoption of the Declaration on the 
Right to Development, the human rights community, especially the NGOs of the North, but 
also academics and the UN, focused almost exclusively on civil and political rights.227 
Consequently, most economic and social rights have, until recently, had a marginal position in 
the human rights community during the last half century. It can, for example, be mentioned 
that Amnesty International changed its statute to include work on economic, social, and 
cultural rights in 2001228 (and it can be added that this was a hard-fought for move and a 
controversial shift within Amnesty).229 The development community has for its part neglected 
both economic and social rights – that could provide a legal and ethical basis for their work – 
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and civil and political rights that are equally important in the struggle for human dignity and 
against social exclusion.230  
The Declaration on the Right to Development speaks about development as a particular 
process of economic, social, cultural, and political development, in which all human rights 
can be fully realised.231 Furthermore, the preamble of the Declaration defines development as 
a “comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process, which aims at the constant 
improvement of well-being of the entire population and of all individuals, on the basis of their 
active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of 
benefits resulting there from.”232  
Arjun Sengupta notes that the concept of well-being in this context extends beyond the 
conventional notions of economic growth to include the expansion of opportunities and 
capabilities.233 This comes close to the human development understanding of development, 
and therefore Sengupta argues that the right to development can be described as the right to 
human development.234 The ‘right to human development’ is defined as a development 
process that expands substantive freedoms and realises all human rights. In the right to 
development perspective, human development is claimed as a human right, and thus becomes 
a qualitatively different approach compared to the human development model. The way 
development objectives are achieved235 becomes central: “The objective is fulfilling human 
rights and the process of achieving this is also a human right.” This process must respect 
equality and participation, not be in violation of human rights, be including a clear 
specification of obligations and responsibilities and having a mechanism for monitoring.236 
Equality and participation are central principles also in human development, but perhaps the 
defining difference between the right to development approach and the human development 
approach is that the objectives of development are set up as entitlements of rights-holders, 
which duty-bearers are expected to fulfil, respect, protect, and promote while respecting 
international human rights standards.237  
One could say that this view on development represents the human rights communities’ 
picture of ‘ideal conditions of social existence’, borrowing Rist’s wording; and that as of 
today, there is no society where these conditions exist. This is simply an observation – not an 
attempt to delegitimise efforts that are striving towards such conditions. Some argue that 
having this kind of vision is what is distinctive about a human rights approach to development 
– that it sets out a vision of what ought to be,238 providing a normative framework to orient 
the practice of development cooperation. The human development discourse is not lacking a 
vision for development, but while human rights approaches can refer to internationally agreed 
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norms, backed by international law, human development uses more philosophical arguments 
to back up their vision.  
The different goals between human development and human rights-based development should 
be noted: the latter has full realisation of all human rights as the ultimate goal of development 
while the former aims at enlargement of peoples’ choices in all fields. Those choices can 
change over time.239 Working with a pre-determined goal decreases the role of people as 
active agents formulating their own vision for development.  
Among the organisations working with human rights-based approaches to development, in 
one way or the other, there are critical voices stating that the objective to realise human rights 
is too narrow and limited. In order to capture all the goals of development, such as ending 
inequality and poverty, it is necessary to extend the notion of rights beyond legal frameworks, 
and this again leads to difficulties in delimiting exactly what a right is.240 Therefore, some 
organisations choose rights-based programming, where a human rights analysis is brought 
into all programming and guides the work, instead of allowing legal human rights to inform 
their overall aim.241 Moreover, many organisations struggle with the fact that concepts of 
human rights are quite alien within many communities they work with.242 In this thesis an 
actor-oriented perspective on human rights in development is proposed as an alternative to 
partly address these dilemmas.  
‘Poverty’ in human rights approaches 
Although in theory human development is about enlargement of peoples’ choices and 
freedoms, in practice it is mostly about poverty reduction or eradication (and that is true for 
the economic development discourse as well, only the tools for development policy making 
are different). Poverty is seen as one of the greatest obstacles to human development. The 
human rights community for its part is starting to protest that poverty is the gravest human 
rights challenge facing the world today.243 Therefore, here the human development 
community and the human rights community have common ground, although it is not part of 
human rights practice to monitor or measure poverty.244 Nor is there a unified human rights 
definition of poverty. The Office of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights has 
commissioned a number of studies on the subject and suggests that Amartya Sen’s ‘capability 
approach’ to poverty245 – that is central in the human development discourse – provides a 
conceptual bridge between the discourses on poverty and human rights.246  
The concept of ‘capability’ refers to a person’s freedom or opportunity to achieve well-being, 
e.g. to what extent s/he can be free from hunger or take part in the life of a community. 
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Human freedom is thus the common element, linking the two discourses.247 The capability 
approach is also a normative framework, evaluating social situations according to the amount 
of freedom people have to peruse what they have reason to value.248 Freedom is here 
understood in a broad sense, to encompass both positive and negative freedoms. The 
capability approach defines poverty as the absence of certain basic freedoms, such as the 
freedoms to avoid hunger, disease, illiteracy, and so on. Poverty is no longer defined as a lack 
of adequate income as has traditionally been done. Income is not a capability and therefore 
not an aspect of well-being in itself, it is seen only as a factor contributing to the achievement 
of capabilities.249 However, when we discuss poverty as a social problem we cannot deny the 
link to deprivation caused by economic constraints. The OHCHR report argues that there is a 
need for a definition of poverty that refers to the non-fulfilment of human rights and at the 
same time linking it to the constraint of economic resources.250 Not every case of low level of 
well-being can be regarded as poverty, and so the report suggests that non-fulfilment of 
human rights would count as poverty when: (1) the human rights involved are those that 
corresponds to the capabilities that are considered basic by a given society; (2) inadequate 
command over economic resources play a role in the causal chain leading to the non-
fulfilment of human rights.251 As has been noted this is not a definition of poverty from a 
human rights perspective, but more a conceptual clarification of when and where human 
rights and poverty meet.  
In the follow-up publication by the OHCHR, it is repeated that poverty is a state of complex 
and interrelated, mutually reinforcing deprivations, which impact on people’s ability to claim 
and access their civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights.252  
2.1.4 Alternative development models and empowerment 
Beside the human development paradigm in the early 1990s there are other development 
models that have influenced how development as a concept has evolved over time and what 
kind of activities have been carried out in its name. The United Nations Commission on 
Environment and Development was established in 1983 in an attempt to address increasing 
concern with environmental problems in developing countries and the failure to relate these 
problems to development issues.253 The subsequent report Our Common Future (1987) and its 
basic concept ‘sustainable development’ had a considerable impact on the development 
discourse. The report, also known as the Brundtland Report, defined sustainable development 
as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs”.254  
As opposed to the human development school, the sustainable development movement, that 
started long before the so called Bruntdland Commission, was to a large extent anti-growth. 
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For instance, the Club of Rome had recommended an end to exponential growth. The 
objective was not to place the ‘environment’ above the living standards of the poor in the 
South, but the Club wanted to see a commitment to meet the basic needs of the poor as the 
prime objective of a much more limited growth trajectory.255  
In the context of how human needs and the environmental needs can coexist it is interesting to 
highlight indigenous cultures’ understanding of ‘development’ and sustainability. In Bolivia, 
indigenous president Evo Morales has introduced the concept ‘Living Well’ into the public 
discourse as the basis for a global movement against consumerism, depletion of natural 
resources for profit, and current models of ‘development’. This indigenous concept ‘Living 
Well’ means, in short, having all basic needs met while existing in harmony with the natural 
world instead of seeking more and more material goods at the expense of the environment.256 
It is a concept, which in theory seems to be similar to attempts to replace GDP with quality of 
life (while in practice these attempts still result in prioritising consumption).257 This view 
challenges development as a process of constant ‘improvement’. It also challenges the very 
core of Western thinking. The idea that growth or progress should be able to continue 
indefinitely is an idea that radically distinguishes Western culture from all others.258      
This brings us to the fact that dominating development models have always been criticised. 
The so called alternative development school that advocates the empowerment model is also 
relevant when exploring the meaning of the term development. Criticism of the dominating 
economic model of development has also been at the core of this movement.  
Alternative development is often referred to as an alternative development model or 
paradigm,259 and within this label there are many representatives. What is common to these 
voices is an emphasis on ‘development from below’ and an effort to redefine development 
itself as social transformation.260 The role of the state is, moreover, not viewed in the same 
way as in conventional development: the role of the state is to be an enabler and facilitator of 
people’s self-development.261 While human development is state-centred, alternative 
development has its agency in local, grassroots, and social movement activism. However, 
more recent alternative approaches, represented by e.g. John Friedman, argue that strong civil 
society needs a strong state.262 I have chosen one representative of alternative development 
thinking, Friedman, because he partly applies a rights language and not only the language of 
equity, participation, and environmental sustainability. In 1992 Friedman wrote:  
No matter how dynamic, an economic system that has little or no use for better 
than half of the world’s population can and must be radically transformed. 
Broadly speaking, the objective of an alternative development is to humanize a 
system that has shut them out, and to accomplish this through forms of everyday 
resistance and political struggle that insist on the rights of the excluded population 
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as human beings, as citizens, and as persons intent on realizing their loving and 
creative powers within.263  
This model strives for inclusive democracy and appropriate economic growth, the overarching 
intent being to reintegrate the invisible poor with the larger community, and to assert their full 
rights as citizens in that community. Friedman claims that this kind of reintegration of as 
many as half the population with an existing political community in which they exercise few 
rights cannot be done unless the system of dominance, i.e., authoritarianism, peripheral 
capitalism, and patriarchy are themselves fundamentally changed. This battle for systemic 
change may last for generations.264  
As we can see rights talk has played a role in alternative development thinking. Friedman 
argues that human rights are one out of three foundations for the claim that every person is 
entitled to both adequate material conditions of life and to be a politically active subject in his 
community. (The other two are citizens rights and “human flourishing”.)265  
The way human rights are understood and applied in a rhetoric argument is, however, 
different from the mainstream understanding, underlining from below action and critically 
examining dominant definitions. This is also the case with regard to democracy. Friedman 
writes that “contrary to the popularly held view that democracy is defined primarily by a set 
of individually held rights, such as the vote or free speech, it is here understood to rest on the 
legitimate powers of an actualized citizenship or of responsible membership in a politically 
constituted community.”266 This means strengthening the meaning and reality of political 
community, and seeing political practice as a form of collective self-empowerment.267 This 
again is linked to the struggle for accountability: a strong political community requires an 
open political space in which to mobilise and be able to hold the state accountable for its 
actions.268 As we will see in the following chapters, the way the concepts empowerment and 
accountability are used, and how they are linked to human rights, differs from one 
development actor to another.       
The term ‘community development’ can be seen as being part of the alternative development 
paradigm, although there are community development projects that are top-down in practice. 
Ife points out that most development projects are a mixture of top-down and bottom-up 
approaches. ‘Empowerment’ and ‘participation’ are principles valued in most top-down 
projects and many bottom-up projects make use of external expertise, to mention one example 
of how the mixture occurs in practice. This mix of top-down and bottom-up approaches also 
contributes to giving ‘development’ a bad name; the criticism is usually directed towards top-
down approaches that seek to impose on a community someone else’s view of what is ‘good 
development’.269 In bottom-up community-driven development it is accepted that 
‘development’ can, and will, mean very different things in different contexts and 
communities.270  
According to Ellerman there are two ways the ‘helpers’ (i.e., development professionals or 
others working with ‘development’) can thwart autonomy or self-help: (1) “the helper, by 
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professionally guided programs of social engineering, deliberately tries to impose his will on 
the doer; (2) the helper, by benevolent aid, replaces the doer’s will with her will, perhaps 
inadvertently.”271 Ellerman gives a number of examples of this kind of “unhelpful help”. All 
kinds of conditioned aid, human rights related or not, can be placed in the first category while 
examples of the latter can be found in the area of funding given based on externally supplied 
motivation of carrots and sticks.  
Ellerman suggests an indirect approach, which is based on the respect for the autonomy of the 
doers. Autonomous action is based on inside-out, internal, or intrinsic motivation and this 
does not go well hand in hand with attempts to engineer action with external carrots and 
sticks.272 Similarly, bottom-up community development is based on the premise that local 
knowledge, wisdom, skills and understandings need to be valued above top-down wisdom and 
experience. In the context of our modern industrial society this is a radical position because 
we are used to bureaucratic models that assume superior wisdom to reside at the top of the 
hierarchy, and that the task of political, administrative and community processes is the 
implementation of this superior wisdom.273 Ellerman makes a distinction between the ‘direct 
path’ and the ‘indirect path’. In the first approach, the helpers help the doers by supplying 
motivation to get the doers to do what the helpers value “the right thing”. In contrast, on the 
indirect path, which respects autonomy, the helper helps the doers to help themselves by 
reducing obstacles and by supplying e.g. resources to enable the doers to do what the doers 
were already motivated to do themselves.274   
Uvin compares this to ‘a radical capacity building approach’. The success of such an approach 
can be measured according to the degree to which local actors, whether public or private, are 
allowed to fail and learn from failure. Local action is never substituted, and the helper only 
brings in complements on demand. Uvin is convinced of the need for such a radical approach 
to institution building but is not sure it conforms with human rights standards. He sees 
compatibility between the approach and human rights values such as freedom of choice and 
autonomy. Civil and political rights might be strengthened through this approach, depending 
on the nature of the institutions. Concerning ESC rights, he believes this approach takes 
longer to yield results in their realisation than direct delivery- or service-based approaches. 
The approach of “do not substitute or impose” might be difficult or impossible to use applying 
a human rights-based approach to development cooperation, in which the build-in assumption 
is that capacity is created and used for human rights-conforming aims. Allowing local 
organisations and people to struggle for their own change and learn from their own mistakes 
becomes limited in a strong human rights approach that has clear objectives where the change 
should be going.275 The contradiction between free choice and conditionality is only one 
example of tensions that are present in all aid.276 At first sight it seems that human rights, 
when conventionally defined, add to the contradictions and paradoxes rather than offering 
solutions. I will show in the next chapter that an actor-oriented, or bottom-up approach, as 
suggested by Jim Ife is more compatible with alternative development thinking and from 
below community development.  
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2.1.6 Concluding remarks 
It is quite sensible for development to change meaning over time in relation to changing 
circumstances. ‘Development’ then serves as a mirror of changing economic and political 
priorities and choices, and changing relations of power and hegemony.277  
It is inevitable that there is substantial ambivalence and contradiction when we try to find a 
definition for development. ‘Development’ can be seen as the broad movement which has 
been carrying the market system along for the past two centuries – or it can be seen as the 
entire set of measures through which the world should be made a fairer place.278 Hugo Slim 
actually suggests we do away with the word development, and talk a political language of 
equality, fairness, social justice, rights and responsibility.279 This suggestion shows how 
contested the concept development is. 
As we can see human rights have played a role in both mainstream development280 and in the 
so called alternative development, and the two are not mutually exclusive. Mainstream 
development may currently be dominating, but at its side an alternative development 
discourse also exists, and it often brings in new ideas (gender equality and sustainability are 
two examples) into the mainstream. Broadly speaking one can see a divide between human 
and alternative development, on the one hand, and positivism of growth on the other.281  
In the right to development and human rights-based approaches to development there are 
elements of people-centred human development, with a strong role to be played by the state. 
Since human rights discourse tends to avoid political questions, there is no clear position on 
economic systems and the question of growth. There is no fundamental critique or 
questioning of the very foundational (Western) idea of ‘development’ as constant growth or 
improvement; the human rights-based model simply puts some limitations on what actions 
can be legitimised in the name of development as well as offering ‘new’ principles, based on 
human rights norms, for the development process.   
The objective of the right to development and human rights-based approaches to development 
is the realisation of human rights for individuals, as rights-holders, by states, as duty-bearers, 
under international human rights instruments. Development is defined as a process of 
economic, social, cultural, and political development, in which all human rights can be fully 
realised. This view on development reflects how the mainstream human rights community 
views ‘ideal conditions of human existence’. It is a society where there are no violations of 
the rights and freedoms guaranteed in human rights instruments. It is a society where there is 
“constant improvement of well-being of the entire population and of all individuals”, as 
declared in the preamble of the Declaration on the Right to Development. It is a society where 
all children are vaccinated, go to school and have access to nutritiously safe food and potable 
drinking water,282 and so on. The ambition is high and the intension is good, but the outcome 
might be a rather uniform society far from the vision that development is about “realization of 
the potentialities of the human person in harmony with the community”, as stated in the UN 
report on the international dimensions of the right to development in 1979.  
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We can compare the human rights development objective with the objective of the human 
development school, which is an enlargement of people’s choices in all fields. People may 
value vaccinations as a way of preventive health care, or they may not value it, they might 
value public schooling or not. Although the human rights system naturally provides for 
individual choice, the human development model has a stronger philosophical basis 
underlining the freedom and agency of individuals and groups. When the objective is given 
(from above as stipulated in human rights instruments and by expert-led institutions) there is 
less room for formulating people’s own visions of what kind of development they might 
value.  
However, when looking at the policies proposed in the human development school, they too 
are rather uniform and offer less room for freedom and autonomy. Moreover, although in 
theory people are at the centre of human development policies, in practice development 
progress continues to focus on nations or economies, rather than people.  
The strongest emphasis given to agency, autonomy, and from below action is in the 
alternative development models. ‘Development’ is accepted to mean very different things in 
different contexts and communities, and the diversity that springs out of this is valued. Rights 
talk has been popular within the alternative development paradigm but the definition of what 
‘rights’ mean is left open and the objective of development efforts is not linked to 
international human rights treaties.  
2.2 Giving meaning to ‘human rights’, agency, and change in human rights 
discourse 
In this chapter, I raise questions about the nature of human rights. What kind of understanding 
of the human rights concept can be respectful and relevant to the lived realities of the actors 
striving to improve the condition of their lives, i.e., doing ‘development’? Who gives meaning 
to human rights? One of the central arguments set out here is that it is doubtful that human 
rights can be drivers of change that contest the status quo in favour of oppressed people if 
these very same people do not have a say in how they understand the concept of human rights. 
In order to be relevant, the people, who are to claim and implement international standards of 
human rights must perceive the concept of human rights and its content as their own. Human 
rights cannot be imposed on people from above as specialised expert knowledge, instead 
people must regard these standards as emanating from their own worldview and values.283 
Legitimacy of human rights is key for their practical relevance. 
2.2.1 Introduction 
My questions are related to the question raised by Balakrishnan Rajagopal as to whether the 
current trends in international law “will end up formalising and reinforcing a ‘hegemonic’ 
international law, or whether there is still some potential for making international law into a 
counter-hegemonic tool.” Rajagopal argues that if it is going to be possible for a co-existence 
of counter-hegemonic international law alongside hegemonic284 international law, then the 
Third World’s reliance on discourses such as human rights or development need to be 
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seriously rethought. Human rights discourse has been, in the past, used by the Third World 
against colonialism, apartheid, and in numerous self-determination movements. Today it is 
still used as a limited shield in the hands of social movements, NGOs and victims of human 
rights violations but the discourse of human rights has also “turned out to be a core part of 
hegemonic international law”.285 Human rights discourse of today has a choice, in 
Rajagopal’s opinion, to either insinuate itself with hegemonic international law or it can be 
part of a struggle to strengthen counter-hegemonic international law.286 This thesis argues that 
an actor-oriented approach to human rights from below, in which the voice of the actors 
themselves is strengthened in the processes of giving meaning to human rights, may be useful 
if the human rights idea is to be relevant as a counter-hegemonic strategy.  
One fundamental dilemma for human rights practitioners, especially working in the South, is 
that there is often a gap between global visions of justice and specific, local community-based 
visions of justice.287 In her research on the localisation of human rights, Merry has seen that 
human rights ideas still have difficulty in crossing the divide between their global sites of 
production and their local sites of appropriation.288  
I agree with Merry that:  
[T]he paradox of making human rights in the vernacular [is]: in order to be 
accepted, they have to be tailored to the local context and resonate with the local 
cultural framework. However, in order to be part of the human rights system, they 
must emphasize individualism, autonomy, choice, bodily integrity, and equality, 
ideas embedded in the legal documents that constitute human rights law. These 
core values of the human rights system endure even as the ideas are translated. 
Whether this is the most effective approach to […] promoting global social justice 
is still an open question. It certainly is an important part of the expansion of a 
modernist view of the individual and society embedded in the West.289  
In this chapter, I look at the debates related to the human rights concept: questions are raised 
on human rights and agency; ‘politics’ and human rights; legalization of human rights; human 
rights law and change; universalism, relativism, context and particularism; individual and 
group rights; and indivisibility and hierarchy between different sets of rights. These issues are 
relevant when exploring the potential transformative power of human rights as they enter into 
the development sphere.  
2.2.2 Historic overview of the human rights movement 
Since this study views human rights as social constructions that are discursively constructed, 
and therefore by definition change over time, it is essential to have some understanding of the 
history of human rights.290 There is no general agreement on this history, and this debate is 
outside the scope of this chapter. For the purpose of understanding the role of human rights in 
modern development discourse and practice, it is sufficient to know that it is strikingly 
recently that the human rights phenomenon became widespread. Although ideals of dignity 
and justice have deep roots that can be located in all societies, human rights are a new concept 
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in human history.291 Human rights, as they have been defined in legal documents and legal 
practice in the past decades, are a distinct and in many ways a new way of seeking values 
such as justice, fairness and humanity. Donnely argues that the claim that most societies and 
cultures have practiced human rights throughout history292 confuses these values with modern 
legal human rights. Human rights, as equal and inalienable entitlements of all individuals, are 
a different way of seeking to realise values such as justice.293 This position can be criticised 
for accepting a narrow and formalistic definition of the human rights concept, something this 
thesis argues should not be accepted, but it is essential to understand that the dominant human 
rights definition departs from other ways of addressing injustice.   
Human rights law represents a modern project, first spelled out theoretically by some 
Enlightenment philosophers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,294 but the history of 
the practical implementation of international human rights extends only a few decades 
back.295 According to Mutua human rights law is “an internationalization of the obligations of 
the liberal state” – the normative regime of international human rights law originated in 
liberal theory and philosophy, taking form in constitutional and other domestic legal regimes 
and only after World War II taking form as a binding system of international human right 
law.296 (The western Enlightenment tradition within which the dominant human rights 
discourse was framed is naturally only one part of the history of struggle for human rights and 
can and should be deconstructed as it has lead to a narrow understanding of the human rights 
concept,297 but it nevertheless has had great impact on how the human rights movement looks 
today.)  
Since the 1980s, a variety of groups around the world, and all governments have learned to 
speak the language of human rights.298 Beitz highlights that it is since the end of the Cold War 
that the scope of human rights doctrine has expanded and the resources devoted to their 
advancement and protection have multiplied.299 It remains a debated issue whether the process 
of ‘vernacularization’ of human rights has granted ordinary people the use of human rights 
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from below in transformative ways – and this is also one of the questions that this thesis wants 
to elucidate. What is clear is that international lawyers assumed a central prominence. 
Moreover, in the 1980s, human rights were no longer a minimalist utopia of anti-politics, and 
human rights organizations were forced to move from morality to politics and from charisma 
to bureaucracy.300 Human rights were conceived through a desire to transcend politics,301 but 
in the thirty years since their explosion in the 1970s, human rights have followed a path from 
morality to politics – although all their advocates are not willing to acknowledge this 
development,302 and this is an issue we will return to later in this chapter. Human rights 
continued to claim that their source of authority transcended politics. However, their 
transformation into the dominant framework of the government and improvement of human 
life all over the planet changed them profoundly. The human rights movements’ engagement 
with ‘governance’ concerns in postcolonial states is one example of embracing politics.303  
Returning to the question of human rights as hegemonic and counter-hegemonic; Rajagopal 
claims that the expansion of the political use of human rights in the 1980s – he refers to 
struggles for democracy in Eastern Europe as well as in Latin America – meant that human 
rights discourse was in a counter-hegemonic mode during this time.304 Latin American 
policymakers, legal scholars, and activists have historically been strong supporters of the 
development of international human rights law, as they have perceived such laws as a way of 
protecting weaker states from more powerful states, particularly the United States. Within 
these countries there have been vocal domestic human rights organizations demanding respect 
for human rights and change.305 Moreover, social movements, e.g. by indigenous peoples, 
used a language of human rights to challenge violations and repression during this time. There 
were examples of how human rights were used for hegemonic agendas also during the 1980s 
but it was the end of the Cold War that made the shift possible, so that a new hegemonic role 
for human rights was born. The UN and human rights groups started to more aggressively 
pursue humanitarian interventions in the name of human rights in Somalia, the Balkans, 
Kosovo, Haiti, and elsewhere. Furthermore, a market-friendly understanding of human rights 
was being embraced by the World Bank and several bilateral donors. A new “totalising 
discourse”, applying the language of military intervention, economic reconstruction and social 
transformation, gave a new hegemonic role to human rights.306 However, this market-friendly 
understanding of human rights has not occurred without resistance and during the 1990s 
human rights played a role in local struggles against large-scale ‘development’ interventions 
such as dam constructions.307 
As mentioned earlier, Jim Ife points out that human rights were created at the time of 
modernity and the specific ways of viewing the individual that characterise this time. One 
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defining feature of modernity has been an effort to seek sameness, a consequence of the view 
that there is or should be one ‘right’ way of doing things (sometimes called ‘best practice’).308 
The West is in this context seen as modern, urban, and dynamic while especially Africa and 
Asia are seen as traditional, rural, and static. These cultures are allegedly characterised by 
tradition, despotism, communalism, and irrationality – values that are seen as inherently 
opposed to human rights. The world is thereby divided “into the creators and recipients of 
human rights, the monitors and monitored, the viewers and the viewed, the globalists and 
provincialists, the universalists and relativists.”309   
In the following pages I will seek an alternative way of approaching and understanding the 
human rights concept. I argue that there is no one-size-fits-all definition of human rights. This 
is an approach to human rights that, in a postmodern way, celebrates diversity.310 This 
approach does not go back to the ‘roots’ in relation to justice and dignity – it acknowledges 
those roots as well as what has been achieved during modernity and moves beyond these 
discourses into something new. A historic perspective on human rights and struggle against 
oppression shows that circumstances can and do change,311 the current social order is not 
given.  
2.2.3 A review of the meanings attached to the human rights concept: Moving beyond 
human rights as defined by the ‘powerful for the powerless’ 
The human rights concept: four schools of thought 
In this section, I first present four schools of thought on human rights, each of which has its 
own way of approaching and understanding the human rights concept. Thereafter, I present a 
so called actor-oriented approach to human rights, inspired by Nyamu-Musembi and 
complemented by Jim Ife’s ‘human rights from below’. Here I try to put forward an 
alternative way of giving meaning and content to the human rights concept where we can 
move beyond human rights being defined by the “powerful for the powerless”,312 which goes 
against the idea of participation and inclusion – central principles in human rights-based 
approaches to development.  
An-Na’im claims that the idea of human rights is one of the most characteristic phenomena of 
our time. This concept has quickly gained global significance, penetrating into the 
consciousness of millions of people in every corner of the world.313 In most research, 
including attitudinal research, the human rights concept is taken as a given. Stenner highlights 
that it is striking how comparatively little scholarship there is on how ordinary people actually 
understand the human rights concept.314 This is the case despite there being serious 
disagreement about the human rights concept, rationale, and content, which is not necessarily 
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a terrible thing,315 and that different people within academia, organisations, and state agencies 
embrace  different concepts of and attach different meanings to human rights.316 
Dembour has analysed academic human rights literature and based on the analysis she has 
identified four schools of thought on human rights.317 I find her model helpful in clarifying 
the different meanings attached to the human rights concept and will therefore use the four 
schools as a starting point for a discussion on some pertinent issues related to human rights.  
The first school presented by Dembour is the natural school,318 which uses perhaps the most 
well-known and common definition of human rights. It is a definition that identifies human 
rights as those rights one posses simply by being a human being. Human rights are viewed as 
given. Human rights are absolute and universal entitlements based on ‘nature’.319 Martti 
Koskenniemi calls this “political theology”, as natural rights suggest that “human 
communities are bound by values that precede them.”320 The natural scholars hold that human 
rights exist independently of social recognition, even though recognition is preferable.321 To 
quote Jack Donnelly: “Although we have human rights universally, simply as human beings, 
we enjoy them as a result of contingent political and legal practices.”322  
Within the natural school, there is a tendency to celebrate human rights law. The development 
of international human rights law in the last half-century is regarded as undeniable progress. 
Natural scholars believe in human rights, and historically they have set up the parameters 
within which human rights came to be conceived and debated. Traditionally, they have 
represented the human rights orthodoxy.323  
The orthodoxy is increasingly moving towards what Dembour calls the deliberative school. 
These scholars tend to reject the natural element on which natural scholars base human rights. 
They claim human rights come into existence through social agreement.324 All rights are 
extrinsic to individuals and groups in that they are created and attached to legal persons by 
external forces, through legislative acts and/or judicial decisions. This kind of legal positivism 
leaves space for a social dimension as regards the development of rights and their attachment 
to their bearers, whilst natural law theory refers to divinations of one kind or the other.325 Ife 
calls this tradition ‘state obligations tradition’ according to which human rights exist only 
when there are mechanisms in place to provide for their protection.326 Rights depend for their 
                                                 
315 An-Na’im, “Conclusion”, supra note 283, at 430-431. See also Paul Gready, “Introduction” in Gready (ed.), 
Fighting for Human Rights (London: Routledge, 2004) 1-32, at 3. 
316 Marie-Bénédicte Dembour, “What Are Human Rights? Four Schools of Thought”, 32 Human Rights 
Quarterly (2010) 1-20, at 2. 
317 Ibid. Surprisingly, Stenner finds an overlap between how experts define human rights (as described by 
Dembour) and the views expressed by non-experts. See Stenner, “Subjective Dimensions of Human Rights”, 
supra note 314, at 1227. 
318 The concept of natural law, which is based on a tradition stretching from antiquity to modernity, claims an 
absolute authority for some basic normative principles that are said to have priority over all ‘human’ legislation. 
The natural law tradition generally appears as one of the most important sources of human rights in Western 
tradition. Bielefeldt, “Philosophical and Historical Foundations”, supra note 295, at 10.  
319 Dembour, “What Are Human Rights?”, supra note 316, at 2-3. 
320 Martti Koskenniemi, “Human Rights Mainstreaming as a Strategy for Institutional Power”, 1 Humanity, 
(2011) 47-57, at 48. 
321 Dembour, “What Are Human Rights?”, supra note 316, at 3. 
322 Donnelly, “International Human Rights”, supra note 293, at 42. Emphasis added.  
323 Dembour, “What Are Human Rights?”, supra note 316, at 5 and 9. 
324 Ibid., at 3. 
325 Anthony Woodiwiss, “The Law cannot be enough: Human Rights and Limits of Legalism”, in Meckled-
García & Cali (eds), The Legalization of Human Rights: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Human Rights and 
Human rights Law (London: Routledge, 2006) 32-48, at 36.  
326 Ife, Human Rights from Below, supra note 8, at 74. 
53 
protective effectiveness on the nature of wider sets of social relations and developments 
within them.327 This school stresses the limits of human rights and although they would like 
human rights to become universal they recognise that this will require time and will happen 
only through the global adoption of the liberal values they express. Whether this will happen 
or not remains to be seen.328  
Similar to the natural scholars, the deliberative scholars tend to have great faith in the 
potential of human rights law. They, however, underline that the human rights normative 
system is in the making. Merry writes: “human rights law is far from being a consistent and 
coercive system of law. Rather, it is a fragmentary and largely persuasive mechanism very 
much in the making.”329  
The most common definition of human rights is probably a mixture of natural and deliberative 
schools. An-Na’im operates with this kind of definition according to which human rights are 
“claims to which all people are entitled as of right by virtue of their humanity”, without 
distinctions on such grounds as sex, race, colour, religion, language, national origin or social 
group. He locates these rights and their implementation in the social and political realm of 
human affairs, and as such require the allocation of resources. The basic concept of rights can 
only be realised through some form of wide-scale political organisation, i.e. the state, which is 
capable and willing to undertake such functions.330 
The third school mentioned by Dembour is the so called protest school. Protest scholars are 
concerned first and foremost with redressing injustice. They hold that human rights are 
realised through a fight for their realisation.331 Zeleza reminds the reader that apartheid was 
not ended by a book or a court case, and neither were colonialism nor slavery, implying that 
human rights are not the outcome of concepts but of conflicts, of politics rather than 
philosophy, and instigations rather than insights.332 Similarly, Stammers writes that the 
emergence and development of human rights needs to be understood as part of social 
movement struggles against structures of power.333  
In the protest school, human rights are seen as rightful claims made by or on behalf of the 
poor, the unprivileged, and the oppressed. Human rights claims allow for the status quo to be 
contested in favour of the oppressed.334 These scholars maintain that, in the words of Upendra 
Baxi, “suffering and repressed people remain the primary authors of human rights values and 
visions”.335 Baxi continues to point out that human rights norms and standards, however, also 
“entail ‘participation’ by national, regional, and global political, bureaucratic, and institutional 
actors”. These actors tend to use human rights for the ends of governance, thereby 
transforming human rights into a means to the end for practices, processes and institutions of 
governance.336  
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Protest scholars often distrust human rights law and thereby attract mostly human rights 
activists and activist-scholars.337 There exists a very diverse field of activists and researcher 
activists, and not all of them distrust human rights law. The contributors, most of whom are 
activist scholars, to the book Fighting for human rights, do not, for example, express any wide 
scale distrust towards human rights law.338 
The last school in Dembour’s model is the discourse school that is, according to Dembour, 
characterised by its lack of relevance towards human rights (I believe Dembour misinterprets 
discursive scholars in this regard as I will explain below). These scholars recognise that the 
language surrounding human rights has become a powerful language with which to express 
political claims, but they do not view human rights as given nor that they constitute the 
definitive answer to the ills of the world.339 Therefore, they believe that human rights law is as 
good or as bad as any other law. It must always be judged in each situation anew.340  
However, these scholars tend to allude to the shortcomings of human rights discourse: it does 
not deliver what it promises, namely, equality between human beings. They often observe and 
describe the contradictory features of human rights discourse and they call for a re-evaluation 
of the human rights language.341 Discursively oriented scholars tend to view ‘rights as 
culture’, proposing that “the rights discourse embodies certain features that anthropologists 
recognize as constituting culture.” Rights are understood as rights talk, rights thinking, rights 
practices.342  
Dembour refers to Makau Mutua as a representative of the discursive school. Mutua claims 
that the human rights movement needs to realise that it is young and therefore has an 
“experimental status, not a final truth.”343 In his work, Mutua “presents a view of human 
rights that questions the assumption of the major actors in the human rights movement.” It 
questions “the mythical elevation of the human rights corpus beyond politics and political 
ideology.”344 Mutua moreover points at the paradox of human rights discourse: it seeks to 
foster diversity and difference, but only so long as it is exercised within certain limits, that 
according to Mutua is the ‘liberal paradigm’. He calls for an urgent revision of human rights 
so that the ideals of difference and diversity can have a true meaning. Seeing human rights 
norms as frozen and fixed is not in the long-term interest of the human rights movement.345 In 
other words, Mutua raises a number of critical questions but he does so because he believes 
human rights are hugely important – not because he sees them as lacking relevance, a feature 
that Dembour claims belongs to discursive scholars.  
Recent anthropology of human rights has shown that, when the idea of human rights is 
rendered discursively, human rights discourse does not always homogenise legal or normative 
practice. Instead, Mark Goodale, who writes about human rights discourse in Bolivia, finds 
that it “transforms the terms of reference through which the legal mediates social, political, 
and economic relations” and “creates new conditions in which individuals or groups can 
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organize social resistance.”346 Rather than suppressing (or homogenising) normative diversity, 
the arrival of human rights discourse has introduced the idea that individuals and groups have 
the right to organise in ways that respect their dignity and diversity.347 This shows that when 
human rights ideas enter the local level, not as abstract universal ideals, but as rights talk, 
rights thinking, and rights practice they can find new limits. The way local groups use human 
rights also has an impact on the global human rights discourse, an issue I will return to when 
discussing who gives meaning to human rights.  
Many critical authors want to acknowledge the importance of the international legal human 
rights framework, but at the same time point out that the global social movements for social 
justice has challenged aspects of this system, thereby contributing to its evolution and 
reformulation. They refer to indigenous movements that have called for a multicultural 
reconstruction of human rights (respecting diversity), to balance the liberal and individualist 
bias of the existing human rights system; to grassroots movements that have contested the 
traditional status of the state as the sole actor in the human rights regime; and to the feminist 
movement that has questioned the patriarchal character of the human rights tradition and 
worked for new instruments and conceptions.348 The human rights practices of these 
movements are important as a research field in the discursive tradition.  
That human rights do not represent a final truth is the same view as is held in the constructed 
rights tradition. Within this tradition the starting point is that human rights are constantly 
being negotiated, defined and redefined at all levels of society.349 Klotz and Lynch write that 
“dominant actors can agree on what constitutes human rights at a particular point in time, but 
these meanings are contested (often by marginalized actors) and are inherently unstable.”350 
To many this view is threatening because stability, or at least a stable core, is seen as a virtue 
and necessity in the human rights system. At the same time, diversity is also seen as a virtue 
and the human rights movement is struggling with trying to achieve stability and ‘core 
content’ of rights while at the same time upholding the image of being a diverse and inclusive 
movement.  
In the constructed rights tradition, human rights are seen as contextual and dynamic, rather 
than universal and stable. The constructed rights tradition is a postmodern critique of 
traditional constructions of human rights, rejecting the idea of universal human rights as 
static, natural or somehow god-given. Human rights as discursively constructed sees human 
rights as a discourse that is changing and evolving but with universal elements,351 as we will 
see. Human rights are grounded in lived experience; everyday life is seen as a process of 
negotiating and renegotiating regarding shared assumption about human rights and 
responsibilities that come with them. This perspective raises challenging questions about 
universality and context, which I will come back to later in this chapter. This tradition 
underlines people’s agency in human rights protection and realisation,352 something it has in 
common with an actor-oriented approach to human rights that will be presented below.  
                                                 
346 Mark Goodale, “The Power of Right(s): Tracking Empires of Law and New Modes of Social Resistance in 
Bolivia (and Elsewhere)”, in M. Goodale & S. E. Merry (eds), The Practice of Human Rights: Tracking Law 
Between the Global and the Local (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 130-162, at 158.  
347 Ibid., at 159. 
348 See Boaventura de Sousa Santos and César A. Rodríguez-Garavito, “Law, Politics, and the Subaltern in 
Counter-Hegemonic Globalization”, in de Sousa Santos & Rodríguez-Garavito (eds) Law and Globalization 
from Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 1-26, at 20. 
349 Ife, Human Rights from Below, supra note 8, at 76. 
350 Klotz and Lynch, Strategies for Research, supra note 1, at 13. 
351 Ife, Human Rights and Social Work, supra note 3, at 200.  
352 Ife, Human Rights from Below, supra note 8, at 76-77. 
56 
The present author finds that the discursive understanding of human right as social 
constructions is the best attempt to capture current reality of the social world we live in.  
However, as Dembour points out, the four schools are not fixed categories that neatly and 
perfectly describe single track thought processes,353 and this study has been inspired by 
academic literature representing all four traditions presented above. For the purpose of 
understanding the role of human rights in development practice the discursive understanding 
of human rights is, however, most helpful.  
An actor-oriented approach to human rights from below 
This study has been inspired by what Celestine Nyamu-Musembi calls an ‘actor-oriented 
approach to human rights’. Jim Ife writes about what a from below perspective on human 
rights and community development means and his account is a good complement to the actor-
oriented perspective on human rights. In the actor-oriented model, there are no fixed 
definitions of the human rights concept. Scholars such as Mahmood Mamdani argue for 
moving towards a conception of rights that is produced in a concrete conceptualising of the 
wrongs in each situation and context. Such an analysis leads to an understanding of rights 
organic to the specific realities, and not a mechanical idea “as if out of a textbook”, from the 
Western historical experiences.354 Theoretically, this perspective is close to the ‘constructed 
rights tradition’, in which it is suggested that human rights are constantly being negotiated, 
defined, and redefined while firmly grounded in  the lived experience of the actors 
themselves. The constructed rights tradition can be placed within the discourse school. 
However, an actor-oriented approach also has features similar to the ideas presented in the 
protest school.  
In these approaches it is accepted that “rights are shaped through actual struggles informed by 
people’s own understandings of to what they are justly entitled.”355 In the actor-oriented 
perspective rights are understood as “claims (of one person or group on another person, group 
or institution) that have been legitimised by social structures and norms.”356  
Nyamu-Musembi observes that “looking for the meaning of rights from the perspective of 
those claiming them transforms defined normative parameters of human rights debates, 
questions established conceptual categories and expands the range of claims that are validated 
as rights.”357 This is a defining feature of the protest school and is in opposition to what Baxi 
calls “human rights as ethical imperatives”, a view according to which ‘human rights’ are not 
thought of in terms of political practices but rather an ethic of human rights that insists on 
what communities and individuals ought to desire.358  
From an actor perspective, it is important to “start from where the doers are and see the world 
through their eyes.” Participation as consultation is not enough: ‘doers’359 need to be in the 
drivers’ seat in order to make their actions and experiences their own.360 Ellerman warns 
against professionally guided programmes of social engineering that deliberately try to 
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impose someone else’s will on the doer.361 In human rights and development practices there 
are many examples of such programmes. Researchers Turnbull, Hernández and Reyes 
exemplify this fundamental dilemma through using an actor-oriented approach in analysing 
assistance programmes for street children. Their data show that the interventions and services 
analysed by the researches were utilised by the street children in their own way and later 
modified by the helpers trying to make the children ‘use them correctly’ – only to discover 
new adaptations on the part of the children. Professional helpers, with their services, try to 
impose upon the children, the outsiders’ idea of ‘help’ and ‘rehabilitation’. However, the 
children have their own ideas. The result is a continuous battle that keeps the children on the 
streets.362 Good intentions are not enough. The conclusion of the researchers is that 
programmes must construct relationships and strategies which do not force the child to 
renounce his or her identity in order to receive help.363 This is a valid point in any programme 
that seeks to give assistance to a person or group of persons living under challenging 
circumstances. Often it comes down to the difference between a top-down model of working 
and a ‘from below’ perspective.  
The conventional ‘from above’ approach to professional assisting usually means privileging 
of professional expertise over the experience of others. The idea of dialogical praxis, building 
on the work by Paulo Freire364 requires that both the professional human 
rights/development/social worker and those with whom he or she works are seen as having 
equivalent wisdom and expertise. Naturally, professional workers will have specialised 
knowledge and skills but the person/s they work with have a range of knowledge, skills, and 
experience that the workers lack: expertise that comes from lived experience and survival 
skills. Dialogical praxis requires shared knowledge and mutual learning, and acting together 
toward achieving human rights.365  
In human rights from the below approach, human rights are defined, negotiated, and enacted 
within different contexts. Human rights work becomes primarily about culture and 
relationships within communities, families, households, workplaces, and public spaces.366  In 
a human rights-based approach to local development it is usually natural to view human rights 
work in this way (‘rights as culture’). In this context, it is necessary to have an open mindset, 
to listen rather than propose solutions. Having a ridged and fixed definition of the human 
rights concept (‘expert knowledge’) usually prevents a meaningful dialogue and therefore an 
actor-oriented perspective may be helpful.  
However, trusting a process directed by the actors alone can lead to exclusion and 
discrimination and there is a need for a human rights-based approach in which a human rights 
framework can place some limits on self-direction. A fundamental requirement is that the 
human rights of all people, whether part of the particular group of actors or not, are respected 
in the process.367 In addition, the claimed right should be seen as either aspiring to apply to all 
of humanity or as applying to people from specific disadvantaged groups.368 Moreover, since 
no local context is devoid of unequal power relationships, it is important to be aware who is 
defining the issues in a rights language. Merry points out that often activists translate rights 
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claims in a way that is relevant to the life situations of the people involved. Often, 
international perspectives are translated ‘down’ more than grassroots perspectives are 
translated ‘up’ – and there is a real risk that e.g. women’s own experiences are not heard in 
the process.369  
Who gives meaning to human rights? 
When I write about ‘giving meaning to human rights’, I do not mean norm creation, i.e., the 
drafting of new internationally recognised human rights norms. I am primarily referring to 
individuals and groups giving meaning and content to the human rights concept as they set out 
to achieve rights that are meaningful to them. This is not only about actors pushing for new 
legal interpretation of existing norms, although this is part of the meaning-giving process. The 
process does not take place in a vacuum: the legal documents defining human rights and the 
structures surrounding the international human rights system naturally influence how actors 
ultimately give meaning to human rights, and the kind of locally manifested interpretation of 
the human rights concept we will observe. Human rights are always interpreted and 
understood in a local context and these local human rights discourses are relevant when 
understanding the role human rights play within various contexts. 
‘Human rights from below’ operates from a starting point where human rights are 
constructions defined by human beings in social, political, and cultural contexts – and it is 
what Jim Ife calls the act of definition that is the primary concern.370 I prefer to call this 
process a ‘meaning-giving-process’ instead of a ‘defining-process’. As Koskenniemi points 
out: “The interpretative techniques lawyers use to proceed from a text or behaviour to its 
“meaning” create (and do not “reflect”) those meanings.”371 My starting point is that the 
meaning of human rights is created in social, political, and cultural processes, not only by 
lawyers and human rights experts but also by rights-holders claiming human rights. However, 
actors have unequal power to shape and reshape meanings in these fields. Moreover, words 
may be interpreted differently by different actors such as by activists and their targets, 
implying that there are limits to the capacity of the ‘producers’ of discourses to control the 
meaning given to words and signs.372 ‘Meaning’ is constantly created and constantly 
challenged – at all levels. The local/national and transnational levels interact. Consensus is the 
result of a hegemonic process in which some actors have made their position seem the 
universal position.373  
Because of these tensions, I agree with Ife that the questions of who defines the human rights 
concept, and who is excluded, are important. In what context does this process take place?374   
In the deliberative school, that is dominating human rights discourse at the moment, human 
rights are accepted as being defined in legal documents and agreements. These are drafted and 
agreed upon by small groups of people: politicians, diplomats, academics, opinion leaders and 
some human rights activists. For a long time, they were predominantly privileged white 
men,375 and particularly during the formulation of UDHR representatives of only a few states 
dominated the scene (the cluster of Western and European states around the United States, 
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that dominated the UN). Since 1945, and the adoption of the UDHR, the circle of actors 
involved in the human rights movement, and also in standard setting, has expanded rapidly.376 
Recently, the voices of women and people from non-Western backgrounds have also gained 
influence in human rights discourse and have impact on how human rights are defined in 
documents. However, human rights still remain largely a discourse of the powerful about the 
powerless,377 thereby contributing to a discourse of domination and disempowerment. Human 
rights discourse is dominated by the voices of the privileged,378 speaking a specialised, often 
technical, language associated with a group of professionals that are part of global elites.379 
This inevitably has an impact on how human rights are perceived and applied by less 
powerful groups. At the same time, another kind of meaning-giving process is taking place, 
largely outside of institutions and agents of international law. Actors such as Oxfam, together 
with local groups, also contribute to giving meaning, or perhaps more accurately, they 
challenge the dominant meaning given to human rights when they generate completely new 
rights and reformulate existing rights in a way that makes sense to the people they work 
with.380  
The international movement for women’s human rights is another example of how activists, 
‘from below’, influence the norm creating processes as well as the interpretative processes of 
international human rights law.381 When reading about grassroots women’s groups one 
receives the impression that the way human rights have been defined in international legal 
agreements has always been resisted by these groups. They have always pushed for new 
interpretations and also new legal norms.  
Some even claim that this is the main value added: so far legal strategies to secure women’s 
human rights have not brought about radical social change, but they have challenged 
dominant social meanings and understandings of gender, difference, culture, sexuality as well 
as the very meaning of human rights.382 This is of central importance as grassroots women’s 
groups are not satisfied with a narrow, legalistic and formalistic understanding of the human 
rights concept. I agree with Temma Kaplan that “we need a new language to explain what 
grassroots women’s groups mean by human rights.”383 This is true not only for women’s 
human rights, but also for other groups who have been marginalised in international and 
domestic processes of norm creation and interpretation. An actor-oriented approach to human 
rights questions the position of ‘experts’ as sole agents in the process of meaning-giving; it 
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contributes to rethinking and reframing human rights, and thereby also gives human rights 
discourse a new language.   
Concluding remarks  
Writing from an actor-oriented perspective is the only way I, as an outsider, can write about 
human rights in development work in Malawi, because it is a completely new social setting 
for me. My argument is that human rights can play a meaningful role in development practice 
if the understanding of the human rights concept is rooted in the lived realities of the actors 
claiming them. At the community level there should be a public dialogue about the meaning, 
source, and authority of human rights as well as forms and strategies for claiming them and 
making them real in the everyday lives of the people. Having said this, the actor-oriented 
approach does pose certain challenges. When actors living in a resource constrained 
environment come together to the discuss development agendas and priorities they tend to 
prioritise short-term needs instead of striving for long-term changes in structure and policy.     
It is also important that some core values and ideas embedded in the legal documents that 
constitute human rights law, such as autonomy, choice, bodily integrity, and equality,384 are 
maintained and respected in the process. There should also be an aspiration of universality:385 
that what constitutes ‘our’ human rights also constitutes ‘your’ human rights. However, 
before going into the universality question we will examine some other debates that are 
important for our understanding of why a conventional definition of human rights is too 
limited for the purpose of contesting the status quo in favour of less powerful groups.  
2.2.4 Human rights and agency  
Norman Long, the founder of the actor perspective, defines agency, as “the knowledgability, 
capability and social embeddedness associated with acts of doing (and reflecting) that impact 
upon or shape one’s own and other’s actions and interpretations.”386 In general terms, agency 
assumes that the individual actor has the capacity to process social experience and to find 
ways of coping with life, even under the most extreme forms of coercion.387 Individuals or 
networks of people have agency, and they may also attribute agency to objects and ideas, 
which can shape their perceptions of what is possible.388 Human rights can potentially be an 
idea that expands perceptions of what is possible.  
The theoretical foundations for studies on agency come from Giddens, who linked agency to 
power, saying that “an agent ceases to be such if he or she loses the capacity to ‘make a 
difference’, that is, to exercise some sort of power.”389 Action is crucial for agency; and action 
involves power in the sense of transformative capacity. According to Giddens, action depends 
on the capability to make a difference. What is important is that when circumstances are such 
that an individual (or group) has ‘no choice’ this is not to be equated with dissolution of 
action as such.390  Having the power to make a difference can, under circumstances of social 
constraint, be used to regulate one’s own inner state of being, rather than outer circumstances 
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or events. Hirsch and Lazarus-Black have a dual meaning for ‘state’ as “institutionalized 
political order” and “condition of being”.391  
Agency scholars tend to put emphasis on the positive possibilities of purposive human action 
and the transformative potential that comes with this. For example Hickey and Mohan’s 
concept of radical political citizenship builds on the tradition of seeing agency as a range of 
“sociopolitical practices, or expressions of agency, through which people extend their status 
and rights as members of particular political communities, thereby increasing their control 
over socioeconomic resources”.392 Cleaver warns that believing too much in active exercise of 
agency through purposive human action and its transformative potential may, however, lead 
to that we romanticise procrastination as resistance. He points out that decision-making 
processes and the exercise of agency in these contexts may be contradictory in their social 
effects; there are complex constraints on the exercise of agency, especially for poor and 
marginalised individuals and groups.393 I agree with Cleaver that in all social processes that 
potentially lead to transformation there are transformation and tyranny, solidarity and conflict, 
articulation and mutedness, enablement of agency and constraint of structure.394  
My position is that of constructivist research which assumes that people, who have agency, 
are both socialised into their situations and capable of transformative actions.395 As human 
beings they have purposes and goals, or ‘intentions’. These intentions affect whether and 
when people choose to take transformative actions that delegitimise, destroy or rebuild 
structures.396 Therefore, agency is not seen as being in opposition to structure, as is often the 
case.397 Actions taken by actors can support or oppose dominant discourse. New discourses 
may shift people’s worldviews.398 This is not, however, always a result of conscious action. 
“People consciously and unintentionally replicate and challenge institutionalized routines and 
prevailing assumptions”.399  
Human rights are sometimes celebrated as giving agency to ordinary people and groups – but 
I claim that it is doubtful that agency is possible if human rights are seen as a system that has 
already decided what people ‘ought to desire’. Speaking one’s desires and naming the 
direction of change one would like to see is crucial for agency. Baxi relates agency to the 
questions: “Who speaks through us when we speak about human rights? And on whose behalf 
may we speak?”400 These are important questions especially in the development context when 
human rights are translated into locally relevant terms.  
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People living under difficult conditions have often, but not always, abandoned the idea that 
they ‘can make a difference’. Therefore, if agency is the starting point for development, and it 
often is claimed that it is, it is important to put these people back in the drivers’ seat when 
action is planned for and when claims are made. However, structural obstacles and social and 
political processes often prevent poor people’s claims from being heard, seen, and reflected in 
the definition, interpretation, and implementation of rights at the national and local levels, as 
stated by Moser and Norton.401 When political space is opened up, it allows different 
configurations for human agency and offers differing possibilities to challenge the status quo. 
By ‘stretching’ the political space in which individuals and groups are able to exercise their 
rights and participate in decisions that affect their lives,402 opportunities for agency are 
created.  
However, many people all over the world are unwilling to assume agency and prefer to be 
‘passive beneficiaries’, maybe because they have been treated as such all their lives. 
Sometimes structures and discourses used by development and human rights institutions 
reinforce the victimisation instead of creating conditions for agency.     
2.2.5 The political element of human rights   
Academics and activists understand the role of ‘politics’ in human rights discourse in very 
different ways. The way the notion ‘political’ is used here is not to suggest that human rights 
commitments are nothing more than a reflection of a states’ power and interests403 (policy-
oriented ‘realism’). Instead this chapter operates from the starting point that human rights, 
especially through social movements, have become both the object of political struggle and a 
mode of political action.404 There is, however, still some resistance against seeing the political 
character of human rights. Mutua argues for a need to become conscious of how the 
abstraction and apoliticisation of human rights “obscure the political character of the norms” 
human rights discourse seeks to universalise,405 and he is not alone in raising these arguments. 
In order to understand the debate about the political or apolitical character of human rights we 
need to look back in history. Costas Douzinas goes as far back as feudal society, claiming that 
political power, economic wealth, and social status coincided in the same individual during 
this era. One of the main innovations of natural rights was to remove politics from society, 
and depoliticise the economy, as a way of bringing to an end the automatic identification of 
political leadership with the economically dominant classes. As a result, politics became 
“confined into the separate domain of the state.”406 Over time, as human rights expanded to 
touch almost every part of daily life and politics, the main contemporary effect of human 
rights, Douzinas claims, “is to depoliticize politics itself.”407  
Here he refers to a distinction between ‘politics’ and ‘the political’, which builds on the 
insights of the Frankfurt School regarding the managerial and anti-ideological direction of 
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parliamentary politics in the West.408 The way I understand this is related to what 
Koskenniemi refers to when he writes that “under the liberal theory of politics […] the point 
of law is to lead society away from politics, understood as an effort to move from a state of 
contestation and conflict into one governed by rational rules, principles and institutions.”409 
Koskenniemi’s own view is that international law is always ingrained in “the system of 
distribution of material and spiritual values in the world.” When this is accepted, the task of 
anyone wanting to use international law or human rights law as a counter-hegemonic strategy 
(Koskenniemi refers only to lawyers, but writing from an actors’ perspective this is too 
narrow) “would no longer be to seek to expand the scope of law so as to grasp the dangers of 
politics but to widen the opportunity of political contestation of an already legalized 
world.”410  
Some argue that this is the main value added by human rights-based approaches to 
development; they can potentially repoliticise areas of development work, 411 i.e. create 
opportunities for political contestation. The question of power structures becomes very 
concrete when one starts to view marginalised individuals and power holders as rights-holders 
and duty-bearers. However, the trend of politicisation of humanitarianism and the fact that 
some NGOs have embraced human rights as politics has also been criticised. Here we should 
be clear that there are several trends taking place side by side and the 
depoliticisation/repoliticisation is a nuanced one, dividing NGOs and other actors internally 
and from one another.412  
Other actors find the rhetoric of human rights appealing precisely because of its apolitical 
nature.413 There can be no definitive conclusions drawn on this issue and there is a constant 
tension between the tendency to use human rights as a seemingly neutral way of improving 
governance, and using human rights to renegotiate political processes and challenge 
development policies contributing to continuous non-realisation of human rights for the 
poorest people.  
Anthropologist Harri Englund has written extensively on the role of human rights talk in 
governance in postcolonial states. He observes that while the situation of human rights is 
invariably political, various participants in human rights discourse, deliberately or not, act in a 
way that contributes to its depoliticisation. For example, the human rights projects that 
Englund has studied avoided talking politics in a context where talk about politics was the 
nation’s favourite pastime.414 This reflects the resistance against admitting a shift to politics in 
the human rights movement. Human rights have become the core language of a new politics 
of humanity that is beyond old ideological contests of left and right.415  
However, in various countries we start to see examples indicating that international and 
national NGOs involved in rights-based community development have been forced to shed 
their “apolitical” attitude and become involved in advocacy about policies to facilitate spaces 
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for disadvantaged and less powerful groups to be heard in governance structures at all 
levels.416 What this thesis calls for is to be more conscious and honest about the political 
element of human rights.  
If human rights are conceived of as only a formal legal project, their counter-hegemonic 
potential remains rather limited. It is when human rights are part of a political struggle for 
social change, in which law is seen as only one among many possible tools to be used against 
oppression, that human rights have empowering potential.   
2.2.6 Human rights and legalization 
Douzinas ends his chapter on the politics of human rights by stating that exclusion, 
domination, and exploitation are brought to the surface and awareness through human rights 
claims. Often such struggles, however, frame their resistance in terms of legal and individual 
remedies, which, in the case of success, lead to “small individual improvements and a 
marginal rearrangement of the social edifice.”417 The way I understand this is that through 
framing political claims as legal claims, human rights contribute to depoliticising politics. 
Further legalisation of human rights, consciously or unconsciously, hides the political element 
of human rights.  
For obvious reasons, legal bodies have the authority to define and determine the limits and 
extent of legal human rights. Therefore, because the legal sphere and international human 
rights law have come to dominate human rights discourse, ‘human rights’ themselves are 
often understood in terms of legal provisions. This phenomenon can be called 
‘legalisation’.418 There are also other ways of understanding the legalisation phenomena, e.g. 
“as a particular form of institutionalization characterized by obligation, precision, and 
delegation,”419 but this is outside the scope of this chapter.  
The predominant starting point for many studies by social scientists is to accept a legal 
definition of human rights.420 This is also the case for studies on the relationship between 
human rights and development. Most development agencies operate with some sort of legal 
definition of human rights, which would fall between the natural school and the deliberative 
school. There are, however, a growing number of international and national NGOs and social 
movements that have adopted their own definition of human rights, which departs from 
international human rights law. Oxfam is one such organisation. Oxfam sees the potential and 
                                                 
416 For an example from Kenya, see Celestine Nyamu-Musembi and Samuel Musyoki, Kenyan Civil Society 
Perspectives on Rights, Rights-Based Approaches to Development, and Participation (Brighton: Institute of 
Development Studies, 2004) at 1. Available at http://www.ids.ac.uk/files/Wp236.pdf, visited 10 May 2012.  
417 Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire, supra note 404, at 109-110.  
418 Saladin Meckled-García and Basak Cali, “Lost in Translation: The Human Rights Ideal and International 
Human Rights Law”, in S. Meckled-García & B. Cali (eds), The Legalization of Human Rights: 
Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Human Rights and Human rights Law (London: Routledge, 2006) 11-31, at 
12.  
419 Kenneth W. Abbott et al, “The Concept of Legalization” in Judith L. Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert O. 
Keohane & Anne-Marie Slaughter (eds), Legalization and World Politics (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2001) 17-
35 at 17. 
420 Basak Cali and Saladin Meckled-García, “Introduction: Human Rights Legalized – Defining, Interpreting, 
and Implementing an Ideal”, in S. Meckled-García & B. Cali (eds), The Legalization of Human Rights: 
Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Human Rights and Human rights Law (London: Routledge, 2006) 1-8, at 2. 
Examples of political and social science studies that use a legal definition include Todd Landman, “Measuring 
Human Rights: Principles, Policy and Practice” 26 Human Rights Quarterly (2004) 906-31; Hans-Otto Sano and 
Lone Lindholt, Human Rights Indicators: Country Data and Methodology (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for 
Human Rights, 2000); Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, Handbook in Human Rights 
Assessment: State Obligations Awareness and Empowerment (Oslo: NORAD, 2001).   
65 
power in applying a rights language, but is wary of legalisation. It has formulated a list of 
rights which made sense to Oxfam’s staff and counterparts around the world,421 but has no 
direct reference to human rights law, although we can see parallels.422 Since the empirical part 
of this thesis makes an analysis of an Oxfam programme in Malawi, I find it motivated me to 
question whether a legal definition of human rights is the only valid way of approaching the 
human rights concept and phenomenon. This study finds that a legal definition of human 
rights is too limiting in the context of human rights playing a meaningful role for people 
striving to improve their lives (doing ‘development’). A legal definition of human rights is 
natural when approaching human rights as obligations of states, including Malawi, but is, for 
reasons that will be described below, not sufficient when doing human rights work at the local 
level with people and groups.  
The starting point for this study is that human rights law is never an end in itself, only a 
means. Sometimes other approaches are more effective in reaching an end such as social 
justice. It remains an open question whether integrating human rights law into development 
efforts is the most effective approach of addressing issues such as inequality, food insecurity, 
and promoting social justice. We need empirical evidence showing the value of human rights-
based approaches to development. We also need to know more about how the human rights 
concept is translated into local sites of struggles over justice, equality, and resources. 
Nevertheless, at times the law in general and human rights law in particular does play an 
important role in challenging the status quo and is naturally not irrelevant from the 
perspective of this thesis.  
2.2.7 Human rights law and change (contesting the status quo)  
Hegemony and counter-hegemony 
Law has been central to the neoliberal restructuring of the world and as such it is, in the words 
of Randeria “a prism through which to capture some of these transformations, and the 
resistance to it, in the South.”423 There is a rich scholarly work on power, hegemony, and 
resistance indicating that the law is simultaneously a maker of hegemony and a means of 
resistance.424 Resistance is evidence that subordinate people are capable of questioning 
hegemony through diverse oppositional tactics. Through oppositional ideologies and 
behaviour, people confront dominant worldviews. Hegemony and resistance are not mutually 
exclusive; usually there are opportunities for resistance (and change) in the same process that 
can also transpire to be a factor contributing to structural reproduction.425 Hegemonic 
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processes and oppositional practices transform people and polities through producing 
“contested states”;426 and are therefore inextricably linked to law.427  
Ratna Kapur writes that “law is a complex and contradictory discourse”, suggesting that at 
times “the process of legalization of human rights has reinforced the subordination of the 
‘victim’ of human rights violations”, while at other times “human rights law has been an 
important source of resistance and change”.428 Moreover, Mamdani repeatedly highlights that 
the discourse on rights is a contradictory one, in both the ‘Western’ and contemporary African 
context (the context he writes about). “At certain historical moments, it has been a rallying cry 
for popular movements against arbitrary rule; at other moments, it has been the standard used 
by privileged minorities that sought a legal umbrella under which to preserve and reproduce 
these privileges.”429 Here we come back to the question of discourses of international law and 
human rights law as hegemonic and counter-hegemonic. If human rights are to play a counter-
hegemonic function, that is questioning and contributing to reshaping the status quo, it is 
important to first be aware of how often they fail to have this function.  
Rajagopal argues that counter-hegemonic power includes various types of resistance, and for 
human rights discourse it means being engaged in counter-hegemonic struggles ranging from 
anti-war protests to market access for agricultural products for poor countries. Human rights, 
being “the pre-eminent global moral discourse of our time”, could potentially play an 
important role in counter-hegemonic international law – but “instead human rights – or to be 
accurate, a broad language of ‘freedom’– has become the foundation for a hegemonic 
international law.”430 Furthermore, Koskenniemi claims that international law, and human 
rights law as one of its components, more often than not can be seen as maintaining the status 
quo. He gives the example of how “contingent and contestable” aspects of the world have 
begun to seem “natural and unavoidable” through legal rules that liberate powerful actors.  He 
asks why concepts and structures of international law, which are in themselves indeterminate, 
nonetheless seem to emerge on the side of the status quo?431  
One is free to disagree with Rajagopal and Koskenniemi on this issue, but it is hard to deny 
that human rights discourse, together with the discourses of good governance and 
development, maintain an image of knowing what to do and how to do it in a way that is 
superior to other ways. Be it in education, health, or the justice system, human rights, good 
governance and development all offer techniques, goals and methods for realising a vision for 
reshaping society following the liberal model.432 The denial of what Obiora Chinedu Okafor 
calls “African agency in the governance of Africa’s own societies” is widespread and 
characteristic of the current international structure in which human rights discourse tends to 
play a hegemonic role rather than a counter-hegemonic role. Advancing an actor-oriented 
approach to human rights and development would perhaps reveal new opportunities for 
human rights to be used as a strategy of resistance, questioning structures of domination and 
contributing to agency.  
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The ‘spiral model’ of human rights change 
In legal human rights research there are, as far as I know, no theories of change concerning 
the role played by human rights law in processes leading to greater adherence to human rights 
standards. International legal scholars tend to focus on success stories of altered domestic 
practices to support the assumption that international law is an efficient way to engage in 
processes of change. In political science, by contrast, we can find some attempts to develop 
empirically testable hypotheses about whether, and under what conditions, legal rules are 
effective in changing government behaviour. International relations scholars have generated a 
number of theories about the relative importance of different explanatory variables (law is one 
of these variables) in changed government practices.433     
This study is not concerned only with change defined as altered domestic practices, but sees 
social change as a broader process that is more difficult to define and test empirically. 
However, one theory of change, the so called ‘spiral model’ of human rights change is 
presented below in order to illustrate the need to develop new theories in human rights 
research.   
The ‘spiral model’ is interesting and relevant for this study because it relies on insights of 
social constructivism, meaning that the model of human rights change by Risse, Ropp, 
Sikklink et al differs from e.g. rational choice theorists. The authors argue that the social 
identities of actors are important factors in the process of change. As actor’s identities can be 
reshaped in discursive processes, transnational advocacy networks often engage in 
argumentative processes with norm-violating governments. However, this is in itself not 
enough for change to occur: sustained improvements of domestic human rights conditions 
require domestic institutionalisation of international norms.434 The authors have developed 
what they call a “socialization model” to explain the conditions needed for “domestic actors 
to internalise the rules and norms emanating from international human rights regimes.”435 
This model resonates with what Merry points to as the reasons why states choose to enter into 
human rights treaties. She believes these reasons are linked to “claims to civilized status in the 
present international order, much as ideals of civilization provided the standard for colonized 
countries during the imperial era.”436 Shaming of non-compliant governments is a cultural 
system “whose coin is admission into the international community of human-rights-compliant 
states.”437 
Risse, Ropp, Sikklink et al investigated eleven countries, each of which started in a phase of 
repression, even though the degree of human rights abuses varied.438 In the beginning of the 
“socialization process” these governments did not perceive any pressure to comply with the 
norms, according the findings of the authors. (This is difficult to believe, but maybe domestic 
resistance was of a nature that is difficult to investigate after many years.) Risse and Ropp 
claim that “it was the task of transnational advocacy networks to create such adaptational 
pressure in the first place.” Later in the stages of the ‘spiral model’, they claim that there 
began to be resonance between domestic audiences and international human rights norms.439 
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(Viewing these findings from an actor-oriented perspective on human rights, it may be the 
case that there was resistance already in the first place but this resistance was not framed in a 
language that at the time fitted international human rights norms. Relying on research by 
Merry, one can assume that there were “mediators” and “translators” who translated 
local/domestic concerns into a transnational agenda.440 What was lost and what was gained in 
this process one can only speculate about.)   
Nine of the eleven countries investigated by Risse, Ropp, Sikklink et al. went through a 
“denial” phase when the government rejected the very notion of international human rights 
jurisdiction. At the time of publishing their findings (1999), all the countries had moved 
towards “tactical concessions”.441 This is the third phase in the spiral, which is characterised 
by the fact that “the norm-violating government is forced to make tactical concessions to the 
international human rights community.” According the Risse and Ropp, this gives the 
domestic opposition opportunity to start its own process of social mobilisation. If it links up 
with transnational networks, the government is under pressure ‘from above’ as well as ‘from 
below’. If this pressure is sustained, a full implementation of human rights norms is likely to 
take place, and this marks the final stage of the spiral model, the so called “rule-consistent 
behavior”.442  
According to the authors, transnational networks have a dual task in the process of 
internalising rules and norms emanating from international human rights regimes into 
domestic practices. First, these networks remind “Western states of their own collective 
identities as liberal democracies and urge them to act upon these identities in the human rights 
arena.” Second, they “teach human rights norms to norm-violating governments.”443 The in-
built assumption is that change is inspired by transnational networks and domestic audiences 
follow later on as there starts to be resonance between them and international human rights 
norms.444 This conclusion shows how much weight is given to transnational networks as 
‘teachers and preachers’ of human rights. They also provide evidence to those who accuse 
human rights discourse of being ‘foreign’ or a continuation of imperialism.  
The ‘spiral theory’ feels outdated and there is need for theories that suit our contemporary 
time when human rights norms are accepted by almost all regimes and human rights rhetoric 
is used on all levels by a multitude of actors. In Malawi, human rights (in practice ‘freedoms’) 
are talked of and referred to by government as well as non-governmental actors; they have 
become part of the official discourse. There have also been revisions of laws in order to live 
up to the international treaty provisions (this process is of course far from complete). 
However, there is no theory about whether all of this makes a difference to the population. 
The question arising from the ‘spiral model’ of human rights change is: what comes after the 
fifth and final stage of change (‘norm-consistent behaviour’)? Can human rights be effectively 
used as a tool (political and legal) by rights-holders to improve the conditions of their lives? A 
certain level of institutionalisation and acceptance of human rights norms is only a first step 
and cannot as such be equated with ‘success’ or social change. It might be that human rights 
are foremost used by domestic elites for hegemonic purposes.  
Moreover, there is need for a theory of change concerning the role of human rights to be 
defined more broadly, not only as ‘legal freedom rights’, but as entitlements that groups of 
people feel justly entitled to. Studying grassroots women’s groups, and the way they apply 
                                                 
440 See Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence, supra note 287. 
441 Risse and Ropp, “International Human Rights Norms and Domestic Change”, supra note 438, at 235. 
442 Ibid., at 238. 
443 Ibid., at 271. 
444 Ibid., at 272. 
69 
human rights discourse to achieve change in their lives, would be a good case study to 
develop and test a hypotheses concerning the role of human rights as a counter-hegemonic 
tool in struggles for social change. I will not develop such a theory here, but I want to 
highlight that lack of theories in studying human rights forces researchers to be humble about 
the possible role of human rights in domestic processes of change. We cannot assume that 
official human rights advancement automatically leads to progress and success.     
2.2.8 The question of universality, relativism, particularity and context  
Dilemmas and debates 
The human rights concept can be meaningful and respectful of the agency of the actors when 
working with an actor-oriented perspective on human rights from below, but it is open to 
many difficult questions about context and universality.  
In the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 1993 human rights were presented as 
universal, indivisible and interdependent, and interrelated. It was stated that “[t]he universal 
nature of these rights and freedoms is beyond question.”445 However, when one takes part in 
scholarly debates as well as discussions at the grassroots level the universal nature of human 
rights is far from a settled matter. Behind the solemn statements in UN declarations there is 
considerable disagreements and contestations over the meanings attached to the human rights 
concept. Moreover, in the real world where people struggle to achieve human rights, things 
are messy, complex, and contradictory. In people’s lived experiences human rights are not 
necessarily universal and indivisible, nor are they inalienable or inabrogable, two other 
principles which often are attributed to the human rights concept.446  
The question of whether human rights standards provide a universal standard to be applied 
uniformly, or whether they are relevant to the social context has characterised the human 
rights movement ever since the adoption of the Universal Declaration.447 In the 1990s the 
debate was rather black-and-white: universalists firmly believed that the power of human 
rights lies in their universality and human rights should be adopted in all cultural contexts 
despite differences in local normative systems. Relativists claimed that human rights ideas 
should not be imposed on societies with different value systems.448 As I will show, the debate 
has become somewhat more nuanced and the positions are no longer so entrenched. There are 
ways around these dichotomous views leading to a more sophisticated way of dealing with 
universalism and relativism as well as human rights and culture. I have already called for a 
more nuanced way of giving meaning to the human rights concept. Furthermore, I will, in the 
following, refer to research that questions conventional ways of defining ‘culture’. However, 
as these dichotomous and essentialised views are still strong in the more conventional human 
rights discourse I will devote some space to understanding this dilemma.  
For many human rights scholars, universality is still beyond question. “Universality is at the 
core of the global human rights regime,”449 is a commonly held conception. Yet, Jack 
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Donnelly argues that the question ‘are human rights universal or relative?’ is 
misformulated.450 I agree with Donnelly and this is also supported by the evidence from the 
field work by Thoko Kaime that reveals the need for a new discursive framework that moves 
the debate beyond relativism and universalism. Universalism and relativism are simply 
inadequate as analytic tools for describing the role of human rights in social relationships.451 
However, before looking at possible solutions to the dichotomy between universalism and 
relativism it is necessary to have a better understanding of the dilemmas and why these 
debates have been so polarised in human rights discourse.  
The ‘natural rights’ argument for universality is that since human rights are not given by a 
sovereign and therefore cannot be taken away by a sovereign, nor are they based on criteria 
such as age, gender, race or caste, human rights should provide a universal standard.452 An 
argument against this view is that the ‘natural rights tradition’ is only one among many 
schools of thought behind human rights discourse. According to other views rights are not 
natural and eternal but always emergent and historically specific.453  
The ‘formalist argument’ for universality is simply that since most states have ratified a 
number of binding international human rights treaties, human rights standards are universal.454 
For example, Donnelly argues that human rights enjoy ‘international legal universality’ 
because virtually all states accept the authority of the Universal Declaration and as of the end 
of 2009 the six core international human rights treaties had on average 170 parties. This 
means that in contemporary international society there is a ‘hegemonic’/authoritative system 
of international legal principles that gives an element of universality to internationally 
recognised human rights.455 Donnelly, however, admits that this universality can be 
relativised by stressing the incompleteness of the human rights system, in the sense that a 
number of states continue to resist these hegemonic international norms.456  
Despite UDHR being cited today with near-universal approval, we have to keep in mind that 
it was a very narrow group of actors that launched the UDHR. Mutua points out that the few 
Southern states present in the formulation of UDHR, such as India, Lebanon, Burma, 
Pakistan, the Philippines, Ceylon, and Syria, had only recently gained independence. He 
reminds us that “the nations that drafted the UDHR directly colonized three quarters of the 
earth and enforced brutal, racist, and even genocidal policies in many places.”457 Only four 
African countries were members of the UN at the time. It is also relevant that the very concept 
of the nation state, with its constitutional order and bill of rights that African societies adopted 
after independence, was a colonial imposition – not a result of internal political, social and 
economic developments.458 For these reasons human rights lack legitimacy in many African 
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societies,459 although the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted in 1981 has 
contributed to increasing legitimacy and a growing African human rights discourse. Another 
dimension of the legitimacy issue is the tension between elements of African cultural and 
religious traditions and certain human rights norms, e.g. in the area of women’s rights, 
children’s rights and rights of minority groups. Tensions naturally exist in all societies, 
including Western ones, but these tensions seem to be very pronounced in African 
societies.460 
This is one reason why e.g. deliberative scholars refer to the incompleteness of the 
international human rights discourse and make the argument that human rights principles as 
currently constituted are not universal because they are shaped by distinctly Western 
experience.461 All ideas, including human rights, emerge in a cultural context and cannot be 
divorced from it. These cultural contexts vary and change; what will be counted as ‘human 
rights’ will inevitably be different in different cultural contexts.462 These scholars, who refer 
to the incompleteness of human rights, are using arguments labelled as ‘multicultural 
universalism’ or ‘weak cultural relativism’ and claim that human rights could become truly 
universal only if as many world cultures as possible contributed to shaping the discourse of 
rights. The human rights movement should build on these various contributions rather than 
work from a Western/Eurocentric conception of what human rights are.463  
Typically there seems to be a contradiction between universalism, in the form of a 
“transnational but European-driven conception of rights, and relativism, in the form of respect 
for local cultural differences.” Rights and culture are, in this view, seen as possibly mutually 
contradictory. However, seen in this way, the universalism/relativism debate essentialises 
both culture and rights. In this context, human rights are understood as a Western idea, based 
on Enlightenment traditions.464 Culture is understood as a homogenous and integrated system 
of beliefs and values.465 This weakens the human rights movement: in the South human rights 
advocates try to demonstrate that human rights are indigenous and relevant while “arrogant 
outsiders” insist on “imposing Northern models and procedures”. The result is that dictatorial 
states dismiss them as imperialist impositions and the energy of the Southern human rights 
advocate is wasted.466 This leads to situations of “law in practice” being very different from 
“law in the books”, a familiar phenomenon in many countries of the South. This is the case 
especially when the latter are foreign legal transplants imported into a very different social 
and political context. Attempts to globalise “legal particularities” overlook the fact that laws 
reflect a long history of political contestation and compromises. When Western norms and 
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practices are diffused globally this does not happen without local translation and also 
resistance. 467 
In the postmodern world of relativism, multiple voices and fragmented realities, it is 
sometimes held that there is no room for a universalist discourse on human rights, especially 
since it has traditionally been a top-down discourse, and has difficulty dealing with difference 
and diversity. According to postmodern critique the idea of human rights is too tightly 
connected to the modernist project, and too western (or Eurocentric) to give a positive 
contribution to the future. I agree with Ife that this is a critique we cannot fully ignore.468 I 
also agree with the relativists that Western hegemony is a concern.469 However, a discourse of 
difference needs to be balanced with discourses of unity, underlining what unites and brings 
us together as human beings. A position that denies anything but the contextual, ignores the 
fact that despite cultural differences, human beings are connected.470 It is from this 
perspective that a discourse of ‘common humanity’ can be appealing and powerful. Due to 
problems with the idea of the term ‘common humanity’, which brings us back to the natural 
rights tradition, seeking some essentialised, fundamental humanity, Ife suggests ‘shared 
humanity’ could be used when indicating commonalities between people. ‘Shared humanity’ 
can be explored through lived experience, but without identifying the single, ‘common’ form 
of human condition applying to everyone.471 Through our ‘shared humanity’ human rights 
have a universal element. However, the context in which this is expressed can never be 
ignored.   
Mahmood Mamdani challenges the debate on whether rights are of Western origin by arguing 
that rights are defined by struggle. He makes a simple yet profound and clear observation: 
“[w]here ever there was (and is) oppression – and Europe had no monopoly over oppression 
in history – there must come into being a conception of rights.”472 He claims that the notion of 
rights cannot have any fixed and immutable content; instead the content of rights must vary 
from one historical circumstance to another, and from one social context to another.473 As 
Nyamu-Musembi points out, when human rights are viewed from this perspective, they are 
“both universal and particular: universal because the experience of resistance to oppression is 
shared among subjugated groups the world over, but also particular because resistance is 
shaped in response to the particularities of the relevant social context.”474 Human rights are 
relevant for people living in any cultural contexts, whenever they struggle for justice.475 
Africans have their own histories of the struggle for human rights, which are linked, but also 
distinct from similar struggles in other parts of the world.476  
The authors referred to above have in common the message that it is necessary to stop 
thinking of universal/contextual as an either/or dichotomy. We need to explore a way of 
thinking about them as both/and.477 This argument moves the debate on universality vs. 
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particularism to a new level, an advancement on being trapped  in the midst of trying to define 
‘culture’ and arguing about into who’s culture human rights ideals fit or who’s culture they 
fail to fit. It questions assumptions about opposition between rights and culture that were 
fundamental during imperialism and to a large extent still remain part of the human rights 
rhetoric.478 The starting point is then that both the concept of ‘culture’ and ‘rights’ are ever-
changing; change rather than stagnation is characteristic of rights and culture.479 
‘Culture’ and the universality question 
In these debates in particular and in human rights discourse in general there is a need for 
conceptual clarification of ‘culture’ in the human rights praxis. Human rights tend to rely on 
an essentialised model of culture, and fail to take advantage of the potential of local cultural 
practices for change.480 Often ‘culture’ is put into opposition to the universal human rights 
project and e.g. ‘Third World women’ are portrayed as victims of their culture in a way that 
reinforces stereotypes and cultural essentialism.481 To give a concrete example from the area 
of women’s rights: according to ethnographic field research by Merry, when government 
representatives, members of the expert committee under the Convention on the Elimination of 
all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), or the convention itself invoke 
‘culture’ in proceedings related to CEDAW, it is mostly as an obstacle to change rather than 
as a resource or opportunity for change. According to this view ‘culture’ is fixed, static, 
bounded, and isolated.482 The fact that transnational legal processes are engaged with cultural 
transformation remains unspoken.483 At the same time, the human rights framework also 
includes rights to culture.484 It is rights versus culture as well as rights to culture that have 
preoccupied scholars from various fields as well as lawyers, bureaucrats, NGOs and lay 
people, and engaged them in debates about the legal and political status which ‘a culture’ 
should or should not have.485   
There are, however, more modern understandings of ‘culture’ as a continuous process of 
creating new meanings and practices.486 Nyamu-Musembi argues that both cultural norms and 
formal rights regimes offer opportunities as well as challenges in dealing with specific 
situations of oppression. In reality, there are no clear cut lines; we cannot place the blame for 
human rights violations on culture and pose universal human rights principles embodied in 
formal laws as the solution.487 Culture consists of ideas and practices that are not homogenous 
but continually changing because of contestation, new ideas, and institutions: “Cultural 
discourses legitimate or challenge authority and justify relations of power.”488 Merry views 
human rights as a means of producing new cultural understandings and actions. She sees 
human rights monitoring processes as a gradual cultural transformation; in these legal settings 
what is being produced is ‘culture’.489 However, mainstream social science has often failed to 
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study culture as a process shaped by factors such as the interplay between individual agency 
and social structure.490  
When focusing on multiple configurations and meanings representing “a network of 
perspectives”, that emerge from a ‘situated analyses of rights’ as proposed in the actor-
oriented perspective on human rights,491 it is possible to avoid the age old dichotomies 
between “human rights universals and cultural absolutes”. For example, non-discrimination of 
children in an African context is not the perspective of human rights advocates alone but also 
that of “ordinary people who claim no special knowledge of children’s rights.”492 It appears 
that the most fruitful approach to the culture and universal human rights debate is viewing 
‘rights as culture’493 instead of ‘rights versus culture’ or ‘rights to culture’.  
Kaime draws the conclusion that human rights should be given a general enough meaning in 
order to address the multiple configurations of meanings and perspectives that are and inform 
individuals’ rights and which emerge from the contexts in which people live.494 Human rights 
should be interpreted and transformed into practice in a way that raises legitimacy and gives 
rise to pluralism that is neither universalist nor relativist but grounded in the reality of 
people’s daily lives.495 Merry highlights the need to develop a framework that recognises 
difference and specificity but at the same time enables a shared language of equity and 
justice.496 Finding this kind of shared language is difficult as long as human rights discourse is 
seen as the exclusive terrain of specialised (legal) experts.   
2.2.9 Individual rights and collective rights 
Another important debate in the search for and exploration of a meaningful human rights 
concept that is relevant in a local context concerns individual rights and collective rights. 
There has been cultural relativist critique claiming that human rights discourse downplays the 
importance of the community and promotes an individualistic model of rights that does not fit 
into non-Western way of life.497 The basis of the so called ‘Asian critique’ of human rights 
has been that the human rights thinking inscribed in the UDHR and various UN covenants has 
a strong focus on the human as an individual, rather than on humanity as a whole. Critics from 
Asia argue that because of their individual bias, human rights are a colonialist attempt by 
West to impose its view of humanity on others.498 (Ironically, the elites in e.g. Indonesia and 
Singapore, two states that have been vocal in defence of ‘Asian values’, are highly 
westernised. It seems that the rhetoric of cultural relativism in this case is more about political 
opportunism than concern for cultural values.)499 
It is true that in conventional human rights thinking there is a strong focus on the individual as 
holders of rights. Individual rights are not to be found only in the field of civil and political 
rights, but most ESC rights are addressed to individuals, and even ‘third generation’ rights 
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such as the right to development contains an individual dimension.500 Human rights are 
private in that they are claimed to adhere in the human person him- or herself (the argument 
being that everyone has human rights by virtue of being human), unmediated by social 
relations. They are consequently also individual: an isolated human being can in principle 
exercise them. A human being holds rights not only against the state, but also against 
‘society’, i.e., against his or her community or even family.501 (We can find examples of such 
cases in Merry’s book on violence against women.)502 This is a radical departure from what 
has been the norm in most human societies, in which collective and communal rights would 
be preferred to individual rights.503  
In different societies there are different ways of placing emphasis on individual rights/duties 
and collective rights/duties. A liberal, conventional understanding of rights implies both 
individual rights and individual responsibilities; a more social democratic tradition would 
underline individual rights and collective responsibilities; in Asia, by contrast, the lines 
between the individual, the society and the state are blurred by conceptions of duty, putting 
emphasis on individual duties to contribute well-being of the collective; and finally a 
communist ideal would subordinate the individual to the collective in terms of both duties and 
rights.504 Human rights as defined in most international legal agreements reflect a certain way 
of putting emphasis on individual rights and responsibilities in relation to collective rights and 
responsibilities, although the normative preferences of many of the human rights instruments 
that have been adopted since the Southern states gained more influence over the standard 
setting process indicates that this is certainly not black-and-white. Many of the latter 
instruments move away from a focus on individualism and aim at tackling issues affecting 
groups or systemic social and economic problems that require radical solutions.505 
Because of the Asian critique and as a response to advocacy on those parts of groups that are 
often systematically denied human rights (e.g. women, indigenous peoples, people with 
disabilities, and children) there has, in recent decades, been a growing interest in 
understanding human rights collectively as well as individually.506 As we know there are some 
human rights documents that contain human rights whose holders are groups as well as 
individuals. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples507 is an example of a 
document that incorporates rights regarded as belonging individually to members of 
indigenous communities as well as rights regarded as collective, such as the right to live 
freely as distinct peoples. The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, adopted in 
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1981, includes people’s rights to existence and self-determination,508 to economic, social and 
cultural development,509 and to a general satisfactory environment.510 Moreover, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights511 contains a true collective right, the 
right of self-determination in Article 1.512  
Developments of human rights law call into question rigid distinctions between individual and 
community in thinking about human rights and rights claims. As with universalism and 
context, it is essential to stop thinking about individual or collective rights, but instead 
emphasise that all human rights can have both individual and collective aspects.513 Some 
claims are collective in nature, such as indigenous communities’ claims for compensation for 
use of their knowledge in medicine. A ‘situated analyses of rights’ as proposed in the actor-
oriented perspective on human rights, point to people’s own experiences of how individual 
and community concerns and interest overlap, sometimes in harmony and sometimes in 
tension. Sometimes it makes no sense to talk of individual rights unless the broader issue of 
the group’s status as a rights-holding community is also addressed. This might be the case 
with individuals belonging to a low caste: your status as a member of a particular group is 
very central to how you are defined and treated in a particular social context.514 The challenge 
is to not disregard the community context in which people are living, but at the same time not 
legitimising a narrow definition of personhood based on status in hierarchical social 
relationships.515  
2.2.10 Indivisible and hierarchical human rights  
A final debate that Nyamu-Musembi refers to when presenting the actor-oriented perspective 
on human rights is that which revolves around the relationship between different sets of 
rights. The issue that has been debated can in simplified terms be put like this: is the 
relationship a hierarchical one so that there are certain rights that take precedence over other 
rights? Or are all human rights indivisible and interdependent and interrelated,516 as made 
clear in the Vienna Declaration and Programme for Action?517 This would imply that human 
rights are non-hierarchical.     
Internationally recognised human rights have traditionally been, especially before the Vienna 
Conference on Human Rights in 1993, divided into different categories. A well-known 
distinction that is often used is between three ‘generations’ of human rights: 1) civil and 
political; 2) economic, social and cultural rights; and 3) ‘new’ or ‘third-generation’ human 
rights, such as the right to peace, the right to development and environmental rights. This 
concept of generations may be used to suggest an order of priority between human rights.518 
Civil and political rights have been accorded stronger recognition in most legal frameworks 
and are often treated as if they take precedence over economic, social, and cultural rights.519 
In addition, the dominance of human rights discourse by the law and the legal profession has 
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had consequences for the way in which human rights have been understood. Privileging civil 
and political rights over other human rights, as these tend to be more readily justiciable and 
thereby more easily dealt with through legal structures and processes, is one such 
consequence.520 This is changing now that there are increasingly more efforts to deal with 
ESC rights as justiciable rights.521  
In the UN rhetoric today, and in the rhetoric of most NGOs, it is, however, almost taken as a 
given that human rights are interdependent, interrelated, and indivisible (although it remains 
more of a statement of intent than a reality).522 Indivisibility is also the starting point for 
human rights-based approaches to development: civil and political rights mean little without 
other categories of rights, and vice-versa. It is clear that in lived reality people do not 
experience rights, or their deprivations, in a way that would make it possible to distinguish 
between different sets of rights.523 Concrete examples of how this functions in reality are 
raised in literature from within the development discourse.524 
The interrelated nature of human rights seems to suggest that all human rights share common 
characteristics, for example that they imply obligations on the part of duty-bearers.525 The 
idea that there would be a clear difference between the three ‘generations’ or categories of 
human rights, or even between the two first ones, is misconceived. While it is possible to 
make a distinction between negative and positive obligations, this distinction does not follow 
the three categories. Civil and political rights often require positive measures, including 
measures that require resources, e.g. holding of elections.526 All human rights require 
resources in order for realisation to take place. Moreover, it is possible to understand all rights 
from the first two generations as having both individual and collective aspects, and also the 
third generation contains rights that have individual dimensions.  
Daniel Whelan has reviewed the ‘indivisibility and interdependence’ literature from the 1980s 
and 1990s and writes that “the language of interrelatedness demonstrates equality of 
importance or legitimacy of economic, social, and cultural rights in relation to civil and 
political rights.”527 The rhetoric of indivisibility carries both conceptual and symbolic weight, 
and the claim that the two categories of human rights are indivisible carries considerable 
meaning. This rhetoric first emerged during the late 1940s and early 1950s, when the UN was 
the scene for serious debates about how to codify the rights in the UDHR into binding 
international law.528 Moyn points out that in the 1940s when the idea of human rights was 
forged, there was some commitment to social equality, and social rights were comparatively 
uncontroversial. However, the context for the breakthrough of the human rights movement in 
the 1970s, that of totalitarianism and authoritarian rule, meant that social rights were not an 
issue that featured on the agenda.529  
As we know, the Universal Declaration makes no distinction between civil and political rights 
and economic, social, and cultural rights. However, it was the intention of the UN 
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Commission on Human Rights to include only the first set of rights in a binding covenant. 
The plan on behalf of the Commission was to later on draft further conventions and additional 
instruments to cover other categories of rights. However, the General Assembly requested the 
covenant to include ESC rights. The Commission made a redraft in 1951 but the following 
year, after heated debate, the GA requested the Commission to draft two separate human 
rights covenants, separating again the two categories of rights. The countries that lobbied for a 
single legally binding covenant were concerned that ESC rights would never be embodied in a 
binding treaty if this was postponed. They also wanted the West to give as much attention to 
ESC right as to civil rights, a debate that also raised the issue of a guarantee for international 
development resources. Other postcolonial states, such as India, on the other hand, recognised 
that ESC rights would be primarily national responsibility – not a responsibility for the 
international community – individual rights as they are.530   
The GA decision of 1952 to divide the then-single Covenant into two separate treaties is often 
referred to in literature on human rights. In the more recent literature, the focus for the reasons 
behind this change of events is placed on Cold War politics and the ideological differences 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. Mostly, these accounts overlook another 
critical political factor that led to the division: the importance of ESC rights to emerging anti-
colonial and development agendas of newly independent states of the South. Among these 
states there was also strong support for self-determination as a human right,531 an issue that is 
highly relevant for the debate on the collective/individual nature of human rights. The debates 
on the right to development sprung out of this rhetoric. Most industrialised states of the West 
were opposed to the fact that the Declaration on the Right to Development framed some of the 
rights as belonging to states instead of individuals.532 All of this is crucial for our 
understanding of the role of human rights in development policy and practice. It seems that 
the recipient states of development assistance and the donor states throughout history have 
had quite a different emphasis in the discourse on human rights, and this has implications for 
the counter-hegemonic potential of human rights. If developing states and their citizens feel 
alien to the contemporary dominant human rights discourse, it is questionable that human 
rights provide tools for them to address injustices and development problems, unless they 
participate in reformulating the human rights concept. 
The contemporary language of indivisibility reflects an acknowledgement of the fundamental 
unity of human rights as enumerated in the UDHR. Indivisibility is seen as a remedy for the 
breech caused by the forced separation that took place due to political disagreements, 
stemming inter alia from hesitation to the idea of justiciable economic and social rights.533 
Recent emphasis on human rights-based approaches to development suggests attempts to 
bridge the gap between freedom and sustenance. Moreover, viewing of participation as a right 
has politicised economic and social rights; the fulfilment of these rights are no longer seen as 
a ‘welfarist’ concern with provision of services to passive ‘beneficiaries’.534 The position that 
there is no ‘hierarchy’ of rights can, however, appear unhelpful for those seeking to identify 
priorities for action and change, e.g. in human rights-based development work. Therefore, it is 
important to understand how rights regimes operate as they relate to the capacity of poor 
people to access opportunities in order to identify and prioritise strategic entry points for 
action.535  
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In an actor-oriented perspective on rights, there would be an open question about how people 
articulate rights claims in specific situations, instead of asking which types of rights are 
important and how they reinforce or weaken each other. An open question that does not 
assume anything about a hierarchy of rights “is more likely to bring the complex overlap 
between demands for rights as ‘things’ and demands for the power to make decisions 
concerning the ‘things’ (participation).”536 
Another important issue is that the two traditional categories of rights, civil, political and 
economic, and social and cultural, are not enough to cover rights claims in a rapidly changing 
world. Demands from rights-holders reject the compartmentalisation of rights and continue to 
expand the rubric of rights into new areas such as knowledge rights. An actor-oriented 
perspective seeks to investigate struggles over rights in the everyday experiences as mediated 
by factors such as gender, ethnicity, caste and kinship structures,537 while being open to issues 
and demands that do not easily fit into the current legal human rights structure.  
Being aware of the tensions and shortcomings of the legal human rights structure is important 
in order to be able to use that framework when formulating human rights claims. An actor-
oriented perspective allows for creative use of the human rights framework, not being too 
limited in instances where the human rights framework clearly contradicts lived reality. The 
artificial division of human rights is an obvious example.  
2.2.11 Concluding remarks 
In constructivist research there is an in-built assumption that people have agency and are 
therefore capable of transformative actions that delegitimise, destroy, and rebuild structures. 
Dominant definitions of human rights are not immune to such delegitimisation and 
reconstruction. There is no opposition between an actor perspective and a structural 
perspective of human rights. Structure puts limits on actions and agency but actions do change 
structure.  
For many, human rights remain an excluding and elitist discourse with little relevance to the 
everyday lived reality. Yet, human rights represent a powerful idea. Human rights discourse 
needs to be expanded and made available so that a public political dialogue can take place at 
all levels of society rather than being protected and kept as expert knowledge. Human rights-
based approaches to development can at best help in advancing this kind of localisation and 
politicisation process of human rights.  
In this chapter I have argued for an inclusive and open way of approaching and understanding 
the human rights concept. Human rights are legal and political; universal and 
particular/contextual; have both individual and collective dimensions and include claims that 
can be situated in different categories of rights. Human rights discourse is a discourse of unity 
(putting emphasis on our shared humanity), however, this discourse should not replace a 
discourse of division but rather be placed alongside it, another example of both/and instead of 
either/or thinking. We need to understand what unites human beings as well as what divides 
them in order to build an adequate basis for social and political practice.538  
Human rights discourse is a complex and contradictory discourse, especially in its legal 
forms. Legal human rights claims can both serve to maintain the status quo and to challenge 
and change it. Law as a discourse tends to have a “distinct ability to define and pronounce 
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authoritatively on the world around it”, as noted by Kapur.539 The actor-oriented and from 
below perspectives on human rights are aware of this one-size-fits-all-best practice tendency 
that stifles from below visions. Political human rights claims are of course not free from 
contradictions and tensions either. When introduced from above, as expert knowledge, human 
rights are often introduced as somehow politically neutral legal solutions that will improve 
‘governance’.  
Central to the argument in Ife’s idea about human rights from below as well as in Nyamu-
Musembi’s actor-oriented perspective on human rights in development practice is the 
importance of the actors themselves being able to contribute to giving meaning to human 
rights. It is the process of ‘meaning-giving’ that is interesting in a human rights-based 
approach to development (and this does not, of course, take in a vacuum, the structures of the 
international human rights system are there to influence that process). If the actors are going 
to have a sense of ownership, so that a ‘culture of human rights’ can be embedded, they must 
have a say in the process. If participation is going to be meaningful, human rights cannot be 
seen as a ‘professional’ (mostly legal) practice. The human rights concept must be understood 
in a way that is organic to the specific realities of the actors claiming them. Additionally, the 
strategies applied must be born out of an understanding of the relationships and identities that 
shape this reality. In this way human rights can be relevant and meaningful to the lived 
realities of people striving to improve the conditions of their lives. If we take the idea about 
agency seriously, we must let actors themselves speak about human rights – we cannot have a 
ready list of ‘things’ ‘they’ ought to desire. There must be trust in the wisdom and change 
from below, seeing that there are opportunities and challenges for change in all cultures and 
all situations. The task of people doing human rights-based development work is about 
assisting the process so that poor people’s claims are being heard, seen and reflected.540 One 
of the most fundamental dilemmas in professional assisting is that outsiders try to impose 
their idea of ‘help’, or ‘change’. Too often top-down management hide behind nice slogans of 
participation and empowerment, and often conflicts between these two principles are hidden 
and ignored. It remains an unresolved question how to deal with situations in which 
participants do not prioritise human rights realisation.  
An actor-oriented approach does not imply that the UDHR, UN covenants of human rights 
and national bills of rights have no value or are unimportant or that human rights 
professionals’ skills have no value. These documents have legal significance and they have 
symbolic power and can be tools to be used in advocacy, an important element of human 
rights-based practice. However, they are not the final and last word on human rights. Even 
though they enjoy some degree of universality, all the documents were made at particular 
times and specific contexts. People should be able to look at them critically and think about 
what human rights mean for them. Social movements have during all times challenged the 
human rights system and contributed to its evolution and reformulation. However, as there is 
a danger that actors ‘defining rights’ will make a list of local ‘demands’ explained in a rights 
language, it is essential that there is the aspiration of universality involved in such an exercise. 
People must think beyond narrow self-interest so that the human rights claims they have for 
themselves are also what they wish could be applied to all of humanity.541 This is what 
distinguishes human rights from other rights regimes.    
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2.3 Food rights, food security, and livelihoods 
Having analysed the concepts ‘development’ and ‘human rights’ it is now time to turn to food 
rights, food security and livelihoods. In this chapter, I will deal with the integration between 
the right to adequate food and food security. In order to understand the context I will start by 
exploring who the poor and hungry are. Then I will firstly review the integration and 
disintegration between the right to food and food security historically, and secondly explore 
the relationship between the two concepts, including how they have come together as a human 
rights-based approach to food security. I will also review how the right to food has been given 
content and meaning by expert institutions and how civil society actors strive to change and 
redefine that content so that it would resonate with the lived reality of the poor and hungry.  
2.3.1 Who are the poor and hungry? 
Who is poor: A word on measuring poverty 
Just as there are no universally accepted ways of defining development, there are no value-
neutral means of measuring development or the lack of it. Since the understanding of 
development has been dominated by economic aspects, it has become common for countries 
to establish a poverty line based on income or consumption. The World Bank has set up the 
equivalent of US $1 in consumption per person per day as the line of absolute poverty, for 
purposes of international comparison.542 According to this way of measuring, a poor person is 
someone who has less than one dollar per day to live on. Despite obvious shortcoming, the 
one dollar a day has been widely used as a proxy for poverty. For instance, the UN 
Millennium Declaration set out the goal that the proportion of the world’s people whose 
income is less than one dollar a day should be halved by the year 2015.543  
The human development index (HDI) is a measurement of socio-economic progress that 
reflects a broader understanding of development. The index uses a combination of criteria to 
measure the quality of people’s lives. Three variables have been chosen: life expectancy, 
educational attainment (adult literacy and combined primary, secondary and tertiary 
enrolment), and real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita.544  
The 1997 edition of the Human Development Report also introduced a human poverty index 
(HPI), using variables such as the percentage of people expected to die before the age of forty, 
the percentage of adults who are illiterate, the percentage who are lacking access to health 
services and safe water.545  
The latest invention is called the multidimensional poverty index (MPI) and is said to reveal a 
different pattern of poverty than income poverty, as it reflects a different set of deprivations. 
The MPI has three dimensions: health, education, and standard of living. These are measured 
using ten indicators, inter alia child mortality, nutrition, years of schooling, child enrolment, 
drinking water, sanitation, and assets.546 What is special about the MPI (compared to progress 
reports on the Millennium Development Goals, for instance) is that the MPI establishes the 
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‘base’ population as being the household. The argument is that as people live in households, 
the suffering of one member affects other members, and the abilities of one member to help 
other household members. The MPI analysis therefore focuses on people rather than nations. 
The MPI calculate the number of people whose lives are affected by multiple deprivations, 
not the number of countries as is the case in the Global Monitoring Reports. This commitment 
is argued to be part of a human rights-based approach and other ethical approaches, in which 
every human life is to be given equal weight.547 People are in the centre, not economies. 
However, one might note that focussing on households rather than individuals is alien to 
conventional, individualistic human rights practice.  
Who are the hungry?  
The FAO calculates the number of hungry and undernourished people worldwide and 
publishes the results  annually in The State of Food Insecurity in the World reports. The latest 
report tells us that, for the first time since 1970, more than one billion people and around one-
sixth of all of humanity are hungry. The FAO claims that even before the food and economic 
crises, the number of undernourished people in the world had been increasing slowly and 
steadily for a decade.548  
Numbers are numbers and they might be useful to give us a hint about how prevalent poverty 
and hunger are on a global scale. However, they do not tell us much about the question who 
the poor and hungry people are. The UN Millennium Development Project Taskforce on 
Hunger writes in the report Halving Hunger: It can be done that the hungry and the poor are 
the vulnerable. Many of the households living below the poverty line are unable to obtain 
enough food to feed the family members. Women and children are especially vulnerable to 
hunger. Women produce 60-80 percent of the food in most developing countries and more 
than 80 percent of the food in Africa – and yet they are disproportionately vulnerable to 
hunger, due to existing social inequalities. They own only 1 percent of the land and receive 
only 7 percent of agricultural extension time and resources.549 In addition, when a women 
receives inadequate nutrition this has a tremendous effects on her children. Women may not 
be able to produce breast milk of sufficient quantity and quality when they are 
malnourished.550  
Poor and hungry people do not live only in so called developing countries but also in rich 
industrialised nations. Janet Poppendieck has studied emergency food and their users in the 
USA. From her book Sweet charity? we learn that also in the wealthy USA the individuals 
most at risk of hunger are women, children, and the elderly, many of them members of 
minority groups. These groups asserted that the reasons they are hungry is because of 
unemployment or underemployment, high costs of housing and other basic needs, and 
inadequate welfare and food assistance benefits.551  
Studies show that the majority of the world’s hungry people live in rural areas. The task force 
on hunger estimate that about half of the hungry are smallholder farming households, as they 
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are unable to either grow or buy enough food to meet their daily needs. While accurate data is 
difficult to find, the taskforce estimates that roughly two-tenths of the hungry are landless 
rural people; one-tenth are pastoralists, fisher folk, and people who depend on forests for their 
livelihoods; and two-tenths live in urban areas.552 Olivier De Schutter points out that in 
Africa, 90 percent of agricultural production is from smallholder famers with less than two 
hectares. They cultivate plots that are so small and of poor quality that they need to buy 
food.553 Employment opportunities to obtain cash are, however, rare in poor rural areas.554 
Modern development schemes have promoted a movement to input-intensive, monocultural 
production for export, and small farmers often face fluctuating prices, increased costs, and 
decreased government support,555 as we will see in the Malawi case-study in part II.  
Most of the world’s hungry, or 90 percent, are chronically undernourished. Only a small part 
of the hungry, or 10 percent, are those suffering from acute hunger that typically takes place 
during famines and disasters. Then as a third category there are those suffering from hidden 
hunger, caused by lack of essential micronutrients, even when they consume adequate 
amounts of calories and protein. Victims of acute hunger usually attract more attention and 
support than the chronic and hidden hunger.556 This study addresses efforts that try to support 
those suffering from acute hunger through food assistance interventions as well and efforts 
that try to address chronic and hidden hunger through improved services e.g. in the area of 
agriculture.  
2.3.2 The poor as experts on their own development 
What is striking when reviewing the meaning behind the concept ‘development’ and ‘poverty’ 
is the absence of the voices of the poor themselves in defining development or the lack of it. 
Traditionally, it has been those who regard themselves as the ‘social superiors’ to the poor 
that have defined poverty and the poor. The nineteenth century called them the dangerous 
classes, and these negative perceptions have not completely disappeared. The poor are often 
viewed as equal to dirty, dumb, drugged, prone to violence and crime, and generally 
irresponsible. Social reformers have protested against this kind of stigmatisation. They have 
argued that the poor are themselves not to blame for their condition: the dangerous turned into 
the unfortunate, or disadvantaged classes. Poor people should at least have a roof over their 
head, clothes on their bodies, food on the table, and a job to go to. Moreover, in modern 
times, the state has become the guardian of the poor, running welfare programmes with 
specialised social workers in charge.557 This is the thinking also in human rights discourse.  
In the Consultations with the Poor study, that set out to listen to and understand the voices of 
approximately 20,000 people from 23 countries, the poor are seen as the experts on poverty. 
The large majority of the poor people included in the Consultations said they are worse off 
now, have fewer economic opportunities, and live in greater insecurity than in the past. They 
do not feel that they have benefited from massive political and economic changes and 
restructuring around the world. From a human rights perspective it is worrisome that poor 
people’s experiences with government institutions are largely negative, even when 
government programmes are rated as important. The poor find their own institutions to be the 
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most dependable.558 One of the significant conclusions was that overwhelmingly the poor 
want to be heard, and they want to participate in institutions, whether of government or civil 
society. They want institutions to play a major role: they want that institutions do more and do 
it well.559  
Another issue that became clear was the importance of the psychological dimensions of 
wellbeing and ill-being. It became clear that the good and the bad in life are multidimensional, 
with the experiential and psychological dimensions at the centre.560 The experiences are 
affected by a combination of material, physical, and social factors.561  
What also emerged from the collective voices of the poor is their resilience and hard work. 
Despite the stress of their children going hungry, the humiliation and shame experienced in 
their interaction with government, traders, money lenders and landlords, the poor survive and 
persist. Additionally the poor take initiatives. They create groups to patrol the community to 
protect against theft; they establish saving groups; they create unions, cooperatives, temples, 
mosques, and church associations. They have labour exchange groups, chicken raising groups 
and burial groups.562 This shows that the poor have agency and find ways of coping with the 
reality of their daily lives.  We assume that because the majority of hungry farmers have not 
managed to take back power from corporate interests, landlords or bureaucrats, nobody can. 
Seldom do we seek to learn from the examples of peasant societies that have in fact overcome 
hunger.563  
This is contrary to our view of poor people as passive and incapable of assuming 
responsibility for their own lives, and thereby needing to be cared for.564 Researchers often 
operate with implicit or explicit assumptions that poor and oppressed people are ‘marginals’ 
or living ‘outside’ society. Paulo Freire claims they have always been ‘inside’ – inside the 
structures which made them who they are. The solution is not to ‘integrate’ into the same 
structures that oppress them but to transform these structures.565 The question is if strategies 
based on human rights and the right to food can contribute to such social transformation.   
2.3.3 Integration of food security and the right to food  
From national food security to household food security  
The concept of ‘food security’ became increasingly into focus in the 1970s as a response to 
the world food crisis taking place early in the decade. In 1974, the FAO organised the World 
Food Conference, which inter alia recommended the establishment of a Committee on World 
Food Security under the FAO.566 The early 1970s saw the start of a new policy-oriented food 
and nutrition debate. This was clearly due to the fact that: firstly, increased food production 
did not guarantee a reduction in hunger; secondly, that many technological solutions proposed 
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had been based on insufficient analysis; and thirdly that a greater role and responsibility for 
the state was essential for the prevention of hunger and long term food security. Then in 1976 
the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which had been adopted a decade 
earlier, came into force. Some human rights experts and a few interested governments started 
to elaborate on the notion of the relationship of human rights with economic and social 
development.567  
In the 1980s, there was increased focus on household food security as opposed to national 
food security defined in terms of national grain reserves for stable grains at national levels. 
Researchers tried to establish a concept taking into account the economics of the household, 
its social and ecological environment as well as the prevailing food culture as the broad 
framework to be used when determining food security conditions of households. Some of 
these elements were to become the basis also for the normative understanding of the right to 
adequate food. Today food security is generally examined at the household level in terms of 
access to food, rather than in terms of food supply.568 However, Engh draws the conclusion 
that focus on access to food is still lacking in parts of the food security debates and policy 
discussions, so that there sometimes is a tendency to focus on availability of food at global, 
national or regional levels rather than vulnerable individuals’ and groups’ access to food. For 
the right to food, the starting point is always physical and economic access to food.569  
The right to food as a concept has not been completely absent in debates on food security 
concerns. In 1981 human rights experts and food/nutrition developmentalists came together at 
a United Nations University seminar to think about how to bridge the gap between food and 
nutrition concerns, as well as goals and the system of human rights norms. As a result of this 
and other similar meetings development professionals working with food and nutrition 
gradually started using a new terminology that was inspired by human rights thinking: the 
hungry would no longer be seen as passive recipients of charity – they would become rights-
holders. As rights-holders they can in principle claim their right to food to be fulfilled, while 
the state, as a signatory to the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, becomes 
the corresponding duty-bearer with obligations to help fulfil the right to food along with other 
rights.570 This implies that the idea to divide people and institutions (mainly state authorities) 
into rights-holders and duty-bearers, when e.g. planning food security interventions, was 
already shaped in the 1980s. (The gap between theory and practice is however big and the 
actors involved in food related development interventions diverse. The language of rights and 
duties is still largely absent in the policies of the World Food Programme, for instance.) 
Moreover, a review of a textbook type of literature on human rights law reveals that the word 
‘beneficiary’ is still applied also in human rights discourse,571 and it is only more recently that 
the term right-holder is used by legal experts.572 This is one example of the mutual changes 
and effects coming out of the process when two discourses meet.   
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We should keep in mind that the meaning of the right to food was far from clear during this 
time. To many the idea of food as a right was unfamiliar and yet others had misconstrued the 
notion of a right to food as the unconditional duty of the state to provide food to all 
irrespective of its limited resources. There were various attempts to promote the right to food 
as a human right at intergovernmental conferences in the early 1990’s. Although the World 
Conference on Human Rights in 1993 contributed to a conducive environment, it was only 
UNICEF among the UN agencies that by the mid 1990s had shown interest or a capacity to go 
beyond rhetorical statements about food as a human right. It was also UNICEF that chaired 
the Working Group on Nutrition, Ethics and Human Rights, that met for the first time in 1994, 
functioning under the UN system. Reports and recommendations of the Working Group made 
the UN agencies more familiar with the concept of a human rights approach to food and 
nutrition policies and programmes. In 1999, there was a session of the ACC/Sub-Committee 
for Nutrition in Geneva, hosted by the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, and 
preceded by a thematic symposium, which provided an opportunity for a deeper consideration 
of the issues.573    
At the first meeting between the human rights and development professionals in 1981 it was 
agreed that a more precise definition of the right to food, as well as further operationalisation 
of the corresponding duties or obligations for implementing this right was needed.574 It was 
around the time of the World Food Summit in Rome in 1996 that the strong interest in food as 
a human right became apparent.575 The World Food Summit and the subsequent Plan for 
Action included a specific call for a better definition of the right to food and the steps to 
realise it.576 Considerable effort has been put into this task. In 1999, the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights clarified the normative content of the right to food in 
General Comment No. 12.577 The next year the Human Rights Commission appointed a 
Special Rapportuer on the Right to Food.578 In the Declaration adopted at the World Food 
Summit: five years later in 2002 the FAO Council was called to establish an 
Intergovernmental Working Group “to elaborate, in a period of two years, a set of voluntary 
guidelines to support Member States' efforts to achieve the progressive realisation of the right 
to adequate food in the context of national food security;”579 These so called Right to Food 
Guidelines were adopted in 2004.580 The Guidelines can be seen as a first attempt to ‘marry’ 
food security and the right to food,581 and will be reviewed below.   
This short historic overview reveals that the debates around food security and the right to food 
have had strong influence on each other. The cooperation between engaged professionals 
from both discourses existed, in the margins, long before human rights-based approaches 
became a trend. From the margins it was in the 1980s that the ‘food security ship’ and the 
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‘right to food ship’ started approaching each other and the conceptual ground work for a 
human rights-based approach to food was laid.   
The relationship between the right to food and food security 
Human rights covenants and development policy share the same aim in relation to food, i.e., 
that all people have access to sufficient food. Both are concerned with fulfilling people’s 
basic needs for food and nourishment.582 In human rights language this aim is put in the 
following manner: “The right to adequate food is realized when every man, woman and child, 
alone or in community with others, has physical and economic access at all times to adequate 
food or means for its procurement.”583 Almost the same wording is used to define food 
security in the World Food Summit Plan of Action,584 a document that was adopted three 
years before General Comment No. 12 appeared.  
Kerstin Mechlem has covered the relationship between the right to food and food security 
quite exhaustively and I will therefore only highlight some basic facts. She firstly points out 
that the overall objective of food security policies is achieving food security while right-to-
food aims at realising the right to food.585 The way ‘realization of the right to food’ is defined 
by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is almost the same way as food 
security is defined. Moreover, food availability, accessibility, safety, cultural acceptability are 
issues of concern for both food security and the right to food. The justification of the objective 
to realise the right to food/achieve food security is however somewhat different, according to 
Mechlem. She states that there are a number of justifications as the ground for the aim of food 
security, ranging from moral grounds to more economic approaches. Human rights are, on the 
other hand, based on the idea of human dignity, and all other considerations must be 
secondary in nature. Mechlem also sees a difference in the nature of the objectives. Food 
security is a policy concept, and as such food security is subject to easy redefinition. The right 
to food, on the other hand is a well-recognised element of international law, with a binding 
normative content, so aiming for realisation of the right to food means implementing a legal 
obligation. The right to food can therefore also be violated and such violations can be subject 
of judicial or quasi-judicial remedies.586 A rights-based approach to food security views 
governments’ commitments in this area as an obligation, not a form of benevolence.587  
I partly disagree that the right to food as part of international human rights law would have a 
more stable meaning than food security as a policy concept. When the right to food is seen to 
be discursively constructed its content and meaning too is subject to changes taking place 
over time.   
I share Mechlem’s view that the concepts of food security and the right to food relate closely 
to each other, although there can be situations when there is food security on the national level 
and the right to food of the individual can still be violated, because of discriminatory means. 
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This again implies that focus on method is crucial. “Progressively realizing the right to food 
should imply using a rights-based approach to food security that has distinct 
characteristics.”588 However, what a rights-based approach to food security means is open to 
interpretation, as will be shown in the following. 
A human rights-based approach to food security as suggested in the Right to Food Guidelines 
This section tries to answer the question what are the distinct characteristics of a human 
rights-based approach to food security? The answer to this question can be found in a 
comparison of the General Comment on the Right to Adequate Food and the Voluntary 
Guidelines to support the progressive realisation of the right to adequate food in the context of 
national food security (the ‘Right to Food Guidelines’), which are said to be a human rights-
based practical tool.  
One could imagine that the specific steps to be taken and the method to be applied are 
described in the Right to Food Guidelines to support the progressive realisation of the right to 
adequate food in the context of national food security. Furthermore, the Right to Food 
Guidelines are said to be “a human rights-based practical tool addressed to all States.” States 
are encouraged to apply the Guidelines in developing their strategies, policies, programmes 
and activities.589 (The fact that States are the target in the Guidelines does not make them 
irrelevant for agencies and organisations as they should support the capacity of the State as 
the main duty-bearer, and the capacity of the rights-holders, to realise the right to food.) A 
critical note is that the strong focus on national food security leaves the international level 
outside the scope of the Guidelines. When focus is on the actions which states can take to 
overcome hunger, the Right to Food Guidelines renders the effects of the international 
economic system largely invisible, which is a structural factor that can constrain the ability of 
states to guarantee food needs of their population.590 This is, however, not the subject of this 
particular analysis. I will instead focus on what kind of a human rights-based strategy is 
proposed in the Right to Food Guidelines and compare this with the General Comment on the 
Right to Adequate Food.  
According to General Comment 12, there should be a national strategy to ensure food and 
nutrition security for all, based on human rights principles,591 (which are not defined). 
National strategies are also dealt with in the Right to Food Guidelines. The General Comment 
and Guidelines both point out that before formulating a national strategy, there needs to be 
careful assessment of existing national legislation, current programmes, and identification of 
constraints and availability of existing resources.592 The strategy should identify policy 
measures and activities that are relevant to the situation and context.593  
Impact assessment is an essential part of the Guidelines, and states are encouraged to conduct 
‘Right to Food Impact Assessments’ in order to identify the impact of domestic policies, 
                                                 
588 Mechlem, “Food Security and the Right to Food”, supra note 582, at 644-645. Engh, Developing Capacity to 
Realise Socio-Economic Rights, supra note 566, at 74. Engh says that “the right to food is not synonymous with 
food security, but they are closely related. If food security is realized, the conditions will be suitable for the right 
to food to be enjoyed.”  
589 Voluntary Guidelines, Preface, at 2. Adopted by the 127th Session of the FAO Council 
November 2004.  
590 Jacqueline Mowbray, “The Right to Food and the International Economic System: An Assessment of the 
Rights-Based Approach to the Problem of World Hunger”, 20 Leiden Journal of International Law (2007) 545-
569, at 559. 
591 General Comment No. 12, (1999) on the right to adequate food, supra note 577, para 21.  
592 Voluntary Guidelines, supra note 589, Guideline 3.2. 
593 General Comment No. 12, (1999) on the right to adequate food, supra note 577, para. 22.  
89 
programmes and projects on the progressive realisation of the right to adequate food.594 With 
regard to assessing the food security situation in the country, the Guidelines highlights the 
importance of undertaking a “disaggregated analysis on the food insecurity, vulnerability and 
nutritional status of different groups in society”.595 Here the Guidelines go further in linking 
assessment of food insecurity with the principle of non-discrimination and the key role 
disaggregated data plays in an analysis of which groups in society suffer from possible 
discrimination in the area of the right to food. Otherwise, the Guidelines more or less repeat 
what the General Comment says in terms of that national strategies should address all aspects 
of the food system, including the production, processing, distribution, marketing, and 
consumption of safe food. The new dimension is that a national strategy for the progressive 
realisation of the right to food is linked to poverty reduction strategies, and in this context 
States should “give priority to providing basic services to the poorest, and investing in human 
resources by ensuring access to primary education for all, basic health care”, etc.596  
The Guidelines are clear in pointing out that they do not establish legally binding obligations 
for States or international organisations, and that the provisions in the Guidelines do not 
modify rights and obligations under international law.597 However, because the claimed added 
value of a human rights approach to food security lies in the emphasis of addressing food 
insecurity as a matter of obligation, not benevolence, it is important to clarify what exactly is 
expected of states under the right to food as formulated in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). According to General Comment 12, the 
principal obligation under the right to adequate food is “to take steps to achieve progressively 
the full realization of the right to adequate food.”598 Similar to any other human right, this 
imposes three levels of obligations on States parties: the obligation to respect, to protect, and 
to fulfil.  
The obligation to respect existing access to adequate food requires States parties 
not to take any measures that result in preventing such access. The obligation to 
protect requires measures by the State to ensure that enterprises or individuals do 
not deprive individuals of their access to adequate food. The obligation to fulfil 
(facilitate) means the State must pro-actively engage in activities intended to 
strengthen people's access to and utilization of resources and means to ensure their 
livelihood, including food security. Finally, whenever an individual or group is 
unable, for reasons beyond their control, to enjoy the right to adequate food by the 
means at their disposal, States have the obligation to fulfil (provide) that right 
directly. This obligation also applies for persons who are victims of natural or 
other disasters.599 
This language of respect, protect, and fulfil is not fully integrated into the Right to Food 
Guidelines. In the Introduction it is noted that States have an obligation to “respect, promote 
and protect and to take appropriate steps to achieve progressively the full realization of the 
right to adequate food.”600 When referring to the respect and protect dimension, the 
Guidelines repeat the General Comment. In explaining what the promote dimension means, 
the Guidelines use the same wording as the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
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Rights use for the facilitation-dimension. (States are to promote policies intended to 
contribute to the progressive realisation of people’s right to adequate food by strengthening 
access and utilization of resources and means to ensure a livelihood.) Finally, without using 
the word fulfil/provide, the Guidelines explains that states should maintain safety nets or other 
assistance for those who are unable to provide for themselves, to the extent resources 
permit.601  
This is a little confusing as the Guidelines are designed to clarify and help states in 
developing strategies, policies, and programmes which are rights-based, i.e. based on legal 
obligations. A human rights approach to food security is supposed to facilitate the 
implementation of the right to adequate food,602 but the Guidelines are perhaps not 
sufficiently clear in defining and giving concrete meaning to this approach. Failing to clarify 
the essential fulfil/provide dimension of the tripartite obligations can be confusing to states 
that want to establish and maintain safety nets or other assistance for individuals who are 
unable to provide for themselves as part of their right to food strategies. The rights-holders 
must be able to claim their right from a duty-bearer, otherwise it is unclear what value the 
human rights-based approach to food security adds to already existing food security policies. 
However the Guidelines seldom link the right to food to an obligation, and does not use 
concepts of ‘rights-holders’ and ‘duty-bearers’, concepts that were introduced into the food 
security debates already in the 1980s. Instead, the Guidelines are full of rather vague 
statements about striving for ‘conducive policies’, through a non-discriminatory and market-
oriented trade system.603 It remains unclear what exactly is the role of duty-bearer institutions, 
rights-holders, and different stakeholders such as donor states and international agencies.  
The Guidelines are, furthermore, not helpful in clarifying the roles and responsibilities in 
times of emergencies. As we have seen in the General Comment, the State has the fulfil-
obligation to provide the right to food directly to victims of natural or other disaster. This duty 
is dealt with in Guideline 14, under “Safety nets”. To the extent that resources permit, the 
State “should consider” maintaining social safety and food safety nets to protect those who 
are unable to provide for themselves. Local procurement of items for food assistance is 
encouraged, and the food should be nutritionally adequate and safe, bearing in mind local 
circumstances and dietary traditions, and should target those most in need of assistance, 
respecting the principle of non-discrimination.604  
General Comment 12 encourages similar approaches to food aid under the heading 
“international obligations”.605 International food aid is dealt with in Guideline 15, which is 
targeting donor states: “Donor States should ensure that their food aid policies support 
national efforts by recipient States to achieve food security.” The stages of the food aid 
process should, “as far as possible be made in a participatory manner and, whenever possible, 
in close collaboration with recipient governments at the national and local level.”606  
The Guidelines deal with national safety nets and international food aid as two distinct 
domains, and the latter is accepted as being in the hands of donor states, whereas the General 
Comment gives the provide-responsibility to the national State, encouraging it to seek 
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international assistance when resources are too few to fulfil its minimum obligations.607 
Donor policies are dealt with separately under “international obligations” where it is stated 
that “States parties should take steps to respect the enjoyment of the right to food in other 
countries, to protect that right, to facilitate access to food and to provide the necessary aid 
when required.”608  
Donor accountability for actions and policies that hamper the right to food in developing 
countries is not an issue that is raised in the Right to Food Guidelines. This is an example that 
there are many aspects to food security and that the international level cannot be left outside a 
comprehensive human rights-based approach to food security. Inadequate food supply is often 
a result of complex, structural problems, outside the control of particular states and authorities 
on the national level.609 However, the purpose of the above analysis was not to determine how 
effective a human rights-based approach is in tackling world hunger but instead to simply 
present the ‘distinct characteristics’ of such an approach as it has been laid out in the Right to 
Food Guidelines. As we have seen, it is far from clear what these ‘distinct characteristics’ 
mean and analysing the Guidelines side by side with General Common 12 indicates that 
neither document is helpful in giving clear answers.     
The Right to Food Guidelines are supposed to be a resource when states want to make their 
own national rights-based food security policies at the national level, and therefore it is 
natural that it leaves room for a margin of discretion for states to choose their own approaches 
and ways of implementing the right to adequate food. Ironically, the Guidelines are quite 
detailed in the substantive parts, e.g. in highlighting what states should do to “improve the 
functioning of their markets”,610 indicating that there is not much room for discretion in the 
area of economic policies – the current market economical system is taken as a given – while 
being more vague when it comes to the obligation to respect, protect, and fulfil the right to 
food. It is especially the fulfil-dimension that differs from the interpretation given by the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in General Comment 12. These 
obligations are mentioned only in the introduction and not in the actual Guidelines, indicating 
their marginal position.  
In the area of impact assessment and monitoring of the right to food the Right to Food 
Guidelines, followed by FAO publications on the same subject, have clarified many issues 
that are only mentioned briefly in the General Comment on the Right to Adequate Food. In 
other areas it has been less helpful. The ‘key principles’ put forth in the Guidelines are vague 
slogans instead of useful guiding principles to inspire the process of development and human 
rights realisation. The fact that the Right to Food Guidelines do not claim to support the 
capacity of the duty-bearer to fulfil its obligations under the right to food and the capacity of 
the rights-holders to claim this same right, probably has many reasons, some of which have to 
do with political disagreements in the intergovernmental working group during the drafting 
process. The subject of rights and obligations under an economic and social right is still 
contested.  
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2.3.4 The right to food defined internationally, regionally and nationally 
Background  
As we know, economic, social, and cultural rights were included in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights adopted in 1948. So called subsistence rights – adequate food and nutrition 
rights, clothing, housing and necessary conditions of care – are part of the right to an adequate 
standard of living in UDHR Article 25. Asbjørn Eide argues that in order to enjoy these social 
rights, there is a need to enjoy certain economic rights such as the right to property (UDHR, 
Art. 17), the right to work (UDHR, Art 23) and the right to social security (UDHR, Art. 22 
and 25).611  
UDHR was, according to Eide, initially an expression of ideals to be achieved, imposing 
above all a moral obligation on states. Gradually these ideas have been transformed into ‘hard 
law’ (‘positive law’). At the international level this process started with the adoption of two 
Covenants in 1966, and later on we have seen numerous more specific conventions. This 
created international legal obligations for states, from which followed also the task to ensure 
that the rights were incorporated into national law and administrative practice.612   
In the early stages of defining the right to food in international human rights law, there were 
debates about the nature of this right as an economic, social, and cultural right. Mutua points 
out that socialism and Latin American and Caribbean states influenced the ICESCR, and 
many other states, particularly in the West, interpreted its focus on socioeconomic justice as a 
threat to ‘free market values’.613 It was also argued that the right to food is not an individual 
right but rather a ‘programme right’ to be put into governmental policies in the economic and 
social fields. Deviations from the “cultural individualism in the West”, can be traced back to 
states in the global South and can be attributed to the influence of the newly independent 
states in the UN standard setting from the 1950s onwards.614 However, these arguments have 
been met by expert-led UN institutions based in New York and Geneva with 
counterarguments that underline the individual nature of all human rights. A UN publication 
“Right to adequate food as a human right”, from 1989, argued that because Article 11 of 
ICESCR proclaims the right to food as “the right of everyone” this formulation implies that it 
is a human right belonging to individuals, not a “broad collective proposition”.615 This is an 
example of the kind of either/or thinking that has been characteristic of human rights 
discourse. 
A related debate, that in part is still on-going, was related to the objection that socioeconomic 
rights are not legally enforceable. It was therefore argued that implementation of Article 11 is 
a political matter – not a matter of law.616 Those in favour of ESCR as legally enforceable 
rights on an equal footing with civil and political rights have met this with counterarguments 
such as “the problem relating to the legal nature of social and economic rights does not relate 
to their validity but rather to their applicability.”617 A group of “authoritative experts” coming 
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together to formulate the Limburg Principles of 1987, concerning the interpretation and 
implementation of the ICESCR, held that “although the full realization of the rights 
recognized in the Covenant is to be attained progressively, the application of some rights can 
be made justiciable immediately while other rights can become justiciable over time.”618 In 
other words, experts have rejected the political element of the right to food and argued in 
favour of an individual, legally enforceable right. Again, tensions between the West and the 
rest in giving meaning to human rights are visible.    
As we have seen, the right to adequate food has been defined in instruments of international 
human rights law, thereby setting a standard for national implementation of this right. Article 
11 of the ICESCR protects in paragraph 1 “the right of everyone to an adequate standard of 
living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing” and in 
paragraph 2 it continues by “recognizing the fundamental right of everyone to be free from 
hunger”.619 
In the process of giving more concrete content and meaning to Article 11, the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereafter ‘Committee’) has played an important role. 
The Committee is a body of independent experts that monitors the implementation of the 
ICESCR.620 In 2008 the UN General Assembly adopted an Optional Protocol to the 
ICESCR621 and it was opened for signature in 2009. Through the Optional Protocol the 
Committee can begin to review individual complaints in a similar way to that of a court. Since 
this has procedure has not yet started to function, it is so far mainly through so called general 
comments and the reporting system that the Committee has given meaning and content to the 
right to food. According to Craven general comments have, so far, been the main tool for 
‘normative development’.622 Before the adoption of General Comment on the Right to 
Adequate Food in 1999 the meaning of the right to food was not very clear. 
The normative content  
In General Comment No. 12, on the right to adequate food, the Committee on ESCR states 
that this right shall “not be interpreted in a narrow or restrictive sense which equates it with a 
minimum package of calories, proteins and other specific nutrients”.623 How “adequacy” is 
defined is determined by prevailing social, economic, cultural, climatic, ecological and other 
conditions in the society concerned.624 The “core content” of this right implies, according to 
the Committee, “the availability of food in a quantity and quality sufficient to satisfy the 
dietary needs of individuals, free from adverse substances, and acceptable within a given 
culture”.625 Availability has been defined as “possibilities either for feeding oneself directly 
from productive land or other natural resources, or for well functioning distribution, 
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processing and market systems that can move food from the site of production to where it is 
needed in accordance with demand.”626 
In order for the right to adequate food to be realised everybody should have physical and 
economic access at all times to adequate food or means for its procurement.627 “Accessibility” 
has been divided into economic and physical accessibility. The first concept implies that 
“personal or household financial costs associated with the acquisition of food for an adequate 
diet should be at a level such that the attainment and satisfaction of other basic needs are not 
threatened or compromised.” Physical accessibility refers to the importance of adequate food 
being accessible to everyone, “including physically vulnerable individuals, such as infants and 
young children, elderly people, the physically disabled, the terminally ill and persons with 
persistent medical problems, including the mentally ill.” Certain groups, such as victims of 
natural disasters, people living in disaster-prone areas and other specially disadvantaged 
groups, e.g. indigenous populations, “may need special attention and sometimes priority 
consideration with respect to accessibility of food.”628  
In Article 11(2), on the right to be free from hunger, three objectives are specially outlined, 
namely, to improve methods of production, conservation, and distribution of food. To achieve 
these objectives states should take necessary measures and programmes. In addition, reference 
is made to technical and scientific knowledge and the development or reform of agrarian 
systems. As the right to be free from hunger acts as a “sub-norm”629 to the right to food, it can 
be assumed that the specific measures are intended to the right to food in general, not merely 
to the right to be free from hunger.630  
According to Craven, the purpose of agrarian reform631 in the context of the right to food is 
not always clear. Nevertheless, as Craven points out, indirectly inequities in land distribution 
contribute to poverty and thus also to inadequate access to food. However, it is clear that the 
inclusion of a reference to developing and reforming of the agrarian systems does not mean 
that states which do not initiate agrarian reforms would automatically be violating the 
Covenant.632 The most effective way to implement the right to food varies depending on the 
situation and context.633     
Even though the Committee has not clarified the necessity of an agrarian reform in the general 
comment on the right to food it has not disregarded this aspect of Article 11(2). Indirectly the 
Committee, on several occasions, makes reference to rural development, for example when it 
                                                 
626 General Comment No. 12, (1999) on the right to adequate food, supra note 577, para 12. 
627 General Comment No. 12, (1999) on the right to adequate food, supra note 577, para. 6. 
628 Ibid., para. 13. 
629 Amartya Sen has argued that the right to be free from hunger is a “metaright”. Such a “metaright” can be 
defined as “the right to have policies p(x) that genuinely pursues the objective of making the right to x 
realisable.” For example, in many countries where hunger is widespread, it might not be feasible to guarantee the 
right to be free from hunger for everybody in the near future, but policies that would rapidly realise freedom 
from hunger, do exist. See Amartya Sen, “The right not to be hungry”, in P. Alston and K. Tomasevski (eds), 
The Right to Food (Netherlands Institute of Human Rights and Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984) 69-81, at 70-
71.   
630 Matthew Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995) at 316-317.    
631 The terms ”land reform” and ”agrarian reform” should not be used as synonyms even though they have much 
in common. The former term refers to a redistribution of land ownership to achieve a more equitable access to 
resources while an agrarian reform also includes supporting measures designed to make the reformed sector 
more productive. See Cristina Liamzon, “Agrarian reform: A continuing imperative or an anachronism?”, in 
Deborah Eade (ed.), Development and Rights (Oxford: Oxfam GB, 1998) 101-113, at 103.       
632 Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 630, at 322.  
633 See General Comment No. 12, (1999) on the right to adequate food, supra note 577, paras. 21-22.  
95 
makes clear that the obligation to fulfil the right to food means that the state must take active 
measures to strengthen access to and utilisation of resources and means to ensure 
livelihoods.634 In addition, in the guidelines regarding the form and content of reports to be 
submitted by States Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, it asks the State Party to 
describe legislative measures in the context of an agrarian reform taken to ensure an equitable 
distribution of food supplies.635 In its concluding observations on State Party reports the 
Committee encourages agrarian reforms in cases where there is a high degree of concentration 
of land ownership.636  
The UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food, has, in the capacity of an independent expert 
also played a significant role in giving meaning and content to the right to food. In 2002, 
Special Rapporteur Jean Ziegler made clear that access to land and agrarian reform must form 
a key part of the right to food. The rapporteur pointed out that hunger is predominately a rural 
problem and that rural poverty is often closely linked to extreme inequity in access to land. 
Moreover, as it is increasingly understood that small farms are more efficient than large 
ones,637 the rapporteur stated that the notion of “developing or reforming agrarian systems in 
such a way as to achieve the most efficient development and utilization of natural resources”, 
used in Article 11(2)(a), can be understood as promoting agrarian reform to encourage small-
scale farming.638 The current Special Rapporteur, Olivier De Schutter, has continued along the 
same lines, stating that investments should be directed at promoting sustainable forms of 
agricultural production, benefiting small-holders who are most in need of support. He notes 
that the global food crisis with the surge in food prices in 2006-2008 was “the result of 
policies that have systematically undermined the agricultural sector in a number of developing 
countries over a period of 30 years.”639 In his report from 2008, he called for structural 
measures, leading to a profound reform of the global food system.640 This shows that experts 
mandated by the UN have not defined the right to food in narrow terms solely as an 
individual, legally enforceable entitlement. They have not avoided putting the right to 
adequate food into a political and economic context, calling for structural reforms. 
The right to food is not only guaranteed in the ICESCR. In the Convention on the Right of the 
Child, two articles address the issue of nutrition. In Article 24(1) “States Parties recognize the 
right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health” and shall take 
appropriate measures “[t]o combat disease and malnutrition, including within the framework 
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of primary health care, through […] the provision of adequate nutritious foods and clean 
drinking-water;”641 In Article 27(3) it is stated that States Parties “shall take appropriate 
measures to assist parents and others responsible for the child to implement this right and 
shall in case of need provide material assistance and support programmes, particularly with 
regard to nutrition, clothing and housing.” The Convention on the Elimination on All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women guarantees “adequate nutrition during pregnancy and 
lactation” in Article 12(2).642 The way the committees monitoring these conventions have 
contributed to giving meaning to these nutrition-related rights is outside the scope of this 
chapter.   
Both civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights, and collective rights are 
included in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. There is no categorisation of 
the three sets of rights; the Charter is, in other words, of an integrated nature.643 Unlike the 
ICESCR, the African Charter does not use the concept of “progressive realisation” in relation 
to economic, social and cultural rights. Only in Article 16, which guarantees the best 
attainable state of physical and mental health, can the language of “progressive realisation” 
be found. In the other provisions the rights are set forth in a manner providing States Parties 
with obligations which are of immediate application.644 
As all rights enshrined in the Africa Charter are placed on an equal footing, the African 
Commission on Human Rights has, in exercising its monitoring functions,645 the ability to 
adopt a ‘violations approach’ in cases where a State Party has failed to fulfil its obligations 
with respect to economic, social and cultural rights.646 This approach would have been 
impossible if the Charter had incorporated the same ‘progressive realisation approach’ that 
usually is the case regarding economic, social and cultural rights. In a violations case-based 
approach, determinations can be made with respect to real-life situations where the 
Commission makes a decision with respect to cases of specific allegations of a State Party’s 
failure to fulfil its obligations.647  
The African Charter does not guarantee the right to adequate food, the right to housing or the 
right to an adequate standard of living as such. According to some authors, this can be seen as 
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a significant disappointment from the promise of the Preamble.648 However, these rights are 
covered by a combination of other provisions. Here, one central provision is Article 5, which 
recognises respect for human dignity. However, also those economic, social and cultural 
rights enlisted in Articles 14-17 of the Charter are of significance. In its case law the African 
Commission on Human Rights has given an extensive interpretation of the economic and 
social rights provisions which are included in the Charter so that also concerns in relation to 
food, clothing, forced evictions, safe drinking water, electricity, and basic medicine can be 
read into the Charter.649 The concept of human dignity has thus been given substance and 
meaning and can be seen as an over-arching concept of the Charter.650 According to Odinkalu, 
recognising “respect of the dignity inherent in the human person” as a distinct right and as a 
foundational value in the African Charter breaks down the artificial barriers imposed on 
economic, social and cultural rights and opens up vast possibilities for implementing these 
rights under the African Charter.651    
In the inter-American system of human rights, the right to adequate food is foremost protected 
in the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador).652 However, an analysis of 
the definition given to the right to adequate food under the inter-American system is outside 
the scope of this chapter.  
Implementing the right to food through national strategies against food insecurity 
In Article 2(1) of the ICESCR the State Party “undertakes to take steps, (…) to the maximum 
of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the 
rights recognised in the present Covenant”. The concept of “achieving progressively” has 
often been used as an argument for considering economic, social and cultural rights as mere 
“aspirations”, not as enforceable individual rights.653 However, the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights has made clear that the concept is used as a recognition of the fact 
that “full realization of all economic, social and cultural rights will generally not be able to be 
achieved in a short period of time”, and it should not be used in a way depriving Article 2 of 
any meaningful content. All States Parties are under an obligation to “move as expeditiously 
                                                 
648 See, e.g., J. Oloka-Onyangio, “Beyond the Rhetoric: Reinvigorating the Struggle for Economic and Social 
Rights in Africa”, 26 California Western International Law Journal (1995) 1-23, at 15. 
649 See Coomans, “The Ogoni Case”, supra note 643, at 751; Odinkalu, “Analysis of Paralysis or Paralysis by 
Analysis?”, supra note 647, at 341 and 364. In communications 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 167/97 and 210/98 v. 
Mauritania, the African Commission found that lack of sufficient food, blankets and adequate hygiene in 
detention centres constitutes a violation of Art. 16 of the African Charter. See Compilation of Decisions on 
Communications of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Extracted from the Commission’s 
Activity Report 1994-2001 (The Gambia: Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa, 2002) at 186. 
See also communication 100/93 v. Zaire in which the Commission held that “The failure of the Government to 
provide basic services such as safe drinking water and electricity and the shortage of medicine (…) constitutes a 
violation of Article 16.” (Ibid., at 366.) In communication 155/96 v. Nigeria the African Commission is of the 
view that right to adequate food is implicitly protected by other rights guaranteed in the Charter.  
650 Coomans, “The Ogoni Case”, supra note 643, at 751. 
651 Odinkalu, “Analysis of Paralysis or Paralysis by Analysis?”, supra note 647, at 366.  
652 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador), adopted on 17 November 1988, entered into force on 16 November 
1999, OAS Treaty Series No. 69.  
653 Magdalena Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2003) at 311; Asbjørn Eide, ”Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
as Human Rights”, in A. Eide, C. Krause and A. Rosas (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook, 
Second Revised Edition  (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001) 9-28, at 10.  
98 
and effectively as possible towards” full realisation of the rights guaranteed in the 
Covenant.654  
Furthermore, Article 2 imposes some immediate obligations on the States Parties. In General 
Comment No. 3, on the nature of States Parties obligations, the Committee underlines that the 
notion in Article 2(1) “undertakes to take steps” imposes obligations that are of immediate 
effect. This means that states must take steps “within a reasonably short time after the 
Covenant’s entry into force for the States concerned” and also that the measures aimed at 
achieving full realisation should be “deliberate, concrete and targeted”.655 Moreover, the 
obligation to guarantee the rights without discrimination, put forward in Article 2(2), is also 
not subject to limitation.656 Discrimination in access to food or means for its procurement on 
the grounds of “race, colour, sex, language, age, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, property, birth or other status” constitutes a violation of the Covenant.657  
According to the General Comment the State enjoys a margin of discretion to choose its own 
approaches and ways of implementing the right to adequate food, as long as whatever steps 
are taken to ensure that everyone is free from hunger and as soon as possible can enjoy the 
right to adequate food.658 Particular attention should be given to the need to prevent 
discrimination in access to food or resources for food. This should include guarantees of full 
and equal access to economic resources. Rights of women to inheritance and ownership of 
land and other property is particularly mentioned.659 Moreover, even where a State faces 
severe resource constraints, “measures should be undertaken to ensure that the right to 
adequate food is especially fulfilled for vulnerable population groups and individuals”.660 
In order to take measures which are “deliberate, concrete and targeted”, and indeed live up to 
the obligation to “take steps”, states must engage in effective implementation and monitoring 
of the rights enshrined in the ICESCR. Designing and adopting programmes for 
implementation can be seen as steps in the process of realising the right to adequate food for 
all and have been regarded essential preconditions for compliance with the obligations set 
forth in the Covenant.661  
States should first identify those who are food insecure and then formulate a national strategy 
for recreating access to food for these groups and the population as a whole.662 Although 
every state has a margin of discretion in applying its own implementation process, the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights makes clear that as the ICESCR requires 
States Parties to take the necessary steps “to ensure that everyone is free from hunger and as 
soon as possible can enjoy the right to adequate food”, this means that a national strategy to 
ensure food security must be adopted.663  
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National strategies that address the essential issues causing hunger and malnutrition are 
important tools when implementing the right to food. The Right to Food Guidelines reviewed 
give further guidance for states that are about to create rights-based national strategies for 
food security. Unfortunately, the guidelines are not very clear with regard to the important 
aspect of food as a human rights issue, i.e., obligations to respect, protect and fulfil the right 
to adequate food.  
Actors calling for a Right to Livelihoods 
The Committee on ESCR has raised issues of market access, land, and discrimination, i.e., 
broader issues of livelihoods. This has, however, not satisfied activists in the global South.    
At the World Social Forum 2009 a group of international NGOs, led by the Programme on 
Women’s Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (PWESCR), came together to launch the 
Global Network on Women and the Right to Livelihoods. The Global Network aims to 
develop a common understanding of the right to livelihoods and is working towards having 
the right recognised in international human rights law.664 The right to livelihoods, currently 
not recognised as a human right in any international instrument, is seen as connected to issues 
of land, water, forest, food security, food sovereignty, food production, and income 
security,665 i.e. issues related to the right to food, natural resources and markets.666 
Conceptually, it is much more than the right to work – the right to livelihoods includes 
options that are outside of the workplace and yet crucial for many people’s survival.667  
The Global Network aims to work from the local to the global level, making women’s right to 
livelihoods visible, to “restore a new language, a new imagination, a new politics and a new 
economy to the world.” The actors highlight that this new polity and politics cannot come 
from those who use domination, extraction and power.668 In these processes, the right to 
livelihoods is beginning to be defined from the ground up.669 
This is an example of how actors strive to expand and reframe food related rights in the 
international human rights framework in a way that makes sense for them and the people they 
work with in the South.   
PWESCR claims that a livelihoods perspective gives agency, especially to women, who are 
usually seen as a vulnerable group that are dependent on male breadwinners.670 In most 
countries of the South women have invisible roles as workers in agriculture.671 Yet rural 
women often play a vital role in providing for their families and communities, growing crops, 
gathering firewood or carrying water. However, lack of women’s legal rights to land, lack of 
support for women after displacement (e.g. due to ‘development’ projects), and lack of credit 
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all have negative impact on food security. Simultaneously, women are losing control over 
seeds, and livelihood-based farming is becoming more and more marginalised.672  
The concept of livelihoods comes from the development discourse, and ‘sustainable 
livelihood approaches’ are popular among a diverse group of development agencies today, 
including Oxfam Malawi. These approaches were developed in the late 1990s and include 
focus on rights and power.673 The campaign to develop a ‘right to livelihoods’ can thereby 
also be seen as a result of increasing interaction between development and human rights 
actors.  
PWESCR notes that, at the grassroots level, one of the best ways to explain the right to food 
is by discussing livelihoods. Moreover, it points out that referring to the right to livelihood 
illustrates that the right to food is not, essentially, the right to be fed, which is a common 
misconception about the right to food. PWESCR and its partners situates the right to 
livelihood—to make a living and survive with dignity—at the core of the right to food, and 
they frame this right as the right to produce one’s own food or earn sufficiently to purchase 
it.674 PWESCR is based in India, and as we will see below, the right to food has nationally 
been defined in a very specific and narrow way as the right to be fed.    
Giving meaning to food rights in India  
In this chapter, I have so far reviewed how transnational expert institutions have given 
meaning to the right to food as a norm of international human rights law and how NGO actors 
strive for a new right – the right to livelihoods – as a complement to how existing rights have 
been defined. At the national level, different institutions play a role in defining food and 
livelihood related rights and the content usually reflects the specific historic, social, economic 
and political context of the country concerned. Although historically, courts have played a 
marginal role in the context of socioeconomic rights in most jurisdictions, their role has been 
strengthened over the space of the two past decades. In a significant number of jurisdictions, 
adjudicatory bodies have intervened to protect a range of social rights,675 thereby contributing 
to giving meaning to these rights, including food rights. A careful analysis of the food-related 
cases, which tend to be litigated under social security, land and labour rights,676 is outside the 
scope of this thesis, especially since Malawi does not belong to these jurisdictions.  
I will, however, highlight India as one jurisdiction in which food litigation has lead to the 
right to food being defined in a particular way. Part IV of the Indian Constitution lists so 
called Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP). Many of the provisions here correspond to 
those protected in ICESCR. Article 43 provides that the State shall secure work, a living 
wage, conditions of work that ensure a decent standard of living to all workers, agricultural or 
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otherwise (compare to Article 11 and 15 of ICESCR).677 In the 1970s and 1980s the Indian 
Supreme Court started to find creative interpretations of constitutional provisions in a way 
that transcended its earlier conservative phase and allowed room for a positive direction in its 
interventions in issues regarding the poor and disadvantaged.678  
Although the issue of recurrent famines in some regions of India has received mixed reactions 
in courts, more recent engagements of the Indian Supreme Court, through Public Interest 
Litigation cases, forced the Court to confront the paradox of food scarcity while State silos 
overflowed with food grains. It was the People’s Union for Civil Liberties that approached the 
Court in April 2001 demanding relief after several states in the country faced a second or third 
successive year of drought. Despite having 50 million tonnes of food stocks these states failed 
to make available minimum food requirements to the suffering population.679 The Court 
ordered state governments to make sure that “food is provided to the aged, disabled, destitute 
women, destitute men who are in danger of starvation, pregnant and lactating women and 
destitute children, especially in cases where they or members of their family do not have 
sufficient funds to provide food for them”.680 Later the same year the Court made a detailed 
order, converting eight nutrition-related schemes of free food distribution, subsidised grain for 
the poorest of the poor, midday meals, family benefit schemes etc into legal entitlement, 
making it obligatory for the government to implement them.681 The Court even specified the 
minimum quantities of food and nutrition (counted in calories) that had to be made available 
according to age group.682 This means that the Court has defined the right to be free from 
hunger in a very detailed and narrow way, as a right to be fed by benefit schemes, which is 
quite a long way away  from the right to livelihoods as envisioned by PWESCR.  
The directions issued recognise the State obligation to provide the minimum core of the right 
to food. However, decisions in the areas of the right to work and the right to shelter shows 
that the judiciary has, in parallel, deferred to a kind of executive policy that undermines these 
and other socioeconomic rights. Millions of people have been displaced as a result of the 
policy decision to continue with large dams and other projects that weaken the ability of 
already socially and economically disadvantaged people to find meaningful livelihood. Many 
of these policies are, according to Muralidhar, inconsistent with state obligations under 
constitutional and international law.683 The Court’s unwillingness to make orders contrary to 
these policies shows the limits of a legal approach to livelihood related policy issues.   
It is in this context that civil society actors have come together under the Right to Food 
Campaign, formulating a set of common ‘essential demands’ relating to the forthcoming 
National Food Security Act. These ‘essential demands’ are claimed to set the Act in the 
context of the nutritional emergency in India and the need to address the structural roots of 
hunger. The campaign demands a comprehensive Food Entitlements Act (notice that the 
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concept ‘entitlements’ is used instead of ‘food security’, indicating the preference among civil 
society). The campaign continues along the lines of giving the right to food a specific 
definition, demanding “a universal Public Distribution System (providing at least 50 kgs of 
grain per family with 5.25 kgs of pulses and 2.8 kgs of edible oils); special food entitlements 
for destitute households (including an expanded Antyodaya programme); consolidation of all 
entitlements created by recent Supreme Court orders (e.g. cooked mid-day meals in primary 
schools; support for effective breastfeeding (including maternity entitlements and crèches); 
safeguards against the invasion of corporate interests in food policy; and elimination of all 
social discrimination in food–related matters.”684 In a similar manner as the Right to Food 
Project in Malawi, actors in India have drafted a Food Entitlements Act (draft 2009), but with 
a rather different content and meaning given to the right to food. The main difference is that 
while the Malawian draft focuses mainly on the negative state obligations, as will be shown in 
part III, the Indian draft includes far-reaching, specific positive obligations in the area of 
social security.   
The Right to Food Campaign in India applies a legal approach, aiming at further legislation 
and legal recognition of food rights,685 as a tool for social change. The campaigners call for 
protection of existing legal entitlements but also pushes to go beyond, calling for new 
entitlements and also fundamental changes in economic policy. The campaign has repeatedly 
called for a comprehensive food security bill that takes into consideration issues related to 
production, procurement and distribution together.686 Such a comprehensive Right to Food 
Act “would require a fundamental realignment of the manner in which society and the state 
uses its resources today.”687 In a statement commenting on the National Advisory Council’s 
proposed National Food Security Bill, a Right to Food Campaign accuses the Bill of being 
‘minimalist’ and far from the comprehensive act they had pushed for: “The recommendations 
essentially deal only with a cereal-based targeted Public Distribution System and are a far cry 
from the comprehensive approach required to truly ensure food security for all.”688 The Right 
to Food Campaign in India is an example of struggles between different state and non-state 
actors over definitions of food rights. It shows how difficult it is to use rights-based 
arguments to push for structural change.  
2.3.5 Concluding remarks 
Food security programmes and food aid have been the development response to hunger while 
the human rights response has been establishing a legal entitlement that in theory can be 
claimed from duty-bearers. Despite this difference in emphasis, the two discourses are closely 
related to each other, both underlining physical and economic access to food. Food security 
has evolved from a focus on supply and availability of food on a national level, to access to 
food on a household and individual level. Physical and economic access to food is a key 
factor in how the right to adequate food has become to be defined.  
In this chapter we have seen that the poor and the hungry, who are mostly women, live in 
rural areas and struggle for their daily livelihoods. We have seen that there are several 
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competing actors giving meaning to the right to food: UN-led expert institutions, national 
courts, NGOs and other civil society actors. The PWESCR’s efforts to establish a right to 
livelihoods in the international human rights system and the Right to Food Campaign in India 
are examples of how civil society actors aim at giving meaning to food rights in a way that 
makes sense to them and the people they work with. They push for redefinition and expansion 
of current legal interpretations of the right to food, calling for what they feel are ‘just 
entitlements’. For the PWESCR and its partners the right to livelihoods makes better sense in 
the lived reality of marginalised groups, especially women, whom they claim to represent.  
We have seen certain tensions in what kind of meaning and content the right to food should 
have. The first tension is between the right to food as a broad, collective proposition that is to 
be implemented through political programmes and between an individual, justiciable 
entitlement to be claimed through courts or similar forums. The Committee on ESCR and the 
Special Rapportuer on the right to food have been in favour of the right to food being an 
individual, legal entitlement but at the same time not avoided broader, structural issues 
causing hunger and lack of livelihoods. The second tension is between the ambition to link the 
right to food to broader issues of livelihoods and a narrower welfare-ist approach to fulfil the 
right to be free from hunger through social protection measures, including food distribution. 
These tensions will appear again in the Malawi case-study in part III. We have, moreover, 
seen that the concrete content of a human rights-based approach to food security is not clear, 
despite the Right to Food Guidelines.  
2.4 The role and meaning of ‘human rights principles’ in development practice  
In this chapter I first highlight attempts to define human rights-based approaches to 
development and then I concentrate on exploring the meaning given to key principles in these 
approaches. The following concepts are analysed: express linkage to human rights, equality 
and non-discrimination, accountability, participation and empowerment. It is clear that an 
emphasis on principles such as participation, accountability, and empowerment is not unique 
to human rights-based approaches to development practice. Equality and a focus on 
vulnerable and marginalised groups suffering from discrimination has also been part of ‘good 
development practice’ for a long time. This chapter tries to resolve what exactly an emphasis 
on human rights adds to these principles. For each principle my ambition is to see how it has 
been interpreted and applied in the development discourse as an element of ‘good 
development practice’ and how it is understood in human rights discourse. Where it is 
possible, I also show what happens to the principle when the two discourses come together as 
a ‘human rights-based approach to development cooperation’. Moreover, I try to identify what 
added or new value human rights thinking may bring to the principle in question.  
2.4.1 Defining human rights-based approaches to development 
From the start it is good to be aware of the distinction between rights-based approaches to 
public policy at the national level and human rights-based approaches to development 
cooperation. This section mainly deals with the latter, keeping in mind that there are “plural 
rights-based approaches, with different starting points and rather different implications for 
development practice.”689 Darrow and Tomas point out that among UN agencies alone there is 
significant differentiation between mandates, operational frameworks and circumstances. It 
may be possible to generalise certain principles, but with regard to programming frameworks 
it is understandable that one size does not fit all. Nonetheless, conceptual clarity is important 
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in order to highlight the distinct opportunities and challenges involved in human rights-based 
approaches.690  
Sometimes the concept ‘rights-based approach to development’ is used instead of ‘human 
rights-based approach to development’. Some development actors are consistent in their usage 
of the terms, making a difference between the two terms, while others are inconsistent in the 
usage of the terms. (And some others use ‘rights-based approach’ simply as shorthand for 
‘human rights-based approaches’.)691 The difference is in emphasis: ‘human rights-based’ is 
seen as being linked more explicitly to the international human rights framework and is 
sometimes described as ‘legalistic’ (i.e., applying a definition of human rights as those 
standards agreed upon in international instruments). ‘Rights-based approaches’ are seen to be 
emphasising ‘empowerment’ of the poor and marginalised people and groups to claim their 
rights, and usually makes more inspirational use of human rights language,692 (fitting better 
with the philosophy of an actor-oriented perspective). The Oxfam programme in Malawi, 
which is analysed in part III, applies a rights-based rather than a human rights-based 
approach. Plipat has made a distinction between three variants of rights-based approaches: 
popular, equity, and classical. The first one emphasises grassroots organising, the second 
global advocacy, and the third international human rights standards.693 This again shows the 
large variations and differences in emphasis. 
These approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive,694 but some commentators believe it 
to be problematic when there is a lot of emphasis that ‘one-size of doing human rights-based 
approaches does not fit all’, reflecting that there is no single, coherent way of doing this work, 
thereby assuming that by invoking multiple expressions of the approach, so called human 
rights-based approaches could cover most incorporations of human rights within the 
development sector.695 It is feared that the notion of rights-based approaches can easily 
become a loose and ill-defined idea, which everyone can adopt and interpret to fit their own 
interests and agendas.696  
In order to highlight the different approaches I devote a great deal of effort to reviewing the 
meanings attached to human rights-based approaches in this thesis. Moreover, human rights-
based approaches do not account for all incorporations of human rights into the development 
sphere. Therefore it is good to be aware of these distinctions.  
The Common Understanding is probably the most ambitious attempt to define a human rights-
based approach to development cooperation and therefore it receives special attention in the 
following sections. The Common Understanding makes clear that:   
1. All programmes of development co-operation, policies and technical assistance 
should further the realisation of human rights as laid down in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments. 
2. Human rights standards contained in, and principles derived from, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments guide 
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all development cooperation and programming in all sectors and in all phases of the 
programming process. 
3. Development cooperation contributes to the development of the capacities of ‘duty-
bearers’ to meet their obligations and/or of ‘rights-holders’ to claim their rights. 
The first point means that the aim of all activities is to contribute directly to the realisation of 
one or several human rights. The second point means that human rights principles guide 
programming in all sectors, and in all phases of the programming process. The third point 
means that in a human rights-based approach to development cooperation “human rights 
determine the relationship between individuals and groups with valid claims (rights-holders) 
and State and non-state actors with correlative obligations (duty-bearers)”.697 The strong 
emphasis on international human rights instruments makes it into a classical/legal approach, 
which is natural for UN agencies bound by the UN Charter. However, UN agencies have been 
creative in applying the Common Understanding and not all agencies use a legal approach. 
The Common Understanding is further elaborated on in the report Frequently Asked 
Questions on a Human Rights-Based Approach to Development Cooperation, listing a 
number of essential attributes of the approach: 
- “A human rights-based approach is a conceptual framework for the process of 
human development that is normatively based on international human rights 
standards and operationally directed to promoting and protecting human rights.” 
- The main objective of development should be to fulfil human rights. 
- In a human rights-based approach rights-holders and their entitlements are 
identified, and the corresponding duty-bearers and their obligations are also 
identified.  
- Principles and standards derived from international human rights treaties guide 
all development programming in all sectors and in all phases of the programming 
process.698 The principles most often evoked are non-discrimination, 
accountability and participation.   
As we can see, these four points more or less repeat what is said in the Common 
Understanding, and I take this as a sign that there is general agreement on these basic 
attributes of the approach at the UN level. There seems to be agreement on the core elements 
defining human rights-based approaches to development cooperation: Human rights-based 
approaches work to strengthen the capacity of duty-bearers to respect, protect, and fulfil their 
human rights obligations. Simultaneously, the rights-holders’ capacity to demand and claim 
that their human rights are respected, protected, and fulfilled is strengthened. The aim of 
human rights-based development is human rights realisation and the process of how this aim 
is reached is informed by human rights principles.  
It is not only within the UN that human rights have entered into development programming. A 
wide range of development NGOs, such as Save the Children, Care International, Oxfam and 
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ActionAid, have been exploring rights-based approaches to their work. Pettit and Wheeler 
argue that the background to this trend is development practitioners began to recognise the 
limits of their approaches and experienced a need to address structural causes of inequality 
and exclusion and to confront these at all levels, i.e., legal, political, social, cultural, and 
economic levels. Legal reforms and enforcement along with public awareness and action 
became new methods of voicing demand and seeking accountability. There was general 
disillusionment with projects. At the same time human rights groups needed to engage with 
community-based organisations and membership associations instead of relying on 
professionals to advocate on behalf of the rights-holders. In order to do that the human rights 
professionals needed new skills such as community organising, participatory appraisals, etc. 
These factors all contributed to blurring the traditional lines between rights and development. 
And the need for change was mutual: development needed rights as much as rights needed 
development.699  
Donor interest in human rights strategies for development has also been considerable, for 
instance in United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), The 
Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and The Norwegian Agency for 
Development (NORAD),700 and lately also Finland claims to apply a human rights-based 
approach to development, promoting the position and rights of people as rights-holders and 
the obligations of states as duty-bearers while emphasizing equality, non-discrimination and 
the right to self-determination.701 With new aid modalities such as sector and budget support, 
donor governments see opportunities to influence recipient government’s policies, but are at 
the same time concerned with lack of accountability on the part of the recipient government. 
In order to remedy the situation, there have been reforms of public institutions and support to 
civil society in holding the government and public sector accountable. Human rights have 
been arguments to back up this work, and have thereby also become part of outcome-driven 
and managerial approaches of top-down development.      
The OECD DAC Network on Governance has published a synthesis report of donor 
approaches and experiences of integrating human rights into development. The authors have 
used a five-part typology for the integration of human rights into development: (1) Implicit 
human rights work; (2) human rights projects; (3) human rights dialogue (4) human rights 
mainstreaming; and (5) human rights-based approaches. The report found that most agencies 
were applying the three middle categories while a few were moving towards human rights-
based approaches. In human rights-based approaches, “human rights [are] considered 
constitutive of the goal of development, leading to a new approach to aid and requiring 
institutional changes.”702  
The DAC report shows that still in 2005, when the report was published, the majority of 
development interventions in the area of human rights were separate from socioeconomic 
issues, such as water or health. The majority of direct interventions were civil and political 
rights projects. At policy level there was emphasis on the positive place of human rights, but 
human rights conditionality remained a feature of development programmes,703 indicating that 
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main attention is to create the conditions or infrastructure to promote and provide human 
rights, such as better laws, courts, stronger NGOs, democratic institutions, more transparent 
state apparatuses while at the same time linking aid to human rights criteria.704 What these 
approaches have in common is that human rights enter into development programming as an 
element of outside quality control.  
Celestine Nyamu-Musembi and Andrea Cornwall make an overview of what multilateral 
agencies, bilateral agencies and international development NGOs say about rights-based 
approaches to development. The authors conclude that there are certain common elements and 
principles, but with different emphasis. Most organisations see that the approach potentially 
can transform development practice from a focus on identifying and meeting needs to 
enabling people to claim their human rights. This entails (1) work with duty-bearers to 
strengthen their capacity in respecting, protecting and fulfilling human rights, (2) work with 
citizens and marginalised groups to claim their rights. The role the approach plays in the 
concrete work of the different organisations is, however, distinctively different. Some 
agencies tend to see human rights-based approaches as a broad set of principles defining an 
overarching approach to development that can serve as a new way of repackaging 
interventions. Participatory approaches as well as efforts to address issues of accountability 
alongside efforts to enable people to empower themselves are examples of principles that 
often are referred to in this context,705 as is shown in the following sections.  
2.4.2 Five principles as key elements of human rights approaches to development 
cooperation 
As we have seen in the previous sections human rights-based approaches often come along 
with an emphasis on so called human rights principles. These principles are seen as giving 
guidance on the processes that should underpin legislation, policy, and implementation at all 
levels and between all actors.706  
Before the adoption of the Common Understanding and the further explanations given to the 
approach in the report Frequently Asked Questions on a Human Rights-Based Approach to 
Development Cooperation, five key principles were often used as a way to define human 
rights-based approaches to development cooperation. Sometimes you also see the same 
principles referred to as the acronym PANEL: participation, accountability, non-
discrimination and attention to vulnerable groups, empowerment and linkage to rights.707 The 
principles can be seen as the operational expression of the idea that human rights and 
development are interlinked, and they have implications for programming. 
In the following I review these five interrelated key principles in another order: Express 
linkage to human rights norms and standards, equality and non-discrimination, accountability, 
participation, and empowerment.708 In the beginning of my research I used these five 
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principles as a starting point for describing what human rights-based approaches are all about 
and it influenced the questions raised in the empirical research. When I started to analyse my 
empirical data from Malawi, I was struck by how differently the actors involved in the three 
food security related projects interpreted and applied the principles of equality and non-
discrimination, accountability, participation and empowerment. I therefore feel that it is 
essential to take a closer look at them and try to pinpoint which dimensions are related to 
human rights principle and which are those that rather belong to ‘good development practice’.  
As the principles are very interrelated, I have not seen anyone who has made a deliberate and 
conscious effort to put the principles in a hierarchical order. The order chosen in this review is 
conscious, yet not suggesting a strict hierarchy of importance. The reason ‘express linkage to 
human rights norms and standards’ is dealt with first is that this principle is the starting point 
for any action or strategy that wants to move into the direction of using human rights norms as 
a map for development policies and practices. It also has implications for situation or problem 
analysis and therefore naturally comes first. Non-discrimination and equality is the one 
principle that has the strongest legal justification in human rights law and is perhaps the 
clearest and least contested of the principles, and therefore it is dealt with second. As many 
agree that accountability under the human rights framework adds value because it gives a 
clear link to obligations of duty-bearers to respect, protect and fulfil human rights of rights-
holders, this principle is taken up as number three. Participation has strong roots in the 
development discourse and it is not always so clear what element human rights add, especially 
since the human rights community is known to be run by an elite group of specialised experts 
in many societies. Empowerment is the principle that has the weakest link to the legal human 
rights framework, and is therefore dealt with last.   
Empowerment, which often is seen as a core element of human rights-based approaches to 
development, is not mentioned per se in the list of principles in the Common Understanding. 
Instead, empowerment is mentioned as part of “other elements of good programming 
practices that are also essential under a human rights-based approach”. Point three out of 13 
states that “strategies are empowering, not disempowering.”709 Perhaps this indicates that 
empowerment is not seen as a legal human rights principle but rather as ‘good development 
practice’. This is quite natural when one understands the historic background of the concept 
and how it emerged in the ‘grassroots development discourse’ in the 1980s710 – long before it 
became popular within human rights discourse. (After all, there is no ‘right to 
empowerment’.)  
The Common Understanding gives a short explanation of the principles it raises (that are not 
the same as the five I will review). The way human rights principles are explained in the 
Common Understanding is strongly linked with the international human rights regime. It is, 
for example, explained under ‘accountability and rule of law’ that states and other duty-
bearers are answerable for the observance of human rights. They have to comply with legal 
norms and standards, and when they fail to do so, rights-holders can institute proceedings for 
redress before a competent court or other adjudicator.711 This shows that the Common 
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development-hrbd/, visited 14 May 2012. The order in which these references list the principles is not consistent.   
709 Common Understanding, supra note 50. 
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Understanding focuses on the judicial aspect of accountability, which is only one aspect of the 
broad concept accountability, as we will see in the next sections. The problem that the human 
rights-based approaches are associated with loosely defined procedural principles, for 
example raised by Russell,712 arises when different UN agencies produce their own 
interpretations of the Common Understanding. Among UN agencies there is a very varied 
practice concerning human rights-based programming, despite the Common Understanding.  
The limits between what is ‘good development practice’ and what is human rights-based 
practice is often blurred, to say the least, and, moreover, we should keep in mind that human 
rights-based approaches seek to strengthen existing good development practice, rather than 
replacing them. Darrow and Tomas make a distinction between ‘good development 
principles’, using instrumental or utilitarian motivations, and normatively-based approaches 
driven by the conviction that human rights are ends in themselves and therefore they must be 
given explicit consideration in development work.713 I will refer to this distinction and test 
whether it holds true under closer scrutiny.  
2.4.3 Express linkage to human rights norms and standards: Using human rights law 
as a framework for analysis 
The whole rationale behind the Common Understanding can be seen in light of this principle: 
Development cooperation should contribute to the realisation of human rights; human rights 
standards and principles guide all phases of programming; human rights determine the 
relationship between rights-holders and duty-bearers, i.e., there is express linkage to the 
normative human rights system. The questions that need to be answered include: who are the 
duty-bearers at different levels and what are their responsibilities in regard to a specific 
problem? Are these duty-bearers also rights-bearers, i.e., do they rely on others performing 
their duties in order to be able to deliver their own?714 
According to Jonsson, programming is first and foremost assisted by recognising that human 
rights standards determine the development outcomes while human rights principles define 
the conditions for an acceptable development process.715 This means that ‘the end does not 
justify the means’,716 i.e., there must be respect for the do no harm principle. In the Common 
Understanding it is made clear that human rights-based programmes should monitor and 
evaluate both outcomes and processes guided by human rights standards and principles. It is 
also important that assessment and analysis is directed towards identifying a pattern of rights 
and obligations. These elements are said to be necessary, specific, and unique to a human 
rights-based approach.717   
From a practical level, it can, however, be argued that human rights standards are not precise 
enough to concretely inform this aspect of development programming.718 (The Common 
Understanding, however, does not only refer to standards and principles but also 
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recommendations by treaty bodies: “Programming is informed by the recommendations of 
international human rights bodies and mechanisms”, and they can be very concrete.) 
Before deciding what measures are needed in order to reach a certain development outcome 
there needs to be careful assessment, analysis and planning. There is still no clear answer 
among UN agencies how to integrate a human rights perspective when conducting assessment 
and analysis at a country level. Some preliminary attempts have been made and I will review 
some of them here. According to the “Guide for Applying Indicators within UN Human 
Rights-Based Programming” step one is to understand the human rights situation at the 
country level. This is carried out through a review of international human rights norms and 
standards, aiming at identifying areas of progress towards realization of human rights, as well 
as areas where rights may be violated. As part of step one, a preliminary assessment of 
exclusion and vulnerability is carried out. Here human rights-based indicators, which are 
disaggregated in order to identify excluded and vulnerable groups, as well as those facing 
discrimination, play a key role. Indicators for understanding the human rights situation in a 
specific country include country ratification of international human rights treaties; status of 
state reports submitted to UN bodies; other reports and experts’ judgments data; surveys on 
human rights awareness; analysis of percentage of budget spent on human rights activities.719 
As we can see this kind of analysis is on a very general level and relies on secondary data 
from expert sources. A risk is that practitioners get ‘stuck’ analyzing legal and policy contexts 
without connecting this information and analysis to input from communities – or even the 
policy work carried out by the national government itself.720 This is an example of the 
shortcomings of top-down approaches. 
A human rights-based situation analysis may reveal “capacity gaps in legislation, institutions, 
policies and voice”,721 (‘voice’ equals the level of opportunity among actors to participate and 
articulate their opinions). To address the capacity gaps, national laws may need to be brought 
into compliance with treaty obligations. Institutions may need to be strengthened, inter alia, 
through improving governance and providing people with effective remedies when their rights 
are violated. In addition, discrimination may be combated through policy reforms.722 These 
are some of the substantive implications of a human rights-based approach that have 
implications for both the process and the outcome.  
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has set out a human rights approach 
for the Millennium Development Goals in a publication from 2008. The most concrete 
suggestions it makes is that human rights are prioritised by making policy choices and 
resource-allocation decisions within a human rights framework,723 i.e., the human rights 
framework is used in situation analysis to assist in policy choices. This is based on the 
argument that international human rights law provides a framework for assessing the 
reasonableness of policy choices and also that international human rights law pre-dates the 
MDGs, which means recipient states as well as donor states have existing legal obligations 
under human rights treaties. The questions that need to be asked include: Is the policy (related 
to the realisation of a MDG target, in this case) resulting in human rights violations? Is the 
policy adequately directed towards realizing human rights and ensuring equality, including 
gender equality? Are there adequate resources available for implementation? Is there risk of 
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decline in the realisation of rights, contravening the principle of non-retrogression?724 Policies 
and programmes intended to realise MDGs have the potential to violate human rights, and 
therefore human rights impact assessment is important in order to respect the ‘do no harm’ 
principle.725  
UNICEF is perhaps the agency that has made the greatest effort to supply human rights-based 
tools for all phases of the programming cycle, but in these tools there is no express linkage to 
human rights law as such. The FAO uses a similar approach when conducting a right to food 
assessment, but with slightly stronger connections to human rights law. The FAO claims that 
only when the factors that hinder individuals to realise their right to food are known can a 
targeted right to food strategy be implemented. So called causality analysis will reveal to what 
extent, and why, the right to food is either being violated or at risk of being violated, as well 
as the major causes of these violations and the key actors involved. The aim is that the legal, 
policy and institutional framework must respond to the causes of malnutrition.726 Role 
analysis not only identifies duty-bearers in relation to the realisation of a certain human right, 
but also their specific corresponding obligations and responsibilities. When there is a list of 
obligations and responsibilities for different groups of duty-bearers, it is necessary to 
investigate whether or not the obligations are being met.727  
The FAO points out that in a human rights approach the primary concern is with ‘what ought 
to be’. Only analysing ‘what is’ and ‘why’ is by itself not sufficient. It is important to focus 
on the aim, rather than the problem and subsequently the conditions that need to be present at 
different levels to achieve good nutrition. Basic conditions should be equitable access to 
resources, transparent leadership, participatory policy formulation, and discrimination-free 
control of resources.728  
There is limited information available about the role of human rights law in programming in 
general and in situation analysis in particular. There are many technicalities surrounding 
situation analysis and the purpose here is not to give a full overview of all details. The main 
point I want to make is that the questions asked in human rights-based situation analysis are 
different since there is, or should be, express linkage to human rights norms and standards. 
The focus should be on the accountability aspect of human rights/development failures: Who 
has a duty? Who has a right? Why is this duty not executed? Why is the right not 
claimed/realised?  What conditions need to be present in order for the duty-bearer to execute 
his obligations and responsibilities and the rights-holder to claim and enjoy his rights? When 
these questions are raised in situation analysis they do add a new perspective to ‘good 
development programming’.  
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2.4.4 Equality and non-discrimination  
The equality and non-discrimination discourse 
Before examining human rights discourse related to equality and non-discrimination, it is 
interesting to raise another related term, ‘equity’, mainly used in development discourse.  
In the World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development the World Bank highlights 
inequality of opportunity as a “waste of human potential” and “missed development 
opportunities”. The report observes that all over the world there is a persistent pattern of 
individuals and groups facing highly unequal opportunities to better their situation 
economically and socially. There are systematic differences in opportunities for individuals 
and groups who differ in skin colour, caste, gender, or place of residence. Such inequalities 
are often reproduced over time and affect welfare, human development, and also economic 
growth.729 In human rights discourse, this would be called indirect discrimination if it could 
be shown that a provision, criterion or practice puts “persons having a status or a 
characteristic associated with one or more prohibited grounds” for discrimination “at a 
particular disadvantage compared with other persons”.730  
The World Development report does not offer a definition of ‘equity’, nor does it explain how 
it relates to equality and direct or indirect discrimination, but it does make clear that equity 
relates to two basic principles: Equal opportunity and avoidance of absolute deprivation. The 
second principle reflects the idea that the road from opportunity to outcome may be anything 
but easy, even if the equal opportunity principle is upheld. Therefore, society may decide to 
intervene to protect its ‘neediest members’.731 These two principles are part of human rights 
thinking as well. Equity and equality may be part of different discourses but they have 
considerable substantive overlap.732 
The rights to equality and non-discrimination have a strong foundation in international human 
rights law,733 and have been reaffirmed in declarations and codes of conduct developed by 
humanitarian agencies.734 In 2008, a group of human rights and equality experts adopted 27 
principles of equality735 to give guidance on complex and controversial issues. This 
declaration is not legally binding in any way, but reflects international trends in the area of 
equality law and human rights law736 and is therefore referred to here when trying to pinpoint 
what is characteristic of equality thinking in human rights discourse.  
The right to equality is defined as “the right of all human beings to be equal in dignity, to be 
treated with respect and consideration and to participate on an equal basis with others in any 
area of economic, social, political, cultural or civil life. All human beings are equal before the 
law and have the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.” The Declaration on 
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Principles of Equality goes on to affirm that “Equal treatment, as an aspect of equality, is not 
equivalent to identical treatment.” It is necessary to “treat people differently according to their 
different circumstances”, and moreover, “to be effective, the right to equality requires positive 
action.”737 There is rich case law both on international and national levels to support the claim 
that positive action is required to fulfil the right to equality, but that is beyond the scope of 
this chapter. What can be noted is that already in 1989 the Human Rights Committee pointed 
out that the principle of equality sometimes requires States parties to take affirmative action in 
order to diminish or eliminate conditions which cause or help to perpetuate discrimination 
prohibited by the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.738   
Moreover, the Committee on ESCR has made clear that “in addition to refraining from 
discriminatory actions, States parties should take concrete, deliberate, and targeted measures 
to ensure that discrimination in the exercise of Covenant rights is eliminated,”739 i.e., the 
Committee calls for positive action on behalf of the duty-bearers. Legislation is one measure 
to address discrimination but governments also need to ensure that policies, plans, and 
strategies are in place and implemented in order to address both formal and substantive 
discrimination by public and private actors in the area of the Covenant rights.740 The 
heightened attention given to positive action reflects the thinking that equality of opportunity 
is not enough; in order to have equal capabilities or possibilities to participate in economic, 
social, political, cultural or civil life, certain outcomes such as education, health etc. of 
disadvantaged groups also need to improve.741  
For development policy and practice, discrimination in the area of economic, social, and 
cultural rights is a huge challenge. The Committee on ESCR reiterates that Article 2(2) of the 
ICESCR requires States parties to guarantee non-discrimination in the exercise of each of the 
economic, social and cultural rights enshrined in the Covenant. Discrimination constitutes any 
“distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference or other differential treatment that is directly 
or indirectly based on the prohibited grounds of discrimination and which has the intention or 
effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, 
of Covenant rights.”742 The list of prohibited grounds of discrimination has been expanded 
over time and the one given in the Declaration of Principles on Equality includes, inter alia, 
pregnancy and economic status.743 The Declaration also clarifies the notions of direct and 
indirect discrimination, both of which have been part of the equality discourse for a long time. 
It is direct discrimination when a person or group of persons is treated less favourably than a 
person or group of persons would be treated in a comparable situation, and this is related to 
one or more prohibited grounds.744 Most non-discrimination law regimes also include a 
prohibition of indirect discrimination, a concept which is defined differently in different 
jurisdictions but usually says that discrimination on any of the discrimination grounds may 
take place when a practice or rule has a detrimental effect on persons meant to be protected 
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against discrimination.745 Schiek finds that the arguments raised in indirect discrimination 
claims potentially expose structural disadvantage, which may lead to policy changes, but 
judicial procedures cannot necessarily repair disadvantage.746 This is an area outside the scope 
of this chapter. What is interesting from a development perspective is whether human rights 
law on equality and non-discrimination can be used to improve efforts to alleviate poverty.  
The Declaration of Principles on Equality calls for measures against poverty in Principle 14: 
“As poverty may be both a cause and a consequence of discrimination, measures to alleviate 
poverty should be coordinated with measures to combat discrimination, in the pursuit of full 
and effective equality.” This is a controversial issue, and poverty as a ground for 
discrimination has not yet been accepted in any statement within the human rights framework. 
The Principles and Guidelines for a Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction instead 
highlights that poor people are often victims of discrimination on grounds such as birth, 
property, national and social origin, race, colour, gender, and religion.747  
It is clear that obligations in relation to the rights to equality and non-discrimination have 
implications for how development policies are implemented. For instance, as the poor are the 
most disadvantaged and marginalised groups in every society, it is crucial that a poverty 
reduction strategy starts by addressing their special needs as well as their right not to be 
discriminated against.748  
When using equality and non-discrimination as an important ‘lens’ for development efforts, it 
is essential to be aware how laws, policies, or administrative practices may create or combat 
structural discrimination. In human rights-based approaches it is highlighted that a great deal 
of poverty originates from political, social, cultural, or institutional discriminatory practices, 
ranging from the international to the local levels.749 In order to measure the impact of 
different policies, it is important that disaggregated data by prohibited grounds of 
discrimination such as sex, disability, ethnicity, religion, language, geographic location and so 
forth, is collected and analysed.750 However, this much called for data often does not exist, 
thereby not capturing the situation of the poorest and most marginalised people, including 
indigenous and minority groups, in official statistics and household and demographic surveys. 
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights points out in a report that “available 
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data mostly remain at too aggregated a level and indicators frequently measure only “average” 
progress and hence hide patterns of discrimination, inequality and disparities in outcomes.”751 
Although there are many legal details around equality and non-discrimination, both in 
international human rights law and national equality legislation, this particular human rights 
principle is quite straightforward, at least in theory. What kind of operational implications it 
has for development efforts can of course be debated, but there seems to be some consensus 
that the principle implies that priority should be directed towards those suffering 
discrimination and disadvantage in any given context, especially the poorest of the poor and 
groups suffering multiple discrimination, such as rural women of an ethnic minority.752 The 
Nepal-Finland cooperation project called Rural Village Water Resources Management can be 
mentioned as an example. Non-discrimination is here seen as requiring a focus on the most 
marginalised and vulnerable to exclusion and discrimination, inter alia, women, children, 
inhabitants of (remote) rural and deprived urban areas, and indigenous groups. In order to 
address the discrimination that these groups face in the area of water management, “positive 
targeted measures may have to be adopted”.753  
Women as a group often suffer discrimination and are a popular ‘target group’ in development 
efforts. Some argue that a rights approach helps avoid the pitfalls that are attached to an 
abstract and often depoliticised notions of ‘gender’, which have made ‘women’ as a category 
visible but not helped in making equality real. Human rights approaches keep the end output – 
guaranteed rights for all – in constant focus.754 It is here that human rights discourse may add 
value: in redirecting focus on non-discrimination as the basis on which to demand equality 
and justice for women as rights-holders.  
Surprisingly, a review of an overview of five of the most commonly applied gender analysis 
frameworks and tools reveals that discrimination is not a common focus of gender analysis. 
Issues such as how the planned activity impacts on men’s and women’s control and access 
over resources, time, and other socio-cultural factors, including changes in social roles and 
status, are analysed. It is only in the Women’s Empowerment Framework by Sara Hlupekile 
Longwe where equal access to the factors of production by removing discriminatory 
provisions in the laws is highlighted.755  
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Non-discrimination in ‘good development’ and human rights approaches: Vulnerable to 
what?  
In development and humanitarian operations, the principle of non-discrimination is linked to 
the impartiality requirement whereby humanitarian operations cannot be biased in favour of a 
particular religious, political, social or other group.756 Therefore, this principle is visible in 
identification and selection of ‘beneficiaries’, in aid targeting. Often equality and non-
discrimination are equated with providing services for ‘vulnerable groups’ such as women 
and children.757 In order to establish the needs among the target population, a needs-
assessment is usually carried out. This exercise is usually carried out by experts. As an 
example of the instructions these experts follow the WFP’s guidelines on Comprehensive 
Food Security & Vulnerability Analysis can be mentioned. This tool is “designed to 
understand and describe the profiles of food-insecure and vulnerable households”. In this 
context, vulnerability is not linked to the possible discrimination experienced by the 
individual or group, but is instead linked to other criteria, such as income. “Looking at 
household expenditure and income, the analyst is able to determine which are the most 
vulnerable households and what risks (drought, flood, pest, insecurity) will affect them the 
most.”758 Naturally, other assets than income are also taken into account, and this information 
is collected separately for men and women.759  
The FAO uses a vulnerability analysis that aims at identifying people at risk of becoming food 
insecure or malnourished. Vulnerability is here about exposure to one or more risk factors and 
the capacity to withstand the effects of a specific risk or risks. Vulnerable or highly vulnerable 
are those people or households that have little or no capacity to safeguard their access to food, 
even when confronted with a minimal risk factor.760 In the vulnerability assessment, 
discrimination experienced by people is not a factor that is analysed. Nevertheless, the FAO 
claims that targeting of groups that are vulnerable to food insecurity is essential in rights-
focused approaches: “these approaches involve establishing transparent and non-
discriminatory eligibility criteria.” The purpose of the vulnerability analysis is to ensure that 
“all those in need are included in actions to reduce food insecurity and vulnerability”.761 In 
this case, vulnerability assessment is about identifying needs and making sure there is no 
discrimination in the targeting process – but less about using discrimination and 
marginalization as a lens for analysis. Focus is not on those who are most marginalised or 
vulnerable to discrimination and exclusion, but on those who are vulnerable to food insecurity 
or malnourishment. These examples show how differently ‘vulnerability’ can be defined in 
development work.   
The point here is that when the human rights principle of non-discrimination and equality is 
used as a lens for analysis this can potentially add something to the kind of analysis and 
assessment usually carried out in good development practice. The focus should be more on 
finding out who is marginalised and vulnerable to exclusion and discrimination than who is 
vulnerable to food shortages, worsened by circumstances such as droughts. The answer might 
be that the same individuals and groups are experiencing both discrimination and food 
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insecurity, but the question is different. Therefore, when the question as to why is there 
discrimination and what can be done to address it is added to the analysis and the affected 
people are actively involved in the inquiry, this can potentially be the first step to change the 
situation (agency) in addition to mitigating hunger through providing for needs for a period of 
time.  
Concluding remarks on non-discrimination  
The usual way of working with the principle of non-discrimination in human rights 
approaches to development is to focus on the most vulnerable individuals and groups. 
However, a short analysis of how vulnerability is defined in work that identifies itself as 
human rights-based, reveals that vulnerability assessment is very much like that in ‘good 
development practice’, i.e., about identifying needs and making sure there is no 
discrimination in the targeting process. The possible added value that a ‘human rights lens’ 
can bring is to focus on identifying the individuals and groups who are vulnerable to 
discrimination and exclusion. Disaggregated data is therefore of high importance – but seldom 
exists in reality. For example, human rights discourse may in some cases add value through 
redirecting focus on non-discrimination as the basis on which to demand equality and justice 
for women as rights-holders. Focusing on women as rights-holders naturally also leads to an 
analysis of the lack of equality. 
2.4.5 Accountability  
Introduction and background to the accountability discourse 
McInerney-Lankford points out that it is problematic that there are two parallel accountability 
frameworks, that of development cooperation, such as the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness (2005), and that of the legal human rights framework. The same countries that 
are held mutually accountable as donors and partners by the Paris Declaration, are also 
accountable for human rights that are “directly relevant to, and potentially impacted by, [aid] 
harmonization efforts.”762 Another challenge is that the accountability propounded through 
development frameworks is not of equal value as the legal accountability under human rights 
law. Accountability through development frameworks is built on principles, political 
commitments, and policy frameworks rather than binding legal obligations under public 
international law.763 It is the value of these binding legal obligations that makes the human 
rights framework so attractive from an accountability perspective. Lack of accountability for 
human rights obligations as well as for development policy and practice is a challenge in most 
countries of the world, and more accountability mechanisms and processes are seen as the 
solution.  
Struggles by the poor to hold the powerful to account is a key issue behind many conflicts.764 
“In most countries around the world, citizens know little about how much money their 
government has at its disposal, where that money comes from, and how it is managed and 
accounted for.” What further diminishes the sense of accountability to citizens in Sub-Saharan 
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Africa for public revenues is that a relatively large proportion of government revenues come 
from international aid and the export of primary resources (rather than tax revenues).765  
In order to address these kinds of accountability gaps, specific reforms are called for whereby 
officials must explain, i.e., ‘account’ for their actions (actions should be ‘transparent’); so that 
officials ‘take responsibility’ for their actions; so that voters hold elected officials to account 
through elections; and so on.766 We can say that accountability generally refers to holding 
actors responsible for their actions.767 As we will see below, there are many ways to do this. 
The concept ‘accountability’ has assumed a central place in contemporary development 
discourse, partly due to increasing attention to the idea of ‘good governance’.768 The logic to 
support an institutional environment for ‘good governance’ is that certain conditions underpin 
the ability of governments to be accountable (supply-side conditions) and the ability of 
citizens and civil society to hold governments accountable (demand-side conditions).769 
Therefore, traditionally both human rights and development discourse have called for 
accessible, transparent and effective accountability mechanisms at all levels.770 With regard to 
operational aspects of support to good governance in aid, donors tend to emphasise good 
governance as primarily linked to institutional development and to reform of administrative 
procedures. This means that the executive branch of government should be accountable for its 
actions, the bureaucracy should be of high quality, the legal framework should be appropriate 
to the circumstances, policy-making should be open and transparent so that citizens can have 
input in the decision-making process, and civil society should be strong so that it can 
participate in public affairs.771   
Newell and Wheeler are of the opinion that the association between accountability and good 
governance, in the technical way described above, has meant that “the politics of 
accountability has been reduced to questions of state reform.” In their book, they show that 
accountability cannot be achieved through institutional reform alone, although it naturally is a 
crucial aspect of improved accountability.772 They claim that when accountability is framed as 
a problem of institutional engineering, legal reform, and better accounting, what often follows 
is a denial of the political and historical context of accountabilities by which people make 
sense of rights and obligations.773 The empirical research for this thesis supports the fact that 
matters of institutional reform are far from the day-to-day reality when demanding 
accountability from power holders in struggles over resources and services.  
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Different forms of accountability  
In recent years, aid and development agencies have funded a large number of anti-corruption 
commissions, auditors-general, human rights machineries, and legislative public accounts 
committees. These are state agencies that monitor the arms of the state, and are called 
institutions of ‘horizontal accountability’. ‘Vertical’ forms of accountability include both the 
individual citizen’s electoral choice and the collective forms of pressure by civil society 
organisations.774 Both vertical and horizontal accountability are dimensions of political 
accountability. The fact that rulers explain and justify actions to the ruled traditionally 
distinguished a democratic society from a tyrannical one. Today, with the growth of 
bureaucracies, the lines of political accountability have become increasingly blurred and the 
mechanisms of political accountability have grown.775 For example, the Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness underlines the importance of the role of parliaments in scrutinizing budget 
and policy proposals. Parliamentary committees provide a further channel for engagements 
with parliamentarians in the role of reviewing legislations, budgets and policies.776  
Traditionally, financial accountability has been important in development cooperation. This is 
a less political form of accountability concerned with inputs, outputs and outcomes, 
monitoring expenditure and making sure that the processes are efficient.777 According to the 
Paris Declaration, partner countries commit to strengthening public financial management 
capacity and taking leadership of the public financial management reform process.778 
Another accountability framework that is often supported by donors is legal and 
constitutional accountability that is assured by the judiciary. The judiciary is entrusted with 
the task to ensure that politicians and officials do not exceed their legal authority.779 From a 
human rights perspective, judicial accountability is key. In countries where, for example, the 
right to food or related rights such as the right to social security have been incorporated into 
the constitution or other national legislation, this gives citizens an opportunity to challenge 
legislation and policy through judicial systems.780 In addition, quasi-judicial accountability 
mechanisms, including independent bodies established to advance and defend human rights, 
such as national human rights institutions and ombudspersons,781 promote accountability for 
human rights failure. Moreover, international accountability processes, such as quasi-judicial 
processes for reviewing governments’ implementation of ESC rights, including the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and special rapporteurs,782 are important 
components of human rights accountability mechanisms. Recently there has also been 
developments within private sector accountability that has international relevance, e.g. the so 
called Ruggie principles on business and human rights.783 
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Rights-oriented development discourses, in which there can be distrust in the processes of 
institutional engineering and judicial processes often support social accountability. This form 
of accountability explores citizen action, aimed at over-seeing political authorities, as a way 
of redefining the relationship between citizens and their elected representatives.784 Social 
accountability is the direct accountability relationships between citizens and the state. In 
practical terms, this form of accountability refers to a broad range of actions and mechanisms 
(beyond voting) that citizens can use, such as monitoring public budgets, participation in 
budget formation, citizen report cards on service delivery, and social audits, to mention a few 
examples. In order to enhance social accountability an array of approaches, strategies, and 
methods have been used by a wide range of actors including citizens, civil society 
organizations, communities, government agencies, parliamentarians, and the media.785 Social 
accountability is most often used in service delivery, in efforts to inform citizens and create 
channels for them to use information to hold service providers accountable.786 In order for 
social accountability to work it requires transparency and right to information, as well as 
opportunities to use the information, i.e. participation and redress mechanisms. These can be 
formal or informal channels to express dissatisfaction as well as complaint channels within 
government agencies, independent redress institutions, redress mechanisms within 
development programmes, and courts.787 (I will return to the role of courts in the next 
section.) 
Social accountability tries to capture voices at the local level. One challenge is the low level 
of resources usually available at the local level. This is related to the fact that if the central 
government is not meeting its obligations in channelling resources for socioeconomic rights to 
the local level (as part of decentralisation) social accountability efforts remain ineffectual 
unless they also target the central government. An unexpected benefit of social accountability 
mechanisms might be that they create opportunities for actors to have a dialogue regarding the 
content and meaning of human rights, and obligations, in their lived realities. This requires 
that the agenda is open enough and that there is some awareness of the idea of rights and 
duties.    
Social accountability as well as other accountability mechanisms in development can be high 
jacked by patrimonial systems and local elites to serve their agendas, or they can serve the 
agendas of development agencies. When unmasking the agenda behind different approaches 
to accountability one can ask questions such as: what is accountability for? (i.e., what broader 
political ends does it serve?); who is it for (i.e., who benefits, who formulates those claims?); 
how is it practiced? (i.e., through what means and processes?); where is it practiced? (i.e., at 
what levels of political decision making?)788 Empirical assessment of which accountability 
strategies work, when and for whom789 can contribute to making context-specific 
accountability models, promoting stronger position for rights-holders.  
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Accountability in human rights approaches to development 
In ‘good development programming’ accountability flows from the implementing agency to 
the funding agency,790 despite the fact that the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness talks of 
‘mutual accountability’.791 The strongest accountability relationship in aid processes is still 
that of recipient governments to donors. ‘Mutuality’ tends to be interpreted as meaning that 
partner countries prove, to the satisfaction of donors, that they have fulfilled their 
commitments.792 (This is not changed by human rights approaches, as we will discuss later in 
this chapter.) 
What does change through human rights-based approaches is that new lines of accountability 
emerge, such as government to target group, through the mobilisation of rights-holders.793 
Human rights-based approaches establish the accountability-requirement within a framework 
of specific human rights entitlements and corresponding obligations.794 This approach implies 
the accountability of those with duties and obligations.795  
Accountability is therefore often seen as the ‘lynchpin’ of the human rights framework: it 
aims at enabling citizens to claim their rights and ensuring governments and other actors to 
implement their responsibilities. Transparency is argued to be essential because without it 
people and organisations cannot access information needed to hold power-holders to 
account.796 Thereby, we return once again to good governance. On the relationship between 
human rights and accountability, Sano observes that human rights can be seen as principles 
against which good governance programmes are checked or human rights can enter as specific 
measures and laws promoted for enhancing popular participation to promote accountability.797 
From both perspectives, the aim of accountability can be seen as enhancing a process of 
reviewing the performance of the government and other duty-bearers against their human 
rights obligations.798  (New lines of accountability explored in human rights-based approaches 
often take the form of institutionalized local monitoring groups.799) 
Human rights discourse has traditionally focussed on the legal and judicial aspects of 
reviewing the performance of duty-bearers. Darrow and Tomas point out that mechanisms of 
redress need not be limited to, but should include, judicial mechanisms.800 The argument has 
been that for accountability to be effective, it needs to be demanded801 and have some kind of 
recourse or remedy mechanism, including rehabilitation, compensation, punitive sanctions, as 
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well as prevention of harm through changes in policies and practices or guarantees of non-
repetition.802 It is often underlined that effective enforcement mechanisms and the capacity to 
punish is an integral part of accountability. Illegal behaviour calls for legal sanctions; 
demonstrated abuses such as corruption or human rights violations, must be punished, 
otherwise there is no rule of law and no accountability.803  
The human rights framework itself incorporates national, regional, and international judicial 
and other accountability mechanisms for reviewing the human rights obligations of 
governments. These include UN treaty monitoring bodies and special rapporteurs at the 
international level; human rights courts and commissions at the regional level. At the national 
level, judiciary and national courts, national human rights commissions and ombudspersons, 
administrative monitoring and review processes804 have roles in monitoring of adherence to 
human rights. 
Broadly speaking, ‘legal human rights-based approaches’805 typically focus on developing 
laws, policies, institutions, administrative procedures and practices that can deliver  
entitlements, respond to denial and violations and ensure accountability.806 This kind of work 
is largely carried out with the support of donors and international agencies. UN agencies seem 
to focus on the legal aspects of accountability, as the Common Understanding promotes 
judicial mechanisms as a solution when states and other duty-bearers fail to comply with legal 
norms in human rights instruments: “aggrieved rights-holders are entitled to institute 
proceedings for appropriate redress before a competent court or other adjudicator in 
accordance with the rules and procedures provided by law.”807 This is a basic principle in 
human rights law, and taking non-compliance with human rights norms seriously in 
development programming is naturally welcome (especially if this concerns also 
accountability for human rights impact by actions involving donor states). We should, 
however, keep in mind that accountability in the context of human rights-based development 
approaches has diverse meanings and many approaches by civil society and marginalised 
groups apply other methodologies for holding duty-bearers to account, e.g. social 
accountability in its various forms. Advocacy and mobilisation campaigns are important 
features of rights-based strategies to achieve greater accountability, and sometimes legal 
strategies are part of the ‘tool box’, sometimes not. Often social and political mobilisation is 
critical for ensuring that court judgments are enforced.808 
Authors in favour of legal approaches often point out the value of human rights law offering a 
normative baseline mandating non-regression and a principle of ‘do no harm’.809 (‘Do no 
harm’ is not mentioned in the Common Understanding, despite its legal approach to 
accountability.) The OECD DAC argues that the “international human rights framework can 
provide a standard against which to assess aid effectiveness and ensure that changes instituted 
in the delivery and management of aid will support, or at least not undermine, the realisation 
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of human rights”.810 For this to work in practice, it would take strong accountability 
mechanisms so that development policy and practice of both donor states, multilateral 
agencies, and recipient states is monitored and assessed from a human rights perspective. 
Considering that the treaty monitoring mechanisms within the UN system seldom even refer 
to development policy and practice811 this would require a considerable modification in 
current practices.  
‘Do no harm’ should naturally be taken seriously in ‘good development practice’ as well as in 
human rights-based approaches. Respecting human rights and preventing harm that causes 
lower human rights enjoyment because of development activities can be seen as being part of 
duty-bearers’ negative obligations. However, we should not forget accountability for positive 
obligations. The process of how rights can be realised is important in the accountability 
discussions that focus on the enforceability dimension of accountability. According to Newell 
and Wheeler, it is in this context that we encounter the limits of (over)-reliance on rights.812  
At the level of development programming, promoting a stronger role for the human rights 
legal accountability framework is not necessarily the only or most relevant role that the 
human rights framework can play. Instead the act of identifying rights-holders813 (and their 
entitlements) and corresponding duty-bearers (and their obligations) is what potentially raises 
levels of accountability in the development process. Both positive obligations to protect and 
fulfil a specific human right, and negative obligations to abstain from violations are to be 
considered.814 But this does not mean that all development failures should be dealt with in 
human rights treaty monitoring bodies, for instance. Instead it requires that human rights 
impact assessment is applied to all development plans, policies, budgets, and programmes to 
determine progress/failures in human rights terms.815 Explicit human rights reference in 
development programming is a doorway to increased human rights accountability.  
Who is accountable for human rights impact in development? 
The question who has duties and obligations is of course relevant. We know that states have a 
legal obligation to respect, protect and fulfil human rights and that they are accountable for 
human rights implementation of the conventions they have ratified.816 We also know that the 
Paris Declaration advocates mutual accountability, i.e., that donors and partners are 
accountable for development results. (Paris Declaration also proposes commitments to donors 
that they e.g. refrain from requesting the “introduction of performance indicators that are not 
consistent with partners’ national development strategies.”817) However, despite the mutual 
accountability principle, it is commonly held that aid accountability is one-way,818 and donor 
obligations are not often on the agenda.  
What sort of accountability for human rights impact can be expected from international 
organisations and donor states? It is clear that the nature of political change in weak states in 
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the South is often heavily influenced by both bilateral donors and by UN development 
agencies. This is the case especially in transitional societies where civil society groups have 
received new influence, often thanks to support and resources from the international 
community. Donors and international agencies view these civil society groups as agents of 
democratisation, and they willingly take that role, but often they alone carry the risk of 
challenging authoritarian or transitional regimes and power-holders. It is not surprising that 
NGOs and local non-state actors raise demands concerning consistency of policy and human 
rights accountability of the very organisations and donors who are driving the agenda to 
reinforce participation and human rights through the operations of these local actors.819 One 
can argue that Western donors and international organisations involved in democratisation, 
good governance, and human rights promotion certainly share a responsibility with national 
states both for respecting human rights themselves and for contributing positively to human 
rights fulfilment.820 Among the development community there is, however, not much 
awareness or conscious effort to take such responsibility seriously.  
In human rights law, the question of extraterritorial obligations has gained more attention 
recently. These obligations pertain to acts of a state which have human rights effects outside 
the territorial jurisdiction of that state. In this context it is important to make a distinction 
between an obligation to cooperate internationally for development and an obligation to 
provide development assistance.821 Many donors have traditionally been cautious in the right 
to development debate, specifically for the reason that it has been interpreted by some as 
creating a right to receive international assistance.822  
There is a general unwillingness among donors to take on international obligations, and 
Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi suggest that international development agencies use the 
language of rights-based approaches to development without intending to bear the entirety of 
consequences that flow from it. They see that the lack of possibility of accountability 
mechanisms in the international development assistance structure is undermining the whole 
idea of aid recipients having been transformed from ‘passive beneficiaries’ to ‘rights-
holders’.823 This is not only a legal question, but a practical problem that undermines the 
credibility of human rights-based approaches to development assistance.  
Struggle for accountability 
Authors who view struggles over rights and accountability in the context of wider social and 
political transformation (compared to those concerned with narrow ‘legal human rights 
approaches’) put accountability into a complex relationship between rights, resources and 
accountability, i.e., the relationship between the state and its citizens.824 Newell and Wheeler 
remind us that accountability is not an end in itself. Instead, it is at best a means to achieving a 
wider set of goals that involves deeper social and political change. This point is often 
forgotten in technocratic and target-driven approaches to accountability.825 For example, 
struggles over resources and efforts to realise rights such as housing or water concerns the 
relationship between rights and accountability. Rights become tools of accountability, where 
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marginalised groups use rights claims around key resources in a struggle for increased 
accountability from state, private, and civil society actors.826  
Accountability is not just about answerability as to results, actions, and non-actions but also 
about delivering enforceability of rights. Rights, or rather the lack of their practical 
implementation, are at the heart of mobilisations for accountability.827 The aim of social 
movements that struggle for basic rights is often to increase the level of responsiveness and 
accountability of public institutions.828 Proposals for change can be made, but if they are met 
with a blank wall of unresponsiveness by duty-bearers the lives of rights-holders will not 
improve.829 The responsiveness and accountability relationship is usually seen to function 
when bureaucracies involved in service delivery are responsive to citizen needs, and 
accountable to elected officials.830 In these struggles, accountability is not apolitical and the 
judicial proceedings are not necessarily part of the process.  
In addition to this, judicial activism is an interesting phenomenon. In India Public Interest 
Litigation (PIL) is one example that is very relevant when exploring the role of rights and 
accountability in development related claims. In a number of decisions by the Supreme Court 
of India, it was established that the judiciary is morally required and constitutionally 
mandated to increase its responsiveness to citizen requests for investigative action concerning 
specific government agencies, including service-delivery ministries. In the form of PIL, 
citizens enter the horizontal process of in-depth monitoring of government, and as such it 
represents an interesting case of hybrid accountability between the vertical and horizontal 
axes. Individual citizens and activists groups become part of an official fact-finding process. 
In India, PIL has legitimized the notion of direct citizen engagement with issues of executive 
oversight. PIL has also attracted a lot of interest by social movements in adopting legal 
processes, showing that it is possible for citizen-litigants to enter into legal-constitutional 
accountability institutions, becoming active demanders of answerability in a forum that 
carries the weight of enforceability. Most citizen-initiated approaches aim to achieve precisely 
this combination of answers and sanctions.831As constitutional regimes vary widely from one 
country to another, the Indian experience can naturally not be generalised. Moreover, the 
experiences from India are not only positive. Litigation has often times been time consuming, 
costly, relatively ineffective as compared to traditional mobilisation strategies,832 and there is 
risk of depoliticising issues in the legal arena.   
It is also important to be aware that, even in countries where there is judicial responsiveness 
to social claims and the courts are able to influence the formal political process, the successful 
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contestation of legal meanings cannot be automatically associated with social change.833 A 
review of social rights cases in Colombia shows that the Constitutional Court went from 
protecting individuals who were structurally marginalised from the market, to a protection of 
particularly vulnerable groups and then to a general protection of the middle class groups that 
were being affected by fiscal constraints. The Court started benefiting claimants who were not 
structurally excluded from the market but occasionally affected by ‘market dysfunction’ 
resulting from the economic crisis. The author behind the review however thinks more 
research is needed regarding the way in which law, legal language, and social movements 
interact to “understand the complex relation between courts and social change better”.834  
Concluding remarks on accountability 
When human rights enter into development policies and practices, new accountability 
relationships and frameworks emerge. There is stronger focus on the state-citizen relationship 
compared to the donor-implementing agency accountability relationship that dominates in 
‘good development discourse’. Naturally there are overlaps, and strengthening the 
accountability of the executive in relation to citizens has been a goal in the good governance 
agenda for a long time (driven by donors and international agencies in the name of 
democracy, transparency and human rights).  
In human rights-based approaches to development, the relationship between rights-holders 
and duty-bearers is at the heart of demanding accountability. The act of identifying rights-
holders (and their entitlements) and corresponding duty-bearers (and their obligations) 
potentially raise levels of accountability in the development process – and this is something 
that can be done in development programming as well as in social activism. However, 
international agencies tend to focus on the strengthening of legal accountability mechanisms, 
through national legal and judicial reforms, leaving other forms of struggle aside. These ‘legal 
human rights-based approaches’ focus on developing institutions and administrative 
procedures that can deliver on entitlements and respond to violations, in the name of ‘good 
governance’, and less on the link between accountability and popular participation.  
In non-legal rights-based approaches, e.g. by social movements, and partly also the by the 
World Bank in the area of social accountability,835 advocacy and mobilisation around issues 
of the lack of practical implementation of services/rights are important aspects of the 
enforceability and responsiveness dimensions of accountability. In some countries, judicial 
activism also plays an important role in these broader struggles for accountability. When these 
struggles are truly inclusive they can have effects greater than ‘winning the case’. However, 
one has to be careful not to generalise the role of rights and the legal framework in 
accountability struggles. The specific effects of a legal human rights discourse should be 
studied in context as they can have diverse effects.  
At the same time as there is a tendency to emphasise the legal aspects of accountability as 
requiring national judicial and institutional reform, there is a tendency to neglect legal 
accountability flowing from human rights treaties and binding both donors and recipient 
countries. This is related to the question mark in the human rights accountability puzzle, i.e., 
the obligations and responsibilities assumed by international organisations and donor states. 
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The silence on this issue among the concerned actors undermines the credibility of their intent 
to strengthen human rights accountability in development.   
Regardless of what form it takes, being able to hold institutions and other power holders that 
affects one’s life to account is an important aspect and the subsequent principles are of 
participation and empowerment. 
2.4.6 Participation  
Different perspectives on participation    
Participation has long been accepted as a means to improve relevance and effectiveness of 
programming, and also based on participation being an end in itself. However, ‘participation’ 
in development can mean different things depending on the context and the actors involved. 
Participatory processes range from people participating by providing information to outside 
‘experts’ to participating in decision making as genuine protagonists.836  
Andrea Cornwall has written an excellent review and analysis of participation in development 
policy and practice called Beneficiary, Consumer, Citizen: Perspectives on Participation for 
Poverty Reduction. She recalls three distinct arguments made for participation in the 1960s 
and 1970s. According to the first line of argument, development projects were seen to have a 
better chance of success if people were involved more directly in them. Participation was 
called for on the grounds of efficiency, effectiveness, and equity of access to benefits. The 
second set of arguments had a very different origin. They arose directly from the struggles of 
popular movement of the time for rights, recognition, and more equitable distribution of 
resources. The vision was social change for self-determination and self-governance, and less 
about institutions involving their users or clients in the design or delivery of programmes. The 
third argument is casting participation as a mutual learning experience.837 In the first 
perspective on participation, people participate as ‘beneficiaries’. They are invited to help 
make contributions to interventions that are designed to benefit them, and their participation is 
held to increase the effectiveness of these interventions. Participation is done for the people. 
The second perspective on participation can be associated with broader struggles for 
democracy and equity. Participation is by the people, and the aim is for them to gain rights 
over and entitlements to resources.838 This perspective is close to issues of citizenship, which 
are linked to rights-based approaches that claim participation as a political right, thereby 
creating a political, legal and moral imperative for focussing on people’s agency.839 The third 
perspective on participation calls for a closer relationship between those who work in 
development practice and the people who are supposed to benefit from this practice. 
Participation means working with people.840  
Cornwall reminds us of what she calls “the ethos of self-reliance” of the 1980s, a kind of ‘do 
it for yourself’ attitude in development that implied that beneficiaries became seen as 
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consumers, or ‘users and choosers’.841 Seeing ‘communities’ as ‘user and chooser’ can imply 
that they are engaged in contributing labour, time, or cash to community development 
projects, or they are involved in user committees, or they obtain the control for design, 
delivery, and maintenance of projects. In the name of ‘participation’ communities are 
achieving an increasing role in co-production and in self-provisioning and are thus assuming 
many functions of the state. The state becomes “an enabling force by removing laws, 
liberalising the economy and opening up access to wider range of services through the 
encouragement of NGO involvement and private sector investment in basic service 
provision.”842 Cornwall cites Vengroff (1974) as proof that arguments such as these have been 
published. Vengroff made a case that self-help efforts can be used to delay the need for 
allocation of government funds and divert local demands for development from the central 
government to local initiative. This generates mass participation.843 That this is contrary to 
human rights thinking is very clear. Human rights require a shift from beneficiary or 
consumer to citizen and rights-holder. We will come back to the implications of this.  
It can naturally be argued that this is merely an example of ‘bad participation’, in which those 
with the power dictate the conditions of the ‘participation’. However, it is important to be 
aware of the various understandings and meanings attached to ‘participation’ as defined in 
development discourse.  
When we come down to the practical level the whole business of participation becomes even 
more complicated. Sometimes we can read in reports or policy statements that there has been, 
or should be, ‘full participation’ and ‘participation by all stakeholders’. However, looking at 
the realities on the ground this can prove to be virtually impossible. Therefore, implicit 
choices about who participates are usually made also when the aim is ‘full participation’. 
Methodology naturally plays a role here. A distinction can be made between approaches that 
place greater emphasis on participation of representatives, i.e., those who speak on behalf of a 
particular interest group, and those that aim at more direct democratic forms of participation. 
Nevertheless, these boundaries tend to be blurred and pragmatism often leads to the 
representation approach being included, in one form or the other.844  
We need to be aware that development programmes can never function in a vacuum detached 
from local struggles for power and resources, i.e., from the political sphere. However, 
participatory approaches have been criticised for ‘depoliticising’ development by 
incorporating marginalised individuals in projects that they are unable to question.845 It is 
often assumed that participatory approaches are apolitical and non-confrontational since they 
build upon an idea of finding consensus. Jenkins and Goetz point out that “in assuming 
consensus, different perspectives can be silenced, a problem which has been observed with 
regard to the subtle filtering-out of dissensus along gender and class lines.”846 This easily 
happens when participatory monitoring and evaluation exercises come from outside the 
community and the emphasis is on generation of information from the grassroots and less 
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emphasis on direct confrontation between people’s knowledge and official accounts. 
Participatory techniques are therefore often apolitical in their implicit assumptions that 
information will flow ‘from the bottom up’.847 However, politics matter in development and 
understanding how participation relates to power structures and political systems is crucial for 
a more transformative approach.848  
At the same time, we need to be realistic about the limitations of participation in development 
programming. People struggling to satisfy daily needs of food and water are not necessarily 
interested in attending workshops – or at least that is the assumption often made. Issues such 
as functional literacy, analytical, organisational, and advocacy capacities can be challenging 
and time-consuming. Under these circumstances it is tempting to involve civil society groups 
that do not necessarily represent the poor and disadvantaged instead of direct participation of 
the target groups.849 We see elites (chiefs, headmen, landowners, higher castes, the urban 
educated) having prominent roles in new spaces created for participation; they represent and 
articulate the needs of the poor and marginalised.850 Additionally, it is clear that perfect, 
transformative, empowering participation is unattainable most of the time,851 especially in 
top-down approaches. However, if these modernist development approaches have caused a 
disjuncture between the ‘elite’ and the ‘grassroots’, participation could at least contribute to 
building a common language between “the architects and recipients of development 
programmes”.852   
Human rights: Participation is a right 
The trend of emphasising new forms of democratic practice, which build on more direct and 
deliberative democratic traditions, broadening notions of political participation beyond the 
politics of the ballot box, and an increasing attention to human rights in development are 
factors that have contributed to a resurgence of interest in popular participation. Talk of 
participation as a democratic right is once again becoming popular.853 In human rights-based 
programming the starting point is that participation is a right854 enshrined in many human 
rights conventions. This right is often violated. It is argued that fostering participation in 
societal decision-making at different levels is an objective in itself. Greater participation is 
both a necessary outcome and a necessary aspect of the development process.855 Participation 
should be viewed as a process of fostering critical consciousness and decision-making as the 
basis for active citizenship.856  This means that participation is first and foremost seen a 
democratic principle that is relevant in all social, political, and economic decision-making – 
not limited to a development project or programme.  
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There are some donors that have this view on participation, for example Sida.857 The Swedish 
Government’s White paper called The Rights of the Poor – Our Common Responsibility 
(1996/97) argues for strategies that enhance the possibilities for the poorest people to take a 
greater part in political life, especially at the local level of decision-making.858 (We should, 
however, be aware that Sida is also struggling with translating their nice slogans into concrete 
practice.)859 The driving force behind the arguments is, however, a belief that 
“democratization, establishment of the rule of law, good governance and popular participation 
in decision-making are declared to be the most important conditions for progress in the fight 
against poverty”860 – rather than seeing participation as a value in itself. 
This is not unique to Sida. In human rights discourse, participation is seen as a prerequisite 
and starting point for making other claims, and that means fostering greater participation also 
has utilitarian motives. The publication Claiming the Millennium Development Goals: A 
Human Rights Approach points out that, participation is a fundamental element in achieving 
economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as the right to development. Classic civil and 
political rights (rights to vote, freedom of expression and association) must, furthermore, be 
supported and it is essential to build strong democratic institutions and to consciously create 
space for participation in MDG-related activities. This means, inter alia, increasing 
transparency, and making information about policies and programmes accessible; creating 
channels for participation by the poorest and most marginalised groups; and making human 
rights awareness cross-cutting in all programmes.861 This is in itself not new for the 
development agenda, the only new element is human rights awareness.  
We can differentiate relationships that should be ‘participatory’, (or accountable or non-
discriminatory for that matter): (1) the relationship between the ‘beneficiary’ and the ‘project 
management’; (2) that between the people as citizens and rights-holders and the different 
power holders, i.e., government institutions, donors, corporations. Traditionally, human rights 
have played a role in the latter relationship but as human rights enter into ‘programming’ 
through human rights-based approaches they increasingly also become relevant in projects, 
although this process is certainly not always clear from the contradictions. When people are 
enabled to represent and choose for themselves through ‘participatory development’ they will 
not always support agendas of gender equality, democracy, and human rights. What 
facilitators should do in these situations remain, for the most part, unresolved either in the 
guidelines or operational practice.862  
Kate Newman has observed in her research that there is in-built tension between participation 
and a human rights-based approach which embraces a universal, legislative approach to 
rights.863 If participants are asked, it might be that they do not prioritise working on the right 
to education, which is the target of the organisation. There is a risk that the priorities and 
perspectives of the local groups become over-shadowed by an approach focusing on a specific 
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human rights-based target. Participation may clash with organisational interests.864 It is 
difficult for transformative participation to have pre-defined goals,865 as this goes against the 
very idea of allowing the ‘beneficiaries’ to be in the driver’s seat. Moreover, transformatory 
participation cannot simply focus on methodologies, but must look at ways of challenging 
broader structures, and this requires political strategies.866   
Cornwall points out that when ‘participation’ is used as a term to describe a ‘method’ or 
‘mechanism’ that is limited to a project or programme, participation is something that is done 
to or for people by outsider agencies.867 This is a very different view on participation 
compared to one where participation is seen as a right and democratic principle. However, the 
lines between the different participation practices in development have been blurred in recent 
years when concerns with the relationship between citizens and the state has increasingly 
become an issue on the development agenda, particularly in the move towards engaging 
citizen participation in policy processes,868 such as Poverty Reduction Development Plans, 
and strategies for decentralisation.869 
The question is what the human rights perspective adds to participatory approaches, in 
addition to giving legal legitimacy? As we have seen the development discourse has for 
decades worked on strategies to increase participation on different levels and by different 
groups, be it with limited success in practice. It is claimed that human rights-based 
approaches can add value to existing participatory approaches by calling for attention to the 
quality of the participation process.870 I agree that rights-based development can provide a 
commitment to a qualitatively different form of participation so that citizens are facilitated to 
exercise their right to participation in challenging and changing institutions that are important 
for their lives.871  
However, I am less certain that applicable human rights standards can provide a meaningful 
‘participation checklist’ with key issues or preconditions that may need to be taken into 
account.872 The problem with this argument is that human rights instruments and 
interpretations tend to have a rather limited view on popular participation, concentrating more 
on legal norms, judicial institutions and technicalities of elections and less on more direct 
forms of participation. (Donors and international financial institutions have been accused of 
operating with a narrow definition of democracy as multi-party elections which satisfy certain 
formal criteria.873) 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) guarantees the right to take 
part in the conduct of public affairs, to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections, 
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and to have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.874 The 
Human Rights Committee has issued authoritative interpretations that give further guidance to 
the question about participation. The Committee points out that ‘conduct of public affairs’ is a 
“broad concept which relates to the exercise of political power, in particular the exercise of 
legislative, executive and administrative powers.” All aspects of public administration, and 
the formulation and implementation of policy at international, national, regional, and local 
levels are covered.875 What forms participation should take is an issue outside the scope of the 
General Comment. The General Comment mentions ‘direct participation’ once,876 and then 
concentrates in detail on the different aspects of the rights related to elections. It does in fact 
not pay attention to the issue of the quality of participation outside of elections in any other 
way than noticing that “no distinction should be made between citizens as regards their 
participation on the grounds mentioned in article 2, paragraph 1, and no unreasonable 
restrictions should be imposed.”877  
The ‘quality criteria’ for participation that is sometimes claimed to come from human rights 
discourse has its origins in the Declaration on the Right to Development, which includes the 
requirement that participation should be “active, free and meaningful”.878 This criteria is 
included in the Common Understanding that goes along the lines of the Declaration on the 
Right to Development, stating that active, free, and meaningful participation is an entitlement: 
“Every person and all peoples are entitled to active, free and meaningful participation in, 
contribution to, and enjoyment of civil, economic, social, cultural and political development 
in which human rights and fundamental freedoms can be realized.”879 This indicates that the 
UN agencies that are committed to using the Common Understanding as a starting point for 
their work have set the level of ambition high. Participation is an entitlement, and the 
participatory methods that are used should fulfil the ‘active, free and meaningful’ criteria. The 
process is as important as the outcome, which is human rights realisation. However, as we 
will see below, the narrow, legalistic approaches that are common in human rights work 
corresponds uneasily with this ambition.  
The human rights community is not very ‘participatory’  
Lisa VeneKlasen et al. have identified differences between how development-focused 
organisations and human rights-based organisations understand participation and rights. In 
interviews with US based organisations the researchers found that there are diverse 
interpretations of these concepts and the approaches applied to advance them vary 
accordingly.880 Development organisations and social movements have been pioneers in 
approaches to participation. In the early stage of this development, the organisations saw it as 
a means to improve programme design and implementation by using local people’s 
experiences. Gradually, it was seen as a method to build capacity and, more recently, as a way 
to engage in policy change. Until recently, there had been little recognition of the role of 
participation in the work of most human rights organisations. Focus has been on the 
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mechanics of legal and policy strategies. Another common strategy involved gathering 
information from victims of human rights violations. Participation was in this case about 
people providing data as informants. With the establishment of national organisations they 
gained a greater role as informants and partners. Methodologically, many of the international 
as well as local human rights groups have focussed on ‘awareness raising’ concerning laws 
and legal procedures rather than more participatory learning processes of helping people to 
analyse problems and identify solutions that promote rights in a local setting. Rights groups 
often use a discussion of rights as an entry point into communities, instead of starting with 
people’s daily problems while ‘good development practice’ emphasises that it is essential to 
start where people are and build an explicit vision of social change. The narrow, legalistic 
approaches in human rights work have contributed to a ‘crisis’ in rights methodology evident 
in the interviews carried out for the research by VeneKlasen and her colleagues. While 
working with laws and legal systems is critical, it has become clear that the previous 
approaches usually failed to expand the scope of rights or strengthen accountability and 
capacity to deliver resources and justice.881  
Harri Englund has analysed civic education on human rights and democracy carried out by the 
EU funded project National Initiative for Civic Education (NICE) in Malawi. His findings 
exemplify the challenges that human rights awareness raising has brought about in the area of 
participation. NICE was a substantial  project in terms of coverage: its endeavour was to have 
an office in every district and its coverage extended to villages and townships through a 
network of volunteers. This meant that its coverage of the country was virtually equal to, if 
not greater than, the state. People in NICE’s professional staff emphasised their association 
with the ‘grassroots’ but the fact is that NICE was a transnational project that, according to 
Englund “participated in governing Malawi with resources that in many cases exceeded those 
of government departments.”882 Despite the rhetoric of ‘local ownership’ the officers and 
volunteers of NICE created a sense of belonging to en exclusive community of human rights 
experts. Englund analyses the many subtle ways this was done in his book. I will not relate the 
details here but the main conclusion is that there was a distinction between NICE and the 
grassroots.883 NICE was an organisation of quasi-professionals, mostly consisting of young 
people, who were taught to think of themselves as separate from the grassroots. They 
identified with the organisation rather than with the concerns of the grassroots. This was seen 
as imperative from the perspective of sponsors and managers, who could not allow NICE to 
appear to be challenging the prevailing political relationships in the country.884 Despite 
emphasis on ‘participation’ ‘the grassroots’ did not choose what issues were important for 
them, and adjust the organisation’s work accordingly, but it remained an abstract principle, 
serving top-down managerialism.    
Another feature of NICE was its apolitical and nonpartisan nature, which corresponds 
uneasily with participation. NICE held public meetings on five thematic areas: local 
democracy, the environment, food security, gender development, and HIV/AIDS and 
health.885 These themes are all deeply political but NICE managed to relegate politics to a 
sphere that posed no threat to wider power relations. The ‘safe sphere’ was ‘the grassroots’, 
often used as a synonym for ‘the community’. Englund concludes that NICE’s civic education 
defined political problems as if they were reducible to communities, and thereby they made 
the communities themselves the problem. The grassroots/community was asked to assume 
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responsibility for its own development. In the name of ‘participatory methods’, greater input 
to the community’s own development was called for.886 This meant that the people in Malawi 
should learn to work for their development without waiting for the world around them to 
change first.887 This was not unique to NICE’s work in Malawi, but a wider trend in 
development practice. This is an example of ‘either/or’ kind of thinking – concentrating either 
on only the community as if the solution is to be found there OR on the wider policy 
environment as if the solution is in changed laws and policies. Few programmes have 
managed to engage both levels.     
Concluding remarks on participation 
When the starting point is that participation is a democratic right, participation is by the 
people – not something done for them.888 This simple fact is often forgotten in human rights 
work as well as in development programming. When experts are involved, they tend to 
believe that they know what is best for ‘the poor’ and participation becomes consultation or 
superficial involvement in activities.  
In human rights discourse participation is a legal right. Adding this as an argument to 
strengthen popular participation at all levels of decision-making adds to the legal legitimacy 
of participatory approaches in development. However, the argument that human rights-based 
approaches can add value to existing participatory approaches by paying attention to the 
quality of the participation process does not tolerate closer scrutiny. Many serious 
development NGOs that work in partnership with local people have probably given this 
question more thought than any human rights body at the international or national level. The 
‘active, free and meaningful’ criteria, which is included in the Declaration on the Right to 
Development and the Common Understanding has not been given extensive consideration or 
interpretation by the human rights community.   
Since participation is a right, advancing participation in decision-making is an objective in 
itself according to human rights thinking. It is a right to be an active participant in political 
processes, being able to speak up and be listened to by those in power – and that has its own 
value. However, it is also about enabling people to actively draw on their civil and political 
rights in order to achieve something else, often their economic, social and cultural rights.889 In 
this way participation strives for a broader change agenda. 
It is common both among human rights groups and development organisations, who define 
part of their work as participation, to view it as a way to link voice to accountability. The aim 
is thus to ensure that personal and community empowerment has a broader political change 
agenda and impact. The method is to start with identifying people’s needs or problems and 
link them to advocacy strategies designed to influence and hold public power holders 
accountable.890 In this case the aim is to increase participation in the relationship between 
people as citizens and rights-holders and the different power holders such as government 
institutions, donors and corporations that make policy decisions that have great impacts on 
poor peoples’ lives.   
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2.4.7 Empowerment  
Power and empowerment – the cause of confusion?  
The concept of empowerment gained popularity in the 1980s in development discourse, 
particularly among village-level practitioners.891 One can say that empowerment discourse is 
a contribution from the grassroots, and in the early days it came with the message from those 
working at the local level that, despite the rhetoric of participatory development, the power to 
define priorities is in the hands of a minority at the top.892 Today, most development agencies 
claim to work on empowerment of the poor; work that no longer only occurs in close, face-to-
face interactions between local organisations and their constituencies. References to 
empowerment are today found throughout development cooperation policies and 
programmes, and yet definitions are rare. Various attempts have been made, and most of these 
definitions focus on issues of gaining power and control over resources, expanding people’s 
choices and opportunities, and investing them with the capacities and capabilities needed to 
affect change in their lives.893 Most of these definitions, by the UN, the World Bank and 
bilateral donors, reflect the idea that ‘empowerment’ is a liberal concern, trying to enable 
people to make their own choices,894 thereby reclaiming the power over one’s own life.  
VeneKlasen et al. point out that many human rights and development initiatives reflect a 
linear understanding of the notion of power. Effective strategies to address power need to take 
into account both visible forms of power (legislatures, laws and policies that can discriminate 
and undermine rights and participation of certain groups) and hidden forces of power that set 
the political agenda and benefit the privileged sectors of society. When working on 
participation and rights, actors need to acknowledge that the process that often is described as 
empowerment is ultimately about challenging and transforming these types of power relations 
and creating new relationships based on equality. In this process, conditions are created to 
help people expand their capacity and analyse problems and deal with power at all levels.895 
For these reasons this presentation starts with an investigation into the concept of power, and 
then moves on to dealing with the two concepts together.  
Naila Kabeer observes in her work in the early 1990s that empowerment as a concept is 
clearly rooted in the notion of power and powerlessness, or absence of power. Analysis of 
powerlessness was, however, abandoned due to the static connotations and the focus shifted to 
the more processual aspects of power, i.e., empowerment and disempowerment. This is based 
on the insight that those who appear to have little power are still able to resist, to subvert, and 
sometimes to transform the conditions of their lives. However, the question remains what is 
meant by power, and therefore also by empowerment.896 For all these reasons empowerment 
is a highly contested concept. Jo Rowlands points out that the reason for the confusion about 
empowerment is because the root-concept – power – is itself disputed. She argues that it is the 
differences in the way in which power is understood that can help explain the anomaly that 
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people and organisations as far apart politically as feminists, Western politicians and the 
World Bank all have embraced the concept of empowerment.897  
Although going deeply into power discourse and the discussions about the meaning of power 
and powerlessness is beyond the scope of this chapter, I will briefly highlight the main 
differentiations in how power is understood. Many important analyses of power in political 
science, sociology, and philosophy presuppose a definition of power as getting someone else 
to do what you want them to do (‘power over’). Michal Foucault, Max Weber and Robert 
Dahl are examples of influential writers who have worked with this kind of definition, with 
their own nuances of course.898 Steven Lukes’ influential book Power: A Radical View, first 
published in 1974, also follows the power-as-domination path, although introducing a three 
dimensional view on power. Lukes claims that his writing about power is specific: it concerns 
power over others, i.e., power as domination. He defines this kind of power as “the ability to 
constrain the choices of others, coercing them or securing their compliance, by impeding them 
from living as their own nature and judgment dictate.” The question how can we know when 
such power is at work, Lukes answers by encouraging penetration that goes behind 
appearances for the hidden, least visible forms of power. Power is the ability to bring about 
significant outcomes even without active intervention.899  
This view on power as either ‘power to’, i.e., the capacity of an actor to affect the decision-
making patterns and outcomes against the wishes of other actors, or as ‘power over’, i.e., 
implicitly accepted and undisputed procedures within institutions that systematically benefit 
certain individuals and groups at the expense of others,900 has influenced the debates on power 
and empowerment. When power is understood as domination it can be described as ‘zero-
sum’: the more power one person has, the less the other has.901  
There seems to be some mismatch between how the notion ‘power to’ is used by different 
authors. Lukes uses this notion as one aspect of power as domination, while Jo Rowlands 
defines ‘power to’ as “generative power or productive power (sometimes incorporating or 
manifesting as forms of resistance or manipulation) which creates new possibilities and 
actions without domination.” She mentions the example of leadership that comes from the 
wish to see a group achieve what it is capable of. This model of power is not a zero-sum as 
one person’s power does not automatically diminish that of another.902  Many feminists have 
argued for a reconceptualisation of power as capacity or ability, thereby understanding power 
not as ‘power over’ but as ‘power to’ (e.g. transform oneself or others). This is a kind of 
ability to foster transformative and empowering growth.903  
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Rowlands adds the categories ‘power with’ and ‘power from within’ as important for the 
understanding of the process of empowerment. She defines ‘power with’ as “a sense of the 
whole being greater than the sum of the individuals, especially when a group tackles problems 
together”. 904 ‘Power from within’ is creative; it is an affecting and transforming power but 
not a controlling power. It is a positive, life-affirming, and empowering force that stands in 
stark contrast to power understood as domination, control, or imposing one’s will on other 
people.905 ‘Power from within’ has its basis in self-acceptance and self-respect, which implies 
respect for and acceptance of others as equals.906 Empowerment must be understood as 
including both individual conscientisation907 (‘power within’) as well as collective work, 
which lead to politicised ‘power with’ others, which again provides for ‘power to’ bring about 
change.908   
Rowlands points out that when power is defined as the ability of one person or group to get 
another person or group to do something against their will, i.e., ‘power over’, then 
empowerment means bringing people who are outside the decision-making process into it. 
Understandably, this leads to a strong emphasis on participation in political structure and 
formal decision-making as well as on the ability to obtain an income that enables participation 
in the economic sphere.909 The World Bank operates with such understandings of 
empowerment, although also taking into account participation in informal institutions.  
According to the World Bank Sourcebook on empowerment and poverty reduction, 
“empowerment is the expansion of assets and capabilities of poor people to participate in, 
negotiate with, influence, control, and hold accountable institutions that affect their lives.”910 
‘Institutions’ include the state, markets, civil society, and international agencies but also 
informal institutions such as norms of social exclusion, exploitative relations, and corruption. 
Removal of formal and informal institutional barriers that prevent men and women from 
taking action to improve their lives is key to empowerment. People need a range of assets and 
capabilities at the individual level (e.g. health, education, housing) as well as at the collective 
level (such as the ability to organise and mobilise to take action).911 Microenterprise credit 
programmes have been a widely used development intervention that has aimed at improving 
these assets and capabilities, especially for women.  
Attempts to measure empowerment: An example of microenterprise credit for women 
Various studies have been carried out to evaluate whether a development intervention is 
‘empowering’, and for these purposes various indicators of empowerment have been set. For 
example Hashemi et al. used the following indicators to evaluate the empowerment potential 
of women’s participation in credit programmes: mobility; economic security; ability to make 
small purchases; ability to make large purchases; involvement in major decisions; relative 
freedom from domination by the family; political and legal awareness; participation in public 
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protests and political campaigning; and a composite empowerment indicator, meaning that a 
woman was classified as ‘empowered’ if she had a positive score on at least five of the eight 
indicators.912 The analysis found that involvement in credit programmes does empower 
women,913 but that is not what is interesting about this study. What is interesting are the 
indicators used to capture what is meant by ‘empowerment’. An ‘empowered’ woman is 
someone who goes to the market; owns her house or land; makes small purchases without 
asking permission of the husband; makes decisions on issues such as leasing land; is free to 
work outside the home; knows the law governing inheritance; and has protested with others 
on issues such as domestic violence. These are things that women received ‘empowerment 
points’ for in the study.914  
The study seems to suggest that there is a clear line between empowerment and 
disempowerment, and that ‘outside experts’ can draw conclusions about who has reached the 
state of being ‘empowered’. Naila Kabeer makes an important point when she notes that some 
of the indicators used may reflect organisational priorities rather than women’s own, and 
cannot be taken as evidence of real change in power relationships unless they are also valued 
by women themselves as an aspect of their own goals.915 Often empowerment is described as 
either an outcome, which can be measured, as in the case above, or as a process. Although in 
fact, empowerment is both a process and an outcome. Additionally it is a process that is often 
both fluid and unpredictable, making it challenging to measure, which of course does not 
mean researchers should not try.916   
Kabeer has studied a number of evaluations of credit programmes’ impact on empowerment 
of women loanees and she finds that what all these evaluations have in common is the 
absence of the voices of the women themselves telling the evaluators what kinds of impact 
they might value and what aspect of their own subordinated position in the family and society 
they might most want to change. The women had no opportunity to testify on their own behalf 
as to what credit has meant to them.917 The central question is whose perspective should count 
when assessing meanings and significance. Impact has to be assessed in relation to the 
situation before the loan in order to understand what the kinds of changes were made possible 
as a result of the loan.918 The women themselves are the best experts on their own situation 
before and after the loan, and they can give meaning and significance to the changes they 
experience.  
In order to explore what the women’s own vantage point can add to our understanding of the 
empowerment potential of the loans given, Kabeer made a participatory impact assessment of 
a credit programme in Bangladesh.919 Many of the women interviewed gave witness of 
improvements in their lives as a result of greater economic and personal autonomy that access 
to credit has allowed them to achieve. Many of the changes reported in Kabeer’s study are 
also reported in outsider evaluations of the impact of loans, such as reduction in domestic 
violence, increased decision-making and greater choice in household resource allocation. 
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What is stressed the most in Kabeer’s study, was the women’s own sense of enhanced self-
worth as economic actors. Her study reveals that one of the most important impacts is related 
to women’s enhanced sense of self-worth, of bringing something of value to their 
households.920 This internal aspect of empowerment was not captured in the evaluations in 
which women’s own experiences where not listened to. 
Furthermore, women did not attach as much value to individualised forms of control over 
resources as some ‘outside’ evaluations of credit schemes claimed that they do, or ‘should 
do’. The ability to participate in joint decision-making about how loans were used and how 
the income from loans were to be used mattered more to the women interviewed. Lending did 
contribute to a greater voice in household decision-making processes.921 Naturally, the aim of 
any empowerment strategy should be to participate with greater strength in decision-making 
and actually influence such decisions,922 but this does not have to be at the expense of other 
decision-makers. All of this indicates that empowerment is more nuanced when the starting 
point is ‘power to’ and ‘power with’ instead of ‘power over’.   
Rowlands points out that when power is given a generative meaning, ‘power to’ and ‘power 
with’, empowerment is concerned with the processes in which people become aware of their 
own interests and how those relate to the interest of others.923 Power is not about domination 
and the power of others is not diminished once you get more power. It is a power that 
contributes, rather than takes away, a power that strengthens rather than weakens.924  
Rowlands distinguishes between three dimensions of empowerment: personal, relational, and 
collective. Personal empowerment means “developing a sense of self and individual 
confidence and capacity, and undoing the effects of internalised oppression.” (Compare to the 
Kabeer study in which one of the most important impacts was related to women’s enhanced 
sense of self-worth, of bringing something of value to their households.) Relational 
empowerment is experienced when one develops the “ability to negotiate and influence the 
nature of a relationship and decisions made within it.” (Compare to the fact that lending did 
contribute to a greater voice in household decision-making processes for women.) Collective 
empowerment is demonstrated where individuals work in a group to achieve a more extensive 
impact.925 This is often very important in work where women work as a group on finding 
solutions to common problems. While collective aspects of empowerment are important, it 
should not be forgotten that women always act as individuals, and there is no reason to expect 
women, even from the same class or caste, to respond identically to new opportunities. It is 
not possible to plan an intervention which will be automatically empowering to all women. 
What a good intervention can do is to create an environment or provide resources which are 
most likely to enable as many women as possible to empower themselves.926   
Kabeer raises the issue that empowerment is often conceptualised unidimensionally so that it 
is assumed that if women are not found to be empowered by one indicator, they must be 
disempowered. Instead empowerment can be seen as “an expansion in the range of potential 
choices available to women so that actual outcomes reflect the particular set of choices which 
the women in question value”.927 The important point is that it is an expansion of choices 
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which the woman in question values. This is the central thinking in Amartya Sen’s capability 
approach, where individual advantages are judged by a person’s capability to do things he or 
she has reason to value. The focus is on the freedom that a person has to do things that he or 
she may value doing or being. The capability approach should be judged in terms of 
individual opportunity rather than a specific ‘design’ as to how a society should be organised. 
Sen points out that as the capability perspective does point to the central relevance of 
inequality of capabilities in the assessment of social disparities, it does not, on its own, 
propose any specific formula for policy decisions.928 Therefore, we should keep in mind that 
Sen’s work on capabilities is only a source of inspiration for the empowerment discourse, and 
there are no clear answers how these notions should be operationalised into practice in 
development policies or otherwise.  
Based on her study, Kabeer draws some broader lessons regarding empowerment and how to 
evaluate interventions that claim to empower people. Her first point is that ‘empowerment’ is 
a multidimensional process of change that cannot be reduced to any single aspect of process 
or outcome.929 In her book from 1994 Kabeer also highlighted the multidimensional nature of 
power and suggested that empowerment strategies of women must build on ‘the power 
within’ as the basis for improving their ability to control resources, to set agendas and make 
decisions.930 Strategies of ‘empowerment from within’ provide women with new perspectives 
as they are able to review their lives from other vantage points. Reflection, analysis and 
assessment of what has been taken for granted uncovers socially constructed and socially 
shared basis of apparently individual problems. Moreover, new forms of consciousness can 
arise out of women’s new access to analytical skills, social networks, organisational strength, 
and a sense of not being alone.931  
Empowerment is not something done to people, but rather it is a participatory process that 
engages people in reflection, inquiry, and action.932 Development cooperation initiatives 
cannot ‘empower women’ but instead programmes can help to create the conditions whereby 
women can become “agents of their own development and empowerment”.933 Institutions, 
including international agencies, can support processes that increase women’s self-reliance, 
building self-confidence, solving problems, gaining skills, and help them set their own 
agendas.934  
Are human rights empowering?  
The Common Understanding does not include empowerment in the list of human rights 
principles. Yet, empowerment is often included as an important element of human rights-
based approaches to development. The question is what human rights add to the ‘good 
development discourse’ on empowerment? Are human rights empowering? This question is 
far too great to be answered here and it reappears throughout the thesis. First of all, I will not 
attempt to answer the question whether the practice of human rights has empowering 
outcomes, i.e., are the results from struggles over rights empowering? I will instead focus on 
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the question of whether human rights discourse and language is empowering or 
disempowering from the perspective of marginalised rights-holders. My focus is thereby more 
on the processual aspects of empowerment.  
It is a fact that human rights discourse has captured the attention of people around the world 
in a way that few other discourses have done. Likewise, it is a fact that an enormous global 
phenomenon has emerged on human rights.935 Human rights thereby play a political role, 
empowering the individual and limiting the power of the sovereign, but we should keep in 
mind that they are foremost a rights discourse rooted in the legal tradition.936 Whether this is a 
strength or a weakness can be debated and different actors have their own opinions about this. 
With regard to the empowerment potential of human rights, one can first of all note that the 
establishment of human rights as a legal structure is one aspect, and the possibilities to use 
this structure to expand possibilities is another. When there are legal norms to protect human 
rights of individuals in a society this is naturally a good starting point for empowerment 
defined by Kabeer as “an expansion in the range of potential choices available”. However, 
we should not forget the other half of the definition “so that actual outcomes reflect the 
particular set of choices which the women [or men] in question value”,937 which indicates the 
importance of whose perspective counts in empowerment processes. Human rights must be 
valued as important and relevant in the daily lives of marginalised people in order for them to 
become relevant, as a language used against oppression, and as tools used to improve the 
quality of peoples’ lives.  
Concerning the human rights language associated with human rights discourse, Charles R. 
Beitz observes that “the language of human rights has become the common idiom of social 
criticism in global politics”.938 Human rights have called forth an advocacy revolution in the 
form of the emergence of a network of non-governmental organisations to pressure states to 
practice what they preach. Human rights have thus given witnesses and bystanders a stake in 
abuse and oppression both within and beyond the national borders.939  
Hugo Slim sees empowering potential as the language of rights enters international 
development. The same people who used to be seen as ‘needy’ or ‘beneficiaries’ can now 
present themselves as rightful and dignified people who “can make just demands of power 
and spell out the duties of power in terms of moral and political goods.” These people move 
from being objects to being subjects of their own free speech.940 Indeed it is easy to agree that 
it is more empowering to be a claimant of rights than an object of a more or less arbitrary 
charity. At the same time, we should be aware that the language of human rights has many 
limitations. First of all, the language of human rights is not only spoken by the oppressed but 
also by the powerful, by the very same governments, inter-governmental organisations and 
government agencies that are criticised for oppressive policies. Human rights language has 
become ‘mainstreamed’ into policy frameworks of states, multilateral lending institutions and 
the UN.941 Similarly, it can be observed that from one aspect codified human rights legitimate 
the power of states; and from another they are also the means to challenge this power.942 
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Moreover, we must keep in mind that although there are analogies to human rights ideas in 
various cultural traditions, the particular form that they have taken in the human rights 
movement have post-Enlightenment, rationalist, secular, Western, modern and capitalist 
origins.943 When combined with the unequal relationships between the West and everyone 
else, and the fact that human rights criticism has been an overwhelmingly one-way street,944 it 
is clear that the language of human rights can be perceived as disempowering for many people 
and groups in the so called developing world.  
Human rights education 
The language of human rights has been preached to a great extent as part of ‘awareness 
raising’, in the belief that if people only know that they have human rights, they will start 
claiming them. Miia Halme observes in her doctoral dissertation that one characteristic of the 
human rights phenomenon is the radical and transformative potential of human rights 
discourse; “adherence to the human rights discourse has come to mark the abandoning of old 
ideologies and embracing of new ways of thinking.” This discourse promises to challenge old 
structures of oppression and, in the name of the equal worth of all, to liberate the individual 
from them. One of the dominant tools used to realise these desires is commonly construed as 
human rights education, making the individuals conscious of oppression and empowering 
them.945  
The objective of human rights education is said to include not only a learning process about 
human rights and mechanisms for their protection, but also skills to apply them. Developing 
values, attitudes, and behaviour which reinforce human rights is another element of human 
rights education, and so is taking action to defend and promote them.946 According to Garth 
Meintjes human rights education should lead to a process of acquiring the knowledge and 
critical awareness needed to understand and question oppressive patterns of social, political, 
and economic organisation. Therefore, human rights education is often claimed to be 
empowering. The idea of human rights education as empowerment, however, demands 
pedagogical skills that differ in terms of objectives and methods from other areas of 
conventionally defined education. Meintjes claims that the danger is that while the rhetoric of 
empowerment is increasingly accepted, the ends and means remain those of conventional 
education.947  
This is probably what happened in the NICE project in Malawi that we reviewed in the 
section on participation. NICE is, however, not the only example of educational activities on 
human rights failing to employ pedagogical methods that are empowering. In her analysis of 
certain educational activities of a Nordic and Scandinavian network of human rights experts, 
Halme asks “whether its educational mode provides students with increasing control or 
mastery over their own lives with which to challenge oppressive structures”,948 (central 
elements of empowerment) and she assesses how the education activities can be seen as 
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contributing to the goal of empowering participants.949 Halme concludes that learning is 
construed as the adoption of necessary information ‘dispensed’ by authorities to those who are 
to receive it, and the outcome of the learning process is static – instead of empowering 
students to become conscious of their own participation in the creation of knowledge.950 Her 
conclusion is that the learning process is static instead of empowering, and participants are 
held in predetermined positions. There is strict separation between faculty participants who 
hold ‘knowledge’ and students who benefit from this knowledge.951  
As we have seen, Englund has made similar observations concerning ‘civic education’ 
activities on the subject of human rights and democratisation in Malawi. He views human 
rights discourse in Malawi as a disempowering discourse, characterised by elitism, and he 
calls it a “thinly veiled patronizing approach that enabled self-proclaimed experts to discount 
popular responses to their interventions.”952  
Halme and Englund both come to similar conclusions: human rights education, as it has been 
provided in their respective case studies, has missed opportunities to empower participants. 
Both see human rights education as hierarchical and non-participatory. Challenging 
oppressive structures is not taking place and instead the teachers or ‘facilitators’ are placed 
within exciting hierarchies.953 Naturally, there are great differences between human rights 
education in a Nordic setting, at a university level, and civic education carried out in rural 
Malawi. However, it seems that the approaches used are not far apart, both seeing the process 
of enhancing knowledge as linear, flowing from the teacher to the student. According to Paulo 
Freire education should begin with resolving the teacher-student contradiction so that both are 
simultaneously teachers and students. This approach is not found in conventional, ‘banking’ 
education.954  
One reason that human rights education has challenges in being empowering is perhaps the 
strong discourse of ‘expert knowledge’ prevalent in human rights discourse. The concept of 
human rights is seen as ready-defined, by experts. Empowerment is hard to reach if ‘students’ 
are seen as only the receivers of ready-defined concepts, instead of partners in a process 
where the human rights concept itself is critically analysed. It is necessary to contextualise 
and give meaning to human rights so that they are understood in the context of people’s lived 
experience. People may have the experience of denial of the right to health care or freedom of 
expression. In a ‘human rights from below’ approach, the facilitators start from people’s 
personal stories, hopes, disappointments, pain and experience of oppression – not from a 
remote ‘universal declaration’ or bill of rights. There can still be reference to such documents 
“but only in the sense that they represent specific attempts to articulate humanity in particular 
contexts and at particular times”. They are not ‘the holy writ’. Instead they can be examined 
from the perspective of the actors’ reality.955 
Perhaps it should not be surprising that human rights education has challenges to be 
empowering as the whole idea about empowerment is fairly new to human rights discourse 
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and has been invented by other discourses, such as that of alternative development956 and 
pedagogy.957  
This short analysis highlights the tensions and paradoxes between the ambition of human 
rights and the actual practices that are trying to translate the principles into reality on the 
ground. In theory, human rights can be very empowering – in practice reality is more 
complicated and complex.  
Human rights-based empowerment  
Power has the ability to prevent people’s participation and the fulfilment of their rights, and 
therefore questions of power and empowerment are central for human rights-based work.958 
Darrow and Tomas suggest that human rights do add value to good programming since they 
imply dignity and respect for the inherent worth of the individual, an argument which is based 
on the universal character of human rights. They use the same definition of empowerment as 
the World Bank in its Sourcebook, only adding that empowerment means increasing the 
capacities of people to claim and exercise their rights effectively. (This kind of rights 
language is not used by the World Bank.) In order to support empowerment, it is held that 
programme priorities should be in the area of education and access to information; strategies 
for inclusion and participation in decision-making; accountability of state officials; and 
building of local organisational capacity.959  
Hans-Otto Sano has observed that the practice of rights-based empowerment include activities 
for rights-holder mobilisation, civil society participation, and advocacy strategies that include 
campaigns and litigation. This results in processes of knowledge enhancement and learning, 
in organisational development and capacity building, in the creation of new channels of 
interaction, and also in direct actions of rights-realisation.960  
This highlights the formal and external aspects of creating an environment in which people 
can empower themselves. Emphasis in human rights-based empowerment is on enhancing 
people’s ability to claim and exercise their rights effectively.961 (This is an important feature 
of the Common Understanding despite the fact that the word ‘empowerment’ is not used in 
this context.) There is no questioning whether people value expanding their skills and choices 
when claiming and exercising their rights.  
As in the discourse and practice around human rights-based approaches to development 
assistance in general, the discourse around empowerment is also diverse. While some 
agencies see rights as a means of addressing issues of accountability of duty-holders, others 
put rights into the context of enabling people to empower themselves to overcome obstacles 
to the realisation of social and economic rights. Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi critically 
observe that CARE’s work in Kenya is an example of the latter, where ‘empowerment’ has 
meant ‘opting-out’ of public services rather than making demands on the state as a duty-
holder.962 Just as ‘participation’ can be (mis)used to give communities an increasing role in 
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co-production and self-provisioning of many services,963 and thereby giving rights-holders 
many functions that, according to human rights instruments, should belong to the state, so can 
‘empowerment’ be used as a strategy to increase self-reliance instead of making demands on 
duty-holders.  
Another strategy for empowerment is to work alongside poor people as advocates, and 
thereby increase the capacity of citizens to claim their rights.964 Ideally, human rights work 
combines a local perspective with a national and global perspective. In development practice, 
empowerment is mostly associated with the local level. Jane Parpart et al. point out that 
empowerment cannot be understood only at the local level but requires attention to the 
“specific historical struggles of women and men within structures and discourses of power 
operating at micro-, meso- and macro-levels.”965  
There can be misunderstandings when the slogan ‘people cannot be empowered, only 
empower themselves’, which is an important insight, is translated into human rights-based 
work. People can empower themselves to make demands on duty-holders. Rights-based 
empowerment does not mean people start building the school on their own (or whatever 
demand it is they have). When mobilisation for human rights is on the agenda, empowerment 
does not automatically lead to increased self-reliance. Instead people start to make demands 
on the duty-holders to respect, protect, and fulfil their rights. If this process can be called 
‘empowerment’ can and should be debated. The issues at stake are especially who sets the 
agenda, who decides what issue to mobilise around, and what happens in the process of 
translating people’s daily challenges into human rights language.  
VeneKlasen points out that when working on participation and rights, organisations need to 
acknowledge that the process that often is described as empowerment is ultimately about 
challenging and transforming these types of power relations and creating new relationships 
based on equality. In this process, conditions are created to help people expand their capacity 
and analyse problems and deal with power at all levels.966 Considering that human rights 
discourse, and human rights education in particular, is often characterised by elitism and static 
learning models, this kind of work needs to start with the human rights organisations 
themselves.       
Concluding remarks on empowerment 
As pointed out by Kabeer, empowerment is a multidimensional process of change that cannot 
be reduced to one aspect, such as human rights. The human rights-based definition of 
empowerment, suggested by Darrow and Tomas, i.e., “increasing the capacities of people to 
claim and exercise their rights effectively”, is too narrow. Human rights can play a role in 
empowerment processes but the willingness to use human rights as tools to expand 
possibilities must come from within the individual or group, especially considering that 
human rights discourse is associated with elite capture in many countries of the South. 
Following on from the thinking by Kabeer and Sen, individuals must have reason to value the 
actual outcome that can be achieved through asserting human rights.  
As human rights traditionally have been seen as safeguards against power, and power in this 
case means ‘power over’, it is natural that human rights discourse has focussed on meanings 
of empowerment that use this kind of definition of power as the starting point. Human rights-
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based empowerment strategies then naturally focus on access to information, education, 
bringing people outside of decision-making into it, accountability of state-officials, advocacy 
strategies that include campaigns and litigation. There is less focus on ‘empowerment from 
within’ which would provide people with possibilities to analyse and review their lives from 
new perspectives. As far as I know there has not been any research on what role a human 
rights perspective could possibly add to this kind of analysis, reflection, and assessment. Both 
aspects of empowerment are important. If empowerment is to go beyond rhetoric to action, 
economic and political power to use legislation, having access to institutions and resources is 
a key issue, especially for women.  
It is clear that the process of empowerment has both an internal and external aspect; it 
includes inner reflection about one’s own inherent worth and ability as a human being as well 
as outer reflection and action challenging and transforming ridged relationships. For example, 
women’s empowerment cannot come in the same language as has been infused by values of 
patriarchy. Empowerment has to come from a place within. The fact that someone learns that 
he or she has human rights just because he or she was born human, does not necessarily 
change this individual’s sense of self-worth. In addition, inner reflection and transformation is 
needed. ‘Power with’ others through collective action and politics is often a force that has 
transformative capacity, leading to processes and outcomes that are valued as empowering by 
the participants themselves.  
The purpose of reviewing some of the critical accounts made of human rights discourse, 
especially human rights education, as disempowering is to remind us that challenging old 
structures of oppression seldom occurs in a neatly organised fashion, from comfortable seats 
in a class room. Learning about human rights does not automatically lead to empowerment, or 
to taking actions to achieve change and address oppression. Change is a messy process, as 
most organisations involved in rights-based empowerment have learned. Moreover, it is clear 
that the role of human rights in processes of change can be static and disempowering or 
‘alive’, claimed in the moment, and empowering. The context and the process matter and 
often there is a fine line between empowerment and disempowerment. We should also keep in 
mind that just because there are instances of human rights discourse failing to live up its own 
ambitions to achieve change, this does not mean that human rights should be abandoned as a 
source of inspiration that can inform struggles against oppression. 
2.4.8 Concluding remarks on human rights principles  
This chapter has tried to give an overview over diverging concepts and interpretations. It has 
also posed critical questions concerning the added value of human rights principles in 
development, and whether human rights discourse contributes to empowerment. 
One of the overall questions in this thesis is what role human rights (as standards, as 
principles, as a language) play in development practice, and whether they have transformative 
potential. The answer to this question always depends on the context – and in order to 
understand the context it is important to understand how the actors involved in shaping this 
context define and apply so called human rights principles. Participation, accountability, and 
empowerment can be used as labels in a technocratic, ‘from above’ fashion that leaves little 
room for deeper structural change or these principles can give people opportunities to 
challenge structures that are hindering their human rights realisation, leading to personal and 
political transformation.  
It is important to be aware of the different forms that the various so called human rights 
principles can take in development cooperation and otherwise. This is especially true 
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concerning accountability, participation, and empowerment which have strong foundations in 
other disciplines and discourses outside of the normative human rights tradition. Once we 
know something about how the principles in question have been interpreted and applied in 
‘good development practice’ it is easier to be clear about the link they have to human rights.  
It is not always possible to see a clear distinction between good development principles using 
instrumental or utilitarian motivations and normatively-based human rights approaches seeing 
human rights as ends in themselves (a distinction made by Darrow and Tomas). Development 
practice is far too complex to allow this kind of comparison, and the role human rights in 
general and human rights principles in particular play in this field is very diverse. Again, we 
must keep in mind that there is not one human rights-based approach to development but 
many approaches with different working methods and overall motivations for their work. A 
general distinction seems to be between an ‘empowerment model’ to human rights and 
development and a more legalistic approach concerning the role of human rights standards in 
development practice. The latter is driven by the conviction that human rights are ends in 
themselves while the former strives for broader and deeper social and political change, also 
questioning the human rights concept itself. Human rights and the principles of participation, 
accountability, and empowerment are means to achieving this wider agenda.  
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PART III  THE ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN FOOD SECURITY 
EFFORTS IN MALAWI: CHARITY-BASED, RIGHTS-
BASED AND LEGAL APPROACHES 
3.1 Human rights discourses in Malawi: Giving meaning to ‘human rights’  
In this chapter I discuss human rights discourse in Malawi and how the concept of ‘human 
rights’ has been used and interpreted by local actors. In Malawi there is a struggle between 
what Merry calls “the generalizing strategies for transnational actors and the particularistic 
techniques of activists working within local contexts”.967 There are no easy answers for 
solving these struggles, but I do think it is time to strengthen the local voices that are experts 
on the contexts within which they live and work.  
However, during my field research I was shocked by the paternalistic attitudes the urban elite 
had towards rural Malawians. There was very little solidarity or commitment to making 
changes in social justice. Englund points out that lack of commitment to social justice is partly 
explained by the relative absence of radical ideologies among the intelligentsia.968 Whether 
human rights have the potential to become a radical ideology that would challenge the status 
quo remains to be seen.   
3.1.1 Second liberation: Commitment to a multiparty democracy, human rights, and a 
market economy 
“The issue of human rights is a new thing to Malawi. And sometimes it brings a 
lot of confusion, fears, it’s natural.”969 
In the following I will give a brief overview of the historic developments behind a formal 
commitment to human rights and multiparty democracy. This overview of the Malawian 
human rights discourse focuses on a limited time period, starting from the ‘second liberation’ 
in the early 1990s to 2006 when I conducted my field research.  
Malawi was ruled by one of the most repressive regimes in Africa after independence in 1964. 
Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda had established an autocratic leadership system, making himself 
the undisputable leader. Despite brutal violations of human rights, Banda was generously 
supported with Western aid during the cold war because of his strict anti-communist stance. 
Around 1991, pressure groups against Banda were founded and in 1992 Banda saw no other 
way than to call for a referendum on the question of whether a multiparty system of 
government should be introduced or not.970  
Neither of the two largest churches had been known for being critical of the Banda regime. 
However, through personal contact between opposition activists and the Catholic Bishops, the 
Catholic clergy was approached and a Pastoral Letter was read in Catholic churches 
throughout the country in 1992, publicly criticising the regime for its poor human rights 
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record, lack of democratic rights,971 and Malawi’s ‘climate of mistrust and fear’.972 This was 
mentioned often by my informants as an important mile stone in the Malawian human rights 
movement.  
In a referendum held on 14 June 1993, two-thirds of Malawians voted for a multiparty 
democracy. The Banda regime did not concede defeat but the momentum behind the 
democratic movement was stronger than Banda had calculated. Two weeks later the Malawi 
Parliament, which had been restricted to the ruling Malawi Congress Party (MCP) for 29 
years, repealed Section 4 of the Constitution to allow opposition parties. A National 
Consultative Council and a National Executive Council were set up to examine  the 
Constitution and the electoral process. Opposition groups and the Malawi Law Society made 
requests for assistance from international legal experts on constitutional law, the electoral 
process and a Bill of Rights, and to advise on constitutional and legal reform.973  
Amnesty International called for human rights guarantees in the Constitution to “provide the 
framework for the institutionalization of human rights safeguards”, based on relevant 
international and regional human rights standards,974 and consequently a democratic 
constitution was drafted within a few months, with considerable input from foreign experts.975 
The international community had become interested in human rights and good governance 
rather than simply anti-communism976 and the democratisation process was encouraged by 
Western donors, but this only partly explains why Banda accepted the democratic transition, 
which was carried out in a reasonably peaceful way. Other factors such as age and illness of 
the president as well as the military’s unwillingness to participate in repressive actions against 
the opposition movements were also important.977  
The 1994 elections were won by the United Democratic Front (UDF) and Bakili Muluzu, a 
former servant of the old regime, was elected president.978 There was no doubt that both in the 
1993 referendum and in the General Elections of 1994 Malawians voted for change. However, 
it was far from clear what this change would involve other than the replacement of Banda and 
his loyalists. The fundamental socio-economic structures remained tightly in place, the 
politics of patronage continued and attempts to address massive poverty remained at the level 
of rhetoric.979  
The 1999 elections were again won by the UDF,980 led by President Muluzi. Five years later 
there was an outcry among civil society at Muluzi’s attempt to stand for an unconstitutional 
third term,981 and finally the 2004 Presidential election was won by Bingu wa Mutharika, as 
the candidate of the UDF. Mutharika was handpicked by Muluzi, who hoped he would follow 
his directives. In early 2005, Mutharika announced he was leaving the UDF and forming a 
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new party called the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).982 The formal commitment to 
human rights, made by the new government, seemed to soothe the donors’ anxieties 
concerning the level of Malawi’s democratic reform.983 Food security became one of 
Mutharika’s priorities, and policies in favour of smallholder famers, such as input subsidies, 
made him popular.984  
At the time of my field research, at the end of 2006, human rights were very much part of an 
official discourse. Human rights were referred to in newspapers, on the radio, in public 
speeches by politicians and by government officials whom I interviewed. I share Englund’s 
observation that the values of multiparty democracy, human rights, and a market economy are 
seemingly shared values. What all political parties in Malawi share since the transition to 
multiparty system of government, is commitment to liberalism in both politics and the 
economy. What distinguishes the parties is their regional base of popular support.985  
3.1.2 ‘Freedom’ discourse 
There seems to be agreement that the major difference between the old and new eras is the 
greater extent of ‘freedom’ – ufulu.986 Ufulu is Chichewa, which is the sole national language 
of Malawi and one of seven national languages of Zambia and has been offered as a 
translation of ‘human rights’.987 For local human rights discourse it is problematic that the 
entire human rights discourse has been embodied in the European linguistic idiom. Going 
deeply into the question of the role of imperial languages in the promotion of human rights 
awareness in Africa988 in general and Malawi in particular is, however, beyond the scope of 
this chapter. It is sufficient to know that ufulu underlines freedoms rather than entitlements.  
A longer version is ufulu wachibadwidwe, in which ufulu refers to ‘freedom’, ‘liberty’, and 
‘independence’ while the adjectival wachibadwidwe, using the verb kubadwa which means 
‘to be born’, and thereby hinges on the individual’s birth right. Englund refers to a Malawian 
linguist, Pascal Kishindo, who has suggested that ufulu wachibadwidwe is actually a new 
coinage.989 Nevertheless, ufulu was used by most human rights actors in Malawi and also by 
researchers describing human rights discourse in the country. I have, however, not found any 
research on the origin of the ufulu concept. Englund has, during extensive periods of field 
research in Malawi and Zambia, not been able to trace the authorship of ufulu.990 Orally I 
have been informed by Malawians that mfulu actually is a more accurate description of the 
human rights idea, and is seen as something that has been part of Malawian culture long 
before the ‘second liberation’.991 The fact that the name of the Malawi Human Rights 
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Commission Bulletin is Mfulu shows that these terms are used in parallel, but with ufulu being 
more dominant. 
Many Malawians also use ufulu to describe liberalism ‘gone wild’, characterised by disrespect 
by youths against elders, immoral dress code, disobedience and political disunity.992 One of 
Thoko Kaime’s informants relates this to the individual focus of, in this case, children’s 
rights:  
These freedoms that children are said to have nowadays are good but sometimes 
they cause problems. The unity and peace that was in the family is now gone and 
parents have no freedom any more... According to our culture everyone should be 
similarly treated.993  
Such accounts seem to indicate that there has been little discussion about the content of the 
human rights concept itself and how that fits into the lived reality of Malawian children, 
women, and men. Englund makes the argument that the notions of rights and freedoms have 
come to be defined in a particular way in Malawi, steered by foreign donors and 
creditors,994 that is, ‘from above’. One example of donor influence is the Malawi Human 
Rights Resource Centre (MHRRC), established in 1997 by the Danish Centre for Human 
Rights as a project with the “objective to strengthen the implementation of human rights 
standards in Malawi.”995 Although the MHRRC consisted exclusively of Malawian staff 
members, and seen as an obvious advantage by the funding Centre, concern was raised in an 
early evaluation report that “a ‘Malawi way’ of doing things is acceptable only when it is in 
line with international norms and standards. It becomes the ‘wrong’ way, however, when it 
is not.”996  
According to this line of reasoning, localised human rights discourses should be in line with 
how human rights are defined in international legal documents and there should be no room 
for too much vernaculisation. On this issue we should, however, be careful in drawing 
conclusions. It is clear that local activists, politicians, journalists and, religious leaders have 
eagerly participated in the process of giving meaning to the ‘human rights talk’ in Malawi, 
and it would be an oversimplification to say that human rights represent a Northern 
agenda.997 Rather, human rights discourse has been dominated by elites that have close 
connections to donor representatives. (Regarding the role of donors, there is also the 
perspective that was presented in some of my interviews with local human rights activists 
that foreign donors have avoided rights talk and been more comfortable in ‘welfare 
issues’.998)  
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However, looking at the legal framework and official discourse, human rights have been 
defined in a rather narrow way in Malawi, with the primary focus on so called civil and 
political rights. One of my informants explains:  
The reception of human rights here after democratization was clearly a transition 
first and foremost for political and civil rights. The excitement was on the 
freedoms rather, … freedom of speech, association, to participate in politics, to 
vote, to be voted into office, that was what the Malawians accepted that these are 
the rights. Economic, social and cultural rights have somehow been a bit hidden, 
they are there, we can talk about them but they are not as exposed as civil and 
political rights. So when we go to the people and we ask which rights are you 
concerned about they talk of those freedoms. Maybe because they were the rights 
that were more suppressed during the authoritarian regime because it was very 
strong on political participation, it tried its best to shot people out. Maybe that’s 
why we are now in this stage, when we talk of economic, social and cultural 
rights, do people appreciate and understand them?999  
There has been efforts by certain NGOs and the Malawi Human Rights Commission to 
include economic, social, and cultural rights in human rights discourse,1000 but also in the 
context of these rights, focus has been on the ‘freedom side’ rather than the ‘entitlement side’. 
To exemplify how a narrow understanding of rights as ‘freedoms’ has come to dominate 
human rights discourse, Englund has analysed translations of human rights instruments from 
English to Chichewa, the main local language in Malawi. That the Chichewa translation of 
human rights as ‘birth freedoms’ (ufulu wachibadwidwe)1001 does not commit itself to the 
entitlement aspect of human rights is particularly revealing in the case of economic and social 
rights. The English translation of the Chichewa version of Article 22 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) reads as follows:  
Everyone has the freedom to get assistance from the state when well-being is 
undermined in accordance with the extent to which the state can assist, as well as 
the freedom of economic activity and of what helps him/her to foster respect, 
development in life and his/her humanity.1002  
When compared with the original version of Article 22,1003 it is obvious that there is a 
mismatch. Englund goes further and says that the translation fails to convey any “empowering 
notion that could be deployed to challenge social and economic inequalities.”1004 Since few 
Malawians have the opportunity to compare the texts they are given by civic educators with 
the original, human rights discourse risks becoming an “alienating novelty and a 
disempowering discourse.”1005 Through civic education and other human rights and 
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democratisation projects, well-meaning human rights groups used the notions of freedom, 
democracy and human rights to confine the scope of what could be discussed.1006 This is 
characteristic of a human rights discourse that, in the words of Jim Ife, defines rights for ‘the 
powerless by the powerful’,1007 and where there is little input ‘from below’ since the agenda 
has been set ‘from above’.  
Englund’s critique of the human rights civil society in Malawi (as an elite movement 
upholding the status quo and current power relationships in a manner that is depoliticising 
human rights) has to be taken seriously, not the least because his findings are based on years 
of ethnographic fieldwork and command of Chichewa.1008       
3.1.3 Local reactions to official human rights discourses 
Ulrika Ribohn, another ethnographer, who has studied the changes that the ‘freedom 
discourse’ has brought about in Malawi, observes that during the Banda era relations between 
categories of men and women, and political institutions were defined in ‘traditional’ terms, 
stressing ‘traditional’ institutions. This has been redefined as the UDF government and 
official human rights discourses having defined traditional ‘culture’ as violating human 
rights.1009 However, people react against attempts to portray their ‘culture’ in these terms 
(violator/violated). Ribohn has studied how ordinary Malawians continue to seek dignity and 
respect through “culturally salient notions of what it entails to be a “good man” or a “good 
woman”’. Her research shows how local values are excluded when human rights are 
positioned in opposition to ‘traditions’.1010 Official arguments are interpreted locally as 
attempts to change ‘culture’ in a top-down manner.1011  
Ribohn’s starting point is that Malawians’ understanding of human rights is rather different 
from the universal intentions of the United Nations. She sees a clash between the local 
“manifestations of transnational agendas” and local reactions to these agendas. This clash is 
particularly strong in relation to cultural values and women’s rights. The official human rights 
discourses used by government organisations and so called civil society argue that cultural 
values have to change in favour of human rights implementation.1012  My argument is that this 
is what happens when human rights rhetoric is imposed from above, as ready-made concepts 
defined by transnational legal documents and actors, without a meaningful dialogue about the 
human rights concept itself.  
Thoko Kaime, who has also done ethnographic research in Malawi, portrays a nuanced 
picture of human rights principles, such as non-discrimination, in action in the lives of 
children and adults in two villages in Thyolo district.1013 He finds that the principles of the 
African Children’s Charter are not only based on children’s rights discourse but also on “an 
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eclectic mix of cultural, religious and spiritual agreements. Consequently, non-discrimination 
perspectives are not the preserve of ‘ajenda’ or human rights advocates alone but also that of 
ordinary people who claim no special knowledge of children’s rights.”1014 Kaime underlines 
the importance of “existing cultural logics and categories in the acceptance or rejection [...] of 
introducing ‘new’ principles”. Kaime’s research suggests that people seek ways of 
“combining their conceptions of family practice and children’s rights norms”, and in this 
process, “they not only redefine their cultural landscape but also redefine the international 
children’s rights corpus itself.” He advises to not essentalise “culture or children’s rights as 
constituting strict categories”. Instead he calls for practices in which children’s rights are not 
formulated as abstract forms but located in “specific, concrete experiences derived from the 
lives of children and their families.”1015 Ribohn’s research suggests that ‘culture’ has been 
given a static and essentialised meaning by authorities and villagers in Malawi,1016 and maybe 
that is why there seems to be such a sharp clash between ‘culture’ and official human rights 
discourses. Kaime’s research suggests that there does not need to be a clash between these 
two worlds if only mutual redefinition is allowed and accepted.  
3.1.4 Civic education 
The main method of introducing international human rights into the consciousness of 
Malawians has been awareness raising and human rights education. The assumption has been 
that if people only knew their rights they would start claiming them.1017 So called civic 
education has been seen as a way to “enlightening ordinary men and women about their 
rights, responsibilities and duties in relation to their government, with special emphasis on 
their rights and freedoms vis-à-vis government authority and power.”1018 In practice, it has 
been NGOs rather than government institutions that have carried out civic education 
activities.1019  
In 1994, Amnesty International reported that “human rights activists are launching a human 
rights training program for Malawi with a symposium”, organised by the Malawi Public 
Affairs Committee and funded by AI. Participants included religious leaders, human rights 
groups, and lawyers. The symposium was a first step towards a national training workshop for 
human rights educators.1020 The strong focus on human rights education has later been 
criticised for having had limited impact also from within the civil society human rights 
movement itself: “All what the NGOs have done is to preach the language of rights and they 
have done that in the context of sensitization of the communities, rights education. It has been 
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in a context of preaching the word, like preachers standing on a podium.”1021 Having the role 
of passive listeners taking in knowledge from outside experts is not very empowering. 
Englund has analysed civic education on human rights and democracy carried out by the EU 
funded project National Initiative for Civic Education (NICE) in Malawi. His findings 
exemplify the challenges experienced by human rights awareness raising. In the civic 
education meetings the officers explained about multiparty democracy and its ‘cornerstones’: 
tolerance, citizens’ participation, free and fair elections, human rights, the rule of law, and 
transparent leadership. There was no attempt to find out to what extent these so called 
cornerstones resonated with the experiences of the people present at the meeting. The 
participants were expected to accept them as given definitions. The implied message was that 
the transition from the one-party regime of the MCP, that ended not many years before NICE 
entered into the country, had already taken place.1022  
Englund’s research questions the transformative role of so called civil society, a potential role 
that was celebrated in the early 1990s by numerous observers of African politics. The 
enthusiasm of the 1990s has faded and more critical accounts have emerged, highlighting the 
problems with overly romanticised notions of the role of civil society.1023 Moreover, in 
Malawi there was an influx of NGOs in 1993-94, more particularly human rights NGOs.1024 
Malawi churches, that played a central role in the removal of the Banda regime, remained 
relatively active in Malawian politics also after the transition to a multiparty government.1025 
The Church and NGOs have worked so closely together on human rights issues that they, in 
some cases, have become virtually indistinguishable.1026 Churches have been part of the ‘civic 
education movement’, but research shows that there were significant limits to their grassroots 
civil society activism.1027 Peter VonPopp draws the conclusion that churches, at the 
grassroots, “may very well be agents of the status quo, rather than advocates for change in 
state-local power relations.”1028 This is a relevant conclusion when reviewing the Right to 
Food Project, which was initiated by a church-based human rights organisation.  
It is not only civil society organisations that have conducted civic education on democracy 
and human rights. Institutions such as the Ombudsman and the Malawi Human Rights 
Commission also have ‘public awareness’ on their agendas. Again, the Danish Centre for 
Human Rights (DCHR) has been a major funding agency. With money from the DCHR the 
Ombudsman Office conducted workshops aimed at District Development Committees, and 
District Executive Committees (DEC); workshops with civil servants in ministries, military 
and the police; workshops for the media; a workshop with Principal Secretaries and Judges 
during the period of 1996-2000.1029 In an evaluation report, lack of training in law and human 
rights among the staff of the Ombudsman Office itself was, however, noted as a major 
                                                 
1021 Interview No. 29 with Malawi Resource Centre for Human Rights, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1022 Englund, Prisoners of Freedom, supra note 414, at 108.  
1023 Peter VonDoepp, “Are Malawi’s Local Clergy Civil Society Activists? The Limiting Impact of Creed, 
Context and Class”, in Harri Englund (ed.), A Democracy of Chameleons: Politics and Culture in the New 
Malawi (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2002) 123-139, at 123. 
1024 Interview No. 29 with Malawi Resource Center for Human Rights, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1025 See also Englund, “The Dead Hand of Human Rights”, supra note 972.  
1026 Ibid., at 586. 
1027 VonDoepp, “Are Malawi’s Local Clergy Civil Society Activists?”, supra note 1023, at 123-124. 
1028 Ibid., at 137. 
1029 Final Evaluation: Strengthening of the Ombudsman Institution in Malawi (Copenhagen, Danish Centre for 
Human Rights, 2000) at 71. 
156 
problem. Of all staff members employed at the time of evaluation, only the Ombudsman 
himself and Chief Legal Officers had legal qualifications.1030 
It seems that the agencies that have been funding most of the human rights related activities in 
Malawi since the transition to multiparty governance are eager to support the growing interest 
in freedoms, ufulu. There is, however, concern for the lack of capacity and knowledge in 
international human rights standards – and more training for the staff of the institutions and 
civil society organisations on the legal dimension of human rights as well as more ‘civic 
education’ for the general public has been seen as the solution. There has been less discussion 
on how feasible it is to adopt a legalistic understanding of the human rights concept in a 
country such as Malawi, with about 500 lawyers and a large, largely rural population with 
little official schooling. Initiatives that would investigate the intersection between everyday 
lived realities and human rights, calling for human rights as cultural practice located in 
specific local contexts, are rare.        
3.1.5 The right to food in the legal framework of Malawi 
Chirwa writes that “[e]conomic, social and cultural rights have suffered from lack of 
constitutional protection in Malawi since colonial times.”1031 The first written Constitution, 
adopted in 1964 at the time Malawi gained independence from Britain, included no socio-
economic rights. The 1964 Constitution did guarantee civil and political rights and the right to 
property. Two years later, it was replaced by a second constitution, designed to transform 
Malawi into a republic. In the 1966 Constitution, human rights were only mentioned in 
passing in section 2(1)(iii) that included a reference to the UDHR. However, in 1968 there 
was already a constitutional amendment stating that “nothing in or done under the authority of 
law shall be held inconsistent with or in contravention of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights”.1032 This lasted until 1992 when the first litigation invoked the provision under the 
UDHR. In the Chihana v. R case1033 the Supreme Court held that the UDHR forms part of 
Malawian law (referring to the 1966 Constitution). The case was about alleged interference 
with the freedom of speech as a violation of the African Charter of Human and People’s 
Rights. The court held that the UDHR is part of the law of Malawi, while the African Charter 
is not (because Malawi has taken no legislative measures to adopt it).1034 Since this 
Constitution of 1966 was repealed, and the 1994 Constitution does not make any reference to 
the UDHR; some writers argue that the UDHR is no longer part of Malawian law.1035   
The 1994 Constitution includes a Bill of Rights, which recognises the right to family 
protection, the right to education, cultural and language rights, the right to property, the right 
to economic activity, labour rights, and the right to development.1036 As we can see, the right 
to food is not on this list. The right to development does, however, provide a potential, but yet 
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unexplored, avenue for protecting many of the socio-economic rights, including the right to 
food, not expressly mentioned in the Bill of Rights.1037  
Section 30 reads:  
1. All persons and peoples have a right to development and therefore to the 
enjoyment of economic, social, cultural and political development and women, 
children and the disabled in particular shall be given special consideration in the 
application of this right. 
2. The State shall take all necessary measures for the realization of the right to 
development. Such measures shall include, amongst other things, equality of 
opportunity for all in their access to basic resources, education, health services, 
food, shelter, employment and infrastructure. 
3. The State shall take measures to introduce reforms aimed at eradicating social 
injustices and inequalities. 
4. The State has a responsibility to respect the right to development and to justify 
its policies in accordance with this responsibility. 
This section is interesting from many perspectives. First, it refers to “women, children and 
disabled” as groups to be given special consideration in the application of the right to 
development, indicating that their vulnerability calls for special measures. Second, there is no 
reference to ‘progressive realisation’ and ‘available resources’ as is the case of state 
obligations under the ICESCR, to which Malawi is a party.1038 Instead it is stated that “the 
State shall take all necessary measures for the realization” of this right, which potentially 
implies far-reaching positive obligations. Third, an element of equality and non-
discrimination (expressed as “equality of opportunity”) enters in relation to access to basic 
resources, including food and employment. Forth, positive measures (‘reforms’) aiming at the 
“eradication of social injustices and inequalities” again gives the impression of extensive 
positive obligations on the part of the state. Lastly, the state has to justify its policies in 
accordance with the responsibility to respect the right to development.  
All of the sub-paragraphs, and especially the last one that refers to policy coherence, are 
powerful statements. It is surprising that civil society groups have not made use of Section 30 
in their advocacy or litigation efforts. (“Again in the past years the least attention has been on 
Section 30 of our Constitution which is the right to development in the broadest sense. I don’t 
recall any grouping testing that provision of the Constitution out.”)1039 This is partly explained 
by a conservative Supreme Court: the majority of the judges do not view economic and social 
rights to be justiciable and the major focus of the judiciary since 1994 has been on civil and 
political rights.1040  
Chirwa argues that section 30(2) can be regarded as guaranteeing access to basic resources 
such as food, and he refers to the Supreme Court’s view in Gwanda Chakuamba & Others 
that “human rights provisions in the Constitution should be construed broadly and 
purposively.”1041 Section 30 shows that positive obligations and entitlements are not 
                                                 
1037 Chirwa, “A Full Loaf is Better than Half”, supra note 1031, at 224-225.  
1038 Malawi ratified the ICESCR in 1994 but has not yet submitted its first periodic report.  
1039 Interview No. 29 with Malawi Resource Centre for Human Rights, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1040 Dan Banik, “Human Rights for Human Development: The Rhetoric and the Reality”, 30 Nordic Journal of 
Human Rights (2012) 4-35, at 30-31. 
1041 Chirwa, “A Full Loaf is Better than Half”, supra note 1031, at 225. Referring to the case Gwanda 
Chakuamba & Others v. The Attorney General & Others, M.S.C.A. Civil Appeal no. 20 of 2000.  
158 
completely absent in Malawi, only marginalised both in the legal framework and in the 
popular human rights rhetoric that has focussed on ‘freedoms’.  
3.1.6 Concluding remarks 
Civic education has been the main mode of ‘sensitising’ the Malawian public to issues such as 
human rights and democracy. In civic education, participants are expected to take ‘human 
rights’ as given concepts and therefore there has been very little dialogue about the meaning 
and value of human rights. Introducing human rights as expert knowledge imposed ‘from 
above’ (by the powerful for the powerless1042) in a country that recently has changed from an 
authoritarian regime to a multiparty form of government is not very respectful of the lived 
realities of the actors involved. In the best case, such practices are only isolated examples of 
bad pedagogy.  
The role of donors as supporters of ‘freedoms’ is somewhat unclear, but it seems that they 
have been eager to support civic education as well as legal capacity building for the 
authorities.   
Although ESC rights are marginalised in the discourse as well as in the legal framework, 
Section 30 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to development, is surprisingly 
strong, underlining the entitlement dimension and positive obligations, i.e., issues that have 
been given less attention in the official ‘freedom discourse’. Why civil society actors have not 
used Section 30 more in advocacy is unclear.1043 This shows that a legal approach to food 
insecurity, in which claims would be based on legal rights, is not developed. There is no 
conscious effort to put legislation, policy, and practice in place that would support the 
realisation of the right to adequate food. Before analysing whether the Right to Food Project 
fills this gap I will explore the role of human rights in the development community’s 
conventional approach, i.e., providing food assistance to needy beneficiaries.   
3.2 Food assistance: A charity-based service  
This section is an analysis of one particular food assistance programme in Malawi 
implemented by the World Food Programme (WFP)1044 and its NGO partners. The purpose is 
to identify the role of human rights and to understand the principles according to which food 
assistance programmes are managed, not to evaluate the effectiveness in reaching the intended 
beneficiaries. What role, if any, is the right to food playing? Is food assistance seen as a 
service that is a matter of fulfilling the obligations under the right to food (i.e., providing a 
mandatory service to rights-holders who have been selected based on clearly defined criteria) 
or as charity (i.e., a favour that may or may not be provided to beneficiaries based on more or 
less arbitrary criteria)? Emphasis is also put on understanding the role and meaning of the 
‘good development practice’ principles of non-discrimination, accountability, participation, 
and empowerment. 
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3.2.1 Introduction 
We occasionally feed people when they run out of stocks. And for some this is a 
yearly event. We make up the four months that people come short. Every year 
about 25 percent [of the Malawians] are chronically food insecure, so those are 
always there. There’s always need, but that’s controllable need.1045 
Food aid has been an important part of international development cooperation and 
humanitarian aid since the post-Second World War Marshall Plan.1046 It is thereby one of the 
oldest forms of foreign aid – and at the same time one of the most controversial. This is 
mainly because food aid involves issues of trade and agricultural policy in donor as well as 
recipient countries, but also because some development specialists have worried that food aid 
can destabilise local markets, create disincentives for producers and traders, and undermine 
the resilience of food economies. In a world that, in theory, produces more than enough food 
to feed everyone, nothing seems more obvious than giving food to hungry people, but yet this 
apparently benevolent response has attracted extensive criticism.1047 The purpose of this 
chapter is not to review evidence for or against any of these arguments, but it is important to 
be aware that food aid is far from unproblematic.  
The WFP is one of the few UN agencies that has not adopted a so called human rights-based 
approach – despite former Secretary General Kofi Annan’s request in 1997 to integrate human 
rights into all activities of the organisation.1048 One reason for this might be the general 
tendency in food aid to adapt to immediate needs and ‘practical problems’ as they emerge.1049 
Service delivery (food commodities), where targeting is based on needs, is characteristic of 
this approach: “Food will be targeted at the right time to the neediest countries, to the neediest 
populations in food-insecure areas (geographic targeting) and to intended beneficiaries.”1050 
This quote demonstrates the simple logic behind food aid in general and the existence of the 
WFP in particular; in times of crisis, food will be distributed to those most in need of 
assistance (the most vulnerable households) so that they can live through the crisis and 
hopefully recover. The objective is to save lives.1051 In Malawi, disasters have become annual 
events and even in a year with an exceptionally good harvest, which was the case in 2006, 
there were areas where people suffered from hunger.1052 
In order to limit the scope of the analysis, focus is placed on the Joint Emergency Food Aid 
Programme (JEFAP). This programme was initiated during the food crisis of 2002/2003 by 
the Government of Malawi, donors, the WFP and NGOs.1053 In late 2006, at the time that I 
was conducting field research, there were three programmes under the JEFAP: (1) HIV/AIDS 
programme where food was distributed to households with chronically sick patients or 
                                                 
1045 Interview No. 30 with donor, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1046 Edward Clay and Olav Stoke, “The Changing Role of Food Aid and Finance for Food”, in E. Clay and O. 
Stokke (eds), Food Aid and Human Security (London: European Association of Development Research, 2000) 
13-54, at 17.  
1047 FAO, The State of Food and Agriculture 2006, supra note 1044, at 3.  
1048 See “Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform”, 14 July 1997. UN doc. A/51/950. 
1049 Clay and Stoke, “The Changing Role of Food Aid and Finance for Food”, supra note 1046, at 17.  
1050 World Food Programme, Executive Board Second Regular Session, Consolidated Framework of WFP 
Policies, An Updated Version, Rome 22-27 October 2007, para. 11. Available at http://www.wfp.org/ 
sites/default/files/wfp137486~2.pdf, visited 14 May 2012.  
1051 Interview No. 21 with Department of Poverty and Disaster Management Affairs, Malawi 2006; Interview 
No. 4 with WFP, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1052 The maize production in 2006 was 113 percent higher than the previous season. See UN Malawi 
Humanitarian Situation Report, July 2006. Available at http://www.unmalawi.org/reports/Sit_reports/ 
UN_SitRep01Aug2006.pdf, visited 10 May 2012.  
1053 WFP/NGO Partnership, Malawi, November 2006.  
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orphans; (2) food-for-asset (FFA) programmes where community members created assets in 
return for food; (3) targeted food distribution for asset creation to help those lacking food over 
the ‘hunger months’.1054 The emergency intervention in 2006 was small-scale (targeting about 
one million people) compared to the foregoing season of 2005/06 when five million 
Malawians where missing food entitlements.1055 Moreover, the WFP in Malawi was also 
implementing a long-term school feeding programme and a therapeutic feeding programme 
for malnourished children.1056 In the following, focus is placed on the food-for-asset 
programmes. During the field research in Malawi I met with WFP staff, NGOs, the major 
donors to the WFP and with government representatives. 
3.2.2 Food aid as part of the right to food  
In order to understand the role of human rights in food assistance programmes, we must first 
establish what human rights law says about food aid. Do people suffering from hunger have 
not only a moral but also a legal right to receive support? As we know the right to adequate 
food is guaranteed in Article 11 of the ICESCR,1057 but this article is silent on food aid. The 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has, however, in General Comment No. 
12 on the Right to Adequate Food made clear that the obligation to fulfil (provide) means that 
State Parties to the Covenant should provide directly for this right whenever an individual or 
group is unable, for reasons beyond their control, to enjoy the right to food. The Committee 
then refers to victims of natural or other disasters.1058 The Special Rapporteur on the right to 
food states that it may be necessary, as a last resort, for governments to provide direct 
assistance to those in need through safety nets such as food voucher schemes or social 
security provisions to ensure freedom from hunger.1059 Food aid is, in other words, one way 
for a government to fulfil its minimum obligations under the right to food. 
The State is in violation of the Covenant if it fails to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very 
least, the minimum essential level required to be free from hunger. Should the State’s 
resources not be sufficient, it has to seek international support to ensure the availability and 
accessibility of the necessary food.1060 The primary responsibility to prevent famine and 
hunger always rests with national governments, but all other governments should, according 
to the Special Rapporteur, refrain from taking action that cause food insecurity and to respond 
to requests for emergency assistance.1061 There is, however, no agreement among states that 
there is a legal obligation to provide food aid and the matter remains controversial.1062 It is 
important to keep in mind that food aid is also legally regulated in other instruments, which 
are unrelated to human rights law. For example, States Parties to the Food Aid Convention 
                                                 
1054 Interview No. 28 with NGO that is member of JEFAP consortium, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1055 In December 2005 the Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee (MVAC) released its final figures, 
which indicated that there had been an increase in the population at risk from 4.2 to 5 million. See Malawi 
Humanitarian Situation Report by the UN Disaster Management Technical Working Group, December 2005. 
Available at http://www.unmalawi.org/reports/Sit_reports/UN_SitRep8dec2005.pdf, visited 10 May 2012.; See 
also UN Malawi Humanitarian Situation Report, supra note 1052. Interview No. 4 with WFP, Malawi 2006. 
FSD2727. 
1056 Interview Nos. 4 and 18 with WFP, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1057 Malawi ratified the ICESCR in 1994.   
1058 General Comment No. 12, (1999) on the right to adequate food, supra note 577, para. 15. 
1059 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Jean Ziegler, 16 March 2006, para. 24. UN doc. 
E/CN.4/2006/44.  
1060 General Comment No. 12, (1999) on the right to adequate food, supra note 577, para 17. See also Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, supra note 1059, para. 37.  
1061 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, supra note 1059, para. 18. 
1062 See Lorenzo Cotula and Margaret Vidar, The Right to Adequate Food in Emergencies (Rome: FAO 
Legislative Study 77, 2003) at 22-23. 
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“agree to provide food aid to developing countries or the cash equivalent thereof” in annual 
amounts specified in the Convention.1063  
The Committee on ESCR has expressed concern about the possible negative effects of food 
aid. According to General Comment 12, international emergency assistance in the form of 
food aid is to be provided in ways which do not adversely affect local producers and local 
markets, and should be organised in ways that facilitate the return to food self-reliance of the 
beneficiaries, and products included in international food trade or aid programmes must be 
safe and culturally acceptable to the recipient population. Moreover, food aid should be 
distributed based on the needs of the intended beneficiaries,1064 indicating that focussing on 
needs is not alien to human rights thinking. The fact that the Committee, which has authority 
to interpret the Covenant, refers to these issues underlines that the implementation of food aid 
is a matter of human rights.  
Clearly, guaranteeing that food is available also during crises situations is part of the human 
rights obligations of the Government of Malawi. The questions is whether the authorities in 
Malawi have accepted that food assistance activities (that are presently called ‘humanitarian 
aid’ or ‘development’, depending on the type of intervention) are part of a human rights 
agenda. Traditionally, there has been a clear distinction between humanitarian assistance work 
and human rights work. For instance George Kent draws this line in saying that “humanitarian 
assistance is mainly about service delivery, while human rights work is mainly about 
advocacy in relation to governmental actions.”1065 As an example Kent mentions that when a 
charitable organisation gives food to the poor this is humanitarian assistance, not human 
rights work. If the same organisation is pressing the government to act on the problem, it is 
doing human rights work. He adds that the task of human rights work is to ensure the 
fulfilment of the government’s obligations in respect of support to the needy.1066 In Malawi 
food assistance has been the government’s way of supporting ‘the needy’ (although the 
motivation has been political and not related to human rights obligations). At least in theory, 
the WFP and NGOs are implementing this service on behalf of the government. Therefore, 
the strict line between humanitarian assistance and human rights work is difficult to maintain. 
Food assistance has a human rights dimension as it is one way of guaranteeing the right to 
food to those who are unable to realise this right through other means. Then of course it can 
be debated whether food assistance is the most appropriate way to fulfil the ‘provide 
obligation’ under the right to food.     
A related question is whether the ‘international relief industry’ is designed in such a way that 
the role of the national government is sidestepped. It is difficult to deny that the fact that as 
donor governments often channel emergency funds through UN agencies and NGOs this has 
an effect on the possibilities for the national government to live up to its human rights 
obligations. This also has implications for the process of citizens holding the government 
accountable, through democratic processes, for failures to respond to food crises. Alex de 
Waal points out that the establishment of ‘disaster institutions’ at the UN (e.g. the WFP) has 
contributed to the internationalisation of responsibility for famines (implying the retreat from 
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1065 Kent, Freedom from Want, supra note 83, at 124. 
1066 Kent, Freedom from Want, supra note 83, at 124-125. 
162 
domestic accountability). Another side effect of foreign-run relief programmes is that they 
often undermine the legitimacy of government efforts in the eyes of the public.1067  
Food distribution in Malawi in 2006 was very much in the hands of donors, international 
agencies and NGOs, although there was an effort to strengthen the role of the government. A 
donor stated: “Last year we tried to make sure that it was the government that was owning the 
food distribution. Half of the distribution was done through WFP and half through the 
Department of Poverty and Disaster Management with NGOs. They were working the same 
way, it was just two different channels. It was to build capacity in the government, so that 
they can handle on their own the food security problems.”1068 Since donors and international 
development agencies have a leading role in the organisation of food assistance it also means 
they have to live up to the principles set out in General Comment 12.  
3.2.3 The new food aid agenda: No free food  
The methods used in food aid have changed over time in Malawi as well as elsewhere. 
Distributing free food is not ‘trendy’ any longer. What used to be food-for-work, mainly road 
construction, became FFA, i.e., construction of small-scale irrigation, fish-ponds etc in 
exchange of food items. Some donors were also increasingly interested in cash transfers 
instead of food (conditional cash transfers where people work).1069 The ambition in the FFA 
programmes was to link the distribution of food commodities to asset creation and to 
livelihoods. The beneficiary worked 20 days in one month for four hours a day.1070 The food 
basket that was received in FFA programmes after one month’s work was 50 kg of maize, 5 
kg of pulses and 2 litres of cooking oil.1071 There is no question that the level of payment was 
low. The programmes were nevertheless very popular and people stood in line at registration. 
In rural Malawi the opportunities to make some money are limited or none existent. “They 
have an option to food-for-asset work and get a bag of maize or sorghum that can feed their 
family for one month. Or they have the option to work for 30 cents a day if they’re lucky.”1072 
It is true that the wage level in Malawi was and still is extremely low, and everyone who is 
‘better off’ benefits from this in terms of cheap labour. Increase in the supply of casual labour 
(ganyu) has depressed rural wages.1073 It is also true that through the FFA programme, people 
in urgent need of food obtained it in return for work on something that was supposed to 
contribute to agricultural production and therefore, in the long run, contribute to long-term 
                                                 
1067 Alex de Waal, Famine Crimes: Politics & Disaster Relief Industry in Africa (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1997) at 70, 79, 137. 
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1071 Interview No. 28 with NGO that is member of JEFAP consortium, Malawi 2006. FSD2727.  
1072 Interview No. 18 with WFP, Malawi, 2006. FSD2727. 
1073 Eunice G. Kamwendo, “Knowledge Review and Gap Analysis: Hunger and Vulnerability in Malawi”, a 
report by Regional Hunger and Vulnerability Programme, July 2006, at 6. Available at http://www.wahenga.org/ 
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development.1074 If it was not for food assistance programmes people would migrate to other 
areas looking for food.1075 FFA programmes helped to alleviate the worst symptoms of 
chronic poverty. However, it is easy to criticise them for hindering the same structures that 
keeps the poor in poverty, that is, low wages. 
The basic idea in FFA was that people should not just ‘receive free food’, because it was 
feared this would create ‘dependency’,1076 and as we remember the General Comment on the 
Right to Adequate Food makes clear aid should be organised so that food self-reliance of the 
beneficiaries is ensured. One donor representative motivated this shift to food-for-asset 
programmes by saying: “To get the participation by the people, to get them understand why 
they are helped and not only receiving things. They have also to give something. That’s why 
there are very few programmes where there is distribution for nothing.”1077  
In most of my interviews a ‘hand-out mentality’ was mentioned as a widespread problem in 
Malawi. Due to this ‘hand-out mentality’ it was perceived to be challenging to get a real 
understanding in the communities that the FFA is an asset creation programme as much as it 
is one addressing hunger. (“Everybody thinks they have a right to the food because the 
government gives food every year.”1078) This brings us to the question whether the people 
receiving food assistance saw themselves as subjects of charity or as rights-holders who can 
demand accountable services from the duty-bearers. Food assistance is a service that, in 
theory but not in practice, is a matter of fulfilling obligations under the right to food. 
Therefore, people receiving assistance could potentially be in a position to make claims and 
hold people in authority to account for the way food distribution is handled. This was, 
however, seldom the case and it is doubtful that the ambition was to move into that direction. 
I come back to the issue of demanding accountable services in the analysis of the rights-based 
approach to food security. 
In her investigation of the return of soup kitchens and food pantries in the early 1980s in the 
USA, Janet Poppendieck puts forward the argument that the kind of charity where free food is 
distributed to poor people is “a retreat from rights to gifts. Poor people might be, and often 
are, very well treated in charitable emergency food programs, but they have no rights, at least 
not legally enforceable rights, to the benefits that such programs provide.”1079 As long as 
Malawian authorities do not view food assistance as a rights-based service, regulating it as 
such, food distribution activities are part of a human rights agenda only in theory. For these 
reasons I label food assistance in Malawi a charity-based service.  
                                                 
1074 The benefit of the assets created is sometimes contested. It is argued that, since unqualified labour is used, 
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3.2.4 Good development practice 
Objective to target the most vulnerable through a participatory process  
In addition to cultural acceptability and quality of the food commodities, principles of non-
discrimination and a focus on the most vulnerable, participation, accountability and 
empowerment are very much on the agenda in food assistance. In this section I analyse the 
meaning of these ‘good development principles’, starting with non-discrimination and 
participation, that are highly interrelated.  
Non-discrimination and impartiality do not imply that food assistance is to be distributed 
equally to all individuals, but rather that it has to be distributed only on the basis of need, 
regardless of any other consideration.1080 Therefore, this principle is most visible in the 
selection of beneficiaries. Only the most food insecure households are being targeted in the 
JEFAP programmes. “A household has to indeed be vulnerable, that they don’t have food, 
don’t have livestock that they can sell and get food, that they don’t have relations that can 
support them during this time.”1081 As we recall from previous sections, in the vulnerability 
assessments carried out in the area of food security, discrimination experienced by people is 
not a factor that is analysed. Vulnerability assessment is about identifying needs and making 
sure there is no discrimination in the targeting process – but less about using discrimination 
and marginalisation as a lens for analysis.  
The identification of beneficiaries for FFA programmes and for targeted food distribution for 
assets started with the report from the Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee (MVAC) 
that indicated the deficit areas in terms of food.1082 After the tonnages needed in each area that 
had been pointed out as food insecure had been established, the WFP and NGOs had a 
meeting with the District Executive Committee to evaluate whether the MVAC report was 
correct in its assessment of the food security situation in the particular district. As a second 
step there was another meeting at the Traditional Authority level (with local traditional chiefs 
as well as NGOs and CSOs active in that authority) where the WFP provided information 
about the amount of food available for distribution and asked about the development priorities 
set in the Traditional Authority so that the asset to be created by those participating in the 
programme would be useful and linked to livelihoods. The aim was to identify the particular 
villages that were more affected by hunger this year compared to normally.1083 As a third step 
there was a meeting with the group village headmen and the village development committee 
to collect data on how many households that group headman had and how many households 
were vulnerable. (Note that there was no vulnerability assessment carried out, but instead the 
group village headmen and the village development committee made these decisions.) The 
village development committee then gave the NGO a list of names of vulnerable households 
and the role of the NGO was to do random verification to check that these households were 
indeed in need of food. It was the village development committee members that finally 
performed the registration of the beneficiaries.1084 The role of the NGO was to sensitise the 
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committee on the criteria for targeting the beneficiaries.1085 What should be noted was that the 
village development committee was common for a group of villages. With regard to one 
specific village, the structure was not explicit as to what happens.1086 Some villages had 
organised sub-committees such as village relief committees or village food committees that 
would manage the process, but this was not the case in all villages.  
In a situation where the majority of the people in rural areas are poor, targeting is a great 
challenge. Although humanitarian programmes usually cover 100 percent of the food 
requirements as identified in the report by the MVAC, the situation on the ground may be that 
households who are vulnerable were still left out. The difference between households being 
targeted and those left out was often very small.1087 (“It is challenging for us to find ourselves 
targeting vulnerable people but at the same time leaving out as well vulnerable people.”1088) It 
was unclear from my interviews how transparent and accessible the selection criteria were for 
the beneficiaries themselves. The risk is that the targeting process feels arbitrary in the eyes of 
the community members, if the criteria for becoming selected for the programme are not 
clearly defined beforehand. Another problem in terms of targeting was that the food security 
situation of the urban poor was not assessed by the MVAC. This meant that there might have 
been urban poor in need of assistance but the government could not provide this because of 
lack of information that could have helped in the targeting process.1089 This was clearly a 
matter of failing to live up to the right of non-discrimination.    
With regard to women as a potentially ‘vulnerable group’, I was told that the WFP aimed at 
high participation by women in food-for-asset activities. As put by one NGO: “Our 
requirement is that at least we should have 70 percent women”.1090 I was not, however, given 
any information on the kind of vulnerability analysis used to arrive at this decision.  
As we know, ‘participation’ in development can mean different things depending on the 
context and the actors involved. In development policy, participation is often framed narrowly 
as a means to improve project performance, rather than a process of fostering critical 
consciousness and decision-making.1091 ‘Participatory processes’ can mean fostering dialogue 
between different stakeholders, or that these are involved in the different phases of the 
programme. Sometimes the voluntary contribution by people in projects is seen as 
‘participation’ (communities contributing time and effort to self-help projects with some 
outside assistance).1092 This was not the case in JEFAP programmes in Malawi, or at least 
nobody I interviewed suggested that since people were working before getting food this meant 
it was a ‘participatory process’. Rather, statements such as “there’s good participation”1093 
suggest that participation was seen as something that is necessary for a successful programme, 
that is needed in order for the beneficiaries to ‘own’ the activities (and thereby sustain the 
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166 
assets that are being created with the help of food assistance). The ambition in FFA 
programmes was that the selection of beneficiaries is a participatory process that is in the 
hands of the community itself instead of an outside NGO, because this is the most effective 
way to handle the process.1094 In this case people participated as ‘beneficiaries’ in 
interventions designed to benefit them; participation was for the people.1095 This interpretation 
of participation is far from that of ‘public participation’, which can be seen as a human rights 
principle.1096  
The value of protecting the right to participation, together with guaranteeing rights such as 
freedom of the press and freedom of expression, is, according to Amartya Sen, a key issue 
with regard to preventing famine. Sen argues that adversarial democracy and an investigative 
press are political preconditions in famine prevention.1097 Although Malawi is suffering from 
chronic hunger and poverty, a state which only occasionally develops into a large-scale 
famine,1098 supporting new avenues for effective public participation in the young democratic 
Malawi could promote rights-holders to demand action from duty-bearers before there is 
another food crisis. This would mean fostering participation as a political process while also 
addressing lack of accountability of people in power, instead of maintaining participation as a 
technical process that aims at effectively managing a particular intervention.     
A managerial approach to accountability  
The WFP had a managerial and financial approach to accountability. The rationale was that 
the WFP has delegated authority and was therefore answerable for carrying out tasks 
according to agreed performance criteria.1099 Accountability was the ensuring of the 
programme being run in the way it was supposed to according to the agreements. “We’ve set 
out in the project document to do certain things, we make certain commitments and with 
certain controls.”1100 This approach is understandable from the perspective of the WFP who 
were indeed carrying out a task on behalf of the government. Surprisingly, it seemed that also 
government representatives had the same approach to accountability (an apolitical process 
concerned with inputs, outputs, and outcomes). “Using the Sphere Handbook1101 we are 
expected to give an adequate amount of food to those affected, at least 2100 kilocalories. And 
we are supposed to be accountable. Accountability is both to donors who are providing the 
relief items as well as to the recipients, the people who have been affected.”1102  
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Donors and UN institutions play a considerable role not only as the providers of funding (in 
cash or in commodities) but also by advising on policy issues, and by expressing preferences 
on how food should be distributed etc. The issue of holding these institutions accountable for 
their actions and non-actions in the area of food assistance was never raised during my stay in 
Malawi. When asking about it I was often told that the relationship between the government 
and its donors was very unequal (“the donor has a superior stake and the recipient a lower 
stake”),1103 and therefore donor accountability was not even on the agenda. As hunger 
response is internationalised, responsibility is given to a wide array of people and institutions 
(UN institutions, NGOs, donor governments and concerned citizens in any country on the 
globe) with vaguely defined accountability relationships.1104   
Accountability during the process of channelling food assistance in Malawi was challenged 
by the fact that there were two governing structures side by side, one formal (created through 
a decentralisation process), and one traditional. According to the formal structure District 
Assemblies have the political power and District Commissioners have administrative 
power.1105 Traditional Authorities consisting of traditional chiefs (inherited positions) have 
important roles in development activities. As we have seen in the above, the traditional 
structure was used in the food assistance targeting process. The problem was that it was not 
clear whether the traditional structure was accountable to the formal structure.1106 These 
uncertainties made it difficult to achieve the aims of the decentralisation process, i.e., 
enhancing accountability and transparency by public participation in local development 
planning and by bringing decision-making closer to the public.1107  
In a situation where needs are extremely high it is clear that those who have been given power 
and responsibility sometimes misuse their status. Since being a member of the Village 
Development Committee (VDC) was a voluntary commitment, it ensued that VDC members 
put themselves or their relatives on the list of beneficiaries. Another common problem was 
that there was a conflict between the chief and the committee, the chief wanting to decide who 
should get food assistance,1108 and in that case the VDC was often a puppet of the chief. The 
result might then have been that the irrigation created as part of the FFA programme was built 
on the chief’s land.1109 There were also situations when the chief, and maybe also the rest of 
the community, felt it should be the active community members who voluntarily took part in 
development activities, such as building a school, who should get food assistance as a form of 
payment. “The community says these people who are not active should not get food, food 
should go to them actively involved.”1110 Therefore, addressing unequal power relations and 
ensuring that it is possible for all community members to participate is a key issue if the 
targeting process is to be accountable. There was, however, no equal participation in decision-
making. I was told that in the local setting it is the people with knowledge who make 
                                                 
1103 Interview No. 1 with Malawi Human Rights Commission, Malawi 2006. Similar statements in interview No. 
24, with Department of Poverty and Disaster Management Affairs, Malawi 2006.  FSD2727.  
1104 de Waal, Famine Crimes, supra note 1067, at 70. 
1105 See Stephen N. Ndegwa and Brian Levy, “The Politics of Decentralization in Africa: A Comparative 
Analysis,” The World Bank, August 2003. Available at http://www.kit.nl/portals/documents/query.ashx? 
RecordID=668296&Portal=RDLG, visited 3 March 2012.  
1106 Interview No. 32 with NGO that is not a member of JEFAP, Malawi 2006. FSD2727.  
1107 On the decentralization process see Mustafa K. Hussein, “The Role of Malawian Local Government in 
Community Development”, 20 Development Southern Africa (2003) 271-282.  
1108 Interview No. 28 with NGO that is member of JEFAP consortium, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1109 Interview No. 18 with WFP, Malawi 2006. FSD2727.  
1110 The interviewee is referring to safety net programmes such as the HIV/AIDS programme, not FFA 
programmes that are targeting people who are physically fit to work. Interview No. 33 with NGO that is member 
of JEFAP consortium, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
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decisions. “In most cases chiefs have knowledge because they are chiefs. They come from a 
royal family, they have privileges, it means they have been to school, they have been exposed 
more than an average villager.”1111 Open meetings where the names of the targeted people 
were shared with the community members, the aim being that in the end everyone is satisfied 
with the list, did occasionally take place in villages receiving food through the JEFAP.1112 
However, it seems that there were few accountability procedures that would have given the 
beneficiaries the opportunity to understand how service providers had discharged, or failed to 
discharge the aid.  
During my field work in Malawi, I was repeatedly told that food (especially maize) in general 
and food assistance in particular is extremely political. Food is a useful political tool in a 
country facing one food crisis after the other. (“Food distribution is highly political, it’s one of 
the tools for politicians to get votes.”1113) The WFP and its partner NGOs naturally tried to 
avoid the involvement of politicians in the targeting process, but sometimes this still 
happened. “We also get a lot of pressure from politicians trying to manipulate our programme 
to suite their political agenda. Usually when they [the Members of Parliament] are involved 
the whole process is distorted. We have to try and make sure that this does not happen, but it 
takes time and effort.”1114  
In the Malawian context, where the distribution of food is highly politicised there is need for 
strong accountability mechanisms. However, it never transpires that politicians are held 
accountable for distorting food assistance programmes. What did happen was that the WFP 
took action against the transporter from whose truck some bags of maize were lost. 
Concerning attempts by politicians to highjack food assistance programmes, this was dealt 
with informally (by calling the Department of Poverty and Disaster Management Affairs, and 
asking them to talk to the politician).1115 Although creating a legal, administrative, and 
political system to address these problems is first and foremost the responsibility of the 
Malawian Government, both the WFP and its partner NGOs dealing with the day to day 
implementation of food assistance programmes are in the position to voice these concerns as 
well as being creative when it comes to enhancing accountability under the current structures. 
Creating awareness of the right to demand accountable services from both Government 
institutions as well as from NGOs can contribute to an environment where citizens speak out, 
demanding accountability for how assistance is handled.  
Taking accountability seriously implies that all the different actors who have responsibilities 
in the chain of food assistance can be held to account. At the bottom of the chain is the 
beneficiary, who might have concerns as to how the targeting was done. In cases of abuse or 
mismanagement beneficiaries are likely to turn to the actors present locally, i.e. the VDC or 
the chiefs (that most likely were involved in any possible abuse). “We tell the committees that 
when they have their own gatherings they should brief the communities. And we tell the 
beneficiaries that if you need further information consult the VDC.”1116 In other words, the 
                                                 
1111 Interview No. 24, with Department of Poverty and Disaster Management Affairs, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1112 Interview No. 4 with WFP, Malawi 2006; Interview No. 21 with Department of Poverty and Disaster 
Management Affairs, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1113 Interview No. 3 with donor, Malawi 2006. FSD2727.  
1114 Interview No. 33 with NGO that is member of JEFAP consortium, Malawi 2006.  FSD2727.  
1115 Interviews Nos. 4 and 18 with WFP, Malawi 2006. FSD2727.  
1116 Interview No. 28 with NGO that is member of JEFAP consortium, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
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communities are on their own with these problems, without official mechanisms of 
accountability.1117  
In the JEFAP programme accountability is an end in itself, a requirement that the government, 
the WFP and the NGOs have to meet. It is not linked to any broader agenda about what kind 
of political, social, and legal changes would be needed in order for beneficiaries to hold duty-
bearers accountable for the food assistance service.  
Empowerment as building capacity 
Can food assistance be empowering? A donor representative did not see many possibilities for 
this: “Empowerment is hard to instil when you are giving somebody something. They don’t 
have the ability to pay for it, and nobody wants to be in that situation. There’s very little ways 
to empower them, they get a bag of maize and leave. There’s not much dignity in that. At 
least you don’t make them beg for it.”1118  
The WFP together with the NGOs implementing the programmes were however convinced 
that people were indeed empowered through the way FFA programmes are designed. I was 
told that the whole idea in FFA is empowering because you ask what the communities want 
(“we ask people what do you want, what are the priorities in your area? They decide if 
irrigation, forestry, roads.”)1119 Empowerment in this context is associated with being able to 
decide for yourself, to manage your own affairs in the community. “The communities are 
really being empowered because we just give them the guidelines and they are able to do the 
targeting on their own. That’s part of empowerment.”1120  
It was claimed that the FFA format built local stakeholders’ capacities and thereby 
empowered them.1121 This meant that the beneficiaries receiving the food assistance were not 
necessarily empowered but local actors (often the local elite) managing the process gained 
more influence and power. The capacity of the actors being ‘empowered’ was supported 
through various kinds of trainings, for instance WFP organised trainings for their NGO 
partners on leadership of women, and the NGOs had then trained the VDCs on giving women 
a voice in the communities.1122 The question of how effectively these kinds of trainings 
addressed power relationships within the communities in general and the VDC in particular, is 
impossible to assess. 
I was told that ‘sensitisation’ is needed among the community members (“so that they 
understand why we are there, why is this important”).1123 This implies that the ideas came 
from outside (and clearly it was not always ‘understood’ in the communities why certain 
things were needed or ‘good for development’, so they needed to be ‘sensitised’), but the 
community members had the right to choose between different options and also had the right 
to work (as volunteers, without payment) with various tasks in the development and relief 
                                                 
1117 The NGOs having responsibility for the implementation of food aid often has a large area to cover. As an 
example it can be mentioned that one NGO with a limited number of staff is responsible for 38 000 households. 
Interview No. 33 with NGO that is member of JEFAP consortium, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1118 Interview No. 30 with donor, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1119 Interview No. 3 with donor, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1120 Interview No. 28 with NGO that is member of JEFAP consortium, Malawi 2006. FSD2727.  
1121 See International Food Policy Research Institute and World Food Programme, “Using Food Aid to Empower 
Communities: Concepts and Examples from Madagascar and Honduras”, 2005. Available at 
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1122 Interview No. 18 with WFP, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
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committees. This indicates that empowerment was seen as a process in which possibilities and 
options were broadened – but the ‘beneficiaries’ did not necessarily have a strong voice in 
setting priorities and agendas.1124  
The way empowerment was understood in the FFA programme perhaps reveals more about 
how the mainstream development discourse has defined the notion ‘empowerment’ than about 
the food assistance programme itself. As so often happens when talking of empowerment, it 
was believed that empowerment is something done or given to people; and when 
empowerment is understood as being ‘given’ by one group to another (in this case the NGO 
contracted by WFP to the local structures) this hides an attempt to keep control. Real 
empowerment may take unanticipated directions, and the ‘power over’ the programme 
process that the outside agent has is likely to be challenged.1125  
3.2.5 Concluding remarks 
Food assistance programmes are large operations that demand a lot of resources in terms of 
administration and logistics, from the initial stage of procurement through international and 
national transport up to the delivery to the distribution authority. The WFP is known for being 
very capable of managing these affairs.1126 The principles of ‘good development practice’ 
were taken seriously1127 in the JEFAP but participation, empowerment, and accountability 
remained tools to increase effectiveness in reaching the intended beneficiaries; instead of 
viewing these principles as a something that should govern the relationship between the 
government and its citizens. When trying to avoid the political games of food aid, the 
development actors altered the programmes into a technical process, thereby also sidestepping 
accountability and participation as democratic principles. The food assistance service was 
being delivered by an international development agency in partnership with NGOs, on behalf 
of the government, and through the support of donors. There is no evidence that food 
assistance was dealt with as a rights-based service. Instead, the JEFAP food-for-asset 
programme was a well-managed charity-based service. 
The WFP has not reformulated its mandate in human rights terminology and the agency does 
not refer to the right to food as a justification or legitimisation of its assistance programmes. 
There is, however, a link between JEFAP and the right to food through the fact that it is a 
human rights obligation of the Government of Malawi to provide food assistance in times of 
emergency to those unable to access adequate food by the means at their disposal. As we have 
seen, neither the government nor the WFP used this link as a starting point for the operations. 
The Government did not view food assistance activities as a human rights issue. The right to 
food, or human rights law in general, had few implications for the way JEFAP was 
implemented. The notable exception was that the right of non-discrimination and focus on the 
                                                 
1124 Compare with Naila Kabeer’s definition of empowerment for women and with Amartya Sen’s capability 
approach. Kabeer, “’Can I buy me love’?”, supra note 915, at 85; Sen, The Idea of Justice, supra note 928, at 
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1125 Rowlands, Questioning Empowerment, supra note 897, at 16.  
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a Comparative Advantage?”, in E. Clay and O. Stokke (eds), Food Aid and Human Security (London: European 
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most vulnerable people in theory had a strong role in the selection of beneficiaries, meaning 
that only the neediest people should get food and that there should be no discrimination in the 
targeting process. In practice the targeting process had its problems of course. This can partly 
be seen as the donors’ way of trying to guarantee that food assistance was not misused for 
political purposes, that targeting was indeed based on needs. (“You cannot give the 
government the whole responsibility, because it’s too political. You have to work with NGOs 
but making sure that the government is setting up a food security system.”1128) One could 
even say that trying to make sure that food assistance reaches the most vulnerable was a sort 
of ‘human rights conditionality’.  
Avoiding the political games of food assistance meant that the influential development actors 
were also avoiding ‘hunger as a political problem’. (‘Politics’ is in this context is not about 
partisan politics but can be defined as “the manner in which humans divide and distribute 
power and resources.”1129) When food is distributed every year this must mean there is 
something wrong with the basic structure of the society1130 – and this is a political problem. 
Distributing food was only dealing with the symptoms of how the basic structure of the 
society was failing to meet the needs of the most vulnerable part of the population. The 
question that we will look at in the next two chapters is whether a rights-based or a legal 
approach to food insecurity has any transformative potential in advancing societal change in 
favour of rights-holders. 
3.3 A rights-based approach to food security: Demanding accountable services 
as a matter of rights and obligations 
It is clear that within a large development NGO such as Oxfam1131 there are several ways of 
working with a rights-based approach (RBA), and the purpose of this study is not to identify 
‘Oxfam’s approach to RBA.’ Instead the aim is to identify the role of human rights in this 
particular intervention and to analyse the meaning of non-discrimination, accountability, 
participation, and empowerment. What is characteristic of this particular RBA to food 
security, implemented in three districts in Southern Malawi? What is the added value of an 
RBA in the context of food security in terms of the potential transformative element of the 
approach? 
3.3.1 Oxfam’s rights-based approach 
Poverty is a state of powerlessness in which people are unable to exercise their 
basic human rights or control virtually any aspect of their lives. Poverty manifests 
itself in the inadequacy of material goods and lack of access to basic services and 
opportunities leading to a condition of insecurity.1132  
Oxfam is one of many development organisations that link efforts to decrease poverty to 
issues of human rights. Oxfam took the formal decision to adopt a RBA to development in 
2000. Embracing RBA was a response to the limited success of previous approaches; 
traditional ways of conducting ‘development’ were simply perceived as becoming less 
                                                 
1128 Interview No. 3 with donor, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1129 Kent, Freedom from Want, supra note 83, at 121.  
1130 Compare with argument in Kent, Freedom from Want, supra note 83, at 123. 
1131 Oxfam is a confederation of 17 organisations working with more than 3,000 partners in more than 90 
countries. See http://www.oxfam.org/en/about/, visited 20 August 2012.   
1132 Oxfam International, “Towards Global Equity: Strategic Plan 2001-2006”. Available at http://www.oxfam. 
org/en/files/strat_plan.pdf, valid as of 8 March 2008.  
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effective.1133 This places a lot of pressure on the new approach to deliver effective outcomes, 
but so far there are many question marks concerning the implications of applying RBA and its 
‘added value’ is difficult to pinpoint. The exact meaning of RBA remained open to the 
organisation and its partners in 2007.1134   
In the Strategic Plan of 2001, Oxfam committed itself to working for five rights: the right to a 
sustainable livelihood, the right to basic social services, the right to life and security, the right 
to be heard, and the right to an identity.1135 Some of these rights are directly protected in 
international human rights standards, while others, such as the right to livelihoods, are not part 
of the human rights regime (although it could be argued that all of the five rights reflect many 
human rights treaties and declarations). The motivation behind Oxfam’s choice is pragmatic: 
this formulation made sense to Oxfam’s staff and their counterparts around the world.1136 
When we examine the five rights it is easy to see why these rights make sense to development 
professionals. The right to a sustainable livelihood stands for food security, the right to basic 
social services for basic health care, clean water, and education, the right to life and security 
for humanitarian action, the right to be heard for participation, and the right to an identity for 
vulnerable groups and gender. These issues have been part of the development agenda for a 
long time. What is new is the rights language.  
In addition to promoting the five rights, Oxfam is committed to the principles of participation, 
accountability, the universality and interdependence of rights, non-discrimination and 
equality.1137 Although empowerment is not on this particular list it is another important 
principle that underpins Oxfam’s work. Oxfam claims that the purpose of the rights-based 
approach is to transform the vicious cycle of poverty, and disempowerment “into a virtuous 
cycle in which all people, as rights-holders, can demand accountability from duty-bearers, and 
where duty-bearers have both willingness and capacity to fulfil, protect and promote people’s 
human rights.”1138 As we will see in the following analysis of the programme called Shire 
Highlands Sustainable Livelihoods Programme (SHSLP), the core of Oxfam’s approach to 
RBA is about empowering rights-holders to demand accountable services as a matter of rights 
from duty-bearers, while at the same time supporting the capacity of these duty-bearers so that 
they can meet their human rights obligations.  
3.3.2 Background to the Shire Highland Sustainable Livelihoods Programme 
In order to understand what the introduction of RBA, that started around 1999, has meant for 
SHSLP in terms of working methods, it is necessary to first give a brief overview of how the 
programme has evolved. Oxfam has been working in the districts Mulanje, Thyolo and 
Phalombe in the Southern Region of Malawi since 1996.1139 However, in 1987/88, Oxfam’s 
interaction with Mulanje District had already begun through a commissioning of action 
research on poverty. This research showed the pervasive, acute, and endemic nature of 
poverty in rural Malawi – and the inadequacy of government structures to address the 
                                                 
1133 Marjolein Brouwer, Heather Grady et al, “The Experiences of Oxfam International and its Affiliates in 
Rights-Based Programming and Campaigning”, in P. Gready and J. Ensor (eds), Reinventing Development? 
Translating Rights-Based Approaches from Theory into Practice (London: Zed Books, 2005) 63-78, at 63. 
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problems – at a time when the one party regime of President Banda did not officially 
recognise the existence of poverty. Due to the authoritarian regime it was not possible for an 
international NGO such as Oxfam to work directly with communities. Instead, the action 
researchers recommended Oxfam to train district government staff in participatory problem-
solving approaches, with the objective to generate attitudes and knowledge that would foster 
the participation of beneficiaries in development. This work was started in 1990, four years 
before the introduction of a democratic constitution.1140 It was a major challenge to build 
government capacity at that time due to the intense and paranoid political environment.1141  
The political environment was often mentioned by Oxfam staff during my interviews as a 
critical factor when introducing RBA. I was told that during the run-up to the second 
parliamentary and presidential elections (1999) in the country, Oxfam felt the need to increase 
awareness among citizens that whether they supported a one political party or not they still 
had the right to demand services from government as a right, not as a favour. Oxfam decided 
to ‘sensitise’ people on their rights, and at the same time also ‘sensitise’ the government 
structures, i.e. the service providers that Oxfam had been working with throughout the 
previous years. It was felt necessary to work on two sides: the supply side to ‘stimulate the 
supply of rights and services’ and on the demand side to ‘generate awareness of and demand 
for these rights and services’.1142 Firstly, the dual approach admitted that it was not 
constructive to only create demand when the government institutions may not have resources 
to meet those demands,1143 and secondly, the non-conducive attitude among government 
officials needed to be addressed. “Now, we are coming from a background where service 
providers were seeing themselves as bosses. With the republican constitution it’s more or less 
a demotion to servers. So we want them [the service providers] to accept that they have duties 
which they have to fulfil and for them to appreciate what there is to understand when we talk 
of human rights.”1144  
A third reason for the dual approach may have been that this is how Oxfam has been working 
from the beginning of the current programme in 1997 when a community based focus was 
introduced. Having identified the initial 10 target villages in Traditional Authority Mbuka a 
first participatory rural appraisal (PRA) with the whole community present was carried out. 
Ever since, PRAs have become yearly events during which communities are assisted in 
analysing their problems and discovering their root causes. The fact that since the year 2000 
government extension workers have carried out the PRAs  without Oxfam supervision shows 
that the programme has become ‘their’ programme instead of it being ‘owned’ by Oxfam.1145 
The link between Oxfam and the government institutions (the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Food Security and the Ministry of Community Development being the most important) was a 
so called desk officer. The link between Oxfam and a community was a VDC, which was 
elected under the supervision of an extension worker.1146  
                                                 
1140 For a short overview of the political history of Malawi, see Englund, Prisoners of Freedom, supra note 414, 
at 13-18 and Englund, “Introduction”, supra note 985, 11-24. 
1141 Max Lawson, “Oxfam Mulanje Livelihood Security Programme: Institutionalising Participation for 
Sustainable Livelihoods, Programme Model and Lessons Learnt 1987-2000”, at 4 and 6-8 (unpublished project 
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1143 Interview No. 5 with Oxfam, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1144 Interview No. 7 with Oxfam, Malawi 2006. FSD2727.  
1145 Lawson, “Oxfam Mulanje Livelihood Security Programme”, supra note 1141, at 9 and 17.  
1146 It should be noted that while the village development committees under the decentralisation structure are at 
group village level (on average about 10 villages), in the villages where Oxfam work, there is an elected village 
development committee in every village. See Lawson, “Oxfam Mulanje Livelihood Security Programme”, supra 
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3.3.3 Programme activities in 2005/2006 
Throughout the existence of the programme, community members have in PRA exercises 
identified food insecurity as their primary problem. In Mulanje people live in rural areas 
farming tiny pieces of land,1147 the fertility of which has been impoverished by continuous 
maize cropping. The majority of smallholder families have been found to be chronically food 
insecure, their own production lasting only for two-to-three months of the year.1148 SHSLP 
promotes food security in a number of ways: by provision of improved seeds, provision of 
goats, organic manure making campaigns, training of extension workers and farmers on the 
management of kitchen gardens, etc.1149  
Oxfam has found that in the programme area income security was an important component of 
food security. In order to obtain an income, people did casual agricultural labour (‘ganyu’), 
which means working for food or cash in the fields of slightly better-off farmers or working 
for cash wages on commercial tea estates.1150 Therefore, the programme aimed at improving 
labour relations. During the high season about 80 000 people were employed in the tea estates 
in Mulanje and Thyolo. The programme supported the Ministry of Labour Departments in 
both districts so that it could conduct inspections of workplaces, in order to enforce labour 
legislation.1151 Moreover, the newly established Tea, Coffee and Macadamia Workers’ Union 
was also supported by Oxfam.  
The Tea, Coffee and Macadamia Workers’ Union was formed in 2003. At that time unions 
were not recognised by tea estates. Therefore, Oxfam facilitated tripartite negotiations 
between the Labour Office (government), the Tea Association (employer) and Tea, Coffee 
and Macadamia Workers’ Union (workers) and in August 2003 a recognition agreement was 
signed. Two months later an access agreement, which gave the union the right to enter into 
the estates and recruit members, was signed.1152 In 2006, negotiations concerning a collective 
bargaining agreement were underway. This agreement was to mean that the union can bargain 
for better conditions of employment for their members.1153 The level of payment in the tea 
industry was so low (1100 Malawi Kwacha per month) that tea estate workers fall below the 
national poverty line.1154 
Support offered to the Labour Office meant that its staff members could go on regular 
inspection visits to tea estates and other workplaces. During these inspection visits staff 
checked whether labour conditions at the site were in line with labour regulations. Increased 
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inspections together with training concerning labour rights led to an increase in the complaints 
received by the Labour Office. In the year 2000, the Labour Office dealt with 201 complaints 
while in 2004 the number was 1,000. These complaints concerned issues such as non-payment 
of wages, unfair dismissals and injuries at the workplace.1155  The Labour Office was in this 
regard equipped to support the members of the workers’ union in their struggle for fair 
conditions of employment.  
Droughts, disease outbreaks, crop disease and HIV/AIDS were factors that had a negative 
impact on the lives of the 120,000 farm families that the programme was targeting.1156 
Therefore, although SHSLP started as a development programme, Oxfam has also been 
involved in humanitarian responses in Mulanje, Thyolo and Phalombe. In 2006, there was a 
humanitarian programme reaching over 70,000 households with food assistance and another 
6,000 households benefited from cash transfers (as an alternative to food assistance).1157  
The programme, moreover, focused on various policy issues that had a bearing on food 
security. One such issue was the on-going land policy reform. One aim of the SHSLP was to 
increase awareness regarding the proposed land law (so that traditional leaders would know 
their new role), the new land tenure system, and the new structures that were to be 
established.1158 The human rights aspect of land rights1159 and the impact that the proposed 
new Land Act could have on food security was not raised. Another issue that had bearing on 
livelihoods, especially livestock production, was lack of security. During participatory rural 
appraisals community members raised warnings that cases of theft of livestock had a negative 
impact on food security. As a response, crime prevention committees were formed and trained 
with reference to community policing as well as crime victim rights.1160  
The programme also worked with government institutions at the district level to address 
gender-based violence as an issue that prevented women from taking part in development-
related activities in the community. A Victim Support Unit where victims of gender-based 
violence could seek assistance was established. Furthermore, there were meetings in 
communities to discuss the issue and informing people where they could report cases of 
domestic violence. According to Oxfam airing out these issues contributed to changes in 
attitude: “People, instead of saying these are family issues, ask can I seek redress from these 
institutions?”1161 
3.3.4 Focus on rights and obligations  
At the time of my field research, SHSLP had engaged the NGO Women and Law in Southern 
Africa (WLSA) to conduct training programmes with government extension workers, to 
stimulate an understanding of the rights and duties in their work, and another NGO called 
                                                 
1155 Interview No. 13 with Ministry of Labour, District Labor Office in Mulanje, Malawi 2006. FSD2727.   
1156 Interview No. 6 with Oxfam, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1157 Oxfam, “SHSLP Annual Report”, supra note 1149, at 1. Interview No. 6 with Oxfam, Malawi 2006. 
FSD2727. 
1158 Today customary land is administered by village headmen and chiefs according to local custom. See Asiyati 
Lorraine Chiweza, “The Challenges of Promoting Legal Empowerment in Developing Countries: Women’s 
Land Ownership and Inheritance Rights in Malawi,” in Dan Banik (ed.) Rights and Legal Empowerment in 
Eradicating Poverty (Surrey: Ashgate, 2008) 201-216.  
1159 See e.g. De Schutter, “The Emerging Human Right to Land”, supra note 553, at 304. 
1160 Oxfam, “SHSLP Annual Report”, supra note 1149, at 7.  
1161 Interview No. 7 with Oxfam, Malawi 2006. FSD2727.  
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Malawi CARER1162 to conduct sensitization meetings on human rights in the communities. In 
order to increase awareness on rights among communities, Malawi CARER had established 
village rights committees in all the villages that were part of the SHSLP. Together with 
volunteer community based educators, who had received training on rights issues from 
Malawi CARER, the village rights committees organised sessions where rights were 
discussed and they also assisted individual community members who wanted to seek redress 
for human rights violations.1163  
Another component of RBA was the so called radio listening clubs. The Malawi Broadcasting 
Corporation’s (MBC) Development Broadcasting Unit (DBU) had received support from 
Oxfam to establish radio listening clubs in 16 communities. The DBU provided communities 
with a microphone, a recording device, a radio, and training how to use the equipment. Then 
the local radio listening club made a recording on concerns that the village had, (a ‘village 
voice’) e.g. on problems with service delivery or non-existing services, labour issues, land 
issues or justice delivery, and took that recording to the responsible office at district level.1164 
It was claimed that the realisation of rights was triggered by increasing interaction between 
“claim holders (communities) and duty-bearers (people in authority – service deliverers).”1165  
The service provider was supposed to listen to the tape and go to the village to respond, and 
together set up a plan for how they were going to address the situation. If no action was taken 
within the agreed time frame the villagers recorded another programme and that would go on 
air on national radio.1166 This weekly radio program, partly consisting of material produced by 
radio listening clubs, was in Chichewa.  
Radio listening clubs were not unique to the SHSLP. Community or rural radio had been a 
feature in participatory rural development initiatives in Malawi also before the SHSLP and 
outside of the programme area. In fact MBC radio has long traditions in being used for 
agricultural and rural development.1167 Radio is the foremost mass medium in Malawi because 
it is far more widely accessed than newspapers and television, and also the internet.1168  
Mchakulu, who has done research on radio listening clubs, based on field research from 2002-
2003 claims that club members rarely discussed national issues that affected development at 
local level, the main reason being that most people were unwilling to discuss controversial or 
politically sensitive issues. This might be changing. Mchakulu’s research shows that the 
younger generation wanted a more vigorous and open-minded agenda while the older 
generation still wanted a more cautious approach that would not alienate the local political 
elite.1169 I was told that the radio listening club I visited did a programme on corruption in the 
                                                 
1162 CARER stands for Centre for Advice, Research, and Education on Rights. Director of Malawi CARER is Dr. 
Vera Chirwa, a lawyer and prominent person in Malawi’s history. See Gilman, The Dance of Politics, supra note 
982, at 163.   
1163 Interview No. 11 with community based educators in Mulanje District, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1164 Oxfam, “SHSLP Annual Report”, supra note 1149, at 7-8. Mchakulu lists HIV/AIDS, general community 
health, education and agriculture and farming as topics that were dominating most clubs in 2002-2003. See 
Japhet Ezra July Mchakulu, “Youth Participation in Radio Listening Clubs in Malawi”, 33 Journal of Southern 
African Studies (2007) 251-265.  
1165 Development Broadcasting Unit, “Case Study: Makaula Community Reunion with Service Provider”, at 3.  
1166 Interview No. 5 with Oxfam, Malawi 2006. FSD2727.  
1167 Linje Manyozo, “Rural radio and the promotion of people-centered development in Africa: Radio Listening 
Clubs and community development in Malawi”, Paper presented in Maputo 6-10 December 2005, at 3. Available 
at http://www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/manyozo.pdf, visited 10 May 2012.  
1168 Englund, Human Rights and African Airwaves, supra note 968, at 11. 
1169 Mchakulu, “Youth Participation in Radio Listening Clubs in Malawi”, supra note 1164, at 257-258; 265. 
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distribution of government fertilizer coupons,1170 which would suggest that at least this club 
did not avoid politically sensitive issues. 
Mchakulu’s research also shows that among youths the desire to “exercise their 
constitutionally guaranteed right to freely express themselves” was the second most common 
reason for joining a radio listening club, information seeking being the primary reason.1171 
This indicates a certain awareness of and willingness to use a language of rights.   
Mchakulu claims that radio listening clubs present local citizenry with a public sphere for 
debate that is free of state interference.1172 It is the club members themselves who have the 
power and responsibility to set the agenda for these debates. Any club member is free to raise 
a burning issue for discussion.1173 According to Englund, this principle that made it possible 
for everyone, regardless of age, gender, and other similar markers of hierarchy, to submit 
stories was unprecedented,1174 and it opened new space for public debate in rural Malawi. The 
forum was, however, not free from power struggles. Women spoke less than men, and the 
longest time slot was taken by service providers, who gave expert-like advice in a manner that 
is typical of top-down developmentalism and a common problem to many participatory 
approaches.1175  
Women made up the majority of the clubs, and this can be partly explained by the fact that the 
Development Broadcasting Station’s original aim with the clubs was to meet developmental 
information needs of women.  In fact, the reluctance of some of the clubs to discuss political 
issues emerges partly from the traditional low status of women in Malawi. The women who 
founded the clubs emphasised issues that seemed development-oriented and useful for the 
improvement of their households and local communities as a way to legitimise the clubs in the 
face of a sceptical male-dominated society. Later on men were invited into the club, and this 
was seen as a way to get the men’s ‘stamp of approval’.1176 
3.3.5 Sustainability and the role of the government 
All extension workers had received training on rights-based approaches by the WLSA. This 
reflected the fact that the SHSLP was not Oxfam’s programme but a programme implemented 
by government structures with the support of Oxfam. It was government service providers 
who were doing the job on the ground with communities. Oxfam filled in with resources, for 
instance, by providing motorbikes and fuel to extension workers so that they could reach the 
communities. In a highly aid-dependent country, such as Malawi,1177 this approach is difficult 
to avoid. At the same time it is clear that Oxfam cannot continue with this form of direct 
budget support at district level forever. The question is whether central government is going 
to make it possible for government officials at the district level to continue with the work after 
Oxfam discontinues its financial and other support. (The democratically elected local 
government councils are responsible for local development plans to the central government 
                                                 
1170 Interview No. 10 with Development Broadcasting Unit, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1171 Mchakulu, “Youth Participation in Radio Listening Clubs in Malawi”, supra note 1164, at 260. 
1172 Ibid., at 253. 
1173 Ibid., at 255. 
1174 Englund, Human Rights and African Airwaves, supra note 968, at 223. 
1175 Ibid., at 42.  
1176 Mchakulu, “Youth Participation in Radio Listening Clubs in Malawi”, supra note 1164, at 258-260. 
1177 Between 1994-2004 aid disbursements have represented between 13 and 41 % of GNI. See “Evaluation of 
General Budget Support 1994-2004: Malawi Country Report”, May 2006, at 10-11. Available at 
http://www.idd.bham.ac.uk/general-budget-support/PDFS-OECDDAC/mal.pdf, valid as of 8 March 2009.   
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but have no financial autonomy, and no right to collect taxes. They thereby depend on 
financing from central government.)1178 
The service providers I met did not think central government is going to provide finances to 
continue the work that they had been doing with funds from Oxfam. On the one hand they felt 
confident that they had the skills and capacity to carry on with the new working methods also 
in the case where Oxfam had to leave Mulanje, but, on the other hand, they were concerned 
that the lack of resources will prevent them from using the newly required skills.  “If they 
[Oxfam] are to pull out it’s just as good to give a gun without the bullets. So how can we use 
the gun? How can we reach the community so that we can assist their problems?”1179 Service 
providers were worried that if they do not have the resources to meet and assist the 
communities, this will create a lot of frustrations. “It’s really a challenge… they [the 
communities] have been trained in rights, this time around they are able to demand various 
services! And at certain times Oxfam was able to come and rescue where government cannot 
manage. Now that Oxfam is pulling out it remains with government to respond to what 
communities will be demanding. That will be difficult and at the end of the day we are seeing 
some frustrations on the part of the communities.”1180 
This question of sustainability is always a challenge in development cooperation. If the trigger 
to use a rights-based approach to government service provision at district level comes from an 
international NGO instead of the central government, there is no guarantee that the changed 
practices that may take place actually last longer than the programme. Another challenge is to 
integrate what local duty-bearers learn in rights trainings into their everyday activities.1181 
Unless it is clearly spelled out that services in e.g. the area of agriculture are to be seen as 
obligations on the part of the local authorities and this approach is integrated into the official 
documents of these institutions, practices are not likely to change.1182  
Oxfam had taken conscious steps to move away from being a service provider to being a 
facilitator. Instead of providing funding directly to small-scale interventions in communities it 
had started giving funding to the District Development Fund that is administrated by the 
District Assembly. Communities, through VDCs, were encouraged to apply for funds from 
this Fund. The idea was that people would understand that Oxfam is not going to be present in 
the district forever,1183 and would learn to turn to the government structures as duty-bearers.   
The process of how a duty-bearer was identified in the SHSLP is interesting from a human 
rights law perspective since traditionally only the state (government) and its agents are 
recognised as having duties under human rights instruments.1184 When human rights enter into 
development efforts it is, however, increasingly acknowledged that rights are also relevant in 
horizontal relationships between persons.1185 In the SHSLP, governmental, non-governmental 
                                                 
1178 Meinhardt and Patel, Malawi’s Process of Democratic Transition, supra note 970, at 48. 
1179 Interview No. 8 with extension workers from Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Community 
Development, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1180 Interview No. 8 with extension workers from Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Community 
Development, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1181 Interview No. 17 with Women and Law in Southern Africa, Malawi 2006. FSD2727.  
1182 Interview No. 29 with Malawi Resource Centre for Human Rights, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1183 Interview No. 5 with Oxfam, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1184 Krzysztof Drzewicki, “Internationalization of Human Rights and Their Juridization”, in R. Hanski & M. 
Suksi (eds), An Introduction to the International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook (Finland: Institute for 
Human Rights, second revised edition, 1999) 25-47.   
1185 Ghalib Galant and Michelle Parlevliet, “Using Rights to Address Conflict – Valuable Synergy”, in P. Gready 
and J. Ensor (eds.), Reinventing Development? Translating Rights-Based Approaches from Theory into Practice 
(London: Zed Books, 2005) 108-128, at 115. 
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and private actors were all seen as relevant duty-bearers.1186 What mattered was who the duty-
bearer is in the eyes of the community members, not under some legal provision. The 
community simply wanted to know who can help them to solve their problems.1187 More often 
the help came from NGOs, instead of government structures. This implied that in 
communities Oxfam was seen as a service provider, and sometimes even as the ultimate 
authority. This constellation was the result of Oxfam (and other NGOs) having more funds 
and resources than government structures.1188 NGOs that wanted to promote and facilitate the 
government duty-bearers instead of themselves providing services directly to the 
communities, find that it was not easy to change roles,1189 especially since community 
members often thought Oxfam was doing a better job than the government.1190 
3.3.6 Giving meaning to human rights: An actor-oriented approach 
In the SHSLP there was open use of ‘rights language’, especially by the radio listening clubs. 
In the programme documents there was, however, no analysis of the legal framework nor was 
there reference to specific rights in the Constitution of Malawi or international human rights 
instruments ratified by the country. Oxfam’s own (international) list of five rights was not 
used either. There was simply no explicit link between the programme activities, focussing 
mainly on food security, and the legal framework.1191  
Oxfam staff told me that the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of Malawi1192 was the point of 
reference for the human rights awareness rising sessions. The challenge was that economic 
and social rights had a weak position in the Constitution in Malawi. For instance, the booklet 
“Human Rights in the Constitution of Malawi: The Bill of Rights”1193 reflected the 
Constitution in the sense that the political and civil rights were given the majority of the 
attention while only the last page dealt with the right to development, which entails access to 
basic services such as education, health and food.1194 Oxfam wanted to change attitudes 
towards socioeconomic rights: “Food security is a human rights issue. And people don’t look 
at it as a human rights issue. Government has to look at food security as a human rights issue 
and make sure people are food secure.”1195 The strategy taken in the SHSLP was to work 
directly with the policy and practice by district level government institutions instead of 
influencing the legal framework.  
I was perplexed by this lack of analysis of and reference to the legal human rights framework 
until I came across theoretical material on an actor-oriented perspective on human rights in 
                                                 
1186 Oxfam Novib, “How RBA Works in Practice: Exploring how Oxfam Novib and Its Counterparts Apply an 
RBA”, 2007 (unpublished document) at 12.  
1187 Interview No. 7 with Oxfam, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1188 Interview No. 24 with Department of Poverty and Disaster Management Affairs, Malawi 2006. FSD2727.  
1189 Interview No. 7 with Oxfam, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1190 I discussed the role of Oxfam and other NGOs with a group of women at Mulanje Mission and they said 
people in general think it is better that aid is coming directly from NGOs than going through the traditional 
structure of chiefs. It is believed that government structures at all levels are corrupt. Group Interview No. 4 with 
female members of Church and Society in Mulanje District, Malawi 2006.  
1191 This is often seen as the first step when applying a rights-based (or a human rights-based) approach to 
development. See OHCHR, “Frequently Asked Questions”, supra note 81, at 15. 
1192 Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, 1995, Chapter IV.  
1193 Malawi CARER, 2001. Malawi Carer has produced awareness raising materials on human rights in the form 
of booklets and posters (in English and Chichewa). 
1194 Article 30(2) of the Constitution reads: “The State shall take all necessary measures for the realisation of the 
right to development. Such measures shall include, amongst other things, equality of opportunity for all in their 
access to basic resources, education, health services, food, shelter, employment and infrastructure.”  
1195 Interview No. 6 with Oxfam, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
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development, and I was able to put the SHSLP into that conceptual framework. In the SHSLP 
actors did not primarily rely on fixed definitions of the human rights concept in general, or the 
right to food concept in particular, instead the meaning of ‘human rights’ were shaped in the 
process of demanding services from local duty-bearers.  
One could assume that lack of analysis of the legal framework would have an effect on 
situation analysis but some actors within the SHSLP had taken steps into the direction of 
using rights as a roadmap for development (‘rights’ defined very loosely). Before radio 
listening clubs decided to record a ‘village voice’ they identified a problem in terms of rights, 
and they also identified a duty-bearer (although the term ‘service provider’ was mostly used). 
For example the community agreed that one reason for food insecurity was lacking extension 
services needed to produce more food.1196 A DBU officer explains:  
The way our right to food is being denied is that we are not getting the services, 
the extension services from Government extension officer. So he’s not coming to 
the community to teach us on how we can make our ridges. As a result we are not 
producing food and we are hungry. So here we wanted to demand that now. So 
they [the RLC] invite that community and they make that recording. And in that 
recording they are going to explain how his absence or his inability to come to 
deliver services is violating their right to have food so they explain in that process 
that you see our right to food is being denied here because of your absence, you 
are not coming here to give us your services.1197 
This human rights language is far from that in international human rights covenants and closer 
to the everyday lived reality of power struggles over resources. Members of the radio listening 
clubs were less specific (than the DBU officer quoted above) on how they had given meaning 
to the right to food to include extension services,1198 but the general impression was that 
people were starting to demand services from duty-bearers as a matter of rights, not as charity 
as it used to be. There seemed to be general awareness that I have a right, without people 
being specific1199 and in most cases without relating rights to obligations of duty-bearers. In 
some instances there was, however, also awareness that the fact that I have a right means 
somebody else has a duty. (“We know we have the right to food so government should reduce 
the maize price.”1200) When asking what should be the role of the central government I was 
told: “The major role that the government should play is to ensure that we villagers here have 
all the social services present in our communities. In addition, the government has a 
responsibility to make sure that all our rights, including right to food, right to health, right to 
education are fulfilled. It’s their responsibility.”1201 These quotations show that in the lived 
reality of villagers it made sense to equate rights with services.  
The way actors in the SHSLP gave meaning to rights and obligations is an example of how 
“rights are shaped through actual struggles informed by people’s own understandings of to 
                                                 
1196 Group Interview No. 2 in Ngamwani Village in Thyolo District, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1197 Interview No. 10 with Development Broadcasting Unit, Malawi 2006. FSD2727.  
1198 Group interview No. 2, Ngamwani Village in Thyolo District, Malawi 2006 (with members of RLC): “One 
program that I’d like to highlight since the RLC was established is how to make ridges and to protect soil. We 
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area.” FSD2727. 
1199 Interview No. 7 with Oxfam, Malawi 2006. FSD2727.  
1200 Group Interview No. 1, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1201 Group Interview No. 2, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
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what they are justly entitled.”1202 Actors do not necessarily use any ‘legal’ argumentation but 
instead insist on what they think “they are justly entitled to” – ‘just entitlement’ as opposed to 
‘an ethic of human rights’ – and this is characteristic of an actor-oriented approach to human 
rights in development, as spelled out by Nyamu-Musembi.1203 One can also draw parallels to 
the constructed rights tradition, according to which human rights are constantly being 
negotiated, defined and redefined at all levels of society.1204 Human rights are seen as 
contextual and dynamic, grounded in lived experience. This tradition underlines people’s 
agency in human rights protection and realisation.1205  
According to Englund the Chichewa radio programme, partly produced through radio 
listening clubs, has generated a nationwide audience that “debates the abuse of power through 
idioms that are different from the vocabulary introduced by human rights activists”.1206 The 
kind of individualistic and assertive claim-making that has been promoted by human rights 
activists, who also tend to focus on civil and political rights rather the full range of rights 
claims, has been absent.1207 The radio programme questioned the idea that human rights need 
to be introduced by experts. All of this contributed to an alternative debate on injustice,1208 
providing competing meanings to ‘human rights’ and questioning the official and NGO 
human rights discourses. This supports the suggestion by Gready and Ensor that a rights-
based approach has potential to not only reinvent development but also reinvent human 
rights.1209 
This kind of actor-oriented approach in which human rights are loosely defined without 
reference to international norms and standards is contrary to the ‘express linkage’ requirement 
of HRBAs, being the basis of inter alia the Common Understanding among UN Agencies. 
According to this thinking human rights standards and principles should guide all phases of 
programming, and human rights should determine the relationship between rights-holders and 
duty-bearers, i.e., there should be express linkage to the normative human rights system.1210  
From a community development perspective it is, however, not acceptable that human rights 
are defined in a non-participatory manner by the powerful for the powerless. Participation has 
long been part of a community development discourse; we recall that participation has been 
on the agenda of Oxfam since 1990. A community development perspective on human rights 
strives to examine ways to make the process of giving meaning to human rights more 
democratic and participatory.1211  
Working with a loose definition of human rights enabled Oxfam and its partners to create 
more dialogue about the meaning and content of the human rights concept than that which is 
normally the case in awareness raising projects. The voice of the actors was particularly 
strong in radio listening clubs as they are free to set their own agenda in terms of claiming 
needs as rights.  
                                                 
1202 Nyamu-Musembi, “An Actor-oriented Approach to Rights in Development”, supra note 18, at 41. See also 
Ife, Human Rights from Below, supra note 8. 
1203 Nyamu-Musembi, “An Actor-oriented Approach to Rights in Development”, supra note 18, at 41-51. 
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1207 Ibid., at 5 and 9.  
1208 Ibid., at 221. 
1209 Gready and Ensor, “Introduction”, supra note 70, at 14.  
1210 Common Understanding, supra note 50. 
1211 See Ife, Human Rights from Below, supra note 8, at 126-127. 
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However, when actors come together to give meaning and content to what they mean by 
human rights, when they decide what they are going to struggle for, there is an obvious risk 
for exclusion and discrimination. In a RBA, such as that used by Oxfam, the task of the 
facilitators is to make sure the voice of everyone is heard and reflected. Otherwise there is a 
risk that the agenda is set by the powerful for the powerless, only on the community level. 
The data I have from the SHSLP is not rich enough to analyse the process of how actors come 
together to give meaning to human rights and whose voice has been the strongest in radio 
listening clubs, and other forums. Certainly, the radio listening club process has not been free 
from challenges and power struggles, as has been shown by Mchakulu’s research. 
Interference from local political elites, which in some cases can lead to violence, and 
sometimes fears of state intervention, were factors that weakened these forums.1212    
In order to avoid exclusion and discrimination in the clubs, it would have been important to 
put more effort into the process of identifying and defining an issue as a human rights issue to 
be taken up by the club. Jim Ife reminds us that a human rights from below approach to 
community development is not an ‘anything-goes-approach’. There should also be an 
aspiration of universality:1213 what constitute ‘our’ human rights in this community should 
also constitute ‘your’ human rights in another community. It is, moreover, important that 
some core values and ideas embedded in the legal documents that constitute human rights 
law, such as autonomy, choice, bodily integrity, equality,1214 and voice, are maintained and 
respected in an actor-oriented approach to human rights, which has no fixed definitions of the 
human rights concept.  
3.3.7 Are rights confrontational?  
In most of the interviews I was reminded of the historical context of Malawi; that the whole 
issue of human rights arose around 1994 with the transition from a one party regime to 
drafting a new constitution that provides for democratic governance and the introducing of a 
bill of rights. Introducing ‘rights talk’ in villages, promoting people to demand services as a 
right and thereby challenging power, and doing this in a very resource constrained 
environment, is indeed not an easy task.  
Human rights are sometimes accused of being ‘political’, or overly focussed on the state and 
using adversarial techniques to hold violators accountable. It is claimed that this is unhelpful 
for the development process.1215 (The debate about the de-politicisation/re-politicisation that 
human rights potentially bring as they enter into development is dealt with elsewhere. If 
human rights are to be bring about transformation, they have to be ‘political’ in that they have 
to deal with political questions about how to share resources.) The DBU’s approach – making 
radio programmes where duty-bearers’ lack of action are exposed on national radio – can 
indeed be defined as almost confrontational, but it is unclear if this approach has found its 
inspiration in human rights techniques or in empowerment techniques stemming from the 
development discourse. Moreover, Mchakulu’s research shows that at least some clubs used 
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to avoid politically sensitive issues and debates, focusing on economic empowerment rather 
than political empowerment.1216  
The difference between ‘human rights techniques’ and ‘empowerment techniques’ originating 
from development discourse could potentially be quite substantial as adversarial human rights 
techniques aim at duty-bearer action to remedy the situation while the development discourse 
often promotes increased self-help and self-reliance in the name of empowerment.1217 In the 
case of the radio listening clubs the two approaches seem to come together. The responsible 
duty-bearer is invited to the community for a dialogue and it is underlined that both sides (the 
community as well as the service provider) should contribute to solving the problem. “After 
discussion we make an action oriented plan: what are we going to do as a community and how 
are you as a service provider going to assist us?”1218 Mchakulu notes that members of radio 
listening clubs are not asking the authorities and service providers to solve problems on their 
own but instead the club members propose possible solutions.1219  
Not all international NGOs applying what they call RBAs have gone as far as Oxfam and the 
DBU in Mulanje, Thyolo and Phalombe. For instance CARE Malawi had developed an 
approach to RBA where there was no explicit use of rights language due to the sensitivity of 
the issues: “When you start talking of accountability and transparency in your face like that 
the authorities don’t always take it positively. We were aware of that. We said how can we 
engage ourselves in a rights based programme but at the same time not being 
confrontational?”1220 CARE also underlined the ‘responsibility’ of the communities in an 
explicit way, thereby promoting self-reliance. For example, when a community becomes 
aware of the resource constraints that a health centre is struggling with, they start to invest in 
preventive mechanisms (“because they know that they cannot rely on this health centre, as it 
is highly limited in terms of the services it can actually provide.”1221) If CARE had had a 
more confrontational approach it could have assisted the community in taking the issue from 
the district level to the central level, and to demanding additional resources.    
Oxfam’s strategy to support channels for rights-holders’ demands was also visible in the area 
of labour relations. Again, Oxfam has a dual approach where it supported the Government 
Labour Office as well as the Te, Coffee and Macadamia Workers’ Union. Again, training and 
sensitisation on labour regulations was a key entry point into cooperation with rights-holders 
and duty-bearers alike. The training sessions on labour rights that Oxfam facilitated targeted 
the general public, workers at tea estates, and other workplaces, as well as managers at tea 
estates.1222  
The environment in Mulanje and Thyolo, where there is a long history of plantation 
agriculture and a sense of acute land scarcity (that is directed against the plantations), may 
facilitate political mobilisation of villagers.1223 In this context, it has been possible for Oxfam 
                                                 
1216 Mchakulu, “Youth Participation in Radio Listening Clubs in Malawi”, supra note 1164, at 264. 
1217 See Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi, “Putting the ‘Rights-Based Approach’”, supra note 44, at 1431. 
1218 Interview No. 10 with Development Broadcasting Unit, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1219 Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi, “Putting the ‘Rights-Based Approach’”, supra note 44, at 264. 
1220 Interview No. 32 with CARE, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. DFID had a programme called “Transform: Through 
Rights to Needs for Marginalised Malawians (2001-2003)” that was suspended in 2003 at the request of 
government. The main reason for the closure was “an underestimation of the sensitivity of the project.” See 
Barnett et al., “Evaluation of DFID Country Programmes”, supra note 998, at 32. 
1221 Interview No. 32 with CARE, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1222 Interview No. 13 with Ministry of Labour, District Labor Office in Mulanje, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1223 Daniel Alberman, Desmond Kaunda and Mick Moore, “Fashion, Passion and Ambiguity: A review of How 
DFID Malawi has Incorporated Rights-Based Approaches into its Work”, 31 March 2005. (Report is with the 
author).  
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to develop a ‘soft confrontational approach’ in which demands are presented to duty-bearers, 
but at the same time underlining dialogue, mutual responsibility, and action by all sides.  
3.3.8 Rights-based development principles 
The following section analyses what non-discrimination, participation, empowerment and 
accountability meant in the SHSLP. I discuss the principles in this order because of the role 
non-discrimination plays in targeting; it cannot be separated from participation and 
empowerment.    
Vulnerability, participation, and power: Increasing the voice of women 
As stated earlier, targeting the most vulnerable has been interpreted as being part of an 
equality agenda. With regard to targeting, the same ‘mantra’ that was on the lips of all 
development agencies – lifting the poorest of the poor out of poverty – was also repeated  by 
Oxfam: “We are looking at children, chronically sick, women. Those are the key targets, 
because we want to get them out of poverty.”1224  
In the SHSLP, the question of who is most vulnerable was critical during the PRA exercise 
that was the basis of all development interventions in the communities. The facilitators (from 
government institutions) used tools such as ‘the resource walk’ to identify those with fewer or 
no resources. They used simple questions such as ‘who can afford to buy bread’ or ‘who owns 
a bicycle’ when categorising people into vulnerable and less vulnerable. An in-depth 
discussion on the ethical aspects of ‘categorising’ people is outside the scope of this paper, 
but it is clear that this process has its own inherent problems (especially since the difference 
in terms of resources between the ‘vulnerable’ and ‘less vulnerable’ is very small). It should 
also be kept in mind that ‘lack of resources’ or ‘poverty’ can be defined in many ways.1225  
The conclusion in previous sections regarding the possible difference between using non-
discrimination as a principle in vulnerability assessment and targeting in ‘good development 
practice’ compared to using non-discrimination as a lens for analysis in human rights-based 
work, is that focus in the latter would be more on finding out who is marginalised and 
vulnerable to exclusion and discrimination than who is vulnerable to e.g. food shortages. The 
answer might be that the same individuals and groups are experiencing both discrimination 
and food insecurity, but the question is different. Furthermore, when the question of why 
there is discrimination and what can be done to address it, is added to the analysis and the 
affected population is actively involved in the inquiry, this can potentially be the first step to 
changing the situation (agency). This did not happen in the SHSLP at the time of my field 
research.  
In RBA it is often claimed that engagement with rights, in a social and political process, can 
transform established, often hierarchical structures within society, and therefore rights can 
potentially be used as entry points to challenge power relations.1226 In the SHSLP it was 
recognised that addressing unequal power relations is indeed important if the so called 
vulnerable groups are to be included in the development process, but it is unclear how 
                                                 
1224 Interview No. 7 with Oxfam, Malawi 2006. FSD2727.  
1225 In local languages there are four different concepts to describe the state of poverty: umphawi, kusauka, 
kusowa, and usiwa. The first term means poor quality of life arising from lack of basic necessities, the second 
translates into poor quality of life arising from continuous struggle to live, the third term means lack of anything 
at a particular time, i.e. it refers to a temporary situation, and the forth is lack of clothing. Kasmann and Chirwa, 
“Mission Report & Recommendations”, supra note 1147, at 18.  
1226 Gready and Ensor, “Introduction”, supra note 70, at 23.  
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explicitly rights were used as justification for questioning hierarchical structures. “We can 
only get them out of poverty through inclusion. It’s an issue of changing relations within 
communities, an issue of redefining roles and responsibilities and sharing power.”1227 In 
human rights terminology ‘changing relations’ means addressing discrimination. If the human 
rights framework had been used as a starting point for the problem analysis, that is basically 
what the participatory rural appraisal is concerned with, questions around vulnerability would 
focus on discrimination, non-inclusion, and equality in the opportunities to participate instead 
of lack of resources alone. Dividing the villagers into categories based on their economic 
status is as such not enough to establish patterns of exclusion and marginalisation.  
The first priority seems to have been to ensure the participation of vulnerable groups in the 
community structures such as the VDCs and its sub-committees. The SHSLP had a policy that 
there should be equal representation of both sexes in the VDC, so that half of the 10 members 
were to be women. In addition, groups such as people living with HIV should be 
represented.1228  
Ensuring equal participation is indeed important since the VDC and other committees play a 
key role in community development. After the PRA, where priority problems were identified, 
the villagers together with the service providers made a development plan for the village. The 
implementation of the plan was in the hands of the VDC. In practice this meant that the VDC 
applied for funding from the District Development Fund for small scale interventions (e.g. in 
the area of clean water).1229  
In the programme area the kinship structure is matrilineal, meaning that heritage of property 
such as land passes through the female line. Female and male children alike inherit property 
from their maternal uncles and not their fathers.1230 After marriage the husband settles in the 
village of his wife. In theory, this provides for a strong economic position for women,1231 but 
it became clear during the interviews that in practice decisions about and control over land are 
taken by the man in the family.1232 Studies have shown that women’s rights to land in such 
matrilineal systems are more theoretical in nature.1233 Additionally, it should be noted that 
leadership positions are usually held by men.1234 Success or failure in promoting women’s 
real influence over the politics of development through having a voice in elected village 
bodies is not easy to demonstrate. Ensuring formal participation by women is not enough if 
the female representatives sit quietly at the back. However, an outspoken effort to have equal 
representation by women in VDCs has made it possible for women to take part in decision-
making.1235  
When speaking of women and participation, it is necessary to elaborate on the concepts of 
power and empowerment. As mentioned previously, Rowlands points out that some 
definitions of power focus on the ability of one person or group to get another person or group 
                                                 
1227 Interview No. 7 with Oxfam, Malawi 2006. FSD2727.  
1228 Interview No. 7 with Oxfam, Malawi 2006. This policy was mentioned also during the two group interviews.   
1229 Interview No. 8 with extension workers from Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Community 
Development, Malawi 2006. FSD2727.  
1230 Chiweza, “The Challenges of Promoting Legal Empowerment”, supra 1158, at 210. 
1231 Kasmann and Chirwa, “Mission Report & Recommendations”, supra note 1147, at 4.  
1232 Interview No. 7 with Oxfam, Malawi 2006; Interview No. 5 with Oxfam, Malawi 2006; Interview No. 25 
with Ministry of Lands, Physical Planning and Surveys, Malawi 2006; Group Interview No. 4 with female 
members of Church and Society in Mulanje District, Malawi 2006. FSD2727.  
1233 Chiweza, “The Challenges of Promoting Legal Empowerment”, supra note 1230, at 211. 
1234 Kasmann and Chirwa, “Mission Report & Recommendations”, supra note 1147, at 4. See also Gilman, The 
Dance of Politics, supra note 982. 
1235 Interview No. 7 with Oxfam, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
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to do something against their will.1236 When defining power as ‘power over’ (being able to 
control something, even having control over another group), then empowerment means 
bringing people who are outside the decision-making process into it.1237 Oxfam and the 
SHSLP seem to have aimed at empowering women in this conventional meaning of the word. 
There was strong emphasis on women’s participation in political structures and formal or 
informal decision-making. This indicates that participation had a broader meaning and agenda 
behind it than what was the case in the JEFAP. Women and men did not participate merely as 
‘beneficiaries’ but also as citizens and rights-holders.1238  
Using the conventional definition of power as ‘power over’, i.e.  if one group gains power it 
will be at the expense of another group’s power position,1239 usually creates tensions. One 
such group was the village heads, who had given up part of their power to other community 
structures such as VDCs.1240 Because the SHSLP underlined equal participation and the 
importance of fair representation in the VDC and its subcommittees, Oxfam staff believed 
people had been empowered to question the position of the village head men. “People used to 
see the village headman as God, they would not question him. But now they can say no.”1241 
It seemed, however, that the position of the village heads varied from one village to another. It 
would be naïve to think that problems around the power position of traditional leaders have 
been solved. In many villages people were still afraid of the village head man and would not 
confront him with concerns about corruption, for example, during the distribution of 
government subsidised fertilizer coupons. “We are voiceless because it’s our village headman 
who is doing that [corruption]. We have no power. We are afraid.”1242 
Participation has been an important theme since the beginning of the SHSLP, when one aim 
was to teach participatory methods to government extension workers. It seems that, in the 
SHSLP, participation has a broader meaning than functioning as a developmental tool 
(although PRA is such a tool). The aim was not only to involve and activate people around 
common development problems, and thereby increase a sense of ‘ownership’, but also to 
address issues of equality and power and thereby to increase the voice of the voiceless. 
Participation, nevertheless, remained at the district level instead of making efforts to increase 
the voice of community members at a central level, where policy decisions are actually made. 
Empowerment as being aware that ‘I have a right’ 
What we have seen in the chapter on food assistance is that empowerment is often linked to 
building capacity and ‘handing over power’ to local structures. There are, however, other 
ways of conceptualising power than ‘power over’, i.e., power as domination. When women 
(or other marginalised groups) gain ‘power to’, ‘power with’ and ‘power from within’ rather 
than ‘power over’ this entails a very different meaning of empowerment.1243 Within these 
non-dominative interpretations of power, empowerment is concerned with the processes by 
which people become aware of their own interests – perhaps in this case defined as rights. As 
                                                 
1236 Rowlands, Questioning Empowerment, supra note 897, at 9. 
1237 Ibid., at 13.  
1238 Comapre with Cornwall, Beneficiary, Consumer, Citizen, supra note 837, at 22. 
1239 Rowlands, Questioning Empowerment, supra note 897, at 11.  
1240 As an example it can be mentioned that some chiefs also feel threatened by the village rights committees and 
community based educators. Group interview No. 11 with Community Based Educators, Malawi 2006. 
FSD2727.   
1241 Interview No. 6 with Oxfam, Malawi 2006. FSD2727.  
1242 Group Interview No. 4 with female members of Church and Society in Mulanje District, Malawi 2006. 
FSD2727. 
1243 Rowlands, Questioning Empowerment, supra note 897, at 12. 
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put by Rowlands: “Empowerment is thus more than participation in decision-making; it must 
also include the processes that lead people to perceive themselves as able and entitled to 
make decisions.”1244 In the SHSLP it seemed that as women became aware of ‘I have a right’ 
this process started, whether this is the intention of the programme or not.  
This awareness means adopting a new sense of self that incorporates rights.1245 Research by 
Merry shows that the rights framework does not displace other frameworks but adds a new 
dimension to the way individuals think about their problems.1246 The same research also 
shows that the human rights framework is powerful because it shows that something, such as 
gender violence or hunger, is not natural and inevitable.1247  
When engaging in a human rights-based approach to development, the aim is not just 
‘empowerment in general’, or ‘building capacity in general’, but empowerment in relation to 
claiming and realising human rights. Rights-based empowerment is concerned with knowing 
your rights, acting on them and holding duty-bearers to account.1248 Rights language is 
therefore a key factor in the empowerment process. ‘A rights-holder’ is per definition entitled 
to something (what he or she is entitled to, is often defined by the actors themselves, as we 
have seen).  
As can be recalled, in the SHSLP, human rights language is far from that used in international 
human rights covenants, and in fact closer to the everyday reality of power struggles over 
resources. In the two communities that I visited, one in Mulanje and one in Thyolo, people 
referred to the right to services, the right to development, the right to food etc.  
Human rights-based empowerment usually highlights the formal and external aspects of 
creating an environment in which people can empower themselves. Emphasis is on enhancing 
people’s ability to claim and exercise their rights effectively.1249 There is usually no 
questioning whether people value expanding their skills and choices into claiming and 
exercising their rights. (The aspect of empowerment emphasised by Naila Kabeer and 
Amartya Sen.) The data I have about the SHSLP is not rich enough to make a conclusion 
about how active the actors have been in setting the agenda, but it seems that within at least 
the radio listening clubs there was a genuine possibility to engage in any challenge the 
community faced. Whether the club members chose to apply a rights language to make their 
claim was something they did if it made sense in their lived reality. Beneficiaries also played 
a crucial role in PRA by e.g. choosing priority intervention for the own community. The 
absence of a clear link to any specific list of rights in Oxfam’s work in the SHSLP gave room 
for an actor-oriented approach to rights-based development, creating space for participation 
and empowerment, rights and obligations. Otherwise there is always a risk that the priorities 
and perspectives of the local actors become over-shadowed by an approach focusing on a 
specific rights-based target such as a specific right.1250 
Among Oxfam staff and extension workers there was a high level of optimism that human 
rights language has already by itself empowered the communities. “The trainings [on rights] 
                                                 
1244 Rowlands, Questioning Empowerment, supra note 897, at 14 (emphasis in original).  
1245 See Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence, supra note 287, at 181. 
1246 Ibid., at 180.  
1247 Ibid., at 180.  
1248 Danish Institute for Human Rights, “Malawi Baseline Data, Malawi HIV/AIDS programme 2005-09”, 
Baseline research 2005-06, report of 2006, at 18. Available at http://www.humanrights.dk/files/pdf/ 
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1249 See e.g., Hansen and Sano, “The Implications and Value Added of a Rights-Based Approach”, supra note 
708, at 51. 
1250 Newman, “Challenges and Dilemmas in Integrating”, supra note 863. 
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are more or less like an eye opener. They never knew before and they say now they know. 
And it’s like they know their rights and they know they have the right to demand services 
from each and every sector of government.”1251 The question is whether awareness of the fact 
that ‘I have a right’ is enough? The capacity to actually take action and claim rights from 
government institutions (to demand services), or to start a process to seek redress for a 
violation (this could mean visiting the labour office or the police) was still very low in the 
communities. The small office of Malawi CARER (with two staff members) did not have the 
resources to assist village rights committees and volunteer community based educators in the 
220 villages in the programme area.  
A baseline research carried out in Malawi by the Danish Institute for Human Rights the same 
year as my visit to Mulanje and Thyolo (2006) revealed that rural rights-holders (small-holder 
peasants, pieceworkers and fishermen) were barely confident to make claims that went 
beyond their community. This was mainly because of low expectations as regards the 
structures of local governance. They tended to see making claims as futile efforts for the 
reason that the capacity and willingness of district authorities to respond to such claims were 
deemed weak or non-existent by community members.1252 The data was collected in 
completely different districts (Salima and Nkhotakota),1253 and cannot be directly applied to 
the situation in the SHSLP districts, but I share the observation that in order for meaningful 
exchange to take place, duty-bearers have to feel and act responsible. Sano observers that this 
is more likely to happen when NGOs facilitate linkages between communities and district 
authorities.1254  
In order for rights-based empowerment to take place, community members cannot be left 
alone in the struggle to make demands. Leaving things at the point of rights awareness is not 
enough. ‘Preaching the language of rights’ is not very effective if there is no link to 
interventions and to action-taking. If rights are to be empowering, people need to become 
involved, to mobilise in a struggle for social justice, not to just be passive listeners taking in 
knowledge from outside experts. The secret behind the popularity of the radio listening clubs 
is perhaps to be found in the active role of the participants. There was a conviction that 
through radio listening clubs communities can mobilise themselves and make a difference.1255 
The popularity of the weekly radio show meant that the DBU was under pressure to set up an 
increasing number clubs.1256   
Mobilising rights-holders to claim rights from duty-bearers while at the same time building 
the capacity of the duty-bearers to respond to the demands, has been a creative and 
empowering way to engage in rights-based development. At the same time, it should not be 
forgotten that also duty-bearers need to be empowered. Duty-bearers should not only be 
aware that ’I have an obligation’ but also have the tools to fulfil this obligation. It will be a 
                                                 
1251 Interview No. 8 with extension workers from Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Community 
Development, Malawi 2006. FSD2727.  
1252 Hans-Otto Sano and Hatla Thelle, “The Need for Evidence-Based Human Rights Research”, in F. Coomans, 
F. Grunfeld & M. T. Kamminga (eds), Methods of Human Rights Research (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2009) 91-109, 
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1253 Danish Institute for Human Rights, “Malawi Baseline Data”, supra note 1248, at 4.  
1254 Sano and Thelle, “The Need for Evidence-Based Human Rights Research”, supra note 1252, at 102. 
1255 The level of optimism about what the local Radio Listening Club can achieve was high in the village. Group 
Interview No. 2, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1256 Interview No. 10 with Development Broadcasting Unit, Malawi 2006. FSD2727.  
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long journey before district level government service providers in Mulanje, Thyolo and 
Phalombe have those tools.  
Accountability: putting pressure on the government  
The traditional approach to accountability is concerned with providing checks and balances in 
the development process. In the SHSLP there was also the ambition that actors should account 
for their actions and for how they have spent resources. However, as we will see below, 
accountability was taken somewhat further, into the area of mobilising communities to putting 
pressure on duty-bearers, thereby linking accountability to obligations, and rights-based 
empowerment. 
Accountability is often linked to ‘good governance’ and this is also the case in the SHSLP. 
Oxfam claimed it promoted good governance in the name of effective monitoring of how 
funds were being used. With regard to the funds used by communities for small scale projects 
it was the task of District Assemblies to do the monitoring. At the village level, the 
community structure that was responsible for the project organised public meetings during 
which they accounted for how the money was spent.1257 Here it should be noted that the VDC 
acted as duty-bearer in this instance.  
As we have seen, new accountability relationships and frameworks emerge when human 
rights enter into development policies and practices. There is stronger focus on the state-
citizen relationship as compared with the donor-implementing agency accountability 
relationship. What is striking in my data is that local representatives of the government 
resisted when Oxfam tried to make changes in how accountability relationships worked, e.g. 
through giving the District Executive Committee the role of approving or rejecting the 
applications for funding of local development projects, a role that Oxfam used to have. This 
might indicate that local actors were unwilling to assume the role of active actors and would 
have preferred to be passive beneficiaries of interventions.  
Oxfam made changes in accountability relationships and tried to take a more passive role. The 
new system of providing funding through the District Development Fund, instead of through 
Oxfam, however, caused concerns that it would actually lower the level of accountability. 
Since the members of the District Executive Committee approved or rejected the applications 
for funding, and the members were politicians, there was fear of politicisation of these 
interventions. “When they [the DEC members] are making these approvals there are so many 
biases. We find where there are strongholds, where they are more powerful within the 
government, we find most of the projects will go there to leave the other areas where there is 
little power. Government cannot do what Oxfam is doing because of issues of transparency 
and accountability.”1258  
One ‘monitoring tool’, that also aimed to increase the level of participation and 
accountability, was regular meetings called ‘How is development progressing?’ (Chitukuko 
Chikuyenda Bwanji). The VDC members met extension workers to discuss how the 
development plan for the village was progressing, and to take stock of successes and 
failures.1259 This was an opportunity for community members to confront the extension 
workers with complaints about not fulfilling their obligations.1260 The political culture in 
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1259 Oxfam, “SHSLP Annual Report”, supra note 1149, at 9. 
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Malawi was, however, still flavoured by almost 30 years of authoritarian regime, and 
questioning people in authority was something people were not yet comfortable with.1261 
Therefore, even if these monitoring meetings provided the space to confront government 
extension workers, it may have been difficult to uphold an atmosphere where it was actually 
possible to do so. “People still have the mindset that standing up and claiming rights might be 
an issue that might face them with certain consequences. They are still fearful about that.”1262  
The question is also whether it is effective to demand accountability from individual 
extension workers at the district level when they in reality have no power to decide about 
resource allocation for their department. As regard to demands about services as a matter of 
meeting obligations, radio listening clubs might be more effective since the programmes are 
aired on national radio. This means that the accountability element is taken all the way up to 
the central government – at least indirectly. If there is enough attention towards the district 
level government’s inability to act, the central government will have to respond. “So you find 
Lilongwe, that is kind of the headquarters, calling the district offices, trying to find out what 
they [the district office] proposed they would do in the village, and asking why it has not been 
accomplished. They had promised to do something and they didn’t do it.”1263 This could mean 
that it is feasible to use the radio as a tool to put pressure on the central government. “I’ve 
seen some improvements in service delivery in some of the areas mainly in government 
departments. I’ve seen some top officials taking action, even if they have not been to the area, 
they have heard that the government officers are not providing. So some top officials have 
reacted by taking positive actions.”1264  
In the SHSLP demanding accountability from duty-bearers in the area of services was at the 
heart of the programme. However, human rights were the platform for these demands on a 
political, or rhetoric, not legal level. There was no legal analysis of what the various rights, 
stemming from the Constitution of Malawi as well as international instruments, actually could 
mean in terms of services. The leading organisation, Oxfam, was not a human rights watch 
dog, naming and shaming duty-bearers, testing the legal provisions in courts, or other forums. 
The legal framework was not seen as an avenue for holding duty-bearers accountable. This is 
natural in an environment were most people, especially poor people, do not seek justice from 
formal courts but rather from traditional leaders, religious leaders, family counsellors, and 
other non-state actors.1265 In the SHSLP it was assumed that outcomes from development 
interventions (roads, schools etc.) are, or should be, de facto rights for the people. It was the 
act of identifying rights-holders and duty-bearers (and their obligations) that was key. 
Accountability was in this context about a political process where citizens put pressure on the 
government to deliver certain services, and these services were understood to be part of a 
rights agenda. Accountability was linked to obligations, but without making explicit linkage 
to legal provisions.  
It can be argued that rights-based approaches to development such as that used in the SHSLP 
contribute to taking human rights into new areas, in the search for, and struggle over, a new 
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rights regime.1266 In this new rights regime there is not necessarily any strong link to the 
human rights instruments as these are being interpreted in present jurisprudence. For members 
of radio listening clubs it made sense to equate services and rights, to claim needs as rights. 
This is a defining feature of the protest school and is in opposition to what Baxi calls “human 
rights as ethical imperatives”. An ethic of human rights insists on what communities and 
individuals ought to desire.1267 
3.3.9 Concluding remarks  
It is striking that the SHSLP included a wide variety of activities; it seems that flexible 
planning allowed for anything from provision to improved seeds to awareness rising from 
land policy. In some of the interventions it was difficult to find even an implicit link to human 
rights and also in the so called rights-based interventions explicit analysis of how the 
particular activities contributed to human rights was lacking. The programme had no rights-
based goal, but had instead introduced rights as one component of the overall goal to 
strengthen food security and reduce poverty. In the report by Oxfam ‘Rights Based 
Approaches’ was, however, put as a separate heading,1268 instead of allowing RBA to inform 
every aspect of the programme. This would suggest that the activities related to rights were 
seen as new ‘add-ons’ to old working methods, implying no fundamental shift in the rationale 
behind the development intervention.1269    
This is one way of presenting how the programme fits into a broader context of what role 
human rights play in development interventions. Another way (and the one I prefer) is to say 
that everything that the programme did was informed by the aim of supporting the capacity of 
the district level duty-bearers to deliver rights/services and at the same time generating 
awareness of and demand for these rights among communities through training and through 
radio listening clubs. It can be argued that the programme viewed all services as rights, and 
enableling government extension workers to include e.g. improved seeds is therefore part of a 
rights agenda. Oxfam and its partners were working to create a culture of human rights where 
rights-holders would be able to claim needs as rights and where duty-bearers would be clear 
that they have an obligation to respond.  
This is a considerable shift in human rights discourse in Malawi that has focused on rights as 
freedoms rather than rights as entitlements. Having such a strong focus on the responsibility 
of the duty-bearer is also a change from a discourse that has previously emphasised the 
responsibility of the rights-holder. Perhaps Oxfam, an actor outside of the human rights 
movement, has another way of working with human rights that is less focussed on the legal 
framework. In this approach, Oxfam and its partners were, moreover, not avoiding political 
issues – but the pressure on duty-bearers remained at a district level instead of taking them all 
the way up to the main duty holder, the Government. 
In human rights terminology, ‘positive obligations’ could be used to describe government 
services, including services needed after a violation has taken place, e.g. in the area of 
delivery of justice, and ‘negative obligations’ to describe preventative action to hinder 
violations from taking place, e.g. community policing, or labour inspections. Oxfam has 
managed to make the district government extension workers to take the programme activities 
                                                 
1266 Gready and Ensor, “Introduction”, supra note 70, at 6-7. E.g. Oxfam has introduced its own list of rights that 
it promotes. On this issue see Olivia Ball, “Conclusion”, in supra note 70, 278-300, at 290.   
1267 Baxi, The Future of Human Rights, supra note 358, at 7. 
1268 Oxfam, “SHSLP Annual Report”, supra note 1149, at 7.  
1269 See Uvin, “On High Moral Ground”, supra note 51, at 2.  
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onboard in their work, instead of allowing them to merely cooperating with Oxfam, which is 
often the norm in development cooperation. This is a good achievement but the question mark 
is how well the role of the central government, as the ultimate duty-bearer of human rights 
obligations, has been taken into consideration. It is worrisome that service delivery, defined as 
rights by community members, was almost completely dependent on the support of an 
international NGO.     
As we have seen there was no strong link to the legal framework to support the line of 
reasoning that services are rights. My impression is that everything that was seen as 
‘development’ before was turned to ‘rights’, without any deeper analysis. The conscious 
choice to deal with rights issues at this level (“we have tried not to look at rights as documents 
but something that is part of everyday life”)1270 can be put into the conceptual framework of 
an actor-oriented approach to rights-based development. In this context at least the following 
factors should be taken into account. It is not sustainable to view all needs as rights; there 
needs to be debate about the content of concrete rights. There is a risk that rights language 
may, in the long run, loose its value and legitimacy if it is used without a clear basis in norms 
and standards. Without a link to the legal framework the normative nature of human rights 
could be weakened. However, rights language may lose its empowering effect if the approach 
becomes too legalistic and abstract. The impression from the group interviews with 
community members was that becoming aware that ‘I have a right’ was indeed empowering. 
Empowerment was in this case a process that led these people to perceive themselves as able 
and entitled to make claims and demand accountability.1271 With continued efforts to support 
the mobilisation of rights-holders there is a chance that rights issues can become part of a 
struggle for social justice in Mulanje, Thyolo and Phalombe.  
Looking back at my hypothesis about the possible added value of human rights-based 
approaches to development, i.e., has the introduction of ‘rights talk’ led to a shift in the 
attitudes among Oxfam staff and government extension workers so that provision of services 
is seen as a matter of obligation? It is difficult, if not impossible, to ‘prove’ that human rights 
language has changed the mindset of the actors in the SHSLP, to move from a charity-based 
to a rights-based approach to service delivery. However, it is clear that the ambition is to 
convince district level government to move in that direction, although the legal reasoning to 
back up this claim might be weak. However, the key issue is that there is a shift from viewing 
services as ‘charity’ to dealing with them as ‘rights’. The challenge is that this shift is not 
sustainable if it takes place only among local level duty-bearers and not in central 
Government.  
Neither Oxfam nor government partners had made any systematic effort to do a human rights-
based situation or problem analysis, but it is interesting to note how community members 
themselves identified problems in terms of rights. Even though it is not clear how widespread 
this practice was among the radio listening clubs, the one example referred to earlier indicates 
that human rights can play a role when preparing to mobilise and demand accountability of 
duty-bearers. In addition, the participatory rural appraisals could move in this direction, by 
asking which rights remain unfulfilled, why this is the case, which duty-bearers should take 
action, what changes are needed in policy and practice.  
Although policy issues are on the agenda of the SHSLP, a systematic human rights-based 
problem analysis would probably mean that there is more attention paid to addressing 
structural causes of hunger (lack of land, lack of services, lack of influence) at policy level 
                                                 
1270 Interview No. 10 with Development Broadcasting Unit, Malawi 2006. FSD2727.   
1271 Compare with Rowlands, Questioning Empowerment, supra note 897, at 14.  
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instead of addressing short-term needs (that can be seen as ‘symptoms’ of past policy 
decisions). The risk with moving in that direction is that problem analysis may become less 
participatory, carried out by ‘experts’ with a good knowledge of the overall policy 
environment instead of the beneficiaries themselves. Beneficiaries play a crucial role in 
current PRAs by e.g. choosing priority intervention for the own community. In a resource 
constrained environment community members tend to prioritise short term interventions such 
as provision of improved seeds – and giving them the liberty to do so is in line with the 
principle of participation and empowerment. It is not easy to strike a balance between a 
legalistic (elite) approach and a participatory (grassroots) approach.    
The principle of accountability was in the SHSLP used as a basis to put pressure on 
government institutions to live up to promises that were made during meetings between 
service providers and community members. This line of reasoning is definitely a step away 
from the managerial approach to accountability that was characteristic of the JEFAP. A 
problem was that accountability demands stayed at the district level instead of targeting the 
central government with power to decide over resources and policy priorities. This was done 
in combination with efforts to increase transparency and participation by previously excluded 
groups (e.g. women) in decision-making. Rights language again played an important role, as it 
was argued that services are a matter of fulfilling human rights obligations.  
Human rights indeed seemed to be a platform to demand that duty-bearers are held 
responsible for their actions and non-actions in the area of services in the programme area, at 
least on a rhetorical level. It is interesting to see how, in the process of formulating human 
rights claims, the actors reshape and broaden what is normally understood to be human rights, 
taking the human rights agenda into the area of services. There is no question that through 
rights-based approaches, the development discourse challenges the traditional understanding 
of ‘human rights’.  
3.4 A legal approach to food security: Legislation as a tool for transformation 
What is characteristic of a ‘legal’ approach to food security? How is the role of human rights 
different compared to the other two projects? Through an analysis of the right to Food Project 
I also attempt to answer broader questions on human rights discourse in Malawi. Can the 
newborn interest in socioeconomic rights in Malawi contribute to a human rights discourse 
that underlines the political implications involved in taking human rights obligations 
seriously? Are the organisations involved in the Right to Food Project contributing to 
challenging the status quo, i.e., is the Right to Food Project contributing to societal and 
political change that strengthens the position/voice of rights-holders, and helps to increase the 
protection of their human rights and possibilities to demand accountability from duty-bearers?  
Is the right to food discourse, lobbying for national legislation on the right to food, 
empowering for rights-holders?  
There is no written material about the project and therefore I have relied on my interviews 
with staff from key member organisations and two group interviews with members of a local 
branch of Church and Society in Mulanje as the basis for this analysis. 
3.4.1 Introduction to the Right to Food Project  
The so called Right to Food Project was started within Church and Society in 2003.1272 
Church and Society is the human rights department of the CCAP Blantyre Synod, established 
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in 1993, around the transition to a multiparty democracy. As all other human rights groups in 
Malawi,1273 Church and Society had originally focussed on civil and political rights but 
gradually it felt the need to move into the area of economic and social rights. As a 
consequence the Right to Food Project was setup with the support of faith-based donors in 
Canada.1274  
In the first year of the Right to Food Project a lawyer was contracted to draft a bill on the right 
to food.1275 This bill, called the Food and Nutrition Security Bill, was presented to the 
Parliamentary Committee on Agriculture and Natural Resources in order to gain their support 
for the initiative. Furthermore, the right to food bill was presented during “awareness 
meetings with the clergy”.1276 The Food and Nutrition Security Bill was therefore an initiative 
by civil society. The draft analysed in this chapter has later been updated with input from the 
Ministry of Agriculture, the Malawi Human Rights Commission and the Malawi Law 
Commission. It has, however, not been adopted and the National Right to Food Network 
continue to lobby for the enactment of the draft bill. The main obstacles are said to be the 
misunderstandings around the concept of progressive realisation and fear that the bill places 
obligations on government that are too heavy.1277 Thus far, one act (The Prevention of 
Domestic Violence Act, April 2006) has been successfully passed in Malawi based on a bill 
from civil society organisations.1278 
After the initial stage of the project Church and Society decided to contact other civil society 
organisations in order to establish a national Right to Food Joint Taskforce. This taskforce is a 
loose network of human rights organisations as well as developmental NGOs working in the 
area of food security. Although the project is an example of joint advocacy by human rights 
and development NGOs1279 it would be an overstatement to say that these two set of 
organisations have truly joined forces under one project. The member organisations say their 
common aim is the adoption of an act on the right to food, but they work individually and 
focus on different ways to strengthen the right to food. While Church and Society has drafted 
a bill, Action Aid, for instance, has focused on lobbying for the inclusion of a reference to the 
right to food in the Malawi Food Security Policy.1280 Advancing the status of the right to food 
as a legal norm is, however, a common objective for the organisations and therefore it is 
possible to analyse the activities of the taskforce as a legal approach to food security. The 
Taskforce later evolved into a registered NGO called the National Right to Food Network.1281  
                                                 
1273 Before 1993, there were no human rights organisations in Malawi. It was especially in the late 1990s that 
human rights NGOs began “sprouting up” in Malawi. Interview No. 19 with NGO, Malawi 2006. Harri Englund 
points out that it was after 1999 that civic education on rights and democracy gained momentum in Malawi. See 
Englund, Prisoners of Freedom, supra note 414, at 96.  
1274 Interview No. 15 with Church and Society, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1275 Interview No. 15 with Church and Society, Malawi 2006. The copy of the draft bill that the author has 
received from Church and Society is entitled Food and Nutrition Security Bill. According to the draftsperson the 
draft bill was presented in early 2005. Interview No. 16 with draftsperson of Food and Nutrition Security bill, 
Malawi 2006. FSD2727.    
1276 Interview No. 15 with Church and Society, Malawi 2006. FSD2727.  
1277 E-mail interview with Church and Society, August 2012.  
1278 Interview No. 19 with NGO, Malawi 2006. FSD2727.  
1279 On this general trend of closer cooperation between human rights and developmental NGOs, see Paul J. 
Nelson and Ellen Dorsey, “At the Nexus of Human Rights and Development: New Methods and Strategies of 
Global NGOs”, 31 World Development (2003) 2013-2026.  
1280 In the Food Security Policy, there is a statement that “[c]ognisant of the provisions for the protection of 
human rights and freedoms as enshrined in the Constitution of Malawi, the right to adequate food is fully 
accepted as a human right.” Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, Food Security Policy, August 2006, at 5.  
1281 E-mail interview with Church and Society, August 2012.  
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At the time I visited Malawi, there was a constitutional review process underway and a 
Special Law Commission had been set up for this purpose. Civil society organisations, 
including member organisations from the Right to Food Taskforce, were represented on the 
commission. Some efforts to include specific reference to the right to food were taking place. 
“We thought we could push for the express recognition of the right to food in the constitution. 
And the civil society did make its proposal to the [Special] Law Commission and since we are 
represented in the Special Law Commission that will review the Constitution, we hope those 
representations are going to be taken into account.”1282 In a similar vein: “The right to food is 
not clearly specified in the Constitution and we would like it to be properly recognized.”1283 It 
seems that different member organisations concentrated on advocating for stronger protection 
of the right to food through different avenues: some focused on stronger constitutional 
protection, others on stronger policy and yet others on a specific act on the right to food.  
3.4.2 Background: The famine of 2001/2002  
In order to understand the discussions about the right to food in Malawi it is necessary to look 
back at the 2001/2002 famine. Action Aid, which is a member organisation of the Right to 
Food Taskforce, facilitated research concerning the causes and consequences of the famine 
and in this context the right to food was briefly broached for the first time.1284 It was 
especially the accusations of mismanagement on the part of the government that raised the 
issue of the right to food. “It happened that in 2001 we had a food crisis which was triggered 
by mismanagement.”1285 The informant is here referring to the fact that in 2001 the National 
Food Reserve Agency (NFRA) sold almost all of the Strategic Grain Reserve (SGR) at a 
critical point. The NFRA had a mandate to maintain buffer stocks of grain and in 1999 and 
2000 the SGR held a near full storage capacity of 180,000 MT of maize. Part of the story is 
that this stock was bought with money borrowed at an annual interest rate of 56 per cent. This 
again is explained through the privatisation of the management of the reserves. Before 1999, 
SGR was managed by Admarc, which is the agricultural marketing parastatal agency. Donors, 
including the IMF and the EU, however, decided that national grain reserves should be “run 
independently and on a cost-recovery basis” (i.e. should be privatised) and therefore the 
NFRA was created in 1999.1286 As no government funds were available, the newly established 
agency took loans from commercial and government banks to purchase maize from 
Admarc.1287   
The chain of events and decisions that led to the deletion of the SGR is at the core of the 
argument that the famine had ‘political’ reasons – not ‘technical’. (The ‘technical’ explanation 
is that the famine was a result of production failure, information constraints, a depleted food 
reserve, import bottlenecks, and high food prices.) According to the political explanation, it is 
                                                 
1282 Interview No. 16 with draftsperson of Food and Nutrition Security Bill, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1283 Interview No. 19 with NGO, Malawi 2006. FSD2727.  
1284 Devereux, “State of Disaster”, supra note 122. 
1285 Interview No. 20 with NGO, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1286 In the 1980s, the proponents of structural adjustment found that ADMARC’s market infrastructure was 
already inefficient, required heavy subsidies, drained the national treasury, and created disincentives for private 
sector entry into the maize market. Privatisation of ADMARC was recommended in the Malawi Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Plan but the government resisted implementing all the changes towards full privatisation to 
avoid risking popular support. See Caroline Sahley et al, “The Good Governance Dimensions of Food Security 
in Malawi”, USAID, September 2005, 46-47. Available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADE034.pdf, visited 
February 2012.  
1287 Devereux, “State of Disaster”, supra note 122, at 9. See also Samdup, “The Human Right to Food in 
Malawi”, supra 145, at 50; Sahley et al, “The Good Governance Dimensions of Food Security in Malawi”, supra 
note 1286, at 48. 
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claimed that the IMF instructed the Government of Malawi to sell the maize in the Strategic 
Grain Reserve in order to repay the debt incurred by the setup of the NFRA. The IMF for its 
part maintains that it only advised the government to sell part of the SGR to service its 
debt.1288 The SGR sell-off was raised by one informant as a human rights violation: “It didn’t 
make sense to just sell the SGR and then maize is scarce. That was more or less carelessness 
and a human rights violation because you can’t play with such an important commodity just to 
make sure you want to make profit, it was supposed to serve the needs of the people. By then 
the signs of the food crisis were visible and people were dying and everything.”1289 
Moreover, private traders were accused of having profiteered from the sale of the SGR 
(buying maize when prices were low and holding it until prices rose; making large profit).1290 
In addition, this issue was linked to the right to food. “The allegation that private traders 
deliberately purchased SGR maize cheaply in order to hoard and resell it at excessively high 
prices during the food shortage is an extremely serious accusation. Profiteering from hunger 
violates the basic human right to food.”1291 There had even been speculation that local 
politicians were involved in these activities. A list of people who had purchased maize from 
the SGR was published, and this list included a number of prominent names.1292 Moreover, 
the Anti-Corruption Bureau accused several Malawian politicians of benefiting from the sale 
of the reserves. A Presidential Commission of Inquiry was set up to investigate the sale of 
SGR maize.1293 The report by the Presidential Commission blamed donors for the 
mishandling of the SGR (for putting forth the idea of forming the NFRA to take over 
responsibility of the SGR from Admarc when the government had no readily available 
resources for this purpose). The Anti-Corruption Bureau had a different view on the scandal 
and recommended in July 2002 that the Director of Public Prosecutions order investigations 
into charges of criminal recklessness and neglect acts against seven people. The list included 
the Director of Admarc, Friday Jumbe, who later became the Minister of Finance.1294 
Despite these efforts, my informants were not satisfied with the level of accountability. “The 
crisis that happened in 2002 and politicians were found to have participated in mismanaging 
the food stocks, never have they been taken to court. I know from rights perspective some 
activists have said that by then if we did have a right to food law that would have made 
litigation possible.”1295  
Against this background, the drafter has made an effort to address profiteering issues in the 
Food and Nutrition Security bill. Draft Section 6 states:  
Any person who practices unfair trade practices which:  
b. takes advantage of vulnerable persons by exerting undue pressure or undue 
influence on such person to enter into a transaction related to food production, 
marketing, storage, supply, processing or consumption;  
Shall be guilty of an offence under this part. 
                                                 
1288 Devereux, “State of Disaster”, supra note 122, at 1. See also Roshni Menon, “Human Development Report 
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1291 Ibid., at 3.  
1292 Devereux, “State of Disaster”, supra note 122, at 11. 
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1294 Sahley et al, “The Good Governance Dimensions of Food Security in Malawi”, supra note 1286, at 48. 
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Furthermore, other sections of the draft bill tried to address problems such as those 
encountered in 2001/2002. Section 4d included a reference to “rules regarding management of 
strategic grain reserves including draw down there from” and in 4e “prescribing minimum 
strategic food reserve levels.” This can be seen as an attempt to make sure there is better 
regulation of the SGR, which is also a top priority for all donors. In 2004, the government and 
donors formed a joint oversight committee of the NFRA to monitor and authorise release of 
the SGR.1296  
Going back to the events in 2001/2002, a State of Disaster was finally declared by President 
Muluzi on 27 February 2002, although information indicating famine was already available in 
late 2001, but the credibility of this information was questioned. Save the Children had 
published a report in October 2001 that indicated that maize prices had risen by 340 percent 
and maize production had fallen drastically.1297 The organisation recommended an emergency 
response but this was rejected. The Malawi Economic Justice Network mobilised activist 
groups, campaigned in the media, and pressured the government to declare a famine. 
International media (BBC, CNN and others) broadcasted reports from Malawi in February 
and March 2002, which showed that in the case of Malawi the media was a late indicator of 
stress, not an early warning.1298 Sen and Dréze have argued that informal systems of warning 
such as newspaper reports and public protests serve the dual function of bringing information 
the authorities can use and elements of pressure that “may make it politically compelling to 
respond to these danger signals and do something about them urgently.”1299 The argument 
contends that famines are therefore best prevented in pluralistic political systems with open 
channels of communication.1300 The Malawi famine of 2001/2002 shows that famine is not 
always prevented despite available information and pressure from the public.  
It is clear that the President was late in declaring a state of emergency; the disaster had 
already taken severe forms. There are no official estimates of excess mortality due to the 
famine and exact figures of the number of deaths are not available. Lists of names collected 
by civil society groups indicate that between 1,000-3,000 people died from famine related 
deaths. If one is to compare with previous sever famines in Malawi’s modern history, the 
Nyasaland famine of 1949 resulted in an estimated 200 deaths.1301  
It was not only the government that did not take the information about the serious food 
shortages seriously; also donors were slow in responding, although they eventually provided 
food aid. This can perhaps be explained through the fact that the relationship between the 
government and the donors was not the best: in November 2001 several major donors 
(including UK, EU, Denmark and the US) had suspended their aid programmes because of 
alleged corruption, economic mismanagement, and political violence by government 
supporters against the opposition.1302 During the past years much has changed and Malawi’s 
President Bingu Mutharika (2004-2012),1303 enjoys a better relationship with donors; the 
general perception is that the Mutharika administration tried to ‘check corruption’.1304 It also 
                                                 
1296 Sahley et al, “The Good Governance Dimensions of Food Security in Malawi”, supra note 1286, at 34. 
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seems lessons were learned from the awful experiences in 2001/2002. “The famine in 2001, 
that was a huge embarrassment, it was burnt in as failure in most politicians minds. And I 
think lessons learned after that, incorporated a lot of that into the 2004/5 famine.”1305    
According to the Action Aid report the famine in 2001/2002 had such devastating effects 
compared to the famine in 1991/1992 because economic liberalisation had removed the strong 
involvement of Admarc. Ten years earlier Admarc had depots in the remote rural 
communities and made food available at affordable prices. To move from a system where 
Admarc controlled input supply as well as food prices to full liberalisation where food 
supplies and prices were suddenly determined by the market proved difficult.1306 “We have a 
liberalized market system and liberalizing a market in a country where market structures are 
not developed you are only promoting exploitation. The government is currently not very 
willing to intervene into the market. We strongly feel it should come in more strongly.”1307 
This is, however, the view of one member organisation and there is no consensus on the way 
forward. Donors, who have a strong voice in policy decisions, government, and civil society 
disagree about the appropriate role of the state in addressing vulnerability and food insecurity. 
Admarc’s social role, in particular, was subject to widespread debate at the time of my field 
research. Nevertheless, Admarc continued to be popular among the general public and no 
politician was willing to go too far with the privatisation, and thereby risk popular support.1308 
In addition to the changed role for Admarc came the fact that the so called Starter Pack 
programme, distributing packs of fertilizers and seed to nearly three million farmers, had been 
scaled down beneficiaries in 2000/01, and had not been replaced by any other large-scale food 
security programme.1309 The above factors need to be taken into account when analysing the 
role of the right to food as a potential avenue for addressing food insecurity and famine.  
3.4.3 Giving meaning to the right to food in Malawi: A word on process 
In the following, I analyse the draft bill produced within the Right to Food Project, The Food 
and Nutrition Security Bill. Drafting a bill on the right to food is a process of giving meaning 
and content to a human rights norm and as such the process is interesting. Who is taking part 
in the process, and who is excluded? In what context does the ‘definition’ take place?1310   
The bill analysed here is the draft of 2006. It has been updated later on but I have not had 
access to these versions. The first bill was drafted by a lawyer without consulting any 
‘stakeholders’. What was done in order to increase ‘participation’ was that member 
organisations took up the right to food and the draft bill during awareness raising meetings1311 
but there were no wider consultations.1312 “Normally when we are drafting a law it will 
                                                 
1305 Interview No. 30 with donor, Malawi 2006. FSD2727.  
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1309 Levy, “Introduction”, supra note 126, at 8. 
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require this participation phase before we even begin to draft the law. That was not the case 
with this one.”1313 This meant only a very small group of people (all men) were included in 
the drafting and thereby also the meaning-giving process: the lawyer who drafted the bill and 
the leader of Church and Society who initiated and advised him. Because of this ‘top-down’ 
approach there were member organisations that felt the draft should be reviewed before the 
issue was be taken any further. “It was drafted by a lawyer. We feel it need to be reviewed, it 
need to have the mandate of the people.”1314  
Lack of participation and dialogue in the process of giving meaning to human rights is 
characteristic of a legal approach to human rights. Human rights are accepted as being defined 
in legal documents, which are, for obvious reasons, drafted by small groups of people, usually 
politicians, diplomats, academics, opinion leaders, and a few human rights activists.1315 As 
can be recalled, in this way human rights is a discourse of the powerful about the 
powerless,1316 thereby contributing to a discourse of domination and disempowerment.  
A drafting process that would have included wide consultations could possibly have 
contributed to a public dialogue about the meaning, source, and authority of human rights and 
the right to food as well as forms and strategies for claiming them. However, this opportunity 
to discuss the relevance and meaning of the right to food for the lived reality of the people in 
Malawi was not taken by the organisations.    
The drafting took place within the framework of Malawi’s regional and international 
commitments to the right to food.1317 From my analysis of the content of draft bill it seems 
that the ICESCR has been the main source of inspiration rather than the African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights. The draft bill uses the same kind of ‘progressive realisation’ 
language as the ICESCR and that it is not used in the African Charter and also not in Section 
30 of the Malawi Constitution. 
The context is which the drafting process in Malawi took place had transnational origins. 
Church and Society took part in the process of drafting the Voluntary Guidelines to support 
the progressive realisation of the right to adequate food in the context of national food 
security (the ‘Right to Food Guidelines’),1318 led by the Food and Agriculture Organisation 
based in Rome (i.e., by a global elite). There is little resemblance between the ‘Right to Food 
Guidelines’ and the draft bill with regard to the content, other than that the definition of ‘food 
security’ is the same. The impulse to legislate on the right to food in Malawi originated from 
the discussions and negotiations on the international guidelines,1319 and that in itself is 
relevant when trying to understand the process and what impact it has had on human rights 
discourse in Malawi. When a small group of people, associated with an international and 
national elite, speaking a specialised, often technical language1320 come together to draft/give 
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Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 22 Dec 1993.  
1318 Adopted by the 127th Session of the FAO Council, November 2004. 
1319 Interview No. 15 with Church and Society, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1320 See Paul Farmer, Pathologies of Power: Health, Human Rights, and the New War on the Poor (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2005) at xviii; Robert Archer, “The Strengths or Different Traditions: What Can 
Be Gained and What Might Be Lost by Combining Rights and Development?”, 4 Sur International Journal on 
Human Rights Law (2006) 81-89, at 86.  
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meaning to the right to food this inevitably has an impact on how human rights are perceived 
and applied by less powerful groups.  
This can be seen against the process of ‘transnationalisation of law’ that takes place as a 
consequence of the emergence of a set of new legal actors. International and local NGOs, 
social movements, and the UN system all play a role in law making processes, and the draft 
bill on the right to food in Malawi is an example of this. Randeria points out that this is as 
such not new for post-colonial states that never had absolute monopoly over law 
production.1321 National legal landscapes have always been complex and shaped by diverse 
external influences, but the growing dominance of international law, the transnationalisation 
of state law and the direct involvement of multilateral institutions, donors and transnational 
NGOs have all contributed  to a new “supra-national dimension of legal pluralism”.1322 The 
draft bill is certainly an example of national civil society, with transnational links, 
contributing to legal pluralism.  
3.4.4 From freedoms to entitlements?  
As previously mentioned, the human rights rhetoric and discourse in Malawi has emphasised 
freedoms rather than entitlements, civil and political rights rather than socioeconomic rights. 
The concept of entitlements is not used, as such, in e.g. the ICESCR. It was developed by 
Amartya Sen in the late 1970s, and became widely known after the publication of his book 
Poverty and famines (1981) and in his later book Hunger and entitlements (1988). The central 
message was that focussing on food supply is not enough – what matters is who has command 
over these supplies. Food and other goods and services over which a person has command, are 
his or her ‘entitlements’.1323 The concept of entitlements is thereby, according to Kracht and 
Huq, closely related to that of legal ownership rights.1324 Eide, who also bases his writing on 
entitlements on Sen’s scholarship, writes that “entitlements exist when one party effectively 
controls productive resources or can insist that another delivers goods, services, or 
protections, and that parties will act to reinforce (or at least not hinder) their delivery.”1325  
Kent views entitlements as “nationalized versions” of global human rights and the obligations 
that come with them.1326 
I use the concept here because I think it describes the idea of positive state obligations and it 
helps in avoiding simplistic assumptions based on ideas that fulfilment of the right to food for 
all can be achieved by mere distribution of food resources. While the positive obligation to 
fulfil the right to food does occasionally (and in the case of Malawi, probably more often than 
not) involve food distribution, or other forms of social protection such as cash distribution, it 
                                                 
1321 Randeria, “Domesticating Neo-liberal Discipline”, supra note 423, at 152. 
1322 Randeria, “Domesticating Neo-liberal Discipline”, supra note 423, at 151. “By pointing to the coexistence of 
a plurality of legal orders within one single political unit, […] legal pluralism interrogates the centrality of state-
made law and its exclusive claim to the normative ordering of social life.” Ibid., at 151.  
1323 Amartya Sen, Hunger and Entitlement (Finland: World Institute for Development Economics Research, 
United Nations University, 1988) at 8. 
1324 Uwe Kracht and Muzammel Huq, “Realizing the Right to Food and Nutrition through Public and Private 
Action”, 21 Food Policy (1996) 73-82, at 74. 
1325 Asbjørn Eide, “The Right to an Adequate Standard of Living Including the right to Food” in A. Eide, C. 
Krause & A. Rosas (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook, Second Revised Edition (Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001) 133-148, at 139. 
1326 Kent, Freedom from Want, supra note 83, at 91. 
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is necessary also to improve the prevailing “legal, political and economic arrangements”1327 
with the aim of strengthening poor people’s entitlements.1328   
The Malawian human rights discourse has, in addition to a strong emphasis on ‘freedoms’, 
also focused on the responsibilities of the individual that are said to come with human rights. 
(This is in line with the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights that departs from 
other human rights instruments and imposes duties on individuals. These duties are owed to 
other individuals, the family, society, and also the state.)1329 Only recently has there been a 
shift to a stronger focus on obligations by duty-bearers. “At first it was everybody for 
themselves: you have rights, it’s up to you. Now we are saying you have rights but certain 
people have obligations to ensure you enjoy your rights to the outmost.”1330 Within the Oxfam 
rights-based approach the actors used this kind of language of rights and obligations.  
Obligations, especially of a legal nature, were also important in the Right to Food Project and 
the draft bill. Overall, the main purpose of the draft bill was to make the right to food 
justiciable,1331 that is, enforceable through legal and para-legal institutions. Due to limited 
access to formal legal forums, the organisations behind the draft bill aimed at a system where 
the right to food could be claimed outside the court system: “We hope the right can be 
claimed not only in formal magistrate courts and the like. Once we have the law we are going 
to call on the government machinery to be more responsible and the claiming might be 
through group actions, advocacy and lobbying, more of that sort rather than maybe an 
individual going to court.”1332  
The draft bill established a the Malawi Food and Nutrition Authority. The Authority would be 
competent to receive complaints. According to the draft bill, individuals and groups, or 
organisations representing such groups, may bring complaints and petitions before the 
Authority and it may find a violation of the right to food and nutrition security.  
Draft Section 50: “Any person guilty of an offence under this Act or regulations made 
hereunder for which no penalty has been prescribed shall be liable to a fine of K750,000 or to 
imprisonment of 5 years.” The explanation behind this rather exceptional approach may be 
found in the fact that the Malawi Constitution allows its Bill of Rights to apply in the private 
sphere.1333 Private actors are bound by human rights provisions and when courts are resolving 
private disputes, they have the duty to consider human rights, including socio-economic 
rights.1334 This practice is reflected in the fact that the Malawi Office of the Ombudsman is 
competent to investigate complaints in both public and private spheres, which has led to a 
massive volume of cases received.1335    
It seems that the draft bill would establish personal criminal responsibility for offences under 
the act, rather than ordering the government to remedy the situation through taking positive 
measures as has been the case when finding a violation of the right to food in India and South 
                                                 
1327 Used in Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen, Hunger and Public Action (Oxford: Clearndon Press, 1989) at 9.  
1328 Kracht and Huq, “Realizing the Right to Food and Nutrition through Public and Private Action”, supra note 
1324, at 75. 
1329 Articles 27-29 of the Charter define duties of individuals. See also Mutua, “Standard Setting in Human 
Rights”, supra note 296, at 577. 
1330 Interview No. 19 with NGO, Malawi 2006. The challenge is that duty-bearers have not recognized that rights 
imply that they have certain obligations. Interview No. 29 with Malawi resource Centre on Human Rights. 
FSD2727. 
1331 Interview Nos. 15, 16, 19 and 20, Malawi 2006. FSD2727.  
1332 Interview No. 19 with NGO, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1333 Chirwa, “A Full Loaf is Better than Half”, supra note 1031, at 235. 
1334 Ibid., at 235. 
1335 Final Evaluation: Strengthening of the Ombudsman Institution in Malawi, supra note 1029, at 50-51. 
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Africa.1336 As we have seen in part II, in India the right to food litigation has lead to the 
Supreme Court converting eight nutrition-related schemes of free food distribution, subsidised 
grain for the poorest of the poor, midday meals, family benefit schemes etc into legal 
entitlements, making it obligatory for the government to implement them.1337 
The Authority was given a broad mandate in the draft bill. Draft Section 36 stated:  
The Authority shall be competent in every respect to protect and promote the right 
to food and nutrition security in Malawi in the broadest sense possible and to 
investigate violations of such right on its own motion or upon complaints received 
from any person, class of person or body.1338 (Emphasis added.)  
This kind of ‘violations language’ was not used throughout the draft bill. Progressive 
realisation of “the right to food and nutrition security” (draft Section 3(1)) was advocated. In 
this context, the right to food was linked to the Millennium Development Goals. The Draft 
Section 3(4) stated that “The Government shall progressively eliminate hunger by improving 
wages and incomes of people in order that by 2015 there shall be no person earning less than 
$1 a day.” Also the notions of “taking steps” and “maximum available resources” (familiar 
from the ICESCR) were used in the draft bill. There was even a direct reference to 
“international covenants”:  
The government shall take steps, legislative, economic, technical or otherwise to 
the maximum of its available resources with a view to achieving progressively the 
full realization of people’s rights enshrined in the international covenants related 
to the right to food and nutrition security to which Malawi is a party. (Sec. 3(6)) 
Draft Section 3 took very little consideration of specific national conditions in Malawi, even 
to the extent that the international poverty line was used instead of the national poverty line. 
Furthermore, the wording of the draft bill seemed to lower the level of positive state 
                                                 
1336 The Indian Supreme Court ordered in the 1985 case of Kishnan Pattnayak and Others v State of Orissa that 
State government try to solve the problems of poverty rather than just focusing on immediate disaster relief. In a 
South African case of 2003 (Kutumela v Member of the Executive Committee for Social Services, Culture, Arts 
and Sport in the North West Province) the North West provincial government was ordered to, inter alia, plan a 
programme to ensure the effective implementation of the Social Relief and Distress Grant. See Sibonile Khoza 
(ed.), Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa (South Africa: Community Law Centre, Second Edition, 2007) 
328-329. 
1337 Interim Orders of the Supreme Court, 28 November 2001. Available at 
http://www.righttofoodindia.org/orders/interimorders.html, visited 15 December 2011. See Basudeb Guha-
Khasnobis and S. Vivek, “The Rights-Based Approach to Development: Lessons from the Right to Food 
Movement in India”, in B. Guha-Khasnobis, S. S. Acharya & B. Davis (eds), Food Insecurity, Vulnerability and 
Human Rights Failure (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) 308-327, at 310. See also Muralidhar, “India”, 
supra note 677, at 102-123.   
1338 This mandate is very similar to that of the Malawi Human Rights Commission, which was established under 
Chapter XI of the Constitution as a national human rights institution, starting its functions after the Human 
Rights Commission Act of 1998. Act No. 27 of 1998, The Malawi Gazette Supplement, 11 August 1998, 
reprinted in Kamal Hossain et al. (eds.), Human Rights Commissions and Ombudsman Offices: National 
Experiences throughout the World (The Hauge: Kluwer Law International, 2000) 540-550. In 2004 a total of 
1,136 complaints relating to human rights violations were handled by the Commission. Twenty two (22) cases 
concerned the right to development and economic activity. Most of the cases have not been concluded. “Annual 
Report of the Malawi Human Rights Commission for the Year 2004”, at 1. Available at 
http://malawihumanrightscommission.org/docs/2004_MHRC_AnnualReport_.pdf, visited 15 December 2011. 
There have been attempts to make the Human Rights Commission as accessible as possible in that exhaustion of 
other remedies is not a requirement for lodging a complaint and free legal aid can be applied for in cases before 
the Human Rights Commission. E.M. Singnini, “Malawi’s Human Rights Commission” in  Kamal Hossain et al. 
(eds.), Human Rights Commissions and Ombudsman Offices: National Experiences throughout the World (The 
Hauge: Kluwer Law International, 2000) 527-532, at 531. 
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obligations from the standard set in the Section 30 of the Constitution.1339 Draft Sections 4 
and 5, on the other hand, tackles specific problems experienced in Malawi, i.e., disasters and 
food aid. The problem of politicisation of food aid was dealt with in draft Section 5:  
(1) No person, entity or political party shall use food aid for political purposes. 
(2) No person shall with hold food aid from any vulnerable person for any reason 
based on political opinion, tribe, region, marital status, disability, or other status, 
nor shall food aid be used to induce change of political affiliation.   
The intention was to criminalise politicisation of food aid or inputs. In draft Section 6, 
prohibited acts and omissions were defined. The question is whether this kind of violations 
and criminalisation discourse can underline and strengthen the accountability of duty-bearers, 
thereby also underlining the obligations side of human rights.  
Considering that more than 85 percent of all economically active Malawians were employed 
in agriculture at the time o drafting,1340 developing the agricultural sector is a key issue for 
food security. The draft bill, however, failed to link the right to food to broader issues of 
livelihoods or to government services in agriculture (for instance in the form of extension 
workers).  
There are some question marks concerning what kind of state the member organisations are 
advancing in their advocacy through advocating the draft bill. There seems to be some 
hesitation even within the Right to Food Project as to what should be the social role of the 
government.  
I don’t know how many people at the grassroots level who would think in terms 
of the social responsibilities of the Government. Our Constitution seems to be 
focused on economic liberalization, that people should be empowered so that they 
can stand on their own. Instead of the government giving direct services, some of 
us think this is just complementing or helping the government out but we need to 
get to a day when everyone stands for themselves. What the government should 
do is to provide the working environment that is conducive.1341  
While this is not in direct opposition to the thinking on entitlements, this kind of rhetoric 
mainly suits the current market driven development agenda, and it can hardly be seen as an 
effort to advocate for a more ambitious agenda for social justice. Instead of creating a strong 
social role for the government in this area, along the lines of strengthening poor people’s 
entitlements, the draft bill promoted “broad based economic development that is conducive to 
the promotion and sustainability of food and nutrition security” (3(7)).  
One can also argue that since the drafting of the bill had taken place in a non-participatory 
manner and the content includes no rights-based services (something that we have seen made 
sense to community members in the SHSLP), this is what Baxi calls an ethic of human rights 
that insists on what communities and individuals ought to desire.1342 The drafters had decided 
                                                 
1339 Section 30(2) of the Constitution reads: “The State shall take all necessary measures for the realization of the 
right to development. Such measures shall include, amongst other things, equality of opportunity for all in their 
access to basic resources, education, health services, food, shelter, employment and infrastructure.” 
1340 This figure is from 2003. See Sahley et al, “The Good Governance Dimensions of Food Security in Malawi”, 
supra note 1286, at 7.  
1341 Interview No. 19 with NGO, Malawi 2006. A similar statement was made in Interview No. 1 with Malawi 
Human Rights Commission: “It has been understood as if that right [the right to food] is only about the State 
creating an environment where you can fend for yourself, not that the State has a direct responsibility to take 
care of you.” FSD2727.  
1342 Baxi, The Future of Human Rights, supra note 358, at 7. 
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what communities and individuals ought to desire, and that did not include services in 
agriculture.  
3.4.5 Policies as politics  
Putting the Right to Food Project into a larger picture of how human rights discourse 
traditionally has dealt with issues of inequality, there is a clear global tendency to favour legal 
solutions to social problems. Gready and Ensor warn against what they call the ‘legal reflex’ 
within human rights discourse, i.e., the assumption that “resort to law is the most effective and 
perhaps only form of protection and remedy”. Establishing legal recognition of human rights 
can at worst become an end in itself, and this again can lead to a reduction in creativity with 
regard to activism. These arguments do not deny the importance of the law, instead they seek 
to give equal importance to political and social processes in securing human rights.1343 Gready 
and Ensor point out that an engagement with rights potentially stimulates a political 
transformation. This challenges the established, often hierarchical structures within society, 
and is therefore never a simple process.1344 Furthermore, Hugo Slim observes that most 
importantly, rights-talk has the ability to politicise development1345 issues such as food 
insecurity. However, Ratna Kapur points out that it is important to be aware how law can 
transform the “political discourse of human rights and depoliticize it”; law as a discourse 
tends to obscure power relations and decontextualise political claims.1346 In other words, 
depolitisation also takes place in human rights discourse, and according to Kapur this occurs 
because of the strong role given to law and legal solutions.  
The Right to Food Project is not an apolitical approach although there are differences in 
emphasis, especially concerning what social role the state should play, among the 
organisations taking part in the project. Clearly, law plays a political role in transforming 
society. Moreover, research from neighbouring Zambia shows that legal practitioners have 
“become intimately engaged with the state, and in doing so has become a form of politics.”1347 
The situation is similar in Malawi and the legal profession contributed immensely to the 
political transformation of the early 1990s.1348  
Some organisations within the Right to Food Taskforce seemed to have committed 
themselves to advocacy so that the Government makes better policies,1349 indicating a 
commitment to using rights as form of political pressure. This approach was, however, not 
visible in the draft bill.  
The main policy issue that was discussed during my field research visit was the on-going 
fertilizer input subsidy programme that was a government driven, yearly initiative to support 
small scale subsistence farmers since 2005. While the draft bill promoted “expanded access to 
agricultural inputs” (3(9)), subsidies as such were only mentioned in connection to vulnerable 
groups. Therefore, it is unclear whether fertilizer or other input subsidies were promoted in 
                                                 
1343 Gready and Ensor, “Introduction”, supra note 70, at 9. This is also discussed in Sano, “Does Human Rights-
Based Development Make a Difference?”, supra note 55, at 66.   
1344 Gready and Ensor, “Introduction”, supra note 70, at 23.  
1345 Slim, “A Response to Peter Uvin”, supra note 57, at 3. 
1346 Kapur, “Revisioning the Role of Law”, supra note 382, at 110-111. 
1347 Jeremy Gould, “Strong Bar, Weak State? Lawyers, Liberalism and State Formation in Zambia”, 37 
Development and Change (2006) 921-941, at 937.  
1348 See in Clement Ng’ong’ola, “Judicial Mediation in Electoral Politics in Malawi”, in Harri Englund (ed.), A 
Democracy of Chameleons: Politics and Culture in the New Malawi (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2002) 
62-86, at 85. 
1349 Interview No 22 with civil society network, Malawi 2006. FSD2727.  
205 
the draft as a broad-base form of government intervention to support the right to food. In this 
context we should keep in mind that widespread application of fertilizers on the soils of 
Malawi is not environmentally sustainable – and the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights has made clear that sustainability is an aspect that needs to be taken into 
account in efforts to realise the right to food. “Sustainability” incorporates the notion of long-
term availability and accessibility so that food is accessible for both present and future 
generations.1350 In any case, the silence on this issue on behalf of the Right to Food Taskforce 
reveals a reluctance to make use of rights as an argument on this highly politicised issue.   
Moreover, the Taskforce has not carried out thorough analysis of which policies contribute to 
food insecurity and hunger and which policies reduce the level of food insecurity and hunger. 
In 2006, Church and Society hosted an international fact-finding mission coordinated by two 
international NGOs, Rights & Democracy and FIAN International. The findings and 
recommendations concerning the right to food in Malawi can be read in the report The Human 
Right to Food in Malawi. “In order to fulfill its human rights obligations, a State party to the 
ICESCR must develop and implement policies and programs aimed specifically at the 
progressive realization of the rights contained therein, including the right to adequate 
food.”1351 The report does not, however, give any guidance as to how this could be carried out 
in practice. Furthermore, there is no analysis of the elements of the right to food (accessibility, 
availability, acceptability)1352 nor is there any analysis of the obstacles to why the rights-
holders fail to demand the right to food and why the duty-bearers fail to meet their 
obligations. There is simply no situation analysis with reference to the right to food; instead 
the report gives a general overview of the food security situation in the country. The 
relationship between the fact-finding mission and the Right to Food Project is unclear; the 
report does refer to the project and also recommends the government to “adopt the Human 
Right to Food Bill” as proposed by the National Right to Food Taskforce but it does not 
indicate what benefits this would bring.1353   
The draft bill only made reference to policies and programmes on a very general level:  
The Government shall put in place mechanisms, budgetary allocations, safety net 
programmes, credit programmes and schemes, wage policies and legislation, land 
tenure policies and legislation to ensure the accelerated full realization of the right 
to food and nutrition security for all without adverse discrimination. (3(3))  
Therefore, the drafters of the bill seemed to represent the view that legislation should only 
give certain guidance to the duty-bearer on what steps to take, not stipulate particular policies. 
The question is if the bill implies that the schemes mentioned in 3(3) should be rights-based, 
and if so, what does it mean? E.g. a credit programme does not automatically advance the 
right to food, nor is it self-evident that safety net programmes are rights-based services. There 
are more than 150 food security projects coordinated by the Ministry of Agriculture,1354 but it 
is unclear if the right to food has a role in this context. In the draft bill it was assumed that all 
programmes that claim to support food security are beneficial as to the right to food.  
Around 2006, there were plans in Malawi to move away from safety nets (mainly food 
assistance) to social protection in the form of, inter alia, unconditional cash transfers to the 
                                                 
1350 General Comment No. 12, (1999) on the right to adequate food, supra note 577, para. 7. 
1351 Samdup, “The Human Right to Food in Malawi”, supra note 145, at 45. 
1352 General Comment No. 12, (1999) on the right to adequate food, supra note 577, para. 15. 
1353 Samdup, “The Human Right to Food in Malawi”, supra note 145, “recommendations”. 
1354 Field diary, notes from discussion with Adviser in Technical Secretariat, 12 December 2006.  
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poorest of the poor.1355 In Malawi thus far social protection policy had been characterised by a 
range of ad hoc, small scale and short term interventions rather than a coherent and sustained 
set of government driven social protection measures.1356 This kind of welfare approach to 
assist the part of the population that is unable, for reasons beyond their control, to either 
produce food or buy food, would be worth investigating from a right to food perspective. 
Food-based safety net programmes to save lives following e.g. drought dominate policy 
response at present but we should keep in mind that these interventions are neither predicable 
nor comprehensive. The ideal form of social protection would be guaranteed, predictable 
transfers to all chronically vulnerable groups – and this remains a distant ambition,1357 but the 
right to food movement in Malawi could integrate the growing interest for social protection 
with efforts to strengthen legal protection of the right to food. In other southern African 
countries rights-oriented civil society actors have shown signs of assuming an activist role by 
advocating for basic social protection as a right.1358 However, the draft bill only included one 
short and general reference to social protection1359 and according to Church and Society there 
has been no serious discussions about minimum social protection as a right.1360 Furthermore, 
the question of the new land policy was not addressed in the draft bill or by the Right to Food 
Project despite its potentially considerable effects on the right to food.1361  
3.4.6 What is the role of human rights principles in the draft bill and the Right to Food 
Project?  
In the following I discuss non-discrimination, participation, accountability and empowerment 
and compare their role and meaning in the draft bill and the Right to Food Project to the role 
and meaning of these principles in the two other projects.  
The principle of non-discrimination has a surprisingly weak position in the draft bill. In the 
first substantive section of the draft the old-fashioned notion of “himself and his family” 
(compare with the ICESCR) is used: “Every person has the right to food and nutrition security 
including a standard of living adequate for the health of himself and his family”. This could 
be interpreted as discriminatory against female-headed households. Moreover, there is no 
general discrimination clause in the draft bill. Instead, with-holding of food aid “from any 
vulnerable person for any reason based on political opinion, tribe, region, marital status, 
disability, or other status,” is prohibited in draft Section 5(2). This means that the focus was 
on upholding non-discrimination in targeting of food aid. Special consideration of so called 
vulnerable groups, on the other hand, was emphasised. According to the definition given in 
Section 2 “Vulnerable groups means and includes children, pregnant women, lactating 
mothers, illiterate persons, persons with disabilities, the poor, the widowed, the orphans, the 
                                                 
1355 Interview No. 24 Department of Poverty and Disaster Management Affairs, Malawi 2006; Interview No. 3 
with donor, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. ‘Social protection’ can include safety nets but is broader in scope and more 
diverse in practice. See Stephen Devereux, “Social Protection Mechanisms in Southern Africa”, a report by 
Regional Hunger and Vulnerability Programme, June 2006, at 1. Available at http://www.ids.ac.uk/files/ RHVP_ 
Review_of_SP_Report.pdf, visited 10 May 2012.  
1356 Devereux, “Social Protection Mechanisms in Southern Africa”, supra note 1355, at 7. 
1357 Ibid., at 2. 
1358 Ibid., at 5. See also Karen Tibbo, “The Role of INGOs in the New Social Protection Agenda in Africa”, a 
report by Regional Hunger and Vulnerability Programme, February 2008. Available at http://www.wahenga.org/ 
node/1023, visited 10 May 2012.  
1359 Section 3(11): “Government shall progressively increase annual budgetary allocation for the programmes in 
para. 8 as part of social protection for vulnerable groups.” 3(8) focus on programmes to strengthen dietary 
diversity rather than safety-net programmes.  
1360 E-mail interview with Church and Society, August 2012.  
1361 On this issue, see De Schutter, “The Emerging Human Right to Land”, supra note 553, at 323-324. 
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elderly;” This means that the majority of Malawi’s population is part of a ‘vulnerable group’ 
(especially since ‘the poor’ is being defined as vulnerable). It is not surprising that there was 
no proper analysis of the relationship between discrimination and vulnerability in the draft 
itself, but it is surprising that these ‘vulnerable groups’ are included in the bill without any 
kind of background analysis.  
In all of the three cases analysed, the principle of equality and non-discrimination has focused 
on targeting processes, i.e., the process of identifying needs and responding to these needs. 
None of the projects used discrimination and marginalisation as a lens for analysis. The 
focus was not on finding out who are most marginalised or vulnerable as to discrimination 
and exclusion, but on who are vulnerable to food insecurity or malnourishment or resource 
constraints in general. 
The principle of participation was even weaker than that of non-discrimination: there was no 
mention of opportunities for public participation in policy formulation concerning food 
security issues in the draft bill. Furthermore, lack of participation in the drafting process itself 
was an obvious defeat of ‘human rights principles’. The Right to Food Project was in this 
regard a sad example of the non-participatory nature of human rights work that aims at 
changing laws and practices from above, with limited or no input from below.  
As we have seen in the previous parts of this chapter, accountability was given quite different 
meaning in the two approaches to food security analysed so far. What was common to the 
JEFAP food assistance programme and the Oxfam rights-based livelihoods programme in 
Shire Highlands was that accountability expressed the concern for checks and oversight, 
monitoring and institutional constraints on the exercise of power.1362 While the WFP and its 
partner NGOs had a managerial and apolitical approach to accountability Oxfam and its 
partners had an advocacy and political approach, in which accountability was linked to 
obligations on the part of government institutions to deliver certain services. What is 
interesting in the Oxfam programme was that accountability was linked to obligations 
(characteristic of human rights discourse) but without making explicit reference to legal 
provisions and without using the normative framework as an avenue for accountability. The 
legal approach in the Right to Food Project, for its part, had a strong focus on achieving 
increased accountability through providing stronger legal protection of the right to food. 
(Naturally, there can be a close connection between action to achieve political accountability 
and action to achieve legal accountability. Advocacy that perhaps starts as demands for 
political accountability may later lead to misuse of power being dealt with in a court.)   
As we have seen in the analysis of the JEFAP food assistance programme, there were certain 
accountability gaps in food distribution. Beneficiaries were left alone with possible 
complaints about mismanagement without avenues for holding duty-bearers to account. What 
complicated the picture even further is that food assistance operations were largely in the 
hands of donors, international agencies, and NGOs, delegated to local structures, i.e. not the 
government that has ratified the human rights treaties. The question is if a right to food act 
would fill the accountability gap experienced by the beneficiary who did not receive the bag 
of maize as she expected?  
There is no doubt that one main aim of the organisations behind the draft bill was to increase 
the level of legal accountability for violations of the right to food, especially in food 
assistance processes (thereby focussing more on the respect dimension of state obligations 
and less on the protect and fulfil obligations). It is difficult to speculate about the possible 
future usage of such a possibility: nobody knows if victims of violations were able to access 
                                                 
1362 Compare with Schedler, “Conceptualizing Accountability”, supra note 803, at 13.  
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legal advice and representation that is required for a successful case. It is also impossible to 
predict if the act would lead to judicial activism around the right to food, and if that would 
have beneficial outcomes in terms of remedies for violations. (Of course, it is natural to 
expect that those organisations that have initiated the Food and Nutrition Security Bill would 
also make use of it in a case where it was adopted.) However, it goes without saying that even 
when accountability institutions are in place these may display variable outcomes for the 
people suffering from food insecurity and hunger.1363  
The way the draft bill appeared in 2006, suggested that cases would focus mostly on the 
negative aspects of obligations under the right to food and less on the positive aspects of 
taking steps to realise the right. However, since politicisation of food assistance was 
widespread and contributed to the view that food assistance is a charity-based service (a 
‘favour’)1364 it would be welcome if courts and other forums were to tackle this issue. It is 
also clear that the drafters were aware of the limited access to justice that poor people face in 
Malawi. The idea behind the Food and Nutrition Security Authority was actually to have an 
institution that is easier to access than courts. “You want to provide for a mechanism, an 
administrative mechanism within the law that ensures it can be enforced without necessarily 
going to court. So you create that kind of authority that will be responsible, it’s responsible 
for the implementation, for the monitoring to make sure it’s being complied with. It’s also a 
kind of tribunal to settle disputes.”1365  
The importance of empowerment was underlined by many of the member organisations in the 
Taskforce on the Right to Food. The possible future usage of a right to food act would depend 
on the empowerment of rights-holders. In this context we are speaking of rights-holders being 
empowered to claim the right to food from duty-bearers, not of empowerment in general (or 
capacity development in general as the term was interpreted in the JEFAP).  
The context in which empowerment was raised in the Right to Food Project, however, 
suggests that it was interpreted as the opposite to being ‘dependent’ and ‘relying on 
handouts’: “The right to food was initially seen as a means to getting handouts but it’s not 
only handouts, it’s empowerment.”1366 In Malawi handouts are usually synonymous with food 
assistance. (And there was no effort to make these ‘handouts’ into a rights-based service.)  
This view of a contradiction between empowerment and ‘handouts’ is prevalent in human 
rights discourse and is not unique to the Right to Food Project. Even when the question 
whether food assistance and other forms of direct assistance does indeed create ‘dependency’ 
has not been solved1367 with such arguments as “if you continue feeding them day after day, 
they may lose the incentive to provide for themselves, and thus become disempowered, 
weakened by the help”1368 are surprisingly common in literature on human rights. The 
                                                 
1363 On this issue in the context of the right to water, see Lyla Mehta, Unpacking Rights and Wrongs: Do Human 
Rights Make a Difference? The Case of Water Rights in India and South Africa (Brighton: IDS Working Paper 
260, November 2005). Available at http://www.drc-citizenship.org/system/assets/1052734463/original/ 
1052734463-mehta.2005-unpacking.pdf?1289493063, visited 10 May 2012.  
1364 “So people are still used to, when they get services from the government, oh this is a favour, this government 
is very considerate, they are concerning our plight, not our rights but our plight.” Interview No. 19 with NGO, 
Malawi 2006. FSD2727.  
1365 Interview No. 16 with draftsperson of Food and Nutrition Security Bill, Malawi 2006. FSD2727. 
1366 Interview No. 15 with Church and Society, Malawi 2006. FSD2727.  
1367 On the debate among scholars and organisation whether food aid creates ‘dependency’ see, e.g. FAO, The 
State of Food and Agriculture 2006, supra note 1044, at 35; Lentz and Barret, “Food Aid and Dependency” 
supra note 1076. 
1368 Kent, Freedom from Want, supra note 83, at 121. 
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argument states that helping people to provide for themselves, or ‘teaching people how to 
fish’, as the saying goes, is synonymous with empowering them.1369  
However, one could also argue that empowerment is about rights-holders becoming aware 
that, in their struggle to provide for themselves and their livelihoods, they have the right to 
demand various means of support from the government (claiming needs as rights), and that 
the government has to be accountable for implementing rights and services. When everything 
else fails they have the right to demand temporary support in the form of food assistance or 
cash transfer as social protection. Creating an empowerment agenda around these issues 
would mean broadening the agenda for social justice and strengthening the entitlement aspect 
of human rights discourse.    
According to Englund, this was, however, not what the human rights movement in Malawi 
was doing in the first half of 2000. Englund argues that the notion of ‘responsibility’ had 
come to complement the emphasis on rights and freedoms in human rights discourse in 
Malawi.1370 It seemed human rights NGOs (during civic education sessions in communities) 
had put a lot of responsibility on the side of the rights-holder in fulfilling human rights. 
Sometimes the concept of empowerment had been linked to encouraging self-reliance and 
strengthening of the capacity of community members to manage their own affairs and to work 
harder for their ‘development’, and this was the case also in the Right to Food Project. 
For instance in the element of food security you’d empower somebody by helping 
them how they can on their own manage their agricultural life, their needs and the 
like. When you just come and donate bags, and say this is your food, that is not 
empowerment. But even education that you can give them, and other basic needs 
that actually propel them to a better future, that is empowerment, through 
education. Once you have showed somebody you should be able to go back and 
see the people do the same things but now on their own without your assistance, 
that is empowerment.1371  
How empowering is the right to food when combined with market logic and emphasis on 
everyone fending for oneself and being responsible for one’s own rights (self-reliance as a 
form of empowerment)? If no strong social role for the state is advocated, the question is what 
added value the right to food has. When too much responsibility is put on the weaker party, 
i.e. the rights-holder, there is a risk that empowerment becomes disempowerment in the face 
of the seemingly impossible task to realise one’s own right to food with minimum outside 
support.     
3.4.7 Concluding remarks 
Human rights discourse in Malawi is not stable or static and naturally the heightened interest 
in socioeconomic rights and the right to food contributes to its change. The entitlement 
dimension of the draft bill is, however, surprisingly weak, much weaker than international 
interpretations of the right to food, such as that given by the Committee on ESCR in General 
Comment No. 12. The fact that the draft bill has, as of 2012, not been adopted may indicate 
that its content did not resonate with human rights discourse dominating at the time of 
drafting and advocating for its adoption.  
                                                 
1369 Kent, Freedom from Want, supra note 83, at 121. 
1370 Englund, Prisoners of Freedom, supra note 414, at 67. This was confirmed in Interview No. 1 with Malawi 
Human Rights Commission; Interview No. 32 with CARE Malawi and Interview No. 24 Department of Poverty 
and Disaster Management Affairs; Interview No. 5 with Oxfam; Group Interview No. 2. FSD2727.  
1371 Interview No. 15 with Church and Society, Malawi 2006. FSD2727.  
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Having an act on the right to food that would promote clearly defined duties for the state in 
the area of food assistance, social protection, as well as services relevant for agriculture would 
advance a human rights-based approach to food security. It would strengthen as well the 
position of the rights-holders in their struggle to demand services as a matter of fulfilling their 
human right to food instead of as favours that may or may not be handed out. However, the 
actors in the Right to Food Taskforce seem to underline a perceived contradiction between 
empowerment and ‘handouts’. Advocating for making these ‘handouts’ into rights-based 
services that could be claimed from accountable duty-bearers was not clearly spelled out. 
Instead the draft suggested individual criminalisation of the politicisation of food assistance or 
inputs. Focus was thereby on the respect dimension of the obligations coming with the right to 
food, while the protect and fulfil dimensions remained weak.  
To conclude I will try to relate the legal approach to food security to my assumptions about 
the possible added value of human rights in food security efforts. My first assumption was 
that a human rights language changes the mindset of the actors in development, underlining 
the legally binding nature of addressing food insecurity, and contributing to empowerment of 
rights-holders. It seems obvious that an act of legislation on the right to food would contribute 
to underlining the legally binding nature of addressing food insecurity. Duty-bearers in 
Malawi need to be reminded that addressing food insecurity is a matter of fulfilling human 
rights obligations, and food assistance (or social protection schemes) should be rights-based 
services. Therefore, legislation on the right to food is valuable as long as it serves the end goal 
that the right to adequate food is realised for all Malawians.1372 Legislation is, however, not an 
end in itself but instead it is merely a stepping stone in a social and political struggle for 
increased equality. There is a risk that if this is forgotten the Taskforce on the Right to Food 
will resort to the ‘legal reflex’ that is common in human rights discourse.1373 Having a 
national law on the right to food does not automatically further the realisation of this right.  
The content of the draft bill was not very transformative as it failed to put forth a clear and 
strong obligation for the state to take positive measures to realise the right to food. It can be 
questioned whether the draft challenged the status quo in a way that would potentially 
strengthen the position of the rights-holder. Naturally, the idea to create a law on the right to 
food is as such transformative (legislation can be a step towards social and political 
transformation), but the problem with the draft was the vague nature of state obligations and 
the unclear role of the duty-bearers. From the perspective of the position of the rights-holders 
it is important that, first of all, there are available services, and second, that these are 
guaranteed; that there are long term and predictable rather than short term interventions based 
on more or less arbitrary criteria. 
With regard to the second part of my assumption about the value of human rights language, 
that such language is empowering for the rights-holder, the question is whether a stronger 
protection of the right to food can contribute to a new human rights discourse in Malawi, with 
an emphasis on rights and obligation, entitlements and freedoms rather than one-sidedly on 
freedoms. Due to the non-participatory nature of the Right to Food Project the empowerment 
element was weak: drafting a bill on the right to food was not taken as a possibility to increase 
dialogue on the meaning of the right to food.   
                                                 
1372 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights states that “[t]he right to adequate food is realized 
when every man, woman and child, alone or in community with others, has physical and economic access at all 
times to adequate food or means for its procurement.” General Comment No. 12, (1999) on the right to adequate 
food, supra note 577, para. 6. 
1373 See Gready and Ensor, “Introduction”, supra note 70, at 9.  
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The idea behind the second assumption about human rights situation analysis was that when 
such an analysis raises questions such as what actors should take measures towards 
progressively realising the right to food, and what obstacles are hindering these steps from 
being taken, focus should be on structural issues such as: policy, power and politics, action 
and non-action by institutions, exclusion and marginalisation, as well as rights-holders’ lack 
of possibilities to participate. In the Right to Food Project itself there had been no human 
rights-based situation analysis outlining the pattern of rights and obligations, rights-holders 
and duty-bearers or obstacles in the way of realising the right to food. Perhaps lack of analysis 
as a preparation for drafting the Food and Nutrition Security bill was the reason why it failed 
to address deeper structural causes of food insecurity and hunger (e.g. lack of land, inputs, and 
agricultural services).  
My third assumption proposed that human rights offer a platform from which to demand the 
accountability of duty-bearers. If the Food and Nutrition Security bill is adopted Malawians 
will have one more platform to hold duty-bearers accountable. At least there would be an 
explicit avenue to demand legal accountability e.g. for misuse of food assistance and that 
could prove to be useful for the effectiveness of these yearly programmes. However, it is 
highly unrealistic to think that every Malawian would have to go to court (or another similar 
forum) every time his right to food is violated, and therefore efforts to achieve increased legal 
accountability need to be combined with broader advocacy efforts.     
3.5 Conclusions and review of assumptions 
Based on the analysis it is possible to develop a number of criteria for what is characteristic 
of (1) the FFA programme within JEFAP (‘charity-based service’); (2) the sustainable 
livelihoods programme SHSLP (‘rights-based approach’); and (3) the Right to Food project 
(‘legal approach to food security’).  
It can be said that food assistance is charity-based service addressing symptoms instead of 
trying to change underlying structures that gave rise to hunger. In JEFAP symptoms were 
addressed through service delivery that was in the hands of NGOs and local elites rather than 
government structures. Although much effort was put into the targeting process and the 
principle of non-discrimination and focus on the most vulnerable were given high priority, 
there was a certain level of arbitrariness in the process where it was determined who was 
chosen as a beneficiary and who was excluded. The food assistance service was not seen as a 
matter of human rights, i.e., meeting an obligation by providing a mandatory service to rights-
holders who would have been selected based on clearly defined criteria. Instead the service 
remained a charity, i.e., a favour that may or may not be provided to beneficiaries based on 
more or less arbitrary criteria. The principles of ‘good development practice’ were taken 
seriously, but in the JEFAP participation and accountability remained tools to increase 
effectiveness in reaching the intended beneficiaries; instead of dealing with these principles as 
a relationship between the government and its citizens. When trying to avoid the political 
games of food aid, the development actors turned the programmes into a technical process, 
thereby also sidestepping accountability as a democratic principle. Food assistance was a 
technical operation where a service was being delivered by an international development 
agency in partnership with NGOs, on behalf of the government, and through the support of 
donors. 
In the rights-based approach the role of duty-bearers was stronger. Everything that the 
programme did was informed by the aim of supporting the capacity of the district level duty-
bearers to deliver rights and at the same time generating awareness of and demand for these 
212 
rights among communities. In this context ‘rights’ meant services – and services were dealt 
with as a rights issue (services seen as ‘just entitlements’). There was no clear link to the legal 
framework to support the line of reasoning that services should be rights, which meant that 
the express linkage to a legal rights framework was missing. Instead, there was a strong focus 
on advocacy and efforts to mobilise rights-holders to demand services as a matter of rights 
and to demand accountability of duty-bearers. Programme activities aimed at changing policy 
and practice and there was a transformative element side by side with traditional service 
delivery that tried to alleviate symptoms of, for example, drought. Rights language played an 
important role in empowerment processes. The principles of accountability, participation and 
non-discrimination were more than tools to be used at the programme level: they also 
informed the ambitions to make societal level changes of how these principles are respected 
in the relationship between rights-holders and duty-bearers. There was a difference between 
charity-based and rights-based approaches in terms of working methods. RBA challenged the 
status-quo by trying to achieve change at different levels, seeing equality and non-
discrimination, accountability, participation and empowerment at the level of society and not 
only the project level. 
Even though certain basic needs (related to freedom from hunger) were seen as rights in the 
legal approach to food security, and my assumption was that this would have implications for 
the working processes, the irony is that the Right to Food Project had not been very mindful 
of so called human rights principles (with the exception of legal accountability). The draft 
Food and Nutrition Bill was drafted by a lawyer with input from a very limited number of 
stakeholders. Furthermore, within the draft bill the principles of non-discrimination and 
participation were weak. (It is too early to judge if the proposed Food and Nutrition Act 
would strengthen these principles in the relationship between the rights-holders and the duty-
bearers in the process of realising the right to food.) The programme represented an elite and 
legalistic approach with limited or no involvement of people struggling to feed their families 
through subsistence farming. Instead, there was strong focus on increasing legal 
accountability of duty-bearers, especially for misuse of food assistance. The idea of creating a 
law on the right to food is, as such, transformative (social transformation through legislation) 
and when combined with advocacy efforts, an ambition to achieving structural change can be 
seen. The content of the draft bill did, however, not provide for a strong social role for the 
government as the ultimate duty-bearer of fulfilling the right to food.  
In all three approaches, targeting was in principle based on needs, but it was only in the 
rights-based approach that services were seen as a matter of fulfilling a rights agenda and 
people started to claim needs as rights. It makes better sense to distinguish between a charity-
based and a (human) rights-based approach than between a needs-based and a (human) rights-
based approach. Needs do not disappear because the focus is placed on rights; needs continue 
to play a role and this is not alien to human rights thinking. However, according to human 
rights standards on economic and social rights certain (basic) needs should be entitlements 
and fulfilling of these needs is seen as obligations rather than charity.  
The charity-based and the legal approaches have more in common than one would think. The 
draft bill on the right to food did not put forth rights-based services but focussed instead on 
how to avoid abuse and corruption in the targeting process (focussing on individual 
accountability and criminalisation). The view on empowerment as the opposite to hand-outs is 
another example of similar ideas being upheld in both approaches.   
What I call a legal approach to food security was a conventional human rights approach to 
food security in the sense that ‘the right to food’ was accepted as being defined in legal 
processes and forums. In the rights-based approach analysed, there was no clear link to human 
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rights as defined in international norms and standards, nor in national legislation. The 
approach taken by Oxfam and its partners resembled an actor-oriented approach to human 
rights in development in that they allowed actors to give meaning to the concept of human 
rights. The rights-based approach is a ‘development approach’ to human rights that in many 
ways takes participation and empowerment to levels where human rights discourse has not 
managed to go due to a non-inclusive agenda in the process of giving meaning to the human 
rights concept itself.  
Based on the assumptions made before the field research as to the value added by human 
rights in development and food security efforts I can conclude and reformulate the 
assumptions.  
1) The first assumption was that human rights language changes the mindset of the actors in 
development, underlining the legally binding nature of addressing food insecurity, and 
contributing to empowerment of rights-holders. There is evidence that when actors in 
development, both duty-bearers and rights-holders, become aware that food security and 
services related to fulfilling it is a matter of rights instead of a ‘favour’ or charity, this does 
change their mindset. However, the process of giving meaning to the human rights concept, 
including the right to food, is essential to whether the human rights language is going to be 
empowering for the rights-holders or not. Human rights language is often associated with an 
elite, using top-down approaches, and there is often a fine line between empowerment and 
disempowerment. All actors must be included in the processes and dialogues about what 
human rights mean, everyone must ‘own’ the rights-language so that it makes sense in a lived 
reality to use it.   
2) The second assumption was that human rights-based situation analysis implies that a 
whole range of new and different questions, which have a basis in the normative human rights 
framework, are raised in a development context. There is evidence that thinking in terms of 
rights and duties has led to actors raising new questions in the context of radio listening clubs 
deciding which development problems to bring to the attention of service providers. These 
questions are, however, not based in the normative human rights framework but instead based 
on what actors themselves feel they are justly entitled to (an actor-oriented approach). In the 
other two projects analysed no situation analysis had been carried out that was based on the 
thinking of rights and duties, however, I do think the Right to Food Project would have 
benefitted from such an analysis.    
3) The third assumption was that human rights offer a platform from which to demand the 
accountability of duty-bearers. There is evidence in my data that human rights offered such a 
platform in the Shire Highlands programme on a political, or rhetoric level, but not on a legal 
level. There was no analysis of how the existing legal framework could be used to demand 
accountability, instead it was the act of identifying rights-holders and duty-bearers that was 
key. Accountability was linked to obligation in the sense that citizens put pressure on 
government representatives to deliver certain services that were seen to be part of a rights 
agenda, but there was no link to legal provisions. In the Right to Food project increasing legal 
accountability and broadening avenues for making legal and para-legal accountability claims 
was a central aim behind drafting the bill on the right to food. However, the content of the 
draft bill suggests that the negative side of the obligations under the human right to food 
would probably be subject to legal claims rather than using the act to demand positive action 
from duty-bearers in the area of livelihoods. The draft bill represented a rather limited agenda 
for social justice.    
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We can draw parallels to four dimensions in the ‘new accountability agenda’ advocated 
within a human rights-based approach to development, as raised by Sano. Firstly, as there is 
strong emphasis on the demands of the rights-holders and the obligations of the duty-bearers, 
this implies “a more direct role for ordinary people and their associations in demanding 
accountability from the authorities.”1374 This was certainly true for the Shire Highlands 
programme, especially in the case of the radio listening clubs. So far the role of the rights-
holders has been limited within the Right to Food Project. The way the draft bill was 
formulated in 2006 there was, however, potential to advance their role, especially through 
associations, in legal accountability claims.  
The second and third new dimension of the accountability agenda is “a broadening and 
diversification of the areas within which accountability is demanded;” as well as “a growing 
repertoire of methods that are established in order to make demands operative.”1375 We can 
see examples of this both within the Shire Highlands programme and the Right to Food 
Project. In the former, the main focus was on demanding accountability through putting 
pressure on the duty-bearers using various avenues such as meetings and the radio to raise 
claims, and in the latter the main focus was on achieving accountability through para-legal 
means, i.e. not only court proceedings.  
The fourth dimension raised by Sano is “a more ambitious agenda for social justice”, 
presuming the existence of a stronger state than the neo-liberal state.1376 If demanding 
services from government institutions as a matter of a rights issue can be seen as advancing a 
more ambitious agenda for social justice, and I argue it can, this was true for the Shire 
Highlands programme. With regard to the Right to Food Project there are some question 
marks concerning what kind of state the member organisations are advancing in their 
advocacy and through putting forth the draft bill. There seems to be some hesitation within 
the Right to Food Project as to what should be the social role of the government.  
 
                                                 
1374 Sano, “Does Human Rights-Based Development Make a Difference?”, supra note 55, at 72. 
1375 Ibid., at 72. 
1376 Ibid. 
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PART IV CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
This thesis has explored the role of human rights (as standards, as principles, as rhetoric) in 
development policy and practice in general and food security in particular. It has explored 
what, if any, transformative potential human rights have in these contexts, which often 
involve struggles over power and resources needed for economic and social rights and 
services. It has asked whether human rights can have a counter-hegemonic function in the 
face of hegemonic development; and whether human rights create space for agency and 
empowerment. In this pursuit, it has tried to reveal contradictions, paradoxes, and tensions in 
how human rights are used to further transformation and ‘good change’.   
In part II of the thesis the author has critically analysed concepts such as development, human 
rights, human rights-based approaches to development and food security, and principles of 
non-discrimination, accountability, participation and empowerment. The overall purpose of 
part II was to give theoretical explanations as to how these concepts have been defined by 
various actors in various contexts as well as answers to the general questions concerning the 
transformative potential of human rights in development practice and food security posed in 
part I. The conceptual analysis also helps to understand the role of these concepts in food 
security in Malawi as well as to understand what difference human rights make as they enter 
into development programmes and projects, what new elements are brought in, and what 
value is added. The author wanted to understand the characteristics of the so called human 
rights-based approaches to development cooperation, compared to ‘good development 
practice’ and ‘legal approaches’.  
***** 
The transnational human rights community has used considerable resources to create an 
international system of legal human rights standards and institutions responsible for the 
monitoring of these standards. Whether this system is working or not was not the subject of 
this thesis. However, it is relevant to notice that when human rights are institutionalised it 
means they also become part of the power that upholds certain dominant structures – and for 
transformation to take place the system of dominance, inter alia, authoritarianism, capitalism, 
and patriarchy have to be challenged. As human rights are further integrated in development 
efforts they often become part of the social engineering and institutionalisation in a top-down 
manner. Human rights become tools of external quality control, a way of imposing 
conditionalities. Whether this is ‘good’ or ‘bad’, and for whom, must be assessed in a specific 
context. In general, this tendency does have implications for the potential to use human rights 
in mobilisation and advocacy against arbitrary power and domination, thereby creating space 
for agency.  
We cannot assume that official human rights advancement automatically leads to progress and 
success. This thesis has pointed out that lack of theories of change in studying human rights 
forces researchers to be humble about the possible role of human rights in processes of 
change. The theory that does exist, the so called ‘spiral theory’, define human rights narrowly 
as ‘legal freedoms rights’. There is no theory of change concerning the role of human rights 
defined more broadly. The thesis has identified the fact that studying grassroots women’s 
groups, and the way they apply human rights discourse to achieve change in their lives, would 
be a good case study to develop and test a hypotheses concerning the role of human rights as a 
counter-hegemonic tool in struggles for social change.    
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As regards the ‘spiral theory’, it is unclear what comes after the final stage of change, i.e., 
‘norm-consistent behaviour’. Can human rights be effectively used as a political and legal tool 
by rights-holders to improve the conditions of their lives? A certain level of 
institutionalisation and acceptance of human rights norms is only a first step and cannot as 
such be equated with success or social change. It might be that human rights are foremost 
used by domestic elites for hegemonic purposes, i.e., to exert social, cultural, ideological, or 
economic influence. We can find examples of such usage of human rights in Malawi. In 
Malawi human rights are very much part of an official discourse used by dominant groups. 
Human rights are also guaranteed in the Constitution and monitored by courts and the Malawi 
Human Rights Commission. However, as using legal avenues for redress is out of reach for 
most Malawians a certain degree of institutionalization of human rights has little impact in 
creating social change.     
***** 
In this thesis we have seen that human rights have played, and continue to play, diverse roles 
in development policy and practice. An early attempt to integrate the two spheres of 
development and human rights was the right to development, with debates in the UN going on 
long before the adoption of the Declaration in 1986. The Southern states that pushed for the 
adoption of the Declaration used human rights as arguments for global equity among states 
and donor obligations but this never had the impact they had hoped for. Today various human 
rights-based approaches have a stronger position in development policy and practice than the 
right to development. Most Northern donors have chosen to integrate human rights into their 
policies and practices through negative human rights conditionality and the demand for good 
governance. As a way of giving support to the capacity to live up to the conditionalities put on 
aid recipients, they are offered ‘positive support’ to democracy, human rights and governance. 
What these strategies have in common is that the demand for rights comes as a measure of 
outside quality control.  
Reviewing how the concept of ‘development’ has been defined and what kind of development 
is the aim in human rights-based strategies is revealing. In the right to development and 
human rights-based approaches to development there are elements of people-centred human 
development, with a strong role to be played by the state. In these approaches the objective of 
‘development’ is the realisation of human rights as defined in treaties. Since human rights 
discourse tends to avoid political questions, there is no clear position on economic systems 
and the question about growth. There is no fundamental critique or questioning of the very 
foundational (Western) idea of ‘development’ as constant growth or improvement; the human 
rights-based model simply puts some limitations on what actions can be legitimized in the 
name of development as well as offers ‘new’ principles, based in human rights norms, for the 
development process. Human rights-based approaches to development, as defined in the 
Common Understanding among UN agencies, or among donors, do not question hegemonic 
development, which of course is not surprising.  
In bottom-up (or ‘alternative’) development it is accepted that ‘development’ will always 
mean very different things in different contexts and for different people. When the objective 
of development is given (from above as stipulated in human rights instruments and by expert-
led institutions) there is less room for formulating people’s own visions of what kind of 
development they might value. Rights talk has been popular also within the ‘alternative 
development’ paradigm that puts emphasis on agency and from below action. It seems that the 
way rights are used in this context resembles an actor-oriented approach (the definition is left 
open) rather than a human rights-based approach that is linked to definitions given in 
international human rights treaties.  
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All kinds of conditioned aid, human rights related or not, can be seen as deliberately trying to 
impose your idea of change and thereby ‘development’ on the recipient of support. In 
contrast, in support that respects the autonomy of the actors, the helpers help the actors to help 
themselves. This can be through reducing obstacles or supplying resources to enable the 
actors to do what they were already motivated to do. There is compatibility between this 
approach and certain human rights values such as freedom of choice and autonomy. However, 
this kind of ‘radical capacity building’ is difficult to use in a human rights-based approach 
that aims at supporting capacity for pre-defined human rights-conforming development aims.  
This thesis finds that the concept of ‘rights-based approaches’ can be more useful for creating 
space for agency and empowerment than ‘human rights-based approaches’ that are strongly 
linked to the international human rights regime. The first concept leaves more room for actors 
to define development and rights in a political process; the international human rights regime 
may serve as a source of inspiration but actors do not lock themselves into certain pre-
determined goals, defined in international human rights agreements.  
***** 
Human rights discourse is often an excluding and elitist discourse in the global South, not 
least in Malawi. This study has argued that human rights discourse needs to be expanded and 
opened up for a public political dialogue taking place at all levels of society rather than kept 
as expert knowledge. While acknowledging the importance of the international legal human 
rights framework this thesis wants to highlight that global movements for social justice have 
challenged aspects of this system, thereby contributing to its evolution and reformulation. 
Specific human rights have to be given content and meaning not only by legislators and courts 
(‘from above’) but also by actors within social movements and community development 
(‘from below’). Rights-based approaches to development can at best help in advancing a 
localisation and politicisation process of human rights. Opportunities for agency are created 
when the political space in which individuals and groups are able to claim their rights and 
participate in decisions that affect their lives is expanded. In the process of formulating 
development and food security-related human rights claims, the actors reshape and broaden 
what is normally understood to be human rights. In Malawi we have seen actors taking the 
human rights agenda into the area of services. This is an example of how rights-based 
approaches challenge the traditional understanding of ‘human rights’.  
An actor-oriented approach to human rights questions the position of experts as sole agents 
in the process of meaning-giving; it contributes to rethinking and reframing human rights as 
contextual and dynamic concepts, and thereby also gives human rights discourse a new 
language. This is challenging and certainly not risk-free but is in the interest of diversity. 
Diversity should not be seen as a virtue only when exercised within the limits the ‘liberal 
paradigm’. There must be trust in the wisdom and change from below, seeing that there are 
opportunities and challenges for change in all cultures and all situations. We should move 
beyond blaming ‘culture’ for human rights violations and posing universal human rights 
principles embodied in formal laws as the solution. Reality is far more complex. This study 
finds that the most fruitful approach to the universal human rights debate is viewing ‘rights as 
culture’ instead of ‘rights versus culture’ or ‘rights to culture’. The task of people doing 
human rights-based development work is about assisting the process so that poor people’s 
claims are heard, seen and reflected, and not one of imposing their idea of help, or change. 
The task also includes putting some limits to self-direction so that everyone’s human rights 
are respected.  
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Actors such as Oxfam, together with local groups, adopt new rights and reformulate existing 
rights in a way that makes sense to the people they work with. Thereby they contribute to 
giving meaning to human rights in a new way, challenging the dominant meaning given to 
human rights. Radio listening clubs in Southern Malawi questioned the idea that human rights 
need to be introduced by experts and created an alternative debate on injustice. At the same 
time we have seen that Oxfam’s local partners and rights-holders tend to prioritise short-term 
needs when setting agendas for development rather than striving for structural changes in 
economic and social policies. However, if we take agency seriously, we must let actors 
themselves speak about human rights and development – despite the risks – also when they 
make decisions that are ‘wrong’ from the perspective of the human rights expert. 
***** 
In the chapter on food security and food rights we have seen that food security programmes 
and food aid have been the development response to hunger while the human rights response 
has been establishing a legal entitlement that in theory can be claimed from duty-bearers. 
Despite the either/or thinking that has been characteristic of human rights discourse in the past 
it seems that today UN-led experts have embraced the right to food as an individual, legally 
enforceable entitlement while at the same time not avoiding putting the right to adequate food 
into a political and economic context, calling for structural reforms such as land and 
agricultural reform. Similarly, the right to food does, according to General Comment 12, 
sometimes include a right to receive food assistance or other support. The State has the fulfil-
obligation to provide the right to food directly to victims of natural or other disasters. 
Despite differences in emphasis, the two discourses of food security and the right to food are 
closely related to each other, both underlining physical and economic access to food. ‘Food 
security’ has evolved from a focus on supply and availability of food at a national level to 
access to food on the household and individual level. Similarly, physical and economic access 
to food has become a key factor in how the right to adequate food has come to be defined in 
General Comment 12 of 1999. Before the adoption of the general comment, the normative 
content of the right to food was less clear. Moreover, other efforts have been made to define 
the right to food and envision the steps towards its realisation. In 2000, the Human Rights 
Commission appointed a Special Rapportuer on the Right to Food and in 2002 the World 
Food Summit called on the FAO council to establish an Intergovernmental Working Group to 
elaborate a set of voluntary guidelines to support Member States’ efforts to achieve the 
progressive realisation of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security. 
These so called Right to Food Guidelines were adopted in 2004, and are said to be a human 
rights-based practical tool addressed to all states.  
The Guidelines are designed to clarify and help states in developing strategies, policies and 
programmers which are rights-based. This means they should be based on legal obligations – 
as the claimed added value of a human rights approach to food security lies in the emphasis of 
addressing food insecurity as a matter of obligation, not benevolence. However, the Right to 
Food Guidelines give very little attention to obligations and what is even more confusing is 
that they fail to clarify the essential fulfil/provide dimension of the tripartite obligations used 
in General Comment 12. States that want to establish and maintain safety nets or other 
assistance, as part of their right to food strategies, for individuals who are unable to provide 
for themselves, will not find guidance in the Guidelines. The Guidelines seldom link the right 
to food to an obligation, and does not use the concepts of ‘rights-holders’ and ‘duty-bearers’; 
concepts that were already introduced into the food security debates in the 1980s. For these 
reasons, it remains unclear what exactly is the role of duty-bearer institutions, rights-holders, 
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and different stakeholders such as donor states and international agencies in strategies aiming 
at progressive realization of the right to adequate food.  
The process of giving meaning to the right to food continues and various actors influence it: 
UN-led expert institutions based in Geneva and New York, NGOs and other civil society 
actors that work locally as well as transnationally, and national courts on the national level. 
The regional, India-based woman’s organisation PWESCR’s efforts to establish a right to 
livelihoods in the international human rights system and the Right to Food Campaign in India 
are examples of how civil society actors strive to contribute to giving meaning to food rights 
in a way that makes sense to them and the people they work with. They urge for redefinition 
and expansion of current legal interpretations of the right to food, calling for what they feel 
are ‘just entitlements’. For the PWESCR and its partners the right to livelihoods makes better 
sense in the lived reality of marginalised groups, especially women, they claim to represent. 
Women produce 60-80 percent of the food in most developing countries (more than 80 
percent of the food in Africa) – and yet they are disproportionately vulnerable to hunger and 
receive only 7 percent of agricultural extension time and resources.1377 What the actors behind 
the Right to Food Campaign in India as well as the Right to Livelihoods campaign at the 
transnational level have in common is the ambition to link food rights to broader issues of 
livelihoods, emphasising that a livelihoods perspective gives agency to rights-holders.  
***** 
Despite the fact that most agencies work with their own definition of a human rights-based 
approach to development cooperation, there seems to be agreement on the core elements 
defining it: this approaches works to strengthen the capacity of duty-bearers to respect, protect 
and fulfil their human rights obligations; simultaneously, the rights-holders’ capacity to 
demand and claim that their human rights are respected, protected and fulfilled is 
strengthened; the aim of human rights-based development is human rights realisation and the 
process of how this aim is reached is informed by human rights principles.  
The problem is that it is not always clear what ‘human rights principles’ add to ‘good 
development practice’, which also works to strengthen equality, accountability, participation 
and empowerment.  
From the review of how these principles are interpreted and applied in the human rights 
discourse, in its conventional legal form, the development discourse and in the practices that 
come into being as these two discourses meet, it is clear that a human rights perspective does 
bring in a new dimension. However, it is less clear whether a focus on human rights and 
human rights principles create space for empowerment and agency. There seems to be a 
contradiction in the discourses linking human rights and development; as on the one hand it is 
aimed at people becoming active agents rather than passive beneficiaries, while on the other 
hand it does not fully allow these same people to be part of a discussion on the meaning of 
concepts such as participation, empowerment, and human rights. Often the agenda has been 
set by organisational priorities that again are informed by ready-made definitions given by 
experts.  
Change is a disorderly process, and it is clear that the role of human rights in these processes 
can be static and disempowering or ‘alive’, claimed in the moment, and empowering. The 
context and the process matter. The issues at stake are especially concerned with who sets the 
agenda, who decides what issue to mobilise around, and what happens in the process of 
translating people’s daily challenges into a human rights language. 
                                                 
1377 Halving Hunger: It can be done, supra note 549, at 5.  
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As a human rights principle, equality and non-discrimination should not remain on the project 
or programme level but also have implications for advocacy and mobilisation efforts to 
challenge structures that uphold inequality in society. In a similar way, when human rights 
enter into development policies and practices, new accountability relationships and 
frameworks emerge. There is stronger focus on the state-citizen relationship compared to the 
donor-implementing agency accountability relationship that tends to dominate in ‘good 
development discourse’. In human rights-based approaches to development, the relationship 
between rights-holders and duty-bearers is at the heart of demanding accountability; 
accountability is about making sense of rights and obligations. The act of identifying rights-
holders (and their entitlements) and corresponding duty-bearers (and their obligations) 
potentially raise levels of accountability in the development process. Advocacy and 
mobilisation around issues of lack of practical implementation of rights/services are important 
aspects of the enforceability and responsiveness dimensions of accountability. In some 
countries, judicial activism also plays an important role in these broader struggles for 
accountability. In these struggles, accountability is not apolitical, even when resorting to a 
court.  
Accountability has in common with participation the fact that it strives to enable people to 
actively draw on their civil and political rights in order to achieve something else, often their 
economic, social and cultural rights. In this way, accountability and participation strive for a 
broader change agenda. The aim is to increase participation in the relationship between people 
as citizens and rights-holders and the different power holders such as government institutions, 
donors, and corporations that make policy decisions that have great impact on poor peoples’ 
lives. In human rights-based approaches the aim would be participation in societal decision-
making; the participatory relationships include the relationship between the government and 
its citizens, not only the ‘beneficiary’ and the project. This is deeply political and fits uneasily 
within organisations that try to maintain that they do apolitical human rights awareness 
raising. Transformative participation must consider ways of challenging broader structures, 
and this requires political strategies.   
In the matter of participation, there is, however, a tendency both within the development and 
human rights communities that, when experts are involved, they think they know what is best 
for ‘the poor’ and participation becomes consultation or superficial involvement in activities. 
Both accountability and participation can be defined narrowly as a way to improve 
development outcomes and increase effectiveness.  
Another key challenge is that human rights-based approaches which are linked to human 
rights norms and standards tend to have pre-defined goals. This fits uneasily with 
transformative development, as it goes against the very idea of participation and allowing the 
‘beneficiaries’ to be in control, making obvious their own intentions for development. In an 
actor-oriented approach to human rights this does not have to be a problem: actors are free to 
give meaning to ‘human rights’ instead of relying on pre-defined concepts, unless actors 
produce demands that violate other actors’ human rights. 
***** 
In the empirical section, we have seen that the development policy and practice has focused 
on responding to immediate needs during the repeated food crises in Malawi while the human 
rights community has mainly focused on freedoms rather than entitlements. The human rights 
work has been characterised by talk rather than action. Civic education has been the main 
mode of ‘sensitising’ the Malawian public to issues such as human rights and democracy. In 
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civic education, participants are expected to take ‘human rights’ as given concepts and 
therefore there has been very little dialogue about the meaning and value of human rights.  
The projects in Malawi analysed in this thesis use the human rights concept in different ways. 
Oxfam and its partners in the SHSLP operated with a rather loose definition of human rights, 
where there was room for the local actors to give meaning to the concept, in a way that 
resembles an actor-oriented perspective on human rights while the Right to Food Project 
applied an elite, from above approach to human rights with limited or non-existent 
participation in the definition process. The latter approach used a legal approach, accepting 
human rights to be those rights that are defined in legal documents while the former approach 
saw human rights as cultural practice. 
My empirical data supports the conclusions reached in part II. The way that non-
discrimination, accountability, participation and empowerment were used in the charity-based 
approach, rights-based approach and legal approaches indicate that it is in the rights-based 
approach that human rights in general and these principles in particular have the greatest 
transformative potential. The strong focus on claiming needs as rights in the rights-based 
approach is a considerable shift in human rights discourse in Malawi, which has previously 
focused on rights as freedoms rather than as entitlements. Having such a strong focus on the 
responsibility of the duty-bearer is also a change from a discourse that has emphasised the 
responsibility of the rights-holder. There was, however, no strong link to the legal framework 
to support the line of reasoning that services are rights; ‘rights’ were rather dealt with as ‘just 
entitlements’. It is thereby possible to put the approach into the conceptual framework of an 
actor-oriented approach to rights-based development: the understanding of ‘rights’ were 
shaped through actual struggles informed by people’s own understandings of just 
entitlements. 
In the analysis of the FFA programme, (representing a ‘charity-based approach’) 
participation, empowerment and accountability remained tools to increase effectiveness in 
reaching the intended beneficiaries; instead of viewing these principles as a something that 
should govern the relationship between the government and its citizens. There was no 
questioning of the status quo. Avoiding the political games of food aid meant that the 
influential development actors also avoided hunger as a political problem. 
The right to food, or human rights law in general, had few implications for the way the FFA 
project was implemented in Malawi. The notable exception was that the right of non-
discrimination and focus on the most vulnerable people in theory had a strong role in the 
selection of beneficiaries, meaning that only the neediest people should receive food and that 
there should be no discrimination in the targeting process. (In practice the targeting process 
had its problems of course.) This can partly be seen as the donors’ way of trying to guarantee 
that food was not misused for political purposes, and that targeting was indeed based on 
needs. In a way this was sort of ‘human rights conditionality’.  
In all of the three cases analysed the principle of equality and non-discrimination focused on 
targeting processes, i.e., the process of identifying needs and responding to these needs. None 
of the projects used discrimination and marginalisation as a lens for analysis. Focus was not 
on finding out who is most marginalised or vulnerable to discrimination and exclusion, but on 
who is vulnerable to food insecurity or malnourishment or resource constraints in general. 
The principle of accountability was in the rights-based approach used as a basis to put 
pressure on government institutions to comply with promises that were made during meetings 
between service providers and community members. This line of reasoning is definitely a step 
away from the managerial approach to accountability that was characteristic of the charity-
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based approach. While the WFP and its partner NGOs in the charity-based approach had a 
managerial and apolitical approach to accountability Oxfam and its partners in the rights-
based approach had an advocacy and political approach, in which accountability was linked to 
obligations on the part of government institutions to deliver certain services. What is 
interesting in the Oxfam programme was that accountability was linked to obligations 
(characteristic of a human rights discourse) but without making explicit reference to legal 
provisions and without using the normative framework as an avenue for accountability. The 
legal approach in the Right to Food Project, for its part, had a strong focus on achieving 
increased accountability through providing stronger legal protection of the right to food. The 
main aim of the organisations behind the draft bill was to increase the level of legal 
accountability for violations of the right to food, especially in food assistance processes. The 
entitlement dimension of the draft bill was, however, surprisingly weak. The content of the 
draft bill was not very transformative as it failed to put forth a clear and strong obligation for 
the state to take positive measures to realise the right to food. It can be questioned whether the 
draft challenged the status quo in a way that would potentially strengthen the position of the 
rights-holder. 
In the rights-based approach there was strong emphasis on particularly women’s participation 
(a groups that traditionally has been outside of decision-making structures) in political 
structures and formal or informal decision-making. This indicates that participation had a 
broader meaning and agenda behind it than was the case in the food assistance programme. 
Women and men did not participate merely as ‘beneficiaries’ but also as citizens and rights-
holders. In the legal approach, the principle of participation was weak: there was no mention 
of opportunities for public participation in policy formulation concerning food security issues 
in the draft bill created by the project. Furthermore, lack of participation in the drafting 
process itself was an obvious failure of ‘human rights principles’. 
In the rights-based approach, Oxfam and its partners were working to create a culture of 
human rights where rights-holders would be able to claim needs as rights and where duty-
bearers would be clear that they have an obligation to respond. Empowerment was in this case 
a process that leads these people to perceive themselves as able and entitled to make claims 
and demand accountability.  
The importance of empowerment was underlined in the legal approach. In this context we are 
speaking of rights-holders being empowered to claim the right to food from duty-bearers, not 
of empowerment in general (or general ‘capacity development’ as the term was interpreted in 
the charity-based approach). However, due to the non-participatory nature of the project the 
empowerment element was non-existent: drafting a bill on the right to food was not taken as a 
possibility to increase dialogue on the meaning of the right to food. The context in which 
empowerment was raised in the Right to Food Project, moreover, suggests that it was 
interpreted as the opposite to being ‘dependent’ and ‘relying on handouts’. In Malawi 
handouts are usually synonymous with food assistance in some form. (And there was no effort 
to make these ‘handouts’ into a rights-based service.)  
***** 
This study finds that human rights are useful in shifting the attention of development policy 
and practice to obligations, accountability and the ‘do no harm’ principle. A human rights-
based situation analysis can, moreover, contribute to raising new questions that contribute to 
analysing structural challenges and the relationship between rights-holders and duty-bearers. 
However, when human rights are conventionally defined as rights guaranteed in international 
agreements they tend to serve as outside quality control in a way that serves the interests of 
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hegemonic development. In order for human rights to play a role in counter-hegemonic 
struggles in social resistance, creating space for agency and empowerment, they need to be 
open to public dialogue. An actor-oriented approach to human rights in development may 
contribute to reshaping and diversifying human rights discourse.  
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SVENSK SAMMANFATTNING  
Avhandlingen är en analys av den roll som mänskliga rättigheter spelar i 
utvecklingssamarbete i allmänhet och tre matsäkerhetsprojekt i Malawi i synnerhet. 
Författaren undersöker huruvida mänskliga rättigheter kan bidra till samhälleliga 
förändringsprocesser. Förändring skapas av individer och grupper (aktörer) med en vision för 
det samhälle som de vill leva i. Den teoretiska utgångspunkten är att individer och grupper 
inte endast formas av sin värld utan också har makt att förändra den. Undersökningen har en 
diskursiv syn på mänskliga rättigheter; rättigheter ses som sociala konstruktioner skapade av 
människor, konstruktioner som förändras i takt med att aktörerna ger dem ny mening.    
Avhandlingen frågar huruvida mänskliga rättigheter, när de integreras i utvecklingssamarbete, 
kan skapa utrymme för egenmakt hos lokala aktörer. Är det möjligt för mänskliga rättigheter 
att utgöra en anti-hegemonisk strategi – då utgångspunkten är att ’utveckling’ har kommit att 
få en hegemonisk position? Genom en analys av hur ’utveckling’ har definierats i 
människorättsbaserade strategier samt i diskursen kring rätten till utveckling finner författaren 
att mänskliga rättigheter snarare minskar utrymmet för aktörers egenmakt: målet för 
utveckling ges uppifrån, via människorättskonventioner. Inom alternativa utvecklingsteorier 
accepteras det att målet för och innehållet i ’utveckling’ alltid varierar. Mänskliga rättigheter 
har kommit att utgöra yttre kvalitetskrav och villkorsklausuler vilket påverkar deras 
möjligheter att skapa utrymme för att ifrågasätta dominerande strukturer.   
Författaren ser möjligheter i ett aktörsperspektiv på mänskliga rättigheter där definitionen 
lämnas öppen. ’Rättigheter’ definieras genom strävanden att få dem respekterade och 
förverkligade. Aktörernas egen uppfattning om berättigade anspråk påverkar vilken 
innebörden blir i enskilda sammanhang. När aktörernas egenmakt är utgångspunkten kan 
dominerande ekonomiska, politiska, sociala och kulturella strukturer ifrågasättas.  
Vad gäller människorättsbaserade utvecklingsstrategiers mervärde finner författaren att de 
riktar uppmärksamheten mot olika aktörers skyldigheter att förverkliga fattigas ekonomiska 
och sociala behov samt vikten av att mänskliga rättigheter inte får kränkas genom 
utvecklingspolitiska beslut. En utvecklingspolitisk analys som utgår från mänskliga rättigheter 
kan leda till att nya frågor lyfts fram: vem har skyldigheter, vem har rättigheter, och varför 
förverkligas inte dessa? Fokus flyttas till hur politiska, ekonomiska och juridiska strukturer 
kan förändras så att de främjar mänskliga rättigheter, samt till olika aktörers ansvar.    
Författaren använder empiriskt material från Malawi för att visa vilken roll mänskliga 
rättigheter och så kallade människorättsprinciper såsom icke-diskriminering och ansvarighet 
spelar inom tre projekt: (1) ett mathjälpsprojekt som syftar till att stärka lokala tillgångar; (2) 
ett rättighetsbaserat projekt med fokus på att stärka småskaligt jordbruk och andra strategier 
för livsuppehälle; samt (3) ett juridiskt projekt med målet att skapa en lag som skyddar rätten 
till föda. Analysen kommer fram till att det rättighetsbaserade projektet i den mittersta 
kategorin strävade efter den mest djupgående samhälleliga förändringen. 
Människorättsprinciperna ansvarighet och deltagande handlade inte endast om verksamheten 
inom projektet utan man strävade efter att stärka dessa principer också mellan medborgare 
och myndigheter. Rättigheter – som ett sätt att tala, tänka och handla – inte som abstrakta 
juridiska normer, påverkade de lokala aktörernas sätt att kräva bl.a. tjänster av lokala 
myndigheter. Teoretiskt kan man säga att projektet representerar ett aktörsperspektiv på 
mänskliga rättigheter där aktörernas egna uppfattningar om vad de är berättigade till samt 
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krav på myndigheters ansvar formade vilken betydelse rättigheter kom att få. Till skillnad från 
det juridiska projektet spelade expertkunskap en mindre roll.            
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